


# WUNSCH

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CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE EPHEMERAL CARTELS  
OF THE ICG 2021-2022

THE PASS TO THE ANALYST  
VII<sup>TH</sup> INTERNATIONAL MEETING OF THE SCHOOL  
*30 june 2022, Buenos Aires*



International Bulletin of the School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field

## EDITORIAL

This issue of *Wunsch* 23 finally appears at the conclusion of the work of the ICG 2021-2022. As is customary, the contributions from the International Meeting of the School in Buenos Aires in June 2022 can be read here. However, for the contributions of the ICG members that open this volume we have chosen an unprecedented formula.

For two years this ICG has conducted its reflections on the Pass in plenary session with its seventeen members based on small texts written successively by each of its members. No doubt it is to this formula, respectful of all voices, that we owe the atmosphere of joyful and friendly curiosity that prevailed during this ICG, to everyone's satisfaction it seems. However, for the transition to the written word in this latest issue of *Wunsch*, we have chosen the opposite. Each person's work was certainly elaborated but in four ephemeral cartels constituted by drawing lots, and each of which decided on its theme and its working methods.

Reading these texts, I think we cannot fail to measure how much we are following in Lacan's footsteps, those of some of the texts or the remarks that he devoted to the pass. It would be better to say, in fact, 'his pass' since it was he who isolated the clinical moment and the structure of its turning point in each analysis, he who invented the dispositive for evaluating it, and he who devoted various commentaries to it. Over the years, all these advances have been read, studied and explicated and have become at the very least familiar to us, placing us in a very different position from that of the first Juries of the Pass in the Freudian School of Paris. They only knew about it from the text, the 'Proposition on the psychoanalyst of the School', and without recoiling. From now on, we have at our disposal not only Lacan's commentaries, each of their own time, but two texts: 'The Proposition of 1967' and the 'Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI', of 1976.<sup>1</sup> The latter, ten years later, no longer says the same thing about either the unconscious or the finished analysis. The question then arises as to the way we have drawn the consequences from this text. It has been read and commented on, but what about the analyses themselves and the dispositive in which they are evaluated with regard to the pass to the analyst?

Rereading it again today, it seems to me that it has very 'practical' consequences for each psychoanalysis and for the dispositive. We certainly say, in accordance with its terms, orientation towards the real outside meaning, but how is it proven? The expression is, moreover, misleading since it suggests that the real is a point of arrival where one stops.

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<sup>1</sup> J. Lacan, 'Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School', trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, pp. 1-13; 'Preface to the English-Language Edition' (1976) in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, trans. A. Sheridan London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981 pp. vii-ix. [Translator's footnote.]

This has nothing to do with what Lacan describes in this text. The non-sense of the signs that cipher the unconscious – whether in their episodic formations or in the ‘fixion’ of the symptom – ‘one knows it oneself’ [*on le sait, soi*],<sup>2</sup> it devalues the articulation of the half-said of truth, but one can neither transmit it, nor settle down in it, because when one examines it, one leaves it. There is no friendship that holds. All that remains is a balancing act, an alternation between the transferential unconscious and the real unconscious, these two irreducible dimensions, transcendent to all will, of which the irreducibility, experienced repeatedly, can ... satisfy. A paradoxical satisfaction, no doubt. It’s not a mourning, rather it’s the opposite, nor is this satisfaction a lightning flash, and it has effects: the end of the “mirage of truth”,<sup>3</sup> says the text. What does this mean, if not on a practical level, the fall of the associated libido, that is to say the devaluation in act of the analysing narrative including, and I stress, dreams. Assuming that this end, which takes note of the irreconcilability of the two *dit-mensions* of their interdependence and their respective impasse being achieved, the question arises for the dispositive as to how the hystorisation of the path taken by the passand can avoid denying this achievement. Perhaps there needs to be a hystorisation that is not very talkative, or at least less talkative than that of analysis, of the kind of which Lacan seems to give an example when he says that if he had done the Pass he could have said, I am a poem and not a poet, but I sign. Hardly a sentence, and it’s not an opening sentence, but a closing one! Would he have had a chance to be nominated?

We can perhaps measure how much remains to be done to reach ‘his pass’, and this is rather encouraging.

Colette Soler, CIOS 2021-2022  
Thursday, March 2, 2023

*Translated by Susan Schwartz*

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<sup>2</sup> Preface *ibid.* In the English, the French “*On le sait, soi*” is abbreviated in translation to “One knows” p. vii.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. viii.

CONTRIBUTIONS  
OF THE EPHEMERAL CARTELS  
OF THE ICG 2021-2022

CARTEL 1

PASS AND LALANGUE

ANA ALONSO, NICOLAS BENDRIHEN,  
BEATRIZ OLIVEIRA, BERNARD TOBOUL

A LIGHTNING FLASH<sup>1</sup>

Nicolas Bendriben  
Paris, France

*The world waits to be said,  
And you only come to say.  
What is said is given to you:  
The world and its word of pass*

François Cheng<sup>2</sup>

It is touching when, in the flood of words recounted by the passers, suddenly the flow seems to stop for a moment, to suspend, then to resume its course, not exactly like the moment before. Happy contingency where, for a time, is collected in a few words what can be the edge of a story, a real point from which a turn is made. The passer is touched by it, for himself in this time of the turn.

However, it is not immediately a reducing such as this that can strike when listening to a testimony of the pass. From the thousands and thousands of words said in the analysis, the passand has to extract some few, to *hystorise* his journey and make heard what has been for him the effective, the unexpected, the unprecedented of these years of sessions, and the point from which he authorises himself as analyst. An extraction which implies having done the work of detaching oneself from what is said, from adhesion to the history, in order to aim for what cannot be reduced to history and which the cartel in its turn can hear, deduce, suppose, construct ... from all these saids. From the place of the Cartels of the Pass, we note on this question a very great diversity of passands, the story which aims at the whole sometimes taking precedence over this work of paring.

In Barcelona in 2018, Colette Soler alluded to the “performance” of the passand, a performance in two stages. “(...) it concerns a performance of transmission which, like that of the joke, is supposed to happen, according to Lacan, precisely by an effect produced on the other, in the first place on the receptive plate of the passers who pass on the effect, the received effect. (...) In the end, in this dispositive, we are therefore going to wager on those who think they have

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<sup>1</sup> From the work of the cartel with Ana Alonso, Beatriz Oliveira and Bernard Toboul, “*Pass and lalangue*”.

<sup>2</sup> F. Cheng, *Contes toscans*, extract cited in *L’Herne*, François Cheng, Paris, L’Herne, 2022, p. 22.

captured something from their own analysis, the first performance, and who manage to pass it on, the second performance.”<sup>3</sup>

Isn't this what we can learn from the testimony of the sudden event of a flash of lightning, where unexpectedly and absolutely contingently, there occurs for the analysand in his treatment, the analysand who is not yet a passand, this very particular moment which is the turn of the pass? Far from illuminating everything,<sup>4</sup> for a moment something other can unfold than what until then was the fantasmatic knowledge that oriented the life. This emergence, even if brief and unexpected, can form the edge of a testimony, and move the passers enough in their turn to make it perceptible to the cartel.

Concerning this flash, then, to draw the conclusions, including in the dimension of incompleteness that this passage reveals and touches. It is then about dealing with what has arisen, with a flash of lightning, a flash of *lalangue*, but also with the emptiness glimpsed, with what remains incurable and irreducible to any analytical operation. Because this passage is only a beginning: if the fantasy is no longer in command, the real remains real, is not touched by it, and always returns to the same place. What is touched is the subject in his relation to the real: how does he orient himself from now on? What does he allow his passers and the Cartel to hear? What happens after the flash that is the turning point?

The performance would not aim then at the all-saying, but at passing on these few scraps of *lalangue* emerging from this passage in the flow of words and history, which the analysis has collected, extracted, reduced – for this second performance: let it pass to the few who will be able to hear it, who will be able to be touched by it, and who will wager on recognizing this real touch of which AS can be one of the names.

*Translated by Esther Faye*

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<sup>3</sup> C. Soler, “What is not guaranteed”, *Wunsch*, n°19, SPFLF, 2019, p. 47.

<sup>4</sup> On this question of the flash of lightning see recent developments by Marie-José Latour, “*L'écoulement du sens et la substituable du signe*”, and David Bernard “*Le bon sens*”, talks at the Seminar of the School of the SPFLF-France in October and November 2022, and published in *Mensuel* of SPFLF-France, numbers 164 and 165.

## THE CROSSING<sup>1</sup>

Ana Alonso  
Madrid, Spain

*There comes a time when you have to  
to abandon the used clothes that already have  
the shape of our body and forget the paths  
that take us always  
to the same places.  
This is the time of the crossing. And if we don't dare  
to do so, we will remain forever outside  
ourselves.*

*The passage*

Fernando Pessoa<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps there is something untransmissible in psychoanalysis. This is how Lacan concluded in 1978,<sup>3</sup> when he stated that he had tried to obtain testimonies on how one becomes a psychoanalyst. In the procedure of the Pass there is an attempt to transmit the experience that produced the metamorphosis of the subject, the passage from analysand to analyst. The passand wants to show, to give an account of, something that has happened to him, that he has learned, and there *lalangue* shows something other than meaning: something that touches, a knowledge embodied in *lalangue* that points to a knowledge about the real, as my colleague Beatriz Oliveira<sup>4</sup> has indicated in her text.

But how can we, in the cartels, give, in language, an account of the real? Perhaps here, the structure of language alone is not enough, since the speaker is not reduced to language alone, and I ask myself about style in the testimony.

“What is this aspect of the function of style? It has a function of diffusion. As Lacan pointed out, in a discourse, style is more on the side of manner. It is not only an aesthetic question, but a causal factor that has effects.”<sup>5</sup>

What is it that passes, and how?

At this turning point, the act and the emergence of an unformulated desire can take place. So what passes is not knowledge, but the desire that has arisen there once the horror of knowledge has passed. Just like the witticism that says something that has no meaning and that resonates

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<sup>1</sup> This text was written in the ephemeral cartel formed with Nicolas Bendrihen, Beatriz Oliveira and Bernard Toboul, on “Pass and *lalangue*”.

<sup>2</sup> While this work has been attributed to Fernando Pessoa, on the Internet, Fernando Teixeira is named as the author.

<sup>3</sup> J. Lacan, ‘*Conclusions du IX Congrès de l’École Freudienne de Paris 1978*’.

<sup>4</sup> B. Oliveira, ‘What does the Cartel of the Pass read?’, in this issue of *Wunsch*.

<sup>5</sup> A partir de C. Soler, ‘Styles de passes’, *Wunsch*, n°10, EPFCL, 2011.

with others by producing a comic effect to which the passers are sensitive and let it pass to the Cartel. When one tries to account for this witticism or explain it, it loses its ability to produce laughter because, like style, it is irreplaceable. Style, insofar as it does not come from the Other cannot be imitated. It is what is most singular for a speaking being.

In the Pass, the passand bears witness to his experience with his style, although he cannot give an account of it, for it is rather the style that attests to it. Thus, the style can be translated into the passand's way of saying, an index of the relation to the real joined to the ethics of the subject.

I take up a question based on a paragraph drawn from the work of my colleague Nicolas Bendrihen:

It is then about dealing with what has arisen, with a flash of lightning, a flash of *lalangue*, but also with the emptiness glimpsed, with what remains incurable and irreducible to any analytical operation. Because this passage is only a beginning: if the fantasy is no longer in command, the real remains real, is not touched by it, and always returns to the same place. What is touched is the subject in his relation to the real: how does he orient himself from now on?<sup>6</sup>

The real which, as my colleague Bernard Toboul points out in his text:

(...) that the real is not-all". A direction of the treatment is to be understood as a direction towards the real, thus becoming disruptive and the analytic act prepares the practice for the approach of the not-all.<sup>7</sup>

There is thus a 'being warned' about the unforeseen that can arise in a typical fluctuation in both the doing of psychoanalysis and in life. There is also a consequence oriented towards desire. And as Lacan points out in the 'Italian Note',<sup>8</sup> a change of affect from horror to enthusiasm.

In '*L'étourdi!*'<sup>9</sup> Lacan emphasises that when the subject encounters the three dimensions of the impossible, drawn into the light in the treatment, the possibility that remains is to know how to conduct oneself. This conduct refers to an ethic that indicates the subject's position faced with the real, which is not to recoil in front of it.

Conduct that, like style, will be connected to the sinthome, a style that speech produces by linking *lalangue* to the imaginary and the real. As Colette Soler writes, it is: "the major index of how a being is affected by the unconscious-*lalangue*".

*Translated by Susan Schwartz*

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<sup>6</sup> N. Bendrihen, 'A lightning flash' in this issue of *Wunsch*.

<sup>7</sup> B. Toboul, 'The lightning flash, the real, the not-all' in this issue of *Wunsch*.

<sup>8</sup> J. Lacan, 'Note italienne', *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.

<sup>9</sup> J. Lacan, '*L'étourdi!*', *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.



## WHAT DOES THE CARTEL OF THE PASS READ?

Beatriz De Oliveira  
Sao Paulo, Brazil

Since the beginning of the work in this ICG, I have asked myself how it is possible to transmit something of the moment of the pass to the analyst. In the work that I presented at the Study Day of the School of the ICG, which can be found in this issue of *Wunsch*,<sup>1</sup> “For a less *alpha-bête* [alpha-stupid] listening”, I speak of the importance for the members of the Cartel of the Pass to be sensitive to the effects of what the passer says, in addition to the passand’s sayings [*dires*]: “if this knowledge in the real, outside sense, an effect of language that demonstrates the impossibility of making a relation, can only be transmitted in a contingent manner, one must be attentive in order to read what supports the statements of the passand, and one must also know how to read in a less alphabetising [*alpha-bêtissante*] way”.<sup>2</sup> I return at this point to Lacan’s neologism evoking the effects of the norms of language on the silence of *lalangue* for the speaking being.

In this sense, knowing how to read in a less ‘*alpha-bête*’ way, in addition to allowing us to open our ears to listening to the contingencies of *lalangue*, also implies not repeating the alphabet of what we are taught in our communities and be able to learn the new languages to which each experience in the Cartels of the Pass introduces us. I think then that it is important to be aware of our own catechisms: it seems to me that this is the freshness and the openness that the dispositive of the Pass has to offer to the School.

I would like to ask a question<sup>3</sup> about the way in which it is possible for a cartel to ‘read’ what is written in the words of a passand, seen, cut out, transmitted by the passer. In the cartels in which I was able to participate, it was very clear that there was an active work of reduction to the essential of what was heard in the testimonies, seeking to define the logic of each case, in the expectation of finding there what could be written about the passage to the analyst. The fact that a passand says that he has finished his analysis and comes to testify how he has managed to ‘get out of his neurosis’, as Lacan said in 1978, is not enough for a cartel to extract the moment of the passage from analysand to analyst. This does not mean that this passage has not taken place, but that it has not been transmitted.

There are several reasons why this passage was not transmitted: either because the passand did not really traverse it; or because the passer was not able to perform the function as planned; or because the Cartel was not sensitive to what was seen. What seems interesting to me in this montage of the dispositive is precisely the fact that one is not always able to give the reasons why something did not ‘pass’. Faced with this scenario, it becomes understandable that there are few passes where there is a nomination: there are many obstacles at play for this moment of passage to be transmitted.

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<sup>1</sup> ‘For a less *Alpha-bête* listening’, in this issue of *Wunsch*.

<sup>2</sup> J. Lacan, ‘*Postface au Séminaire XP, Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2011, p. 504

<sup>3</sup> Thank you to the members of my cartel, Ana Alonso, Bernard Toboul and Nicolas Bendrihen, for the discussion.

But there are situations in which the passage to the analyst is transmitted and the cartels can thus designate an AS. It is at this point that I wanted to make a contribution and go a step further than the previous text already presented.

In Seminar XX, Lacan says: “That which speaks deals only with solitude regarding the aspect of the relationship I can only define by saying, as I have, that it cannot be written. That solitude, as a break in knowledge, not only can be written but it is that which is written *par excellence*, for it is that which leaves a trace of a break in being”.<sup>4</sup>

I understand that Lacan proposes that the fact “that there is no sexual relation” is equivalent to that which “does not cease to be written”, that is, the impossible, the real. Thus, it is not the real that is written in an analysis, but its *ex-sistence* is proven by what is written. In other words: this break in knowledge, named here solitude, can be written in a contingent manner and manifest the *ex-sistence* of the real.

I wrote for the Study Day of the School of the ICG in Buenos Aires that, at the end of analysis, “Lacan then takes a wager on another relation with unconscious knowledge, a knowledge without a subject, a knowledge about the impossible. It will not be the act as predicate but rather its effects; ‘a knowledge that only proves itself as being readable’<sup>5</sup> a knowledge in the Real”. This leads us to think that one of the consequences of the act of becoming an analyst is precisely another knowledge, no longer supposed in the Other, but “which must take into account the knowledge in the real”.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, we can think that this knowledge only becomes legible from the moment when what has never ceased to be written is written in a contingent manner, proving the *ex-sistence* of the real. In this sense, we will have news of the act of passing to the analyst through its consequences: a new relation to knowledge, to the real.

I take as an example an extract from the testimony of Anastasia Tzavidopoulou (nominated AS by a Cartel of this ICG). In one of her testimonies, she said: “words transform themselves, we follow their thread without knowing exactly where they will lead us”. Lacan said that they make us slip and he wondered if the effect of sense in its real is really linked to the use of words...<sup>7</sup> “Language plays with us, it captures us, renders us captive, captivates us, it plays tricks [*touris*] on us and takes us off track [*détours*]”. In her testimony, the vestige of a detachment and a displacement: the encounter with the “solitude of the shrinking of words”. Detachment from the supposed knowledge of the analyst and displacement towards what one knows to be unconscious. “The impossible search for a word in the dictionary, a word that became foreign but without belonging to a language because it was too close to the Other, brought back an experience of language where something (I am citing Lacan) ‘remains indeterminate between the phoneme, the word, the sentence, and even the whole of thought’<sup>8</sup> and pushes in the aftermath [*après coup*], towards another language, a foreign language also, that of the unconscious and of its logic encountered *in* the analysis”.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, livre XX, Encore*, Paris, Seuil, 1975, p. 109. *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore 1972-1973*, ed., J-A Miller, trans., B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1998, p. 120.

<sup>5</sup> J. Lacan, (1969) ‘L’acte psychanalytique. Compte rendu du Séminaire 1967-1968’, *Autres écrits*, op.cit. p. 376.

<sup>6</sup> J. Lacan, (1973), ‘Note italienne’, *Autres écrits*, op.cit., p. 308.

<sup>7</sup> J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, RSI, 1974-1977*, unpublished seminar, lesson of February 11, 1975.

<sup>8</sup> J. Lacan, *Seminar XX*, op.cit. French edition, p. 131.; English edition op. cit. p. 143.

<sup>9</sup> A. Tzavidopoulou, ‘Captivities’, *Wunsch* n. 22, EPFCL, 2022, p. 6.

I like the expression used by Anastasia: “solitude of the narrowing of words” and the reference to this “foreign language, of the unconscious”, absolutely unique. Throughout an analysis, fragments of knowledge, pieces of real that have a feminising effect, not all in front of which something of this foreign language is written. It is only from there that a mark is made, something singular that allows one to emerge from non-existence. A solitude that is transmitted.

In the texts of my colleagues Nicolas Bendrihen and Bernard Toboul, I find two passages that run counter to what ‘passes’:

Nicolas says:

The performance would not aim then at the all-saying, but at passing on these few scraps of *lalangue* emerging from this passage in the flow of words and history, which the analysis has collected, extracted, reduced – for this second performance: let it pass to the few who will be able to hear it, who will be able to be touched by it, and who will wager on recognizing this real touch of which AS can be one of the names.<sup>10</sup>

In his text, Nicolas speaks of a touch of the real, or a contingent moment from which there is a radical change in the subject in relation to the real, when the fantasy is no longer in control, establishing a before and an after.

As Bernard points out in his text:

The analyst, within the trace of the lightning, can access a receptivity that is a poet’s secret. The act is followed, let us say, by a superior passivity (or of the third kind, to put it in Spinozian terms), which is the condition for an approach to the real that is not-all.

On this condition, some piece of the real is circumscribed. Nothing but bits of the real, for the real as not-all is un-fogged [*se désembrume*].<sup>11</sup>

Thus, it seems to me that what the Cartel does not make pass, is those fragments of knowledge about the real that emerge from this point of rupture and solitude that are present in the testimonies. The Cartel’s ability to read is what will say, *a posteriori*, if something was inscribed there: an analyst.

*Translated by Chantal Degril*

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<sup>10</sup> N. Bendrihen, ‘A lightning flash’ in this issue of *Wunsch*.

<sup>11</sup> B. Toboul, ‘The lightning flash, the real, the not-all’ in this issue of *Wunsch*. Translator’s note : ‘*désembrume*’ appears to be a play on the verb ‘*désembruer*’ which means ‘to demist’ and ‘*brume*’, ‘mist’ or ‘fog’.

## THE LIGHTNING FLASH, THE REAL AND THE NOT-ALL

Bernard Toboul  
Paris, France

The work of our cartel was based on the text that Beatriz Oliveira presented in Buenos Aires and the testimony of his pass that Nicolas Bendrihen gave to us. I will make two series of remarks on Nicolas Bendrihen's text, also taking into account Beatriz Oliveira's presentation.

### 1. "The occurrence of a lightning flash"

'The instance of the letter' speaks of the spark of metaphor. The first Lacanian theory of metaphor sees it as the production of a (+) of signification. The second theory of metaphor, in the third response in *Radiophonie*, again makes reference to electricity: metaphor produces a "disruption". Disruption is a physical phenomenon that produces an electrical clash. Lacan insists that metaphor is not so much the production of signification as a "paving stone in the pond of the signifier".

As for the lightning flash, according to Lacan it is a term that applies to the moment of the pass. It is also disruptive, like the burst of laughter that punctuates a witticism. And Lacan associates the moment of the pass with the play on words and the lapsus: it is "the space of a lapsus" [*l'espace d'un laps*].<sup>1</sup> In Seminar XVII, *L'envers de la psychanalyse*, Lacan refers to the *Witz* that he had taken up in Seminar V, denoting it as "astonishment and light" [*sidération et lumière*].

The "occurrence of a lightning flash" to which Nicolas Bendrihen bears witness is of this order.

### 2. "What happens after the lightning flash?"

This is a major question that Nicolas asks because for whom has the 'flash' happened? There is a risk of being struck by it – to follow the direction of this image. What follows is the pass. And so we enter the so-called 'procedure of the pass'.

But pay attention to this, Lacan warns. In the "space of a lapsus ... one only has to be aware of the fact to find oneself outside it".<sup>2</sup> But one comes out of it – out of the unconscious – through performance. It is no longer the act, it is the doing. We are thus made, as Austin's nominalism indicates: we (ourselves) do (everything) with words [*on (se) fait (tout) chose avec des mots*].

Psychoanalysts know that performance implies enjoyment, or is even reduced to it. Displacement of satisfaction. Lacan punctuates: "the public arranges it".

We must therefore take Nicolas Bendrihen's answer seriously: "What is affected is the subject in its relations to reality". This is a formula that calls for some additions.

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<sup>1</sup> J. Lacan, 'The Preface to the English-Language Edition, 1976', in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. vii. (Translator's footnote.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

Rather than ‘relations’, let us choose ‘opening’. In the study of great poetry – I am thinking here of Hölderlin – it turns out that this opening is in fact *receptivity*. The analyst, within the trace of the lightning, can access a receptivity that is a poet’s secret. The act is followed, let us say, by a superior passivity (or of the third kind, to put it in Spinozian terms), which is the condition for an approach to the real that is not-all.

On this condition, some piece of the real is circumscribed. Nothing but bits of the real, for the real as not-all is un-fogged [*se désembrumé*].

In his ‘Caracas Lecture’ Lacan says: “The real that I approach in my practice”, and further on, “can only be admitted as not-all”. And already on April 15, 1975, in RSI: “It still pushes towards this idea that I have ventured to formulate, that the real is not-all”.

A direction of the treatment is to be understood as a direction towards the real, thus becoming disruptive and the analytic act prepares the practice for the approach of the not-all.

*Translated by Susan Schwartz*

## CARTEL 2

### DEMAND, SURPRISE, LINK

CATHY BARNIER, CHRISTOPHE CHARLES,  
MIKEL PLAZAOLA, TRINIDAD SANCHEZ-BIEZMA

#### THE SURPRISE: ALWAYS OTHER

*Cathy Barnier*  
Paris, France

It is on the basis of these three signifiers that our cartel, drawing on the different Passes heard, has carried out its reflection in order to articulate the connections between them.

Demand: there are of course those of the analysand, from the one which supports his saying, the one which will have motivated his demand for analysis and sustained the transference up to its fall, to his ‘demand for the Pass’, a formula that we use to speak of a demand to submit to a dispositive in order to deposit/offer there an oral testimony of what transpired in his analysis concerning his division, of the particular conditions in which the fall of the subject supposed to know occurred for him, and so that may be verified there, or rather glimpsed, the basis on which his desire of the analyst is founded.

During our exchanges in the cartel, we agreed on the fact that what was expected of the Pass by the passand, the mode of his demand, coloured his testimony in a certain way and in consequence, influenced the decision of the Cartel. Be it a demand for recognition, a ‘validation’ of his treatment, or the expectation that the Cartel by its decision would complete it, or on the contrary, the offer of a lack, a not-all on the basis of which the passand attempts to testify to and for the School. The passers, ‘sensitive plates’, in one case as in the other, echo this and reproduce it in their testimony.

After the analysand’s demand has been refined in the analysis and an end point has made it fall, a certain time seems necessary in order to know what to do with this destitution, as if it required going back through the failure so that a push to say imposes itself: something of the real surprises, disturbs anew, and in haste a demand for the Pass is made in order to respond to it.

This can also happen after listening to a recently appointed AS. Depending on the case, one can see there the sign of a knowledge maintained in the other or, on the contrary, as the fact that in the interstices of the AS’s speaking something real has touched the passand and has echoed his own experience, thus allowing him to grasp it again. This also happens, and can happen in the Cartel between its different members, revealing the ‘discreet fraternity’ that links them together.

In cases where there has been a nomination, a sobriety in the testimony can be identified, going directly to the essential points thus sparing the passers and the Cartel from the narrative of a whole life. It should be noted that the Cartels of the Pass are composed of members speaking

different languages, and the language of the passand and/or one of the passers can be different from those spoken by the members of the Cartel. Someone is then asked to translate. I was surprised, and so were others, to note during a testimony of the Pass that gave rise to a nomination that, although not speaking the language of the passers, something passed, outside of the translation, almost allowing it to be anticipated.

In RSI, Lacan says that nomination is the thing that we can be sure makes a hole. The nomination of AS would thus be two letters to designate what will have been spat out of this hole, two letters to inscribe an incompleteness in the School, whether it's a matter of a disjunction in knowledge, picked up in the testimony, or the particular way in which a subject supports himself, in full knowledge of the cause of his subjective division, or again a silence which closes the testimony as a sign of nothing further to say. Can we say that this new mode of nomination subverts it in a way, making it less the designation of a subject as analyst, as is the case for the AMS, than that of the surprise which has produced it, of the invention from which it is generated? That invention which Lacan tells us in Seminar XI is always accompanied by a loss, and that it is an act.

This is what would lead to the paradoxical way that the Cartel has of wanting to grasp, of being in expectation of a 'surprise' while everyone knows that it is by escaping all expectation that it can occur! Unless we consider it as 'anamorphic', that is to say, revealing itself in some way thanks to a movement, one that is not predictable – that one or each member of the cartel will have known how to make, it being a responsibility for him, if he is alone, of leading others to do so. For this to take place, it is necessary that the passand is able to lodge in his testimony what is his own!

So, can we say that this 'surprise' would be what specifies the demand/expectation of the Cartel via the passers to the passand. But then the risk is that this hoped-for surprise is itself caught in the nets of the doxa, whereas what specifies it is to present itself as that which escapes it. In its discussion after the testimony, it is important that the Cartel does not just plug the hole with its elaboration, but rather circumscribe its edges.

*Translated by Deborah McIntyre*

## FROM THE SURPRISE TO THE LINK

*Christophe Charles*  
Pertuis, France

“It is only that, it’s not much but it is so much!”

It is with this concise observation that a passand ended his testimony. He was affected by it and told the Cartel which had listened to him.

Sometimes an unexpected encounter can be a (happy) surprise.

Not always. Then you are disappointed. The surprise is not always happy.

Passand, passer, members of the Cartel, each one has the right to expect something to happen from the dispositive of the Pass. What will happen? We don't know in advance, we wait, and sometimes – surprise! – it’s there.

You don’t catch it, rather you are seized by it. An unprecedented encounter which upsets the tranquil course of the testimony.

Throughout the process of testifying to the pass, the passand or passer may be overtaken [*dé/passés*] by a dream or a bungled act, which was not foreseen in the programme. A manifestation of the unconscious that awakens discomfort is welcome when it concerns a testimony of a pass!

This happy encounter can also take place at the moment when the members of the Cartel elaborate on what they have heard from the two passers ... the emergence of something new which, like a flash of lightning in the moment of seeing, short-circuits the well-understood of the time for understanding and precipitates everything that has been able to be said and elaborated during the testimony towards the moment to conclude...

*From the surprise to the link*

Why this title?

It is the product of an experience of a Cartel in which an effect of surprise seized all the members, beginning with a (not so) random signifier, and made it possible to illuminate, from the passand’s initial request for analysis, the conditions of the end of the treatment and his request for the Pass.

A surprise effect, therefore, which ‘makes waves’ and affects each member of the Cartel. How to account for it?

Sur/prise to be written in two words to accentuate the effect of the emergence of “the space of a lapsus” [*l’esp d’un laps*] which “no longer carries any meaning”.<sup>1</sup> If the moment of capture [*prise*]

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<sup>1</sup> J. Lacan, ‘Preface to the English-Language Edition’ in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*. London, W.W. Norton & Company, p. vii.



is prompt and unexpected, it sur/prises from below, between the words of the testimonies, a signifier outside meaning, an index of the real and its affects and thus, a touch of the real.

If the effect of surprise occurs in this time of elaboration, this time of understanding, where experience, theoretical knowledge, doxa and pre/judices [*pré/jugés*] are evoked, the unexpected can come to dissipate the fog and the cautious ‘step by step’, to unveil a logic of the structure, a ‘that’s it’, signalling the urgency of the moment to conclude, liberating the prisoners of the Cartel from signifying alienation.

From the unheard to the unexpected! Like a ‘blow of the baton’, it is an awakening that extracts the members of the Cartel from the torpor of meaning.

What has (re)awakened them?

Something that is not on the side of knowledge, of recognition and of the ‘well-understood’ but rather what has to do with the structure, that is to say, the real.

The cartel then became ‘sensitive’, sensitive to this mark of the real that the passer was able to ‘perceptibly’ transmit, without his knowing it, not without a saying that goes beyond his own understanding, not without the effects of affects to which he bears witness, not without the famous ‘naivety’ of which Lacan speaks, which is in the register not of a knowledge but of an experience by which he is affected.

The surprise that arises is “the effect produced on the mind by a strong emotion provoked by something unexpected”.<sup>2</sup>

What is called ‘testimony’ must be able to go beyond the objective data of a treatment, and the necessary identification of the decisive points of the process that took place for the passand, and give an account of the way in which the subject made himself ‘a behaviour’ based on something incurable... but this cannot be said, really... . What is said fails to say the real experience.

If there is no other solution than to use words to bear witness, how can we then give an account of it? What arrives at its destination is on the side of a saying [*un dire*] (and not the saids [*les dits*]) of the testimony of the passand taken up by the passers), it is a saying that ‘hits the bulls-eye’ [*fait mouche*],<sup>3</sup> the effects of which the Cartel has to measure from a logic beyond comprehension.

Is the affect that seized the members of the Cartel an indication that, for each one, something of his own target has been touched at the point most ‘central’ to his jouissance? A particular affect that would allow us to re/cognise [*re/connaître*] each other based on a certain fraternity that concerns the way in which each is affected by the structure?

Although each of us can try to say something about it, it is always a ‘not that’ that is said, and the experience originates from an impossibility to say.

Lacan speaks of “brothers in discourse” to account for the fact that what we have in common is castration and that we are all, in a particular way, affected by the real. But is this enough to

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<sup>2</sup> Alain Rey, *Dictionnaire historique de la langue française*, Le Robert.

<sup>3</sup> ‘*Faire mouche*’: To touch the centre of the target. (Author’s note)

create a link? Being a brother does not guarantee peace... and can lead to fratricidal wars and not all cartels make a link or generate enthusiasm... ! Can a cartel 'match' [*assortir*]<sup>4</sup> the scattered, allow a discreet bond of brotherhood? And if so, on what basis?

What is certain is that this cannot be decreed and that there is the dimension of contingency. Beyond the epistemic interest, can we think that a link of another kind can be made which particularly touches each One in his or her relation to *jouissance* and which can make a 'common' experience, starting from what has been touched in a testimony of the pass, whether there is a nomination or not?

Lacan spoke of "discrete fraternity" in 1948 to conclude his article on aggressiveness in psychoanalysis.<sup>5</sup> Discrete because it is not announced; it is rather on the side of a 'resonance' of an unspeakable that each one has to deal with, thus an effect of the real. This resonance can enter into 'sympathy'<sup>6</sup> with that of the other. Sympathy in the musical sense of the term, where a vibrating string enters into 'sympathy' with another string by making it vibrate in its turn.

I have therefore had the idea that what permits 'that passes' [*ça passe*] is the possibility that this resonance of the passand can be put into vibration (sympathy) with the different 'sensitive' strings of the passers and of each of the members of the cartel who are, themselves, affected by the real.

A setting in vibration of the chords of each one from the vibration of the passand. Thus, a setting in sympathy in the musical sense of the term. Not without a (resonant) saying from the passand.

*Translated by Susan Schwartz*

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<sup>4</sup> In French, '*assortir*' can mean a good arrangement of colours: '*couleurs bien assorties*', but also a beautiful couple who go well together: *un couple bien assorti; ce qui va bien ensemble*. (Author's note)

<sup>5</sup> J. Lacan, '*L'agressivité en psychanalyse*', *Écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p 124. 'Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis' in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, p. 101.

<sup>6</sup> Sympathy: Musical term. The respective state of two bodies of sound, one of which enters into vibration when the other is shaken. The phenomenon of vibrations by influence or sympathy occurs when two vibrating bodies are placed at a suitable distance, and only one is put into action. The vibratory movement of that one is propagated and communicated to the other.

## MY REFLECTIONS ON THE CARTEL

Mikel Plazaola  
San Sebastian, Espagne

Two testimonies of the Pass heard and debated within the ICG, and an experience lived with surprise and novelty in one of the Cartels led me to think about surprise as an element to be accounted for in the experience of the Cartels of the Pass.

One of the definitions of surprise is: “Emotional disturbance caused by something unforeseen or unexpected.”

There are two vectors of the question:

a. Surprise *vs* known

The function of the passer’s sensitive surface has been described many times, the passer who, sometimes without having any explicit knowledge of it, can transmit to the Cartel of the Pass something which has ‘touched’ him in the passand’s testimony. I think of ‘surprise’ as a similar event, which can occur in some or all of the members of the Cartel who listen to the passer.

We can qualify this by saying that, at a minimum, not all surprises are the same in terms of the novelty they bring. A disappointment or a banality can also surprise; although in the case of disappointment, it does not lose its illuminating value.

It is interesting to consider surprise as an unexpected, unforeseen effect in a field of symbolic knowledge (*savoir*) and of imaginary knowledge (*connaissance*). An effect within a method, that of floating attention, as in Freud (“each case must be listened to as a new case”) or in Lacan, when he goes a bit further and responds: “the analyst, in the analysis, must know how to forget everything that he knows”.

Similar formulations apply to the listening in a Cartel of the Pass, even if one is not in the position of the analyst.

One of the first points raised during the first debate of the ICG 2021-2022 was the question of markers (not necessarily explicit or articulated) with which each member of a Cartel listens to the testimony of the passands. I do not think there is a listening without markers. The important thing is to be aware of them, just as I do not believe it would be possible “to forget all one knows” however little one knows. But there, too, being forewarned provides a certain guarantee.

I understand “to be forewarned” as another nuance in what Lacan says in *RSI*, when he tries “to paint for the analyst the discourse he supports. It is essential that the analyst be at least two. The analyst to produce effects and the analyst who theorizes these effects”.

It is two when he is aware, that is, with a certain attention, however floating, of what can work in him and from him in the listening.

In this sense, the value of surprise is in verifying, in he who lives it, what is new in relation to what is known (*connu*). Something makes a pathway across one's own markers, with which one inevitably also listens to a testimony. In other words, a kind of event.

If this is also in disagreement with the markers of the listener, it is not just about something new, something different. It also allows him to question his own experience, for example, his own analysis, the ending, how he got there... by verifying that someone else did it another way, another journey, another ending, with different consequences, a different story. Proof of the singularity of the one by one.

The surprise can be new as knowledge or as a logical consequence (something appears where it was not expected, at a different moment even if it was known). For example, if the condition for nomination is that the AS, "being among those who are able to testify to crucial problems, at the vital point they have come to, for analysis..."<sup>1</sup>, we understand that in his testimony the AS can bring something new compared with what is already known, one more link in the epistemic chain of the discourse of the School. It is obvious that the testimonies of the AS's provide a viewpoint, a reference, and allow the theory to advance.

Here it is not necessarily via surprise, there is a progressive elaboration, but with novel elements. In this elaboration, surprise is certainly not the only element, but it has its value. To quote Lacan, paraphrasing T. Reik, "surprise – that by which the subject feels himself overcome, by which he finds both more and less than he expected – but in any case, it is, in relation to what he expected, of exceptional value."<sup>2</sup>

#### b. Surprise and temporality

There is a double elaboration on this question in Lacan: on the one hand, a reaction to novelty, on the other hand, a re-finding.

If it is understood as a reaction to unexpected novelty, I believe surprise can be equated to the *instant of seeing* in the logical time of the subject: a fleeting moment of perceiving something, something that touches sufficiently to call for *the time for understanding*, of elaboration, therefore ... until this elaboration is sufficient and can then lead to the *moment of concluding*.

But, on the other hand, Lacan emphasizes that this "discovery becomes a rediscovery and, furthermore, it is always ready to steal away again, thus establishing the dimension of loss."<sup>3</sup> But even if surprise is a "re-discovery", that is to say, a re-finding, it is not only about the unknown, it has another element, the moment, the when... which gives it its value. Thus, in 1965, he will say: "What is the unexpected if not that which reveals itself as already expected but only when it happens? The unexpected, in fact, traverses the field of the expected. Regarding this game of waiting, and confronting anguish, as Freud himself put it in his fundamental texts on the theme of waiting, we must explain the status of what of the analyst's desire is there."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> J. Lacan, 'Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School', trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, pp. 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> J. Lacan, *The Seminar, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (trans. Alan Sheridan) New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. 25.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> J. Lacan, *Problèmes cruciaux pour la psychanalyse*, unpublished, lesson of May 19, 1965.

We thus understand that the Cartel waits, it has its markers, but there is a moment, sometimes ephemeral, where surprise can have all of its value of discovery or of unveiling. This is the instant of seeing (of listening), something affects, and makes the Cartel take note in order to grasp by what and how they have been touched...by a real.

Probably not so much for the passer, but for the Cartel of the Pass, this moment of seeing requires time to consider, to be able to finalize its judgement. It is similar to this *two-analyst* who reflects on the perceived effects on both the passer and on the members of the Cartel.

What is new, surprising, will be shared, questioned, dismantled to account for it, along with its judgment.

When we talk about surprise, it does not refer only to the enthusiastic Eureka! to the clear and evident affects (joy, fright, fear...); there are also small discoveries that leave their effects after an articulation or a path or a conclusion that brings something unexpected. For this reason, it is not considered as a condition of new knowledge (*savoir*), as a definitive guarantee, with which it would lose its intrinsic value, but perhaps as an element of interest to account for when it occurs.

*Translated by Devra Simiu*

## THE CARTEL OF THE PASS FINDS-ENCOUNTERS

Trinidad Sanchez-Biezma  
Madrid, Spain

*On occasion we laugh in the Cartels of the Pass. A laugh may come to surprise either the passers and the members of the Cartel during the testimonies, or the members of the Cartel during their subsequent exchanges. This laugh which surprises, as unforeseen by the passand of course, as is it is unexpected to the cartel, makes the thing, this serious thing, suddenly cheerful.[...]. This laugh... tells us that we are in the presence of something that the passand 'made on his own'.*

Sol Aparicio<sup>1</sup>

From 'Function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis' in 1953, Lacan approaches the question of satisfaction according to a structure homogeneous with that which he writes the 'Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School'. In both moments, satisfaction, in my opinion, is an integral part of the structure of the end, but it is also integral with others, with a community. It is a conception of the end where the satisfaction of the analysand is not dissociated from the satisfaction of the group: the satisfaction of the subject finds its fulfillment in the satisfaction of each one; that is to say of all those with whom he associates himself in the realization of a human work. And then it's in *...or worse [...ou pire]* in 1971-72 that analysis inverts the precept of the doing-well and letting-say to the point that saying-well satisfies, since there is only the not enough to answer to the more-to-say [*plus-à-dire*].

Satisfaction is an affect of the end. If we take the Pass and its conclusion through the encounter, the Cartel must be able to testify to the fact that the satisfaction of the end corresponds to the satisfaction of the production of an unprecedented real; a new affect which is the translation of a new position in life. In this seminar, he specifies that upon which satisfaction is based: an act which satisfies, which depends on a saying, and which is linked to my understanding: satisfaction with a saying which satisfies.

A final citation in 'On psychoanalysis in its relations with reality' refers us to "The joke satisfies us by joining the mistake in its place. We are played by the saying, be that as it may, the laughter bursts from the path spared ...".<sup>2</sup>

This brings us to consider the satisfaction of the Cartel of the Pass in receiving a testimony where something that is heard is unheard of, exceeding what is comprehensible and producing an unforgettable affect. The unexpected comes from the passers; they bear a listening which, transmitted to the Cartel, constitutes it as such. It is precisely at this moment that the Cartel is

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<sup>1</sup> S. Aparicio, 'De son propre crû' [Of his own making], *Wunsch*, n°7, EPFCL, 2007, p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> J. Lacan, 'De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports à la réalité' [On psychoanalysis in its relations with reality], *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 356.

formed. The Cartel is constituted by testimony and not instituted by the institution.<sup>3</sup> The Cartel captures an occurrence of the not-all, of the unthinkable which surprises and connects, which links to others. If something unheard of, extracted from what has been heard, convinces the Cartel, we will know that their conviction is not the product of the truth, but of the real.

When that happens, there is surprise due to a saying that detaches itself from the story and makes its way. It is not possible to say what is real as real, but it is rather the lucubrations of *lalangue*. It is about these signifiers, holes of signification and meaning, which are initially enigmatic for the subject himself. Signifiers that manage to convey what has been their lying truth.

Laughter sanctions the gain, knowing that it imposes itself: “to have pushed the door beyond which there is nothing more to find”,<sup>4</sup> the very one that is pushed towards the exit of an analysis, but long after the front door opened on the expectation of the expected revelations.<sup>5</sup>

Satisfaction therefore does not flow from nomination; it emanates rather from the readability of the conclusions of the testimonies. But not only of the satisfaction obtained by the subject at the end and which resonates against a background of neurotic dissatisfaction, but also gives the idea that in the procedure of the Pass – conceived as hystorization – it is crucial to obtain the satisfaction of the colleagues, which, in my opinion, would help the registered letter to reach its destination.

*Translated by Diana Correa*

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<sup>3</sup> D. Touchon Fingermann, *La (dé)formation du psychanalyste* [The (de)formation of the psychoanalyst], Paris, Éditions Nouvelles du Champ lacanien, 2019.

<sup>4</sup> J. Lacan, op. cit., p. 356.

<sup>5</sup> C. Soler, ‘*Les satisfactions de passes?*’ [The satisfaction of the passes?], *Wunsch*, n°8, EPFCL, Mars 2010.

## CARTEL 3

### THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CARTEL

JULIETA DE BATTISTA, MARIE-JOSE LATOUR,  
FERNANDO MARTÍNEZ, MANEL REBOLLO (+1)

#### INTRODUCTION

At the moment of the ending of the mandate of this International College of the Guarantee (ICG) in which we have had the chance to participate in several Cartels of the Pass and for some of us, in several nominations of Analysts of the School (AS), it is also the moment of trying to extract what we have learnt.

To the two years of work and exchanges with all our colleagues in the ICG, let us add listening to the passers, the testimonies of the ASs, the Meetings of the School (European in Rome, international in Buenos-Aires). All of this constituted an extremely enriching epistemic experience.

This document is the decantation of the work of the cartel 'The interpretation of the Cartel', constituted exclusively for our *Wunsch*, as a reflection on the work carried out during this period.

We began the work in our cartel with a shared observation: all interpretation is a reading. What remains is to make explicit the relevance of these terms with regard to what is at stake in the Pass. Each of us elaborates here according to the singularity of our experience.



## THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CARTEL AND CONTINGENCY

Marie-José Latour  
Tarbes, France

1.

The title we have given to our cartel, ‘The interpretation of the Cartel’ [*L’interprétation du Cartel*] underlines the equivocation at stake whenever there is, in French at least, the use of the preposition ‘de’ [of] or of the definite article ‘du’ [of the].<sup>1</sup> As soon as we consider that interpretation is a question of reading, this equivocation is at stake in each cartel and perhaps even more so in the Cartel of the Pass.

A small mismatched unit (with various elements, which differ in idiom, continent, engagement in the School, etc.) is thus the dispositive chosen by our School to listen to the two passers who have to pass on what they have heard from the passand. It is up to the latter to produce, through this complication [*chicane*], some light on the passage to an analyst!

2.

*The interpretation of the Cartel, objective genitive*, is the reading that the cartelisands will make of the dispositive itself. As proposed by Lacan, this dispositive involves a particular link between 3 or 4 + 1. Its very written form presents from the get go, a sum that does not make a totality. It appears that there is already a reading by the Cartel as a dispositive. The fact that the members of the Cartel share this reading of the dispositive in which they engage is perhaps not immediately obvious. Is sharing this point of view not a matter of contingency?

*The interpretation of the Cartel, subjective genitive*, is the interpretation that the Cartel will make of the testimonies of the passers and which will lead to a decision relating to the nomination. The hypothesis that we will try to establish is that the decision of the Cartel of the Pass comes from an interpretation. Is not the particular moment when the Cartel comes together to speak about its decision also a matter of contingency? The equivocal dimension indicates that one cannot choose between genitives. Hence, there is a need to stand on this uncomfortable ridge to try to seize, to catch in mid-air, the flash of an event. What a wager!

3.

In the “Opening of the clinical section”<sup>2</sup> Lacan recalls how what is hazardous in clinical practice can be limited by the clinic, namely, by laying out the new knowledge that is going to be deposited from the practice. In the dispositive of the Pass there is a certain element of chance and there is also what we have been able to establish for some years now and which we could call the ‘Clinic of the Pass’. This has oriented us in our ICG discussions.

To return to the point I am trying to grasp. There is a never-ending deciphering of the trace that remains of what linked language with its resonance in the body. Analytical reading mobilises the gap that reading-deciphering tends to cover. Isn’t the renewal of this enigma, of which no deciphering can give the word, also at stake in the Pass?

<sup>1</sup> Translator’s note. ‘De’ is a preposition equivalent to ‘of’ and ‘du’ is the contraction with the definite article ‘le’, ‘of the’. With the definite article ‘la’ the preposition ‘de’ becomes ‘de la’.

<sup>2</sup> J. Lacan, ‘Overture de la section clinique’ [Opening of the clinical section], *Ornicar* ? n° 9, Paris, Navarin, 1977, pp. 7-14.

4.

There is a moment when the planets seem to align and the five members of the Cartel come to an agreement with an obviousness that is always surprising. The cartel has only to take note.

When there is a nomination, it's with enthusiasm and it seems to be self-explanatory. Just as at the moment of leaving the room of the National Gallery in London, after having looked at the famous painting of the *Ambassadors*, the five turn around at the same time, with the same movement, to see, thanks to this twist in the turning round, what until then was not readable and yet was there.<sup>3</sup>

When the cartel is unanimous in the non-nomination, this observation would also seem to be self-explanatory. However, when there is no unanimity in the Cartel, everyone feels obliged to explain themselves to the others.

Our ICG instituted a discussion after each Pass where it was a question of establishing the reasons that presided over the decision of the Cartel, which of course does not call it into question but makes it readable. Here the Cartel is called upon to 'declare its reasons'. How to declare your reasons to the five? Each one goes over his reading, his way of reading, and then can arise seemingly contradictory arguments to serve the same decision.

5.

So there is the time when it passes and the time when you have to say why. This is a difficulty that analytic discourse should allow us to explain and reduce. If the Pass is this dispositive that makes it possible to establish the logic of a treatment up to the passage to the analyst, will this not pass through something that ceases not to be written?

This is the definition that Lacan gave us of contingency.<sup>4</sup> Unlike chance, contingency has to be established. Isn't it part of the work of the Cartel to measure the saying that left this unprecedented trace?

Lacan established a structure of interpretation: between enigma and citation. To read between the lines, *intelligere*, is not to add anything else to what is said, but rather to take into account the gap, the trace that the 'between' has left.<sup>5</sup> From this novelty in the way of reading, of which he was initially a pupil, Lacan also deduced a way of working in a School of psychoanalysis, a 'reading with' of which the effects remain unpredictable. Is it not this particular link that is also at stake in a Cartel of the Pass?

*Translated by Diana Correa*

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<sup>3</sup> M-J. Latour, 'Point de vue et "pouvoir d'illecture"' [Point of view and "power of reading otherwise"], *Mensuel de l'EPFCL-France*, décembre 2022, n° 164. [Editor's note: In her paper in *Mensuel*, M-J Latour cites Lacan's comment in Seminar VII, *The Ethics*, in relation to the anamorphic effect of Holbein's *The Ambassadors*: "It is any kind of construction that is made in such a way that by means of an optical transposition a certain form that wasn't visible at first sight transforms itself into a readable image. The pleasure is found in seeing its emergence from an indecipherable form." In this paper she is drawing an analogy between this effect and what can happen in the Pass. *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-60*, ed. J-A Miller, trans. D. Potter, London, Routledge 1992, p. 135. See *Le Séminaire, livre VII*, Paris, Seuil, 1986, p.161.]

<sup>4</sup> J. Lacan, see seminars books XX and XXI, *Télévision*.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Manel Rebollo's work on the Cartel and in this issue of *Wunsch*.

## THE INTER-PRETATION OF THE CARTEL : ITS INTERPRETERS

Manel Rebollo  
Tarragona, Spain

After the experience in the ICG during 2021-2022, it's now time to register in this brief written piece what I have been able to reflect on, with my colleagues, of my passage in the debates of the ICG and the four Cartels of the Pass in which I participated, in the first one of which I had the satisfaction of being present at the nomination of an AS.

Interpretation is a term that is present in abundance in psychoanalysis, the definition of which was specified by Lacan as 'reading'.

In the interpretation of the Cartel, the prefix 'inter' [between], is highlighted, because it is a reading that takes place between the five members of the Cartel, whether or not there is accord between them, but this will always depend on the effects that the reading of each one produces on the reading of the others. From the first moment when the members of the Cartel listen to the passers and ask their first questions, their reading is never individual, since each of the five involved in the listening is touched by the comments in play, insisting in a different way, with different nuances, in each of the listenings.

This listening was filtered through different languages in the Cartels in which I participated: Spanish, French, Italian and Portuguese, which adds a new variable to what was heard – interlanguage polysemy, to call it thus. The possible intervention of a member, added to the Cartel exclusively as a translator, adds a new accent to the 'inter' of the interpreter.

The term 'interpreter', of Latin origin, finds its oldest meaning in the commercial field. They were those who negotiated prices (*inter-pretium*), the greater or lesser value (*pretiosus*) between different merchants who spoke different languages and used different currencies.

The Cartels in which I participated listened each time to two passers, giving testimonies of the same passand, consecutively, without any delay between the two.

Listening to the second passer frequently put in question the validity of what had been reported by the first (was it something dreamt, interpreted, actually happened?), thus influencing the different readings. On some occasions, one of the passers exceeded his role, bringing his own interpretation of what he had heard, assuming the responsibility of 'defending' his testimony, or showing his 'horror' in the face of what he had heard, and other singularities that go beyond his function of 'making pass', a function that involves a certain effacement so that what passes is the testimony of the passand.

The passer who interprets, in his various ways, impedes the work of inter-pretation of the Cartel, since he functions as a wall preventing the 'passage' of the passand's testimony, his access to the Cartel.

The passand is ‘the one who passes’, if one is rigorous with the conjugation of the verb: *present participle* [in French], and the passer ‘the one who makes pass’. When the previously mentioned protagonists make the passer so present, the noise makes the hearing of the pass difficult. And this is what happened in some cases. I would also like to point out that on other occasions the fact that there are two passers allowed the noise of one to be isolated by the clarity of the testimony of the other.

It’s in the subsequent work of the Cartel, when the different impressions of listening and what arises from them come into play, that the inter-pretation is elaborated, beyond the evaluation, which can give the ‘prize’ that the Cartel accords to the passand: nomination as AS or no nomination.

In the first of the Cartels in which I participated, the inestimable value of the nomination was distilled in the work of the Cartel from the questions that we asked ourselves and that put all the importance on the passand, forgetting the passers. I can say that the ‘minus one’ of this Cartel was the passand, whose testimony operated as the ‘cause’ of our enthusiastic work, which was crowned with a unanimous ‘yes’ of satisfaction at the moment when the ‘plus one’ asked us if there was a nomination.

The Cartel that made this nomination wanted to continue the elaboration of this passage to the analyst, even after the elaboration within the ICG.

After the nomination, the discussions that led us to the nomination had to be reported to the ICG. It was not easy to give an account of our inter-pretation: of what had happened [*de ce qui s’était passé*]. We continued to work on these questions and in a second attempt, it was easier to give an account, albeit with difficulty, of our nomination, when all five of us were fully convinced that there had been a passage to the analyst.

What I want to emphasise here is that the AS was the driving force behind this work of the Cartel post-Pass, leaving the passers effaced, as I understand it. The enthusiasm continued in this work and produced certain affective and affectionate effects among the cartelisands, in which the ‘goodness’ of our decision was materialised.

It is this effect of ‘cartelisation’ by the passand-AS, that I define as ‘what cartelises’, the ‘cause’ of the Cartel, which did not occur in the other three cartels in which I participated.

In one of them, it was the prejudices of the passers that became an obstacle to listening to the passand who, differently from the previous case, is blurred, erased by the presence of the passers. Here, there was no cartelisation: the Cartel did not continue and its elaboration within the ICG was brief, and the absence of nomination easily agreed to and readily transmissible. I hardly remember who the members of this Cartel were.

These two passers gathered the testimony of the passand online, via Zoom, throughout the whole duration.

In the third pass, the passand had a face-to-face meeting with his first passer and one via Zoom with the second. In this case, we witnessed the fascination that the passand provoked in the first passer, while the second passer was perfectly able to convey the effect of his unveiling of such a fascination, which made it possible to better account for the ‘real’ at stake in this non-Pass (*pas de passe*).

In the fourth Pass in which I participated, and which was entirely in the room, there was a first passer who gave an account of his effort to transmit what he heard, with a certain interpretation on his part, although it did not prevent him from listening to the testimony, and a second passer who again presented a typical elaboration of the pass which was a screen which hid the passand, who was recognised more in the work of transmission by his first passer.

Nor was there any effect of ‘posterisation’ [*postérisation*] in these two Cartels: the passand was present in the work, he was glimpsed, much more so than in the second Pass, but this was not ground for enthusiasm in the work of the Cartel, even if there was agreement between its five members on the reading of this Pass.

In the two cases, the subsequent work of elaboration in the ICG was quite easy, even face to face, even with nuances that were not always coherent between the different interpreters, but it was obvious to everyone that there was no nomination and that the analysis was not finished.

The differences in nuances between the different cartelisands were no obstacle to a very coherent reading in the four Passes mentioned, in which we were able to work on the elaboration without difficulty, but in the last three there was no ‘cartelisation’. It did take place in the first case, although the presentation of the elaboration in front of the ICG was much more complicated, even with the conviction between the five that there had been a Pass.

I understand from this that it is more difficult to give an account of what ‘passes’ than of what ‘does not pass’ in a Cartel of the Pass, and perhaps we should interrogate ourselves on this point in our School.

*Translated by Deborah McIntyre*

**THE PASS-THAT-IS-LISTENED-TO : A LIMIT TO  
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CARTEL**

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At the beginning of the work of this cartel, we started from a simple observation: all interpretation is a reading. Consequently, the Cartel of the Pass could spend a lot of time interpreting, reading and deciphering the marks in the material transmitted by the passand in order to be able to locate such indications as: the falling of identifications, the crossing of the fantasy, the fall of the subject supposed to know, etc. These are the elements that our doxa indicates and that are useful in locating the emergence of the analyst's desire. Clearly, they are useful because they allow the epistemic work, an elaboration, a teaching, etc. to be made, but they are insufficient to formalise the precise moment of the passage to the analyst.

The interpretative readings of the Cartel are not enough, even less so when the testimonies of certain passers are purified by the sieve of the prevailing doxa, producing a closure of the possibility that something is happening. These are the cases in which the passer fulfils the role of secretary to the passand, supported by the reading of the biography and trying to find the relevant points that correspond to the doxa and its theory, rather than delivering the experience of something that is happening.

The dispositive of the Pass does not escape the impurities of the effects of discourse and the use of language: the standardisation of words, the idealisation of knowledge, imaginary experience, etc. It is however a key dispositive for a School in constant revision of the doxa that supports it.

*The idealisation of the dispositive is a limit to the experience of the pass*

We see then that the circulation of theories and ideas produces a certain idealisation, a certain condition of reading, an inevitable effect of the use of discourse and which often goes against the experience of the pass itself.

It is then necessary to distinguish the interpretative condition that the doxa introduces in all the actors in the dispositive, the inevitable implication of its use in the discourse, in order to differentiate it effectively from the moment of the pass.

Thus, we have on the one hand the dynamics of the dispositive more or less contaminated by the doxa and, on the other the pass to the analyst, effectively, the pass-that-is-listened-to-and-then-read.

The School offers the dispositive that generates the necessary conditions for this to take place, of course, this is not always achieved, but at each attempt, a large part of the School is revitalised with the episteme that results from the work and the movement produced by the dispositive. It is a question of the efficacy of the dispositive in that which is decanted from the experience

of all the actors who participate in it. A School that effectively practices the Pass, like ours, can at least guarantee that it is alive with contributions to knowledge, in its attempts to name it.

*Knowledge [savoir] and mark*

... it is the mark of that condition that the analyst must carry, whatever his adventures, in order for his fellows [congénères] in 'knowing' [savoir] to find it.  
J. Lacan, 'Italian note'<sup>1</sup>

Knowing how to find the mark is not the same as talking about it; the finding is somewhat surprising. Like someone who discovers an archaeological mark, there is first the impact of the encounter. It is recognised insofar as the mark interpellates the subject who finds it, and then comes a first reading which inaugurates the attempt to say something about it – that it belongs to such and such an era, that it refers to a human being, etc. This is what is read, and what is not. This is what is read-written [*lu-écrit*]<sup>2</sup> (or written-read? [*écri-lire*?]) about the mark.

Something similar happens in the recognition of the pass to the analyst: something appears as a mark that resonates in the members of the Cartel. In my experience, what resonates through the passand in the members of the Cartel of the Pass refers to, echoes, evokes the mark of each one's analysis, what an analyst has given as the remainder of this operation. And, it must be made clear, this is not an identificatory evocation, but a resonance of the absolute singularity that is heard in the saying that passes through the saying of the passand.

The pass-that-one-listens-to is the moment of the (a)appearance of the mark, the moment of the coupling between the mark and the impossibility of speech: the desire of the analyst is an unprecedented desire that had not been brought to light; it is not a desire ex-nihilo. With the Pass, doesn't one seek to know how this desire is read-written for the subject who, destituted on the spot, reveals himself as an analyst?

In a Cartel where one has been able to hear for the first time the pass to the analyst, something resonates beyond the words, among the sayings of the passand and produces a mobilising effect on the members of the Cartel from the impact of the encounter with the mark. This belongs to a certain splendour of the object *a* in its aspect of cause of desire and, in its effects on each of the members of the Cartel, one can deduce a certain encounter with a knowledge [*savoir*] that arrives only at this moment, at this instant only, where the mark is recognised and then a name is put to this discovery: AS.

The pass-which-is-listened-to is the experience of transmission in action, which passes through the passand, when he or she really is one. After this experience, the Cartel will try to make a reading of it, to transmit its decision to the rest of the ICG in a justified manner. This second moment, already reconstructed by the word, will reformulate or confirm the episteme which will amplify or question the doxa and which, in turn, will relaunch, once again, the search for knowledge.

The interpretation of the Cartel is always *a posteriori*, like any reading, since at the moment when the pass to the analyst is effectively heard, the reading is suspended since the members of the Cartel are concerned by what happens there. In other words: there is no interpretative reading at the moment of the chance encounter with the mark, only an impact. Later, we will try to

<sup>1</sup> J. Lacan, 'Note italienne', *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 308.

<sup>2</sup> Condensation of 'read' and 'write' in Spanish – *lee y escribe* – which is an equivocal with '*le escribe*' [writes to you].

formalise this, but it already belongs to a second moment, to the interpretative moment of the Cartel. From then on, the chance encounter with the mark is an instant of suspension of all interpretation, stopped by the said experience.

If 'there has been a pass', as we say daily in our community, that is to say, if there has been an encounter with the mark in the transmission of the passand, we have noticed that the attempt at formalisation was more difficult in spite of the precise encounter with this moment of the pass. Conversely, in the Cartels in which I have participated and where 'there was no pass', that is to say, the encounter did not take place, these Cartels find it less difficult to read and formalise the case. I don't believe that this phenomenon is accidental, since the passers' testimonies and their listening were on the side of a pure interpretative reading that was not very open to contingency, and we know that we could interpret indefinitely, so in this sense it would seem 'simpler' to continue reading the phenomena.

On the other hand, in the Cartel in which we were able to nominate, the limit was given in advance, at the moment of the encounter with the saying that passes, as if one could not go much further than what had appeared. Something is offered for interpretation on a precise point: the mutation of a desire that we had heard there and which is much more difficult to formalise. I consider that this difficulty is due to its ex-sistence: it comes and surprises because it does not fully belong to the field of meaning, of interpretative reading, but on the contrary, signals the failure of the tendency to generalized meaning.

A transitional conclusion then, is that the pass-which-is-heard is in itself a cessation of interpretative meaning; it shares this accomplishment with the *acte manqué* [bungled action]. It appears and breaks with the tendency to meaning.

Just as the analytic experience is not what can be said and written about, neither is the experience of the pass. At least not all of it. Thus, the offer of the dispositive remains for those who wish to immerse themselves in this experience of transmission, offering their testimony to re-launch once again the commitment to our common work: the search, in the singularity of the case, for the emergence of the analyst's desire.

Patagonia, January 2023

*Translated by Susan Schwartz*



## IN PRAISE OF SHADOWS

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Buenos Aires, Argentina

In this cartel, we continue to work on what questions us about the passage from analysand to analyst on the side of what we call ‘The interpretation of the cartel’, trying to advance the elaboration of problems that we consider crucial for psychoanalysis, such as that of the contingent emergence of the analyst's desire. Following the trace of this origin, the thesis ‘Desire is its interpretation’ has imposed itself. One step further and the question arises as to whether the confirmation of the analyst's desire in the testimonies is then the result of a convergent interpretation by the members of the Cartel [of the Pass]. Much has already been said about the polyphony that reigns in the Cartels of the Pass (analytic training, languages, diversity of domains: from European minimalism to South American effusion, etc.). Each member of the Cartel brings the reading that can be made of the point at which their own analysis has arrived, of their relationship to the doctrine and also their position in the face of the doxa and the group effects of the community in which they work. This will not be saying too much, once again, about the need to maintain the greatest possible difference (between the passers drawn, between those who make up the Cartel, between the zones and the dispositives etc.). This principle of maximum difference could be a guide for the operation, or at least a good omen to attenuate a little the group effects, which are necessarily ineliminable.

I participated in the work of six Cartels of the Pass: in only one was I convinced that I had verified something of the analyst's desire. It was a verification,<sup>1</sup> not the result of the work of elaboration of the Cartel. That came later. To verify a desire is to verify in the presence its causal power. On this occasion, which led to a nomination, I remembered the analogy that Lacan mentioned in his *Entretiens à Sainte Anne* in 1972. There he renews the question of how an analysand can want to become an analyst after knowing how his analysis ended, and he says: “It’s unthinkable, they get there like the marbles in certain games of trictrac that you know, which end up falling into the thing. They get there without any idea of what’s happening to them. Well, once they’re there, they’re there, and there’s something that’s awakened at that point. That’s why I proposed to study it.”<sup>2</sup> He then mentions the functioning of what I understand to be a pinball machine. You’ve probably seen this artefact before: the whirlwind of analysis is compared to the crazy back and forth of the ball in the machine, until suddenly the ball comes out, falls, game over, a melody is awakened by this fall. It’s a cutting and waking effect. Nothing anticipated, announced nor is there a sleight of hand. Surprise, this exit, it’s like a blow. It is impossible to break down the exact path that led this little ball to the exit. However, two things are clear: that the final fall is the result of this previous whirlwind and that the exit is final.

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<sup>1</sup> I use this term in the sense Lacan gave to it in 1975: “*Nous ne croyons pas à l'objet, mais nous constatons le désir, et de cette constatation du désir nous induisons la cause comme objectivée*”. J. Lacan, (1975-1976), *Le Séminaire, livre XXIII, Le sinthome*. Paris, Seuil, 2005, p. 36. [“We do not believe in the object, but we observe desire, and from this observation of desire we induce the cause as something objectified”, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, The Sinthome*. (1975-1976) trans. A. R. Price, ed. J-A Miller, Cambridge, UK and Malden, USA, Polity Press, 2016, p. 26.]

<sup>2</sup> J. Lacan, (1972), *Je parle aux murs. Entretiens de la Chapelle de Sainte-Anne*. Paris, Seuil, 2011, p. 97.

In this particular testimony, the mode of exit produced a rather infectious comic effect on me. After several detours, this passand found herself unexpectedly exiting where she had entered, in a different way. I was able to read a sequence in this analytical journey where crucial moments of this analysis could be punctuated: the entry due to a first symptom of urgent and exhausting overflow to be at the service of others – leaving the body deprived – the analytical work dismantling the support of a fantasy that amalgamated the childish desire to count as a saviour for the Other, being (at the ser-)vice, *ser-vicio*,<sup>3</sup> covering her lack and finally the satisfaction of a transformation and separation that not only produced effects on her body and her positions in life, but rather led her to consent to receive emergency cases, without blocking her and without the vice of seeking to save the Other by always being at his service: to be able to keep quiet and let him speak freely. The contrast of this production with a long analytical journey marked by tragedy and pain was eloquent. The elective moment of the Pass was legible in the consequences of her actions. This verification of the analyst's desire was accompanied by a possible reading of the reasons why this passand now wanted to take the analyst's place.

But this is not common. In most of the testimonies I heard, the material was not so legible and the reasons for becoming an analyst were 'conspicuous by their absence'. Either because in some cases the interpretations of the passers prevailed, or because even among the members of the Cartel we could not reach basic agreements.<sup>4</sup> Most of the time, these other reasons why someone might want to take the analyst's place after having met the end, simply did not appear in the testimonies.

This is a question whose glaring vacancy in the testimonies is striking. Especially if we remember that in 1978 Lacan had already detected this absence in the testimonies presented to the Freudian School of Paris.<sup>5</sup> Twenty years later, in 1999, a similar conclusion was drawn in a report by a European Cartel of the Pass of the *École de la Cause Freudienne*.<sup>6</sup> Another twenty years have passed, this time at the *École des Forums du Champ Lacanien*, and I could not say that this trend has been reversed.

Lacan's question on reasons, which appears in his seminar on *The [Psychoanalytic] Act* and remains, continues in the shadows, and not precisely because it has not been insisted upon. There is something in this question that makes it resistant to becoming part of the doxa. There is no answer to this in the doctrine either. Obviously, it cannot be answered by the simple desire

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<sup>3</sup> Equivoque in Spanish: being-vice/*servicio*/ *ser-vicio*

<sup>4</sup> On some occasions, it has even been difficult to arrive at a consensus about up to what point one maintains the discretion in the argument: 'not to fall into obscenities'. We also debated on how 'to take care of the passand', which for some of us was nothing more than calling things by their name. This has been a point of discord. In my view, the passand takes risks in what he transmits of the historization of his analysis. I understand it is not the cartel's role to mitigate risks, so to speak, not much further than what is necessary in order to exchange about the material with colleagues. In order to make an omelette one has to break eggs and to speak about an ephemeral testimony, one should be ready to speak about the most common childhood desires: incest and murder, sexuality and death. This constitutes no more than the daily discourse in our practice.

<sup>5</sup> *"J'ai voulu avoir des témoignages, naturellement je n'en ai eu aucun, des témoignages de comment ça se produisait.*

*Bien entendu c'est un échec complet, cette passe"*. ["I wanted to have testimonies, naturally I didn't have any testimonies of how it was produced. Of course it's a complete failure, this pass."]. J. Lacan, (1978). *'Conclusion. Journées L'expérience de la passe'*. *Lettres de l'EEP* n° 23, p. 180-181.

<sup>6</sup> "The cartel had to evaluate the testimony of the candidates not only in relation to the end of the analysis, but also to the passage from analysand to analyst about which some testimonies were not convincing. Most of the passers provide little information on this situation, and on the elaborations that concern the analyst's desire, or they do not appear to be articulated and produced by the subjective changes that occur in the analytic experience that is coming to an end." Lucie D'Angelo (1999). *'Rapport du cartel de la passe'* (E2) de l'EEP. Disponible sur [www.wapol.org](http://www.wapol.org).

to want to 'be' a psychoanalyst, by an idealised version or by the social prestige that might be granted professionally, nor is it exhausted by simply getting money. There are other reasons, which should escape self-promotion and personal advantages. They are not extracted from the doctrine and it would be futile for them to be always repeated. On the other hand, these reasons should be able to opt for the 'hystorisation' of this analysis. It is therefore no coincidence that this question remains unanswered.

The insistence of this question about reasons, which is conspicuous by its absence in the testimonies, led me to question myself in this work of the ICG on the destinies of mourning at the end of an analysis. What is discovered at the end is the destiny of litter [*déchet*s] to which the person who has made this journey is reduced: knowing that they are litter. Why would someone choose something like that to make a lifestyle out of? It is clear to me that this goes against the grain of self-promotion and Lacan seems to warn us in the 'Italian Note', when he recommends sending back to their dear studies those who only get the "most effective realisations and the most endearing realities" from their analysis.<sup>7</sup> He also seems to underline it in 1967: "the analyst to come dedicates him- or herself to the agalma of the essence of desire, ready to pay for it through reducing himself, himself and his name, to any given signifier".<sup>8</sup> I read in these quotations a possible evocation of this mourning of the end, which would perhaps be the hinge between knowing oneself to be litter and knowing how to be litter: a particular willingness to pay to occupy this place by 'reducing oneself and one's name', a willingness to lose what may be most precious, in order to be able to enter the play of transference. One more operation that an analysis can produce, but not necessarily.

Transference is resolved in a hole, says Lacan, but peace does not come immediately. There is loss. It's time for mourning. A fundamental, conclusive, terminal mourning, which will not have the resource to mobilise the whole symbolic apparatus for its resolution, since it is precisely this that has been exhausted on the analysing path to the point of no longer wanting to confirm this option. This is the final point of the task of analysis, the analysis is finished. Nor will it have the support of any ritual value,<sup>9</sup> nor will it be resolved in the sole identification with the analyst, since the game of separation is played there.

How, then, does the resolution of this mourning take place in the face of the hole opened in the real by the capture of the inessential quality of the subject supposed to know?

In 1959, Lacan worked on the relationship between desire and mourning and spoke of satisfied<sup>10</sup> and unsatisfied<sup>11</sup> mourning. The former requires a certain sacrifice, a certain renunciation of the self, of what had phallic value for someone and had become the cause of desire. Analysis is, without a doubt and for a significant period of time, something in which a subject invests time, money and libido, to witness an end where what is obtained is the knowledge that the analyst who for many years has carried the agalma of interpretation and endured the transference, is no

<sup>7</sup> J. Lacan, (1973) 'Note italienne'. *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 310.

<sup>8</sup> J. Lacan (1967) 'Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School', trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 9.

<sup>9</sup> Perhaps the demand for the Pass inserts itself in this sequence on some occasions.

<sup>10</sup> « *Le travail du deuil se présente en principe comme une satisfaction donnée à ce qui se produit de désordre en raison de l'insuffisance de tous les éléments signifiants à faire face au trou créé dans l'existence. Il y a mise en jeu totale de tout le système signifiant autour du moindre deuil.* » ["The work of mourning is presented in principle as a satisfaction given to what is produced by disorder due to the insufficiency of all signifying elements to cope with the hole created in existence. The whole signifying system is put into play around the slightest mourning." J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, livre VI, Le désir et son interprétation*, Paris, Ed. de La Martinière, 2013, p. 398.

<sup>11</sup> Hamlet's is precisely an unsatisfied mourning. *Ibid*, p. 399

longer useful. Here a hole and a fundamental mourning opens up, because this mourning for the phallic value that analysis had affects the narcissistic demands of this subject, the narcissistic privileges that we thought we had in analysis where an analyst was at our disposal, listening to all that came to our minds and giving great importance to what is not important in the common discourse. Why would anyone want to do without an analyst in order to be able to continue speaking in this way? A part of it is finally sacrificed, it is reduced, in order to elevate it, eventually to the function of cause. From this loss, a power known to be impotent may emerge. The hole can become a ‘swirling hole’.

This is very far from any possible idealisation of the analyst: “There is no object that is of any greater value than another – this is the mourning around which the analyst's desire is centred”.<sup>12</sup> It remains to be known to what extent an analyst dares to interrogate a being, at the risk of the end, that of disappearing.<sup>13</sup>

From then on, I wonder if it would not be appropriate to conclude with a certain praise of shadows,<sup>14</sup> instead of insisting on an ideal of illumination in relation to the pass or on the possibility of establishing a ‘clinic of the pass’.<sup>15</sup> Freud reserved ‘this place in the shadows’ for the origin of desire. Perhaps the pass is not something so illuminating, neither lightning nor epiphanic. Perhaps it is enough to find transmissible reasons to get enthusiastic about the idea of knowing how to be litter.

*Translated by Chantal Degril*

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<sup>12</sup> J. Lacan (2015 [1960-1961]) *Transference, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII*, ed., J-A Miller, trans., B. Fink, Cambridge UK, Malden USA: Polity Press, 2015, p. 397. Trans. Mod. [*Le Séminaire, livre VIII, Le transfert*. Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 464.]

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 398. [French edition, p. 465.]

<sup>14</sup> Jun'ichirō Tanizaki presents interesting considerations on the praise of shadows in the East. Compare, for example, the treatment of bathrooms (where waste is disposed of) in the West and in the East: extremely bright and with pretensions of absolute cleanliness in the former, hardly visible and mostly in the shade in the latter. Here are some fragments that I found stimulating: “We, Orientals, try to adapt ourselves to the limits imposed on us, we have always conformed to our present condition; we therefore feel no repulsion towards darkness; we resign ourselves to it as to something inevitable: that the light is poor, well, let it be! In addition, we sink with delight into the darkness and find there a special beauty. On the other hand, the Westerners, always on the lookout for progress, are always on the lookout for a better state than the present one, they are always on the lookout for more light, and they have succeeded in passing from the candle to the oil lamp, from oil to gas, from gas to electricity, until they have finished with the slightest escape, with the last refuge of shadows.” J. Tanizaki (1933), *In Praise of Shadows*, Buenos Aires, Sirula, 1994, p. 69

<sup>15</sup> See, in the present volume, my contribution in that regard: “Mind the gap. What we don't recognize in the pass”.

## CARTEL 4

DE-FOSSILISING *LALANGUE* OF THE PASS?SIDI ASKOFARÉ, SANDRA BERTA, MARIA DE LOS ANGELES GOMEZ ESCUDERO,  
SOPHIE ROLLAND-MANAS, COLETTE SOLERDe-fossilising *lalangue* of the pass?Colette Soler  
Paris, France

From my two years of experience in the ICG, I have been left with a worrying question: what is *lalangue* of the dispositive of the Pass? I am not talking about the five idioms of our community, which we verify through experience that they don't get in the way thanks to the translations. I am talking about the fundamental language in which we try to think our experience and our decisions. This is a necessary operation in order to make a School [*pour faire École*]. It is not a question of the decisions of the Cartels of the Pass as regards nominations, nor of what they learn on a case-by-case basis from the passes listened to, whether there is a nomination or not. Moreover, I have no doubt that each member of a Cartel is oriented by the idea, more or less clear, more or less implicit, that he or she has of what a psychoanalysis is, according to what his or her own was and the point at which it ended. It is even a problem characterised by a vicious circle, this subordination of judgement to the experience gained, but there is no way in psychoanalysis to have recourse to an authority more external than that of those who call themselves psychoanalysts.

Only experience, and not only the experience of a psychoanalysis, defies transmission without the sayings [*les dites*] that make its ordering apparent. As Annie Ernaux, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2022, says in a quotation taken up by Jean-Pierre Drapier in his Prelude to the 3rd European Convention next July: “If I don't write them down, things have not been completed, they have only been lived”.<sup>1</sup> “Only lived”! I remember the fracture line which, in the Freudian School of Paris, in the 1970s, saw the advocates of “lived experience” [*vécu*] brandishing the lyre of affects against their *bête noire*, the theorists of the pen and their indifference, always supposed to be cold. This duel had its paradigmatic figures. However, this configuration is no longer there, times are changing, and the common aspiration among us is rather towards the ‘learned discourse’ [*discours savant*] put in Lacanian terms.

For two years, in its debates with seventeen members, our ICG has questioned what had guided the decision of the Cartels of the Pass concerning each of the passes that had been listened to. This is an opportunity to grasp in what language we think our experience. This ‘*we*’ is certainly constituted by the one by one of the seventeen, but it does not prevent the ‘*we*’. Moreover, it is not only a question of the Cartels, but of the language in which the passers themselves hysterise their analysis, try to give an account of it, to grasp its course, its final outcome and its balance [*solde*], no less than the language of the passers in their transmission.

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<sup>1</sup> A. Ernaux, *Le jeune homme*, Paris, NRF Gallimard, 2022.

The words we use to say always come from a prior language and, for us in psychoanalysis, it is the one that Lacan produced by relying at least in part on Freud's. The language forged by Lacan to raise psychoanalysis to the intelligible, the first to renew Freud's language from top to bottom, disconcerts by bringing together sentences creating the most memorable surprises, aphorisms, mocking remarks, multi-purpose *mathemes*, equivocations and concepts, etc., but it has this characteristic of never having stopped until he did. This is what he wanted, I believe. A language in movement that has left in the wake of its gestation an impressive stock of what he himself calls "pretty fossils". Here he was aiming at the use that his contemporaries made of them, and we ourselves as well. His shifts in emphasis were often noted in the dispositive of the Pass, and one could list the vocabulary over time, the crossing, the flash, the reduction at the end, the mourning, the letter, the poem, the satisfaction, the desire of the analyst of course, and so many others – which however could be said in a different way.

This is not exactly about the doxa here. It obviously exists. But in the end, it is not surprising that the speaking (beings) [*parlants*] are "*apparolés*"<sup>2</sup> to the dominant doxa of the group in which they live, they are steeped in it. However, the obscenity of the group is not that of language, it is only added to it. As for language [*la langue*], unlike the group, which is always frozen in a strong inertia, it does not stay in place in its natural state.

Its use produces a constant renewal. In the study of so-called living languages [*langues vivantes*], the question arises as to what makes of each one a unity despite variations in different times and places.<sup>3</sup> Why, for example, is the French of a Rabelais, more widely known throughout the 16th century, only readable to us today if translated, even though it is French? The same question applies to pronunciation: how does a specific pronunciation, for example in Canada, crystallise? It is a fact that every language evolves, and without a master – despite the attempts of the Nazis to bend *lalangue* to fit their own purposes, and despite the current proponents of inclusive writing who are attempting a similar operation. It evolves through usage, the same way it is acquired, through oral usage. Curiously, the use of language, far from presiding over entropy as is usual with other uses, presides over an incessant creativity and, moreover, essentially without authors – although not without agents, and these are all the users of this language. It has nothing to do with the degree of culture; it is as much the so-called popular uses as those of the most sophisticated writers or poets that are part of these reorganisations, as if at every moment the *jouissance* of *l'achose* [*l'achose jouissance*]<sup>4</sup> were in excess of, or out of step with the language received, to the point of having to secrete something new, to make new words, new expressions that are deposited according to the existential vagaries. This is where we see the ambiguity of our academy, a sort of soft police force for language, which welcomes innovations while setting the limits that freeze them and that will be inscribed in the dictionaries.

Strangely enough, for analytic languages it is the opposite. What happened to Lacan's language among the Lacanians, happened to Freud's in the IPA, its use progressively mortified it. Fossils have been deposited by this teaching in spades over the years, according to the times and the people, and one can vary *ad infinitum* the bone to gnaw on that each person can choose as a "ready-to-think". Thus goes the fundamental *lalangue* of the group. As a result, we don't even speak Lacanian, but rather dialects that crystallise according to the times and the groups. I shall

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<sup>2</sup> Editor's note: '*Apparolé*' is a neologism playing on the French verb '*paroler*', 'to speak' and the noun, '*parole*', 'speech'. It connotes the way the subject is made from language and is permeated by whatever the dominant discourse maybe.

<sup>3</sup> Voir à ce sujet les travaux de Bernard Cerquigni, linguiste que nous avons écouté à l'EPFCL-France.

<sup>4</sup> Editor's note: '*L'achose*' is Lacan's play on '*La Chose*', the Freudian Thing. '*L'achose*' combines the Thing with the lost object of *jouissance*, *a*, the real that "tickles from inside", as Lacan says in *Seminar XVI*.

spare the examples out of indulgence, especially since this doesn't prevent, sometimes, the work of elucidation that can revive the fossil, for a while at least, and also some precious finds, but the great cart is immobile.

So the real question is this: where is the damage, and for whom, beyond the effects of repetition and sterility, beyond the fact that today's psychoanalysts, although more talkative than those of 1970 of which Lacan spoke, remain like them "lacking invention".<sup>5</sup> Isn't this a counter-effect of the School that is announcing itself?

In order to grasp it, I'll stop for a moment at the function of language in discourse. The opposition, even contradiction, between the creative effects of use in vernacular languages and the entropic effects of clinical language in psychoanalysis is striking. Every living language certainly moves towards the dead language, because all the verbal delectations of the speakers that have been deposited in it cool down as soon as they are entered in the dictionary. This is why Lacan said that a language said to be alive because it is spoken – language in the sense of an idiom – is nevertheless a dead language. So we can say, "Tell me the language you speak and I will tell you...". Or, why not, "Tell me the language of the School that you enjoy and I will tell you what you do". It is that for each speaking (being), always caught up in a discourse moreover, what matters is the language he chooses. To speak is to choose one's language from the great stock of the maternal *lalangue*. Now it is the language that each person speaks that accommodates, welcomes and maintains the thrusts of desire, the vibrations of *l'achose* and the vital drive at play in his relationship to psychoanalysis. On this point, nothing is more harmful than the desire to be heard, which pushes one to choose the language most common to the majority. What do *passands*, passers, Cartels enjoy in the common language of the fossils that addresses the common of the group? Surely not the analytic thing [*la chose analytique*], and in this case, what's the point of saying as one does: transmit!

It is because it seems that the effect of transmission that circulates from one to the other does not only pass through the discursive syntax and its arguments but through the obscenity of language, the contagion of *jouissance*. The term obscenity certainly sounds negative, it is a bit off-putting, but it indicates what the driving force of language and its bodily effects is, whether we situate it in terms of desire or *jouissance*. This is true even for *sexuated* love and reproduction, which require nothing less than "the *jouissance* of speaking", so how could it not be the case in psychoanalysis?

This fossilised language has a function: it pretends to know, it allows the knowledge it contains to take the place of the semblance. So is it not the pale reverence of the dead language to the living language of Lacan? A form of embalmed transference love. I underline the irony of this, since it is always accompanied by the great watchword of the famous "fall of the subject supposed to know", which one does not fail to lose track of in the Pass, in view of any nomination of AS, either in offering it when one is a *passand*, or to demand it when one is in a Cartel.

Frozen language is probably the recourse of what Lacan calls "psychoanalysts lacking invention".<sup>6</sup> There is no reason to accuse them, only that there are many reasons to follow the effect that this dead language engages: it is the turn of the analytic discourse towards that in which the dead languages of acquired knowledge command, the academic [*l'universitaire*] whose

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<sup>5</sup> J. Lacan, « Lituraterre », *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 12.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

“incompatibility”<sup>7</sup> with that of psychoanalysis Lacan saw fit to mark once again in his Postface. And indeed, how can we hope that the singularities without equal, with the absolute difference of their pass at the end in a language passed to the semblance of knowledge that excludes them, will be circumscribed as we wish? If the “I think, therefore it enjoys itself” [*je pense donc se jouit*] just like speaking, there is no way not to involve *lalangue* with which one chooses to speak and think in the effect of transmission or non-transmission.

*Translated by Chantal Degril*

## **RESPONSE TO COLETTE SOLER’S ‘DE-FOSSILISING *LALANGUE* OF THE PASS?’**

*Sidi Askofaré*  
Toulouse, France

At the end of our ICG’s work and of our cartel formed in Buenos Aires, Colette Soler presented us with a stimulating text, to which she gave a title whose interrogative character, even so, barely scrapes its polemical edge: ‘De-fossilising *lalangue* of the Pass?’

What reply to such a contribution which not only summarizes the major part of the results of our two-year experience, but also diagnoses the state of the Pass in our School, the limitations having to do with group effects and opens up perspectives called for by the necessary counter-effects of the School?

If I had to retain only one point in this reply, it would be the one indexed by the question from which the title of this decisive contribution derives: “What is *lalangue* of the dispositive of the Pass?”

The Pass, last born of the dispositives of psychoanalysis – invented to discern analysts on the basis of the unconscious and, if possible, capture the ‘desire of the analyst’ – the Pass thus shares, with the treatment and with supervision, the irreducible fact of belonging to the field of language and function of speech.

Furthermore, is it not strange to question this Pass from *lalangue*, a notion that came late in Lacan’s teaching, just like such equally essential advances as the Borromean knot or the *parlêtre*?

In truth, more than any other of the two dispositives that preceded it, the Pass – and in particular the Pass as a dispositive of an international School like ours, multilingual from the outset – expands, complicates and sophisticates, so to speak, that for which the treatment and supervision offer only the blueprint: namely, the complex articulation of the passand’s *lalangue*, the language, sometimes languages, of his analysis, the passer’s languages and, *in fine*, the language of the Cartels.

Nevertheless, as Colette Soler wisely noted, nothing of our common experience in our ICG can suggest that the diversity of the languages of our School community in itself constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the transmission of testimonies and, therefore to the work of the Cartels. In short, the problem is not translation, whatever the losses this operation always and necessarily entails. Perhaps the

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<sup>7</sup> J. Lacan, ‘Postface au *Séminaire XP*, *Autres écrits*, op. cit., p. 504.



rigor and effort of precision required by translation make it even more reliable than the apparently common, shared understanding in a monolingual Cartel.

Beyond a common language – in this case impossible – what remains if not the common doctrine, the notions and uncommon concepts in which this doctrine is articulated?

And if so, could we consider this conceptual language – the vocabulary and syntax of our referential knowledge (*savoir*) – “as *lalangue* of the Pass”? The question arises if only because this term, *lalangue*, carries references to the body, to *jouissance* and to the enigmatic affects.

But that is not what matters. What matters, it seems to me, lies in the fact that the Pass is situated at the juncture of the singular and the institutional, the hystorisation of a singular experience and the elaboration of a community’s experience. Whence the challenge which, ideally, consists in making the passand’s singular *lalangue* pass into the discourse of the community. But how to transmit the passand’s singular hystorisation to a community which thinks and speaks in the institution-language? And the adoption of this institution-language for testifying to an experience, singular and woven from *lalangue*, does it not violate the “*One knows*” of the ‘Preface to the English-Language Edition’<sup>1</sup> of Seminar XI?

Perhaps nothing remains for the passand except to follow the path traced by the writer: “My history is in that of others, and yet I must tell it, so that it exist and be added to the others *with its difference*.”<sup>2</sup> This is not possible in *lalangue* alone, which is destined to absolute non-communication, or in the institution-language, which reabsorbs the singular saying into the common, even universalizing, discourse. Could this be the limit, the failure, the failing of the Pass, which is also its good fortune, that of always having to be recommenced?

*Translated by Devra Simin*

## **Response to Colette Soler’s ‘De-fossilising *lalangue* of the Pass?’**

*Maria de Los Angeles Gómez*  
Puerto Rico

At the end of our mandate in the ICG, the members, having assembled in Argentina (in-room for the first time), decided that it was important to collect and transmit something of our experience. This involved a proposal to work in the ephemeral cartels, each one working according to its own interests and methods, the product of which would make up part of the next issue of *Wunsch*. Each cartel, formed at random, had the opportunity to work on a question or concern that had arisen during its time in the ICG. In the case of our cartel, it involved a question that sums up a good number of the concerns and questions that emerged during our

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<sup>1</sup> J. Lacan, ‘The Preface to the English-Language Edition’ (1976), in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI*, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York & London, W. W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. vii.

<sup>2</sup> A. Ernaux, *L’atelier noir*, Paris, Gallimard, 2022, p. 167. “*Mon histoire est dans celle des autres, et pourtant je dois la raconter, pour qu’elle existe et qu’elle s’ajoute aux autres avec sa différence.*”

two years of work. A reflection that refers, in our case, to the question of *lalangue* in the dispositive of the Pass and the effects of its possible and frequently verified fossilisation.

Colette Soler has written a first text based on the question: ‘To de-fossilise the *lalangue* of the Pass?’, in which she invites us to reflect on the language with which we think about the experience of the Pass, and the ways in which the structural markers interweave and adapt or not to the singularity of each case and each Pass. What place do we give to the doxa in the dispositive of the Pass? What place do we give to the discourse on the pass and its effects in the constitution and crystallisation of the doxa that would serve as reference? These are crucial questions that have permeated our School since its beginnings and they point, even further upstream, to the traces and setbacks of the implementation of the dispositive since Lacan proposed it in 1967.

With this proposition, we know that Lacan sought to give a certain form and a certain place to the experience of formation, trying to shed light on an essential question that emerges at the end of the analysis, which refers to the production of the analyst and to the fundamental question of the guarantee in a School of psychoanalysis. Thus was borne his formula of the ‘desire of the analyst’, and the question of the emergence of this desire. The possibility of giving an account of it in the dispositive of the Pass was also evoked, which generated a theoretical, clinical and ethical engagement, but also a political one that would shake up the different analytic institutions in which the experiment of the Pass was attempted.

Part of the difficulty refers to the enigma that runs through the Lacanian formulation of the ‘desire of the analyst’. He tried to account for this formula at different times, but he was never able to clarify theoretically and clinically the multiple implications that his proposition involved. He inscribed it, for example, in the sense of the possibility of assuming a function, designated at a given moment in his teaching by an *x*. He also came close to this in his writing ‘On Freud’s “*Trieb*” and the desire of the psychoanalyst’, when he declared that “... it is ultimately the analyst’s desire that operates in psychoanalysis”.<sup>1</sup> It would then be the axis on which the whole dispositive of the treatment is articulated, pointing especially to the extent of its function as operator, less so to its emergence, not to say product of the analysis pushed to its ultimate consequences.

But it is a product that does not unveil itself, but rather takes shape sometimes in the obscure clarity of what Lacan called this “dark cloud that covers this juncture [...], the one at which the psychoanalysand passes to becoming a psychoanalyst”.<sup>2</sup> A cloud supposed to dissipate, that would allow us to filter something of this pass that leaves room for the emergence of an unprecedented desire, a desire without references or previous moorings. Dissipating part of this cloud is undoubtedly the work of the analysand, but what is the work of dissipation that is incumbent on the School? Moreover, would it be possible to sift through it with the conceptual coordinates that we use to approach the clinic?

There have been many attempts to bridge the gap that subsists between the transmission of the singular experience of the passand and the community of experience, and with this the path of discourse and of concepts has been reinforced, some among them being elevated to the category of precepts. The proposition of Lacan on *lalangue* makes it possible to do something else with

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<sup>1</sup> J. Lacan, (1964), ‘On Freud’s “*Trieb*” and the Psychoanalyst’s Desire’, *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 2006, p. 724

<sup>2</sup> J. Lacan, (1967), ‘Proposition of 9th October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’, *Analysis*, Vol. 6, 1995 (trans Russell Grigg), p. 8

this difficulty posed by the flaw in transmission, since, open to misunderstanding and nonsense, “*lalangue* affects us first of all by everything it brings with it by way of effects that are affects”.<sup>3</sup>

The dispositive created by Lacan is a wager because a certain conjugation can be produced from a structure that is always put to the test both in its strength and in its fragility. This would be an effort to frame something of the singular dimension of the experience with the School, although we know that there is neither a manual nor a common measure, nor an institutional language to collect everything that, from the singular ‘*lalangue*’ of the passand, resounds in the common space of the dispositive. So, as Colette Soler asks, “how can we hope that the singularities without equal, with the absolute difference of their pass at the end in a language passed to the semblance of knowledge that excludes them, will be circumscribed as we wish?”<sup>4</sup>

Although knowledge is a crucial and complex axis of experience, it would be good to recall something that goes beyond it and refers to what Lacan called in the Proposition: the glimpse; ‘the glimpse’, which is played out in the visual field from where the lightning flash can be glimpsed –luminous but silent rage as Prévert said – inherent in the moment of the pass. This electrical metaphor brings us back to the question of what can be transmitted and received of this unique and brilliant intensity of the *lalangue* of the passand? How can we avoid, following this metaphor, the electrifying force of the experience of the pass being diluted with the lightning rod of the doxa and the desire to make sense? Well, as Colette Soler says, “the effect of transmission [...] does not pass only through the discursive syntax and its arguments, but through the obscenity of language, the contagion of *jouissance*”. How to maintain in the effect of transmission, what sustains it as the vital beat of the School, avoiding the drift towards the university discourse or towards what Freud called the safe ground of science?

*Translated by Deborah McIntyre*

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<sup>3</sup> J. Lacan, (1972-1973), *Encore, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX*, NY, W.W. Norton & Co., 1998 (trans. Bruce Fink), p. 139

<sup>4</sup> C. Soler, ‘De-fossilising *lalangue* of the pass ?’ in this issue of *Wunsch*.

**RESPONSE TO COLETTE SOLER'S  
'DE-FOSSILISING LALANGUE OF THE PASS?'**

*Sophie Rolland Manas*  
Narbonne, France

*Preamble*

For me, coming to the end of this new experience as a member of an ICG, I recall the opportunity and responsibility of listening to the passes in the Cartels in which I participated, whether there had been a nomination or not. In the same vein, I don't forget the journey of an epistemic work elaborated with the participation of each one of the members of the ICG. The seventeen monthly meetings during these two years have registered the value of what this work can be in a School of the pass of the Lacanian field and underlines, if need be, that of a community of experience. Communal work, the work of exchanges and discussions, but not without the singularity and difference which makes us "scattered disparate individuals", and with the idea of being heard in a shared language. Not the one which concerns plurilingualism, which can be resolved by translations without major problems. And this, all the more so, if we refer to J.L. Borges telling us that it is "the original which shows itself to be unfaithful to its translation". But rather, our shared language would be the one that has to do with *lalangue* of the unconscious with which we orient our work in the dispositives of the School in order to think about the experience and what can be transmitted from it.

Thus, it is in this ICG's termination and with the aim of leaving a trace of the work, of placing some written productions in *Wunsch* and therefore in the School, that during the international meeting in Buenos Aires the ephemeral cartels were formed by the drawing of lots.

In reference to the work elaborated and the discussions in the ICG over two years, several exchanges, and reflections, between the five members of the ephemeral cartel led to this question: "De-fossilizing *lalangue* of the pass?" It's what I have taken from reading Colette Soler's text, with the clarity and epistemic density it contains, and no less invigorating, that I am going to attempt to address this question by basing it on the experience of the Cartels of the Pass.

From each pass listened to and from the elaborations that followed I will start from the idea that each one of us hears at the point that he has reached in his own experience. Lacan insists on this in his Proposition, "We start from the fact that the *root* of the experience in the field of psychoanalysis posed in its extension, the only possible basis for motivating a School, is to be found in the psychoanalytic experience itself, we mean taken in intension: the only correct reason to formulate the need for an introductory psychoanalysis to operate in this field."<sup>1</sup>

We note that if the experience of a successful analysis is an inescapable and necessary condition to welcome each transmission of testimony of the pass, it is not sufficient. It can even sometimes "be a problem" Colette Soler emphasizes, if the decisions taken are based solely on the

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<sup>1</sup> J. Lacan, 'Première version de la "Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'École"', *Annexes, Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 577-578.

knowledge gained from the experience. Indeed, it can only play its part in conjunction with the work of the Cartel's elaboration.

This time of elucidation to several individuals is fundamental. It is inscribed in a relation between the singularity of the experience of the passand, the logic of the testimony and of the structural markers (fall of the subject supposed to know, completion of mourning, turn of the pass, therapeutic effects, identification with the symptom, etc.), often tinged moreover with the *doxa* of the time with the risk that this entails of a slide towards orthodoxy. This work cannot be done without its articulation with the teaching of Lacan nor without the link to the School, and always by re-interrogating the relationship to psychoanalysis. I have the idea that continuing to think about the pass, 'putting the heart back into the work', is probably in the attempt to identify something real at play in the pass, at each stage of the dispositive and more widely in the School.

Perhaps you will say, and you will be right, that although fundamental, these articulations are not yet sufficient and that they do not prevent the ever-present *doxa*, nor the 'fossilisation' from continuing its work.

Perhaps, moreover, we can put *lalangue* with the "pretty fossils" and next to "The unconscious is the real, insofar as it is holed [...] soon everyone will repeat it and, as long as it keeps raining on it, it will end up making a very pretty fossil".<sup>2</sup> But nothing prevents us from using these fossils, from making them work. And isn't this already "de-fossilising"?

Is it then a question of moving, airing, opening up, letting originality pass through, something new and a little invention in the dispositive of the Pass?

To question the pass starting from *lalangue* can appear as a paradox between what would be most singular, *lalangue* specific to each person and a School dispositive in which the members work together.

However, the paradox is not an obstacle if we think that the elaborations, the epistemic work are done by several and where the relation of each one to *lalangue* differs. Something then can allow for movement, to act on the dead language, to reinvigorate it. Indeed, with *lalangue*, it is not a question of a private language, any more than of jargon, but of that which resonates. That which is heard despite the signifiers.

In any case, I will dare to say that the experience over two years at the ICG has evolved in a space of work in which *lalangue* can cease to be dead. That *lalangue* can regain liveliness is what the satisfaction we find in our work bears witness to.

*Translated by Esther Faye*

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<sup>2</sup> J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire, RSI*, 1974-1975, unpublished, lesson of 15 April 1975.

**RESPONSE TO COLETTE SOLER'S  
« DE-FOSSILISING *LALANGUE* OF THE PASS? »**

*Sandra Berta*  
São Paulo, Brazil

De-fossilising *lalangue* of the Pass? A precise text – passer of the experience of the ICG over these two years – that Colette Soler proposed for our ephemeral cartel. Reading it has given me the effect of a warning that, written as a question, is still one. On the other hand, reading the replies that the colleagues of this cartel have provided did not dispel that warning, it only confirmed it.

In this text Colette Soler conveys a preoccupation that somehow slipped throughout all the work carried out and it certainly takes up concerns of members of the International Colleges of the Guarantee that preceded us.

The question makes a hole with that whirlwind effect that a hole can produce if we don't cover it, as we have tendency to do. The problem it points to is a warning based on a verification. That is: how could we make from the School that Lacan intended, an experience of permanent construction, something that is not a fossil? Could a School of analysts fossilize the question of the analyst and psychoanalysis? It would be a contradiction if it weren't a potential confirmation.

A warning not to forget that 'the big cart [*carro*] is motionless' and that our responsibility is to make it work, to make it move in some way. The offer puts the focus on the opportunity that *lalangue* provides, the one that we can collect from the dispositive of the Pass ... if we don't fossilize it.

*Lalangue*, event, linguistic equivocation that Lacan put into relief when he asked himself about the knowledge of the psychoanalyst. A knowledge that has to be orientated by the effects of the real and from which he expected other effects than those of university knowledge. It is one of those effects that would make it possible for the obscenity of the language to be trafficked in singular equivocations of *lalangue*.

But that doesn't happen at any time. It seems that this is the fundamental demand that Lacan called "it is not that," that something can be reversed so that this obscenity can be transmuted to the singular. Time of the mourning of the end – one of our 'structural references' that we have been debating all these years.

Obscenity of what was fundamental because of language and the demand. Can it be an event? Is this what Lacan named "analytic act"?

In the Cartels we are at the disposal of those effects of transmutation of the obscene into the singular that indicates “the *achose*” [the *athing*]. That is where the singular is trafficked, sometimes.

The chances of that happening are slim. That is why in our debates we confirmed that we could defend our thesis better when there was no nomination of AS. As if defending a nomination would make a hole in the argument. The barrel of the Danaïdes is shown there. The ‘structural references’ are also somewhat punctured there by “there is something of the new” in each singular case. There is something about the act that breaks down any argument. That affects any agent of that dispositive that Lacan named “The Pass” for his School.

In the end, maybe that warning of today is not dissonant with what Lacan told us about the act of the analyst, the passage from analysand to analyst. After a Seminar dedicated to it, he will continue saying that he did not conclude his arguments about that so-called act. He said it a few times in other Seminars. And after that he went back to the topology of speech, to finally focus on distinguishing ‘the said’ from ‘the saying’. Precisely, that saying which is deduced when a shift in speech is produced.

That is the reason why I underline the difference between being trapped and swearing by the discourse about which Colette Soler writes: there is a choice. Whether I follow it well, depends on the “*achose*”, cause of the analyst’s desire.

Not to be captivated by the doxa would be one of the first conditions for the experience of the School – and of each Pass – to be one, and that in some way, those experiences were not summable. There, some of the risk of futility is lost. There, one would also hope not to fall into an “embalmed transference love” – a strong warning Colette Soler makes in this text.

In fact, between the singular and the tendency to the universal of the doxa, the analytic act continues to be its paradox. I read it in the replies to Colette Soler’s text that the colleagues of this cartel wrote.

I quote them:

Sidi Askofaré: “Could it be the limit, the failure, the fault of the Pass, which is also its opportunity, that of always having to start over?”

Sophie Rolland-Manas: “Something can then move and act on the dead language to revive it. Indeed, with *lalangue* it is not the question of a private language, nor a wooden language, but of what makes it resonate. The one that can be heard despite the signifiers.”

Maria de los Ángeles Gómez: “The dispositive created by Lacan is a wager so that a certain conjugation can be produced based on a structure that is always put to the test, both in its strength and in its fragility”.

To which I can add, paraphrasing Lacan: *lalangue* of the Pass ... or worse, in the case of a School of psychoanalysts, as we claim it to be. There is maybe something of a singular jouissance, made and extracted by *lalangue* in the experience of each analysis, that can answer to the permanent risk of fossilizing *lalangue* of the Pass.

In the end, Lacan wrote of *lalangue*: “It’s about animating in the sense of a stirring up, a tickling, a scratching, a fury”.<sup>1</sup> The challenge not to petrify our experience of the School is set: that *lalangue* of the Pass does not lose that track defined by *lalangue*.

*Translated by Elisa Querejeta Casares*

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<sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. (1973-1974) El Seminario, libro 21: *Les non-dupes errent*. Clase del 11 de junio de 1974.



VII<sup>th</sup> INTERNATIONAL

MEETING OF THE SCHOOL

June 30, 2022 – Buenos Aires

THE PASS TO THE ANALYST

## OPENING

*Fernando Martínez*  
Puerto Madryn, Argentina

“The pass is not the end” our colleague Patrick Barillot reminded us in a work of 2006, after having been nominated AS, having presented himself for the pass before the end of his analysis.<sup>1</sup> Sixteen years later, we find ourselves gathered here to take up again some aspects of this distinction under the title: ‘The pass to the analyst’. We thus intend to shed light on a point which so difficult to locate, that is, the emergence of the desire of the analyst, starting from the act which, by structure, is quickly denied.

The title derives from the epistemic work of the current International College of the Guarantee on the differences between the pass, the end and the emergence of the analyst’s desire in order to re-emphasise the latter as the fundamental objective of the dispositive of the Pass. In many testimonies received in the Cartels of the Pass, the search for the confirmation of the end of the analysis is noticeable, whereas the grasping of the cause that has led the analysand to want to occupy the place of the analyst is practically nil – a question that was also already a reflection on the doxa in the work by Patrick to which I referred.

A further, implicit distinction should then be noted: the completed analysis is not the end of the analysis either.

The first refers to the turn of passing from the analysand to the analysed, illustrated in the clinic with the fall of the subject supposed to know, which establishes the fundamental condition for the act, the advent of the analyst. The second, on the other hand, refers to the logical time of the end of analysis, a time that has a duration that is its own and often incalculable, in that the analysis can be finished before the end point, as several of the works of the Analysts of the School since the beginnings of our School testify.

In the text calling this meeting, Colette Soler pointed this out in these words:

If it is well evaluated that the analyst can be produced before the end of the analysis, then we will be able to focus less on what is missing in the testimony of the passand than on what suffices to attest of the analysand. However, the real question will remain: the analysand is still only a potential analyst, who will have to choose to know if, as a psychoanalyst, he or she wants to be one in act.

We have programmed several panel discussions today with the purpose of navigating amid these distinctions: we will listen to our Analysts of the School; we will discuss the work of this International College of the Guarantee; some colleagues will speak about their beginnings in the function of the analyst; and we will culminate with a political debate about the social utility of the analyst. All this with the aim of taking over and approaching the question introduced by Lacan about the cause of the emergence of that unprecedented desire which is the desire of the analyst. This is a cause that even in today remains under thick shadows, but which nevertheless disposes us to work on the impossible.

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<sup>1</sup> Barillot, Patrick (2006). ‘The pass is not the end’. *Wunsch*, March 2006.

We will take advantage of this re-encounter on this continent where trying to make the impossible exist is a matter of everyday life. We will try once again. But not without first paraphrasing Borges' warning as he prepares to transcribe his experience before *The Aleph*: *What my eyes saw was simultaneous: what I will transcribe will be successive, because language is so. I will, however, pick up something.*<sup>2</sup>

On behalf of all our colleagues in Argentina and the members of the International Collee of the Guarantee, and with special thanks for the work of the Organising Committee of this event which, pandemic by pandemic, has twice organised this Rendezvous, I welcome you to the VIIth International Encounter of the School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field, wishing us a productive day of work and debate.

*Translated by Leonardo Rodríguez*

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<sup>2</sup> Borges, Jorge Luis (1996). *El Aleph*. Barcelona, Emecé Editores, p. 196.

## THE AS SPEAK TO US ABOUT THE PASS TO THE ANALYST

### PROMOTION OF A FORFEITURE

Anastasia Tzavidopoulou  
Paris, France

If Lacan in his 1967 ‘Proposition’ refers us to the game of chess,<sup>1</sup> it is undoubtedly to underline the openings, openings of the unconscious, which condition the *logical* continuation of the game. It is a way of signalling to us what is too easily taken for granted, that is, the link, the dialectic between the beginning and the end of the analysis. We enter through the transference, we leave through the Pass and we are supposed to grasp something of this journey, something beyond the therapeutic effects. This exit implies a new entry.

By studying the proposition on the Pass, we notice the turn, the shift Lacan makes in relation to the Freudian dispositive. Where Freud proposes a natural end to analysis that comes up against the impasse of castration, with the Pass, Lacan proposes a logical end. But, for all that, does this turn exclude all continuity with Freud?

I'll focus on two points.

The first: Freud wrote to Binswanger that “there is nothing in the structure of man that predisposes him to occupy himself with psychoanalysis”:<sup>2</sup> no natural tendency for man to deal with the unconscious, with its deciphering and elaboration. Could one suggest that between the lines of this Freudian observation, which bears on psychoanalysis in the world as “enemy of civilisation”<sup>3</sup> but also on the analytic act itself, this observation of the natural human ineptitude for the unconscious, the proposition of the Pass would come to be inscribed as a process *contra-nature*, ending up in this strange place which is that of the psychoanalyst, a place one would not necessarily desire?

Second point: Freud remains sceptical of the excessive respect for the mysterious unconscious as well as the errors and the dazzle that it can generate.<sup>4</sup> Not to be dazzled by the unconscious but to grasp something of the wager of the one who goes through the dispositive of the Pass; not to be dazzled by the unconscious, which means referring to the logic of the treatment which is not the logic of its narrative, and transmitting a piece of it to the analytic community. This is the difficulty because we are confronted with the unconscious as hypothesis, as deduction. We

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<sup>1</sup> J. Lacan, ‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’, trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 4

<sup>2</sup> S. Freud, L. Binswanger, *Lettre du 28 mai 1911, Correspondance : 1908-1938*, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1995, p. 134.

<sup>3</sup> S. Freud, *Résistances à la psychanalyse*, *Résultats, Idées, Problèmes, II*, 1921-1938, Paris, PUF, 1985.

<sup>4</sup> S. Freud, *Théorie et pratique de l'interprétation du rêve*, *Résultats, Idées, Problèmes, II*, 1921-1938, Paris, PUF, 1985, p. 82.

are confronted with Lacan's assertion "the unconscious is",<sup>5</sup> full stop. And at the same time, we are invited to formalise something of its singular logic, the logic of an hypothesis, and not that of a notion, or to put it another way we are invited to give life to this "full stop" that "the unconscious is", full stop. This formulation by Lacan comes after his reading of the Freudian position. Freud does not know what the unconscious is but he works on it and is worked by it. In the dispositive of the Pass, we are called to say not what the unconscious is, but what it is for each one.

So, Lacan relies on Freud in order to extract from the experience what distinguishes it from the treatment and goes beyond the Freudian impasse to propose the pass from psychoanalysis to psychoanalyst within a psychoanalytic School as a central question of the end of the analysis. We could therefore understand that this proposition of Lacan's, a proposition with a new political import in which the place of knowledge in a School is to be examined anew, coming on the edge of the Freudian field, on the edge of the unconscious enunciated as an hypothesis, and also of the question "what does the psychoanalyst want?"<sup>6</sup> a question posed by Freud, as well as the question, still being posed since then, "what is a psychoanalyst?"

"At the beginning of psychoanalysis is the transference", we find this well-known expression in the 1967 text. It can of course be understood as a transference of all psychoanalysts to Freud. But it is also the pivot of the analytic act around which the unconscious, a supposed knowledge, ought to unveil itself in the form of a knowledge that does not know. This reference to transference, to the subject supposed to know and to the beginning has its importance in a text that deals with the end. There is a natural movement at the beginning of an analysis, an address to the analyst. It is an act of belief. The subject-analysand counts on the guarantee of the analyst's presence and thanks to this presence he does not have to be cautious in the face of the dazzle of the unconscious. On the contrary, it's the very condition for him to be at home there.<sup>7</sup> The entry into analysis, that is, being under the effect of the transference, supposes an 'I don't know', 'I know nothing', followed by an 'I don't know what I'm looking to know but I'd like to know something'.

Hence, the question that can be asked, and I ask it rhetorically: does the analysing subject, at the end of his analytic journey, leave 'his home' through the Pass? Would he be leaving the imprudence of the unconscious? Would he be leaving the 'I don't know', the 'I don't know what I'm saying', would he be leaving all the imaginary and symbolic elements that have clothed his history, his *hystoriole*? I would say yes. At stake, a knowledge. This is necessary for there to be something of the psychoanalyst, but is it enough?

I return to the metaphor of the chess game. The analysand, like a pawn, advances imprudently but not without a certain logic; this is the necessary condition of the transference because the analyst is there to guide the desire of the subject in analysis, not toward himself but toward an other than himself. It is Lacan who underlines this and he adds: "We [the analysts] ripen the desire of the subject for an other than himself".<sup>8</sup> The analysand, like a pawn, advances towards a 'promotion', this is a chess term: a pawn, having arrived at the end of the chessboard, the last row, can 'metamorphose' itself, it can transform itself into a knight, a rook, a queen [*dame*], even a bishop; but never into a king. And most often the pawn is turned into a queen because the queen is the most powerful piece, capable of moving horizontally, vertically or diagonally as

<sup>5</sup> J. Lacan, 'Radiophonie', *Autres écrits, op. cit.*, p. 432.

<sup>6</sup> S. Freud, *Cinq leçons sur la psychanalyse*, Paris, Payot, 1966, p. 45.

<sup>7</sup> J. Lacan, *Séminaire XI, Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse*, Paris, Seuil, Essais, 1973, p. 44.

<sup>8</sup> J. Lacan, *Séminaire VI, Le désir et son interprétation*, Paris, La Martinière, 2013, p. 572.

many squares as she wishes. But what is the ‘promotion’ involved in analysis? Promotion into a queen is promotion of a forfeiture because the analysand will arrive at the end of the journey in order to embody the non-knowledge that the queen, the woman, bears, the non-knowledge in the unconscious. This promotion is necessary for the pass to the analyst. I will explain.

The analyst is the product of this journey, of his own particular, singular journey, he is the product of the transference, the product of “what happens at the end of the transference relation”.<sup>9</sup> What the Pass verifies is the knowledge that the analysed subject reaches, and this knowledge is not completely disconnected from the ‘I do not know’ of the entry. This knowledge at the end is precisely not dazzled by the unconscious but is the result of a logical operation. The ‘I don’t know’ of the beginning, which implies a knowledge in itself, orders, under the sign of the transference and the direction of the cure, the knowledge of the end. This is how I hear Lacan’s expression “the not-known [*non-su*] is arranged as the framework of knowledge”.<sup>10</sup> Dialectic, then, between the beginning and the end, between the entry and the exit.

To arrive at the end means that the analysed subject has left some feathers behind, he has left behind a knowledge to be precise, the result of the free association which produces signification. The pass produces the analyst, says Lacan, who “holds only the signification he engenders in retaining this nothing”.<sup>11</sup> A nothing of metamorphosis, a ‘nothing of knowledge’ which precisely breaks away from the ‘nothing’ of ‘I want to know nothing about it’, an agalmatic nothing. We thus pass from the Freudian question, “what does the psychoanalyst want” to the Lacanian question, “what must the analyst know in analysis”.<sup>12</sup>

At the end of the journey “there will be *some* [of the] psychoanalyst [*du psychanalyste*]”<sup>13</sup>, says Lacan, product of his very experience,<sup>14</sup> and the partitive article ‘of the’ [*du*] reflects the particular, peculiar to each subject analysed in his singularity. So, if the particular is identified in the treatment, in the deciphering of the unconscious by particular ways, the singular, outside class because it is without comparison, aims to define, to name what is not comparable in the analysed subject, and which thus orients him to accompany the singular that he will encounter in his treatments. So, it’s a matter of a particular experience at the end of the analysis, an experience that is not acquired by the sum of the one+one+one of several knowledges, as in other fields, but an experience that will oblige the analyst, product of this experience, to be confronted *each time* with the One. This is what differentiates the analyst who passes through the dispositive of the Pass from the one who has reached the end of his analysis. In the dispositive we are confronted with the One of the experience because we are obliged to move back from the dazzle of the unconscious, we are obliged to take on board something that slips away from the knowledge of the psychoanalyst. This is what we are called to testify to, and is what our mandate pushes us to produce.

To conclude, I take up the term ‘promotion’, still in the vocabulary of chess, and which is part of my title. I hear the pass to the analyst in this movement that designates this strange promotion. Promotion of a pathway certainly, but also promotion of a forfeiture, undoubtedly

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<sup>9</sup> J. Lacan, ‘Proposition’, op. cit., p. 8

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, “This does not mean anything ‘in particular’, but it is articulated in chains of letters that are so rigorous that provided not one of them is left out, the not-known is arranged in the framework of knowledge.” p. 6 (trans. mod.).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7 (trans. mod.).

<sup>12</sup> J. Lacan, ‘Variations on the Standard treatment’, in *Écrits, The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W. Norton & Company, p. 289.

<sup>13</sup> J. Lacan, ‘On the subject who is finally in question’, *Écrits*, op. cit., p. 196

<sup>14</sup> J. Lacan, ‘Proposition’ op. cit., p. 10 (trans. mod.).

a noble forfeiture insofar as at the end of the game the analyst will have the task of honouring the feminine position in the framework of a School. Honouring the feminine position would mean honouring it in the embodiment of the 'one' analyst, one among others who will make up the School, and also honouring it in the not-knowing [*non-savoir*] of this position, a not-knowing to which the subject is led, thanks to the knowledge he has acquired during his particular journey. The pass to the analyst would be the test of a paradox. We have acquired a knowledge, we are supposed to demonstrate its logic, its formula, to the analytic community, but it is the not-knowing that will sustain our position as analyst in our act and that will make us begin each time without avoiding anew the imprudence of the unconscious. The pass that produces an analyst designates this test that pushes the progress of analysis essentially into not-knowing, Lacan tells us, and into the paths of a learned ignorance.<sup>15</sup> The metamorphosis at the end will never be a regal metamorphosis for the analysed subject.

*Translated by Deborah McIntyre*

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<sup>15</sup> J. Lacan, 'Variations', op. cit., pp. 299-300.

## THE PASS TO THE DESIRE OF THE ANALYST

*Alejandro Rostagnotto*  
Cordova, Argentina

*What matters is that they cannot  
be sustained (...) without a firm support in  
the real of the analytic experience.  
It is therefore necessary to interrogate that real  
to know how it leads to its own ignorance,  
and even produces its systematic denial.*

Jacques Lacan, 1967.<sup>1</sup>

### *Introduction*

In this presentation I intend to place some coordinates regarding the desire of the analyst and the transmutation that occurs as a condition prior to the exercise of his practice, in a way that problematises and is not assertive. Based on my analytic experience, I propose some punctuations regarding the desire of the analyst. To do this, I use the questions that this School has raised for me, specifically regarding the end of analysis, the function of testimony and its return, and the desire of the analyst as a supplement for the Borromean experience of the subjective knot that occurred in the analysis.

Talking or writing about the desire of the analyst, in my opinion, requires a different degree of formalization than talking about one's own case, about the logic gathered, if it is produced, or about how each one has understood the end and conclusion of the treatment. Explaining the case does not require more than saying it, arguing it, narrating it, not without reaching the original splitting. On the other hand, speaking of the desire of the analyst implies formulating what cause it is useful for, and what foundation of the drive, erotic, sexual can sustain this pragmatic desire called the desire of the analyst.

The end of the analysis as journey and subjective repositioning is an objective that we share with non-analysts, it is an expected end for the direction of the treatment, but for the analyst it is an expected plus, a suppletion that binds this experience and that allows this social bond that we call analytic discourse where the morbid experience of subjective suffering, of jouissance, can become legible. The Pass allows us to identify some details, some glimpses of the enormous constellation of the experience of an analysis, a personal universe full of anecdotes and foldings, puns, failures, misadventures and some small memorable things, whether they are interventions by the analyst or the fact of having produced some decisive movements in the back room of the unconscious, in particular concerning the management of jouissance.

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<sup>1</sup> 'Primera versión de la "Proposición del 9 de octubre de 1967 Sobre el Psicoanalista de la Escuela, en Otros Escritos"', p. 603. [First version of the "Proposition of October 9, 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School"].



I think that we named passands talk a lot about the end of the analysis to the extent that we verify something new there, something that was not there at the beginning, but that in the end, surprisingly occurs. It is a discovery, an event. For this reason, ending an analysis includes the experience of a new satisfaction, a *jouissance* that we seek to spread, which is why we run to tell the disparate person in the parish [*parroquia*] or that *Witz* to the passer.

If we understand the analysis as a single act made up of different scenes from the same play and add to it the characteristics of the act as Lacan presents it to us, we will understand that in the course of the act, in its realization, there is something that opposes the representational register, so that to represent something, formalize it, requires a different temporality and even a different procedure – a showing rather than a mere argumentative demonstration.

*Fantasmatic masochism and death drive*

I had already understood long ago that my analysis had come to an end in terms of deciphering discontent, of understanding the main causes of the production or self-production of discontent.

The fantasmatic masochism sustained by a death drive that horrified me, produced a version of the unconscious as unknown knowledge, denied, the centre of the effort to dislodge a meaning enjoyed (*gozado*) to the core. This corporal imaginary was also made consistent from the love-hate of the father, closing the circuit of Oedipal signification. A silent father whose centre of existence was the absence of his dead loved ones (my grandfather due to lung cancer, my grandmother giving birth to my father, my father's older sister who devoted herself to his care died of asthma), and a mother who always spoke with the dead, connected with the afterlife, always mistrusted her father, an alcoholic who saw the devil himself and sometimes fought with him. All this around a narrative that said that at the time of giving birth, my mother and the doctors, given the seriousness of the case, would have debated whom to save: do we save the mother or the child? One of the two had to die. As can be quickly inferred, desire as the desire of the Other is constituted around the fantasy of one's own disappearance, around death that, as the absolute master that commands the unconscious scene, coloured both love and hate, not only of eroto-aggressiveness but of melancholy, of pain for the fact of existing as a desiring being.

A whole first analysis was necessary to reconstruct and then disarm the family romance and its Oedipal signification bit by bit, and this disassembly left me with loose pieces, fragments. The search for the meaning of meaning, if you will, leads to the infantilization of meaning and to weariness, to the detachment of the libido. Worse still, it leaves intact the real bone [*hueso*] that fantasy camouflages and sustains, putting itself at the service of denial, via the horror of knowledge.

The second analysis begins in the first interview, around the unresolved. Above all, this was because of the subjective difficulty of having in front of my eyes all the elements that would make up the puzzle of the fundamental fantasy but without being able to interpret the desire that sustained it and without being able to identify the tragic key of the fate assumed in the unconscious. For the first time in analysis, in the analyst's consulting room, a bodily symptom linked to the story appears quite clearly to me: a sensation of dizziness in view of the hesitation that accompanied me.

Subsequently, several years later, in order to undo the previous analysis and to reinstate myself in my life projects in a healthier way, an analyst in another city, 800 km away, made me travel and have several sessions, where each farewell could well have been the last. We didn't set the next session, he gave me freedom, well, I owed him nothing, nothing forced me, it was just that simple: by the analyst's desire. A desire that when passing through the underground station Olleros always stole a lively, mischievous smile from me. I knew that it was about analysis: hey Eros, not only by the listening but also by the interpellation directed towards erotica.

Meanwhile and to my regret, in a period of boredom and manic elation in which I had not made the demand to be analysed, a psychosomatic response appeared threatening my daily life and my existence. A condition in the hypophysis detected by a migraine that ended in a headache so throbbing that I could only imagine death (obviously). Imagination as palpable as it was powerful that horrified me and made me see and question why so much effort had been made to dislodge that desire, which was nothing more than a desire for death. An intervention by the analyst was crucial 'it's just a desire'. A desire among others, one that I am not obliged to fulfil, a wish that is not destiny but one among others. This involved not only understanding the mark of destiny, but also that destiny is sustained by a libidinal current, very active after the horrors that the sinister fantasy produced. This factor of dis-identification, on the one hand, and the possibility of redistribution of the libido with its erotics on the other, coincided with a passage in the transference from the subject supposed to know (from whom I expected the interpretation that I already had from the beginning) to the equivocation of the subject supposed to know. The presence of the analyst began to have two important roles: a presence willing to listen and a function of affable interpellation of intimate judgments, something like an objector at the service of questioning and disobedience (prelude to *saying no* as an enunciative position beyond the statement or sayings but as *a saying*, among others).

How long to continue waiting for the analyst to interpret, to solve this case, to cure? Well, no, I had to solve it myself, I wasn't alone, but it was in the loneliness of the act that I had to give birth to myself, on my own. Or had I transferred to the analyst some good that I had to pay for, for his care or maintenance?

*Desire: between the remainder and the end of the analysis*

I had imagined for a long time that my analysis had ended, in fact, I spoke about it in analysis, with a certain fear of farewell, but the news did not produce any catastrophe, but rather a calm "That's good!" That encouraged me to keep talking. There was a remainder that kept me in the analytic link in a waiting position, I was in no hurry. I had stopped travelling, I had telephone sessions, with headphones and a microphone. The micro sessions that I had were giving speech a renewed, powerful, lively shine, very close to a joke, to the evocation of resonances, to allusions, to saying with images or painting, opera or sculpture that once had moved me deeply, although sometimes the sessions were rarefied by the noises that communication by telephone sometimes produced or the noises made by the analyst, quite aggravated by my auditory sensitivity (in general, I refer to noises as sounds that escape the virtues of the phoneme).

In my last session, the noises that my analyst made on the phone, almost superimposed with a "wait for me, I'll be back" prompts me to end my analysis at that very moment. "Well, goodbye", were his words. I made him wait, to thank him and to say a few words of gratitude and a phrase "this is my institution", which made me think that I was not only referring to the situation of the School to which I belong but of instituting myself there, where *id (ello)* had been.

However, what happened in that last session – it was in the encounter with the passers – and even after that, that I managed to see clearly that those noises that precipitated the end of my analysis precisely evoked the primal scene in which the noises of sex made by the parental couple leave their mark, and how the concealed memory overlapped the excess experienced with flagrant pleasure. The memory shows a wet mattress drying in the sun and many half-open windows looking at me like indiscreet witnesses of a comedy [*cómic*] that was beginning to take place. This divorce between the eroticized auditory register from the primary satisfaction with the register of the image showed, from the beginning, a fracture that was difficult to reconcile. Like two musical scores written in different keys, the deconstruction of neurosis involved disarming the tragic key of unconscious sexual meaning that had death as a mark of destiny. That emancipation highlights that there is still (in body) another score, written with other keys. It is necessary to know how to channel the keys to erotic jouissance so that it is not a prohibited jouissance, or always negative. The *Triebe* that does not cease not being written can have another destiny than defence, it is in this sense that at different times I have insisted on putting in tension the notion of body (condition of jouissance) and desire of the analyst which, like all desire, rides the crest of the drive, which requires a double authorization of itself: to sex as a revisited decision and to the practice of analysis in a social bond that requires the agency of the analysing object, and for this to happen it is necessary to have objectified the most intimate object, it having happened within the analyst's own intimacy. Passage of the object *a* as a plug in the absent centre of the subjective knot, to writing, starting from the littoral of letters made legible by the analytical discourse already consummated.

#### *The desire of the analyst*

The desire of the analyst is not validated by an interpreter; it requires the blurring of the subject supposed to know and through its equivocation, postulating knowledge in place of the truth. It additionally *suppletes* a destiny for the drive, detaching itself from its morbid symptomatic paths and proactively adding this desire for difference. It is a desire that swings between being an interpreter of desire and a support for the object, but also an *objecting desire* in its double sense of to object and becoming an object, or rather one that knows how to become refuse (*desecho*), disbeing (*deser*).

In the case of the analyst we add, passing at the level of the intimate (resolved by the fantasy's traversal), a body disposed to and capable of being a genuine place where suffering can be deciphered. A body with drawers like Salvador Dalí's Venus de Milo or the anthropomorphic cabinet. The analyst's body, with its little drawers, is a place to put the object, the loss. With one hand we hide it there and with the other we cover our eyes. It is there waiting for our journey, waiting for the un-concealing that occurs once we have rid ourselves from its ballast or surplus jouissance, and also waiting the possibility of clarifying that it is only a semblant (the voice overlapped by the look) that covers the lack of being.

The experience of the analysis and the Pass, led me to propose the body of the analyst as a *body available* to be a musical instrument interpreting the score so that later, each one manages their own strings. We not only put at the service of the analysand the technique learned for the resolution of a case, but also a *desire* that is based on the vicissitudes of the drive and that is not a response to childhood history. The marks of personal history nuance the desire of the analyst, they will give him a style that, like brushstrokes or flats introduced in the original score, will allow him to build semitones with the notes already written in the analysand's original score and thus obtain resonances where previously they weren't any. From then it will have a new sound, a different sound.

Resolving not wanting to know is not wanting to know, but rather knowing that denial and mental debility are not alien to the analyst, and being an agent that enables the analytic act implies an attitude of vigilance in the face of the tendency to close *one's* unconscious.

The desire of the analyst may suppose a certain self-affirmation such as that of the ego [*Icb*] at the end of the analysis. It may imply having constructed a new symptom, however, *its being of desire* makes us inhabit a dimension without guarantees where what happens session after session, encounter after encounter, opens the doors to the event, to chance, to what is not in the program, to the dysmorphic, to noise. There is no standard analysand or analyst, so the synchronous bodily disposition makes room for a genuine, healthy analytic presence beyond sympathy, antipathy, or apathy. Becoming an empathic channel where the analysand's subjective *pathos* is lodged, is perhaps a version of the desire of the analyst more or less updated to this case (to his own, I do not think it is a generality).

But this surrogate body (I am not referring to any universal or abstract body, but to this one that is speaking at this moment) needs, not only the crossing of the fantasy and the deciphering of the cipher of jouissance, but also *an act of intimate decision* that consists in consenting to stopping making jouissance pass through the fixity of the circuit of a masochistic drive that tried to consume the whole libido by means of the semblant voice, a semblant that operated by making the transference a suggestion and a semblant that vociferated in the service of the compulsion to repeat as a super-egoic imperative voice.

*Some consequences of what was said*

The noises on the analyst's telephone and the demand made by the analyst to wait, precipitated the final act. The curtain is lowered, there is nothing to continue looking at, the *fascinum* has lost its shine and the demand finds no correspondence. For this reason, for the analyst, it is necessary that the object for which he is the agent in the discourse, stays outside the neurotic dimension of the object that shouts, hidden behind the demand. The object in question for the analysand, the object to produce and finally to precipitate its separation, is a letter that is finally legible, in the same way that the sign of anguish on the body can be legible. This object as letter is necessary – and not the object of surplus jouissance – in order that the meaning that the analysand comes to does not follow the circuit of the drive determined by the force field of surplus jouissance. The desire of the analyst requires a corporeal instrument whose strings can return both an interpretation and an interpellation, or simple resonances which require that the acoustic box of the body with its emptiness is a place where the vibrations of the strings of the analysand's subjective knot are modulated.

Revisiting the primal scene after the journey has been made shows that this inaugural moment was nothing more than a blank sheet of paper that the condition of neurosis filled with its deadly requirements. Returning to this place, now emptied, allows one to once again draw upon that blank sheet of paper on which one poured one's own fiction, the autofiction, or the analysand's autobiography. Once again, an analysis shows us its paradoxes: a fiction without fantasy, a symptom without conflict, a desire without tragedy, the song of the word without the surplus jouissance of the object voice, even more than a... not without that.

*Translated by Daniela Avalos Gonzales*

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE ICG

OF THE PSYCHOANALYST

Colette Soler  
Paris, France

Those in the Cartels of the Pass, as I call them, who receive the speech of the passers about a passand, cannot do less than regularly ask themselves what they might extract from it. The fact that a voice is raised by contingency, to say this to them will not change anything regarding this recurring perplexity. It is structural: it is the fate of every listener, even the analyst, to have to choose what they retain from what they hear, so a choice, but redoubled in their case by the expectation of the decision that they have to wrest from their perplexity. And not alone, but with others!

It's not that knowledge is lacking there, but everything we know about the Pass comes from Lacan – a point not to be forgotten when we speak of making something new. This possible newness will have to emerge from knowledge produced by Lacan, both concerning the pass in analysis, and in the dispositive he invented to evaluate it. So, at the beginning of our VIIth Meeting of the School, I'm going to draw on it in order to present my opening remarks.

Regarding this dispositive, he said it had this aim: the analyst is in the hot seat, that is, the change that has made an analyst from an analysing subject, what we have called 'the pass to the analyst'.

As I said, since the 'Proposition on the psychoanalyst of the School', this supposes the analysis as 'finished', as having reached a point of closure. A point to be distinguished from the actual end of the analysis, even if they overlap temporally. It's like the "end of history" with which Hegel entertained a whole generation in the 60s and 70s, via Kojève. When it comes, this end, it in no way stops the little human ups and downs, the just scraping by of the 'Sundays of life' of which Lacan made such a big deal, it only puts an end to a process that had a precise aim.

Now, it is this, this finished analysis that can produce the conditions of possibility for the psychoanalyst. Shall I say of his desire, or of his act? It's an alternative, but without symmetry. I'll pause on this for a moment.

This 'desire of the analyst' for which Lacan left us the formula, is much talked about, but it falls under the same aporia as the intransitive desire that is proper to the divided subject, that cannot be formulated: it makes the subject but is not subjectifiable under the heading of an 'I'. It is only in the analytic act that it comes into effect [*passé à l'effectivité*]. For the analysis in operation, it is the desire supposed through its act, which moreover is no more subjectifiable as an 'I' than the desire, but it, the act, is measured by its very real consequences in analyses. Consequently, in an analysis, the desire of the analyst in operation is attested, I can almost say proven by the analyses,

by the fact that there are those who analyse themselves with him, as Lacan says. The act is thus attested, but it neither thinks nor speaks, it is not there that we should look for it.

It's a problem for those in the Cartels of the Pass, because each time they receive, via the passers, the testimony of a particular individual – hysteresis of the analysis, Lacan says – but this hysteresis, well, it does nothing other than speak. How, then, to attest through speech what is only attested in act? Will the famous 'reading between the lines' be a recourse for them, allowing the capture of the possible emergence of a new desire, unsupported by the individual fantasy of the subject?

We have said 'pass to the analyst' in order to bring back attention to this question. I say bring it back because it has clearly been lost over the years in our use of the dispositive. Interest has been focused more and more on the exit from the analysis and less and less on the question of the turn [*virage*].

The AS, therefore, is recognised by the end of his analysis, that is, the end of each one of his relations with his analyst-object, and by the symptomatic and epistemic balance that it leaves him. It seems that the work of the ICG as well as the testimonies of the passands themselves have increasingly swung in the direction of this problematic.

Is this due to the fact that the passands are almost always practitioners already and sometimes of long standing? Perhaps, but I lean towards a more analytic reason for this predominant interest in the exit from the final phase of the analysis. First of all, the very difficulties of the separation from the object and the incalculable time this requires must contribute greatly to this in my opinion. I recall that Lacan referred to this as the "desert of analysis". It is the metaphor of a place where there is no longer an oasis of articulable truth, and therefore no longer any logical time but only the time that I have described as "not logical" and which therefore varies according to the contingency of singularities. But there is more, I think, that I am going to get to.

Our title invites us to revisit what happens in the turn of the pass. We do not seek to ward off the 'forgetting of the act' but to raise Lacan's nagging question: what is it, at the end of the transference investiture that makes a subject decide to take this place that his analyst has held for him? He was indicating with this question that the said turn has two dimensions that merit being clearly distinguished. On one hand, the finished analysis produces the "metamorphosis", that's his term, of the analysand into an analyst, but this is still only a potential analyst as Aristotle would say. It is still necessary that an option be added there for the subject destituted – a decision to not leave the field of analytic discourse. This is what happens most frequently and even in large numbers, as if it were a virus from which there is no cure, and about which Lacan supposed that the dispositive could enlighten us via the hysteresis of the passand.

This clinical moment that no one had heard spoken of beforehand, the existence of which there is no contesting, although no one can say anything about it, this "thick shadow" [*ombre épaisse*]<sup>1</sup> – you recognise his expression – Lacan thought that his dispositive could shed some light on it. It's that the dispositive in itself carries an implicit hypothesis, and it's a matter of knowing if it is verified. In any case, it indicates to us the way in which Lacan had thought that testimony could be given on the emergence of a desire which cannot be formulated. That there is a need

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<sup>1</sup> Translator's note: This expression comes from Lacan's 'Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School', translated by Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995. However, Grigg translates "*ombre épaisse*" as "dark cloud", p. 8.

there for passers, and passers as he defines them, as a doorway, an hypothesis. And it is not the recourse of reading between the lines, which never leads to any assurance. The passer conceived by Lacan is not supposed to be an analyst already but rather in the time just before and for whom the whole affair is therefore still pending or under discussion. I say all this to delineate the two components: the end of the process and the subjective decision. On these two points the passer is, even must be, in the unresolved. And it is precisely this unresolved that can allow him to be especially sensitive to what he still lacks in order to create a solution, or to what the passand brings in addition or differently and which has created a solution for him. In other words, Lacan postulated that the not yet passed to the analyst was necessary for the pass to the analyst to be recognised. In the absence of this passer ...

Here again, we can do no less than note that our passers are almost never of this profile, and very often long-time analysts already. Whatever their good dispositions, they are never lacking, so how could they be sensitive to this moment which, for them too, is already behind them. No wonder Lacan concluded initially that the Pass depended on those who named the passers, the AMSs, for without a ‘sensitive plate’ [*plaque sensible*] how could this pass? This problem of the passers is still there – perhaps insoluble, because for the AMS to recognise the moment of the pre-pass to the analyst which defines the passer, is it not necessary that he know how to recognise that of the pass, of which Lacan alone had the idea?

This may also explain why, with time, attention has been focused on the exit from analysis, which the passand can directly attest to, without passers in fact. It is so true that the essential part of the elaborations on the exit from analysis has been produced outside the dispositive, from signifying and discursive logic. And at the individual level, in fact, there is no need for a sensitive plate in order to formulate what is perceived of the trajectory of the analysis, and its therapeutic effects and epistemic gains that have allowed each one to put an end to his “transference-for” [*transfert-pour*] according to the expression of the ‘Preface’, that is to say, to his demand “to get something” [*obtenir*].<sup>2</sup>

I was asking: how, without a sensitive plate, is this able to pass? Well, Lacan, who never retreats from a conclusion, concluded it does not pass, failure, the anticipated testimonies did not come, and he considered in 1976 that there might be no other reason to pass to the analyst than to earn money. Let us note, however, that after these harsh remarks he did not suspend the dispositive, not even after the dissolution of his School.

In what concerns us, shouldn’t we do as he did and draw some conclusion from the fact that the hypothesis immanent to the dispositive is not confirmed? The passer in its Lacanian definition has never functioned. It’s not a question of young or old obviously, but of a moment in the trajectory. We have passers who are generally already analysts and sometimes for a very long time. Unless we say that they were not really analysts, we are obliged to conclude that they have found their passageway, that their pass to the analyst has taken place, though not yet their exit from analysis. So let’s ask ourselves what in this case is the effective function of their interposition between the passand and the Cartel-Jury? It is notable to me that the ‘Preface’, with the new terms it uses to describe the resolution of the analysis and of the muddle between the truth half-said and real outside sense of the unconscious without a subject, that the ‘Preface’

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<sup>2</sup> Translator’s note: In the English translation of the ‘Preface to the English-language Edition’ of Seminar XI, ‘*transfert-pour*’ is translated as “positive transference”, which is not Lacan’s sense here. See the ‘Preface’ in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. viii.

makes no mention of the third-party function of the passer, and this could be for us a programmatic question, that of reformulating it in these new terms. With the additional question: should those in the Cartels continue to look for the moment when the analyst is decided, in the double sense, and without the passers being necessary there, rather than simply making sure that an analytic trajectory has come to term?

*Translated by Deborah McIntyre*

### **REMARKS ON THE ‘PASSAGE TO THE ANALYST’**

*Sidi Askofaré*  
Toulouse, France

If we consider ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’ as Freud’s quasi-testamentary text on the end and the aims of analysis, one understands both Freud’s legacy to the psychoanalytic community and what Lacan had to start from in order to think the passage to the analyst.

Because of Freud, there remained essentially an undecidability, even, an impossibility of the end. Infinite or indefinite analysis. Analysis always, endlessly restarted...

To which Lacan replied by asserting that not only does analysis have an end – and a logical end – but that this finitude of the analysis is not without a relationship to the ‘production’ of the analyst. A production which is not, and cannot be confused with, formation of said analyst.

‘Analysis with an end, passage to the analyst, formation without end’, one could say, starting from the Lacanian advance.

With the following caveat: this advance is a knot.

For us, isn’t that what indexes this signifier, the pass, that has become opaque and enigmatic?

For my part, I would say that the pass, as Lacan introduced it in 1967, is not strictly speaking a thesis, and even less an imperative or an injunction. At most, an hypothesis – undoubtedly based on Lacan’s experience as an analyst – and perhaps a method, a procedure, a supervision and, insofar as this is possible, a guarantee. A guarantee that there is an analyst.

If it is simultaneously that Lacan introduces his notion of the pass and the dispositive intended to capture its effectuation in the passand, this was doubtless at the cost of a contraction and a superposition: that of the turn at the end and that of the emergence of the ‘desire of the analyst’, indeed of the act which authenticates it.

As I understand it, the question based on Colette Soler’s text – the very one you have just discovered – is the following: does the dispositive of the Pass, as it has functioned and continues to function in our School, starting from Lacan’s indications and formalization, permit us to answer, equally and simultaneously, the two points that interest us: the end of the passand’s analysis and his/her passage to the analyst?



Or, on the contrary, would there not be a form of uncertainty principle, in the sense of Heisenberg, which makes it impossible to pinpoint, simultaneously and with the same precision, the fall of the subject supposed to know and the passage to the analyst?

From the experience of our School – and arguably from what we can learn from others with whom we share this experience – it is perhaps time to take stock of this experience, if only to know what we should do with it going forward.

It is doubtless difficult, for a community like ours, to put into question something as structuring for our School as the Pass, and in the terms proposed by Lacan.

However, what we cannot avoid, unless we set up the Pass as a totem or fetish, is whether or not, in its current functioning, it allows us to attain the two objectives I just evoked, following Colette Soler: to authenticate the endings of analysis and the passages to the analyst, via the markings of the ‘desire of the analyst’.

These two points have often been debated within our ICG as, I suppose, in other previous ICGs. At the least, I can testify to three others, in which I was given the opportunity to participate.

For me, one thing seems certain. It is just as necessary to rejoice in our School’s interest in the pass (even if this interest is far from being converted into requests for the Pass) – of supporting the transference to this dispositive insofar as it is a transference to the School – as it is to be able, even if we disagree, to discuss and elaborate upon a certain number of points.

For today, we have chosen the theme of the ‘pass to the analyst’. The expression, to my knowledge, is not Lacan’s. It nonetheless indexes something that neither the pass nor the dispositive conceived to verify it can disregard.

Colette Soler reminded us that neither Freud nor his students and disciples thematized or elaborated the pass. If Lacan did so, the fact remains that in what he put forward about it – whether an effect of reading or a matter of the point he himself had reached – the pass is organically linked to the end of analysis and to becoming an analyst.

But one need not be a genius to see that ever since psychoanalysis has existed there have always been

- Analysts who did not finish their analyses and, even in Freud’s time and among his closest entourage, analysts – who no-one disputes were functioning as analysts – who had never been analyzed;
- Analysts who finished their analyses, at least according to the termination criteria of the time;
- Analysts who finished their analysis yet never wished to, or in any case, never practiced psychoanalysis;
- Not to speak of those complex cases in which analysis is, speaking literally, interminable –or its finitude asymptotic – whether because psychoanalysis has become the sinthome of these subjects – an analyst will always succeed the prior one – or because such analyst has been erected as a sinthome for this subject, thus as a knotting function for his structure as parlêtre. And so the analysis will last as long as this analyst lives...

It is this disparity, among others, which creates the value of and interest in this theme, if only because it forces us to take a fresh look at what the passage to the analyst includes for us. Indeed,

the passage to the analyst cannot mean what are referred to in the Flash as the first steps of practice, in other words, a passage to analytical practice, to the exercising of the function of psychoanalyst.

If passage to the analyst is not that passage, how can the dispositive of the Pass which is centered essentially, if not exclusively on the ending of analysis, help us establish it?

In my view, it is certainly at this point that the fundamental question is posed: is not the focus of the pass on the ending a bias that is internal to the dispositive itself, one which is linked to the fact that even if they themselves already practice psychoanalysis, the choice and the designation of the passers are entirely determined by the point at which they are in their treatment as analysands? As a result, what makes them suitable, more than anything else, for the receipt and transmission of passands' testimonies with regard to the ending, namely the fall of the subject supposed to know, does it not constitute an obstacle for hearing and transmitting something of the emergence of the desire of the analyst and thus the passage to the analyst?

If these remarks touch on important points of the structure of the experience of the Pass, there would no doubt be some consequences to be drawn from them. To start with, a re-examining of why we went from Jury to Cartel, without really distinguishing between their functions. Indeed, if a Jury can pronounce indubitably on the ending – and right now based on some of Lacan's indications, sometimes establish its criteria – is it truly suited to locating the desire of the analyst (in the sense of the *desire for knowledge*) which could result from the end of analysis without being its necessary consequence?

*Translated by Devra Simin*

## MIND THE GAP:<sup>1</sup>

### WHAT WE DON'T RECOGNISE ABOUT THE PASS

*Julietta L. de Battista*  
Buenos Aires, Argentina

#### *Current situation*

I'm going to try to pass on something of what has been elaborated with my colleagues, to try to dissipate a little of the thick shadow that seems to hang over the work of the ICG: to leave behind silent intuitions, ineffable conclusions, irrefutable convictions, to seek reasons and arguments.

We proposed to question again the pass to the analyst by asking ourselves where we were listening from, what were our *a priori*, our structural points of reference. There was a dominant note: a certain tendency to accentuate the end of the analysis, in particular the fall of the Subject

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<sup>1</sup> On the London Underground, as one is about to board the train, a voice warns 'Mind the gap', which sometimes has the paradoxical effect of reminding one of the gap between the platform and the train; it is then sometimes difficult to take this step without stumbling.

Supposed to Know<sup>2</sup> or the glimpse of its flaw. We wondered if this emphasis on the end didn't warrant being critiqued.

Are we witnessing a certain shift from the end towards the pass, to a certain deviation or, perhaps, to a concession that could attenuate the progression of the elaboration?

What do we find in the current practice of the pass? Most of the time, we encounter the *hystorization* of the transformative effects of an analysis on the analysand's life, particularly the undeniable (and welcome) therapeutic effects. Sometimes, we also encounter some version of the end, usually related to having grasped something of the flaw in the supposition of knowledge, accompanied by a newfound satisfaction. We have found very little, almost nothing, about this "other reason"<sup>3</sup> which may lead the analysand to want to take up the place of the analyst, especially after having learned from his own analysis, the destiny that his analyst knew at the end.<sup>4</sup> That's to say, we encountered little of the mutation that analysis can produce in desire if it transforms it into the desire of the analyst. It is not certain that this will happen, not even "when the final point of the end is not followed by two ellipses" [*"cuando al punto final de los finales, no le siguen dos puntos suspensivos"*].<sup>5</sup>

I will start then with what I consider a slipping.

*The presuppositions in question I: the end is not the pass*

What did we look for? Perhaps a structural guarantee: the beginning and end of the analysis are the most exemplary owing to their structure,<sup>6</sup> as Lacan taught us to recognize them. What a relief it would be for those who are in the difficult situation of designating the passers of also being able to recognize the structure of this precise moment of the pass! What is certain is that we do not find enough testimonies of this passage, of this "elective moment" when the analysand becomes an analyst.<sup>7</sup> There is a logical reason for this: the reading of the act is only done after the fact, in its consequences. Despite this, we do not find enough in the testimonies to put forward in the elaboration the possible conditions for the emergence of this desire of the analyst, of this event. And this cannot be avoided. It is inescapable.

We know that an analyst is the product of his analysing task, but that is not enough, nor is it enough to note that the SsS is no longer indispensable. The desire of the analyst is not only an effect of the analysing task or of the end of the analysis: it is not without that, but it is not enough. This the *gap*.

Or even worse: Lacan had already reached a similar conclusion at the conference in 1978 on the experience of the pass, where he takes up the same question he asked himself in 1967 on the reasons for someone wanting to take up the place of the analyst after knowing how it ended,

<sup>2</sup> The following abbreviation SsS is used.

<sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. (1976). 'Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI', in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XI The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, New York and London, Norton. p. viii.

<sup>4</sup> "(...) the pass is this point where having come to the end of the psychoanalysis, the place that the psychoanalyst has held in his journey, someone takes this step. Understand well: to operate there as he who has taken it up, whereas of this operation he knows nothing, except to what in his experience it has reduced the occupant." Lacan, J. (1967a) Discours à l'EFPP, in *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, p. 276.

<sup>5</sup> Popular song in Spanish which can be translated as: "When the final point of the end, is not followed by two ellipsis points."

<sup>6</sup> Lacan, J. (1967b) 'Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School', trans. Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 4.

<sup>7</sup> Lacan, J. (1969). 'L'acte psychanalytique. Compte rendu du séminaire 1967-1968', *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, p. 375.

and he concludes: “I wanted to have testimonies of this, naturally, I had none, no testimony of how that happened. This pass is a total failure.”<sup>8</sup> A failure that continues to encourage us in what can be achieved by failing. I leave this point aside, the difference between the pass and the end of analysis has already been elaborated by Colette and Sidi. I continue with what I consider to be a concession that I propose to challenge.

### **The presuppositions in question II: Is there a clinic of the pass?**

I turn this second point towards a common expression in our work, that of the “clinical pass,” to question what it presupposes: are we, perhaps, tempted to elaborate a clinic of the pass? In 1968 Lacan warned that the great temptation for an analyst is to become a clinician, that is, someone who “(...) separates himself from what it [ça] sees in favour of figuring out the key points and to tinkle away at the business. It is not at all of course to diminish the significance of this know-how. We lose nothing. On one condition, it’s knowing that you, the truest thing in you, is part of this keyboard.”<sup>9</sup>

I have often heard a “clinical pass” spoken of; I wonder about its implications. There is a clinic of the particular, a knowledge of the typifiable. Could there be a clinic of this singular, of an elective moment of the pass? I think there can be a clinic of the end of analysis, but would it be appropriate to extend it to the irreducible reasons for which “the psychoanalyst to come dedicates himself to the *agalma* of the essence of desire, ready to pay for it through reducing himself and his name, to any given signifier”?<sup>10</sup> What reasons could there be for committing to this vow, and agreeing to these payments?

I think it appropriate to rethink this expression “clinical pass,” for it supposes that the pass can be recognized by its structure or its clinic, which would entail the risk of dissipating its character as an elective moment. I prefer to think of the pass in its liminality, in this zone of passage where something ceases to be what it was to make room for what can potentially be transformed into something else, without recognising what one is or only recognising what one is in this strangeness of a “having been what is no longer.”

Will liminality, this threshold effect, be recognizable or will we be faced with the *Unmerkant* of the pass, with the un-recognized?<sup>11</sup> You will recognize the *Unmerkant* as Freud's choice of name for the unfathomable of the dream, its navel, which must be left as a “place in shadows.”<sup>12</sup> The un-recognized or, perhaps, the impossible to recognize, like the unfathomable origin of desire. The navel, the hole, around which the whole frame is woven. Would the work of hystorization be devoid of such a navel? Will there remain traces of separation at the end of the analysis, scars from the way the analysand gave birth to himself [*se parer*] as analyst, or is it perhaps appropriate to leave this “place in the shadows”? In his seminar on *Transference*, Lacan wondered what the role of the scar of castration should be in the analyst's eros.<sup>13</sup> Let us then pull this thread.

### *Mourning: an opportunity for the desire of the analyst*

I move on next to the third point, a proposal, that of drawing attention to a precise moment of the end, which escapes analysis, perhaps a possible prelude to the pass: mourning. If the

<sup>8</sup> Lacan, J. (1978). ‘Conclusions. Journées L'expérience de la passe’, *Lettres de l'EFPN* n° 23, p. 180-181.

<sup>9</sup> Lacan, J. (1968). ‘En guise de conclusion. Discours de clôture au Congrès de Strasbourg, le 13 octobre 1968’, published in *Lettres de l'École Freudienne* 1970 n° 7, p. 166.

<sup>10</sup> Lacan, J. (1967b). Proposition, op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>11</sup> See the proposed translation of the Freudian term according to Lacan, J. (1975) ‘Réponse à une question de Marcel Ritter’.

<sup>12</sup> Freud, S. (1900). *The Interpretation of Dreams* SE V, p. 525.

<sup>13</sup> Lacan, J. (1960-1961) *The Seminar. Book VIII. Transference*. Cambridge, UK: Polity, p. 103-104.

question bears on the origin of a hitherto unseen desire, should we not be more interested in the different resolutions of this mourning, in the elaboration of a possible “ordering of its varieties”<sup>14</sup> of these “scattered oddments”<sup>15</sup>

Let’s go back to this moment of the end: the transference resolves into a hole,<sup>16</sup> a hole that the analyst to come does not rush into, for he now knows how to stay on this edge.<sup>17</sup> Grasping the failure of the SsS, a hole opens which no longer has any chance of mobilizing a work of the symbolic, for this has been in a way exhausted by the analysing task, to the point of *no longer wishing to exercise the option*.<sup>18</sup> What ‘exit styles’ are then possible for this mourning?

Mourning is separation, to engender oneself [*se parer*], it is the crossroads where one who has been an analysand has the opportunity, or the potential, to engender himself as an analyst. There will also be unfinished mourning, enduring, resistant.

To become an analyst is one of the possible outcomes, but not the only one. This directs me to think, for example, of the fate of the libido which has been invested in the analysis and which is regained once the mourning of the end has taken place: is it dedicated to psychoanalysis, perhaps to militancy, is it destined to make a name for oneself or is it dedicated to receiving urgent cases, to work for the School? Perhaps for someone it concerns requesting the pass. In this case, isn’t the pass a practice that would allow us to weigh the causal potential of this passand, precisely in front of a passer who can be found in this moment when the analyst, as cause of his analysing desire, begins to be extinguished?

#### *To conclude*

Structural reference points are very important, just as is the clinic. But at the inescapable point of the origin of the desire of the analyst, they are not sufficient. This does not make the matter ineffable. There can be statements of this desire and the conditions of its likelihood, of its possibility, of its opportunity. In such a happy event [*bonheur*], the fate of this mourning does not sink into sadness but suffers a reversal to a certain effect of joy that we find in our work as analysts.<sup>19</sup>

An abstinent joy, devoid of mania and euphoria, cured of *hubris*: a joy for what has been traversed, perhaps a certain taste of being on the edge of the abyss ... and not plunging into it.

Analysis is a high-risk practice: we don’t know what we are going to encounter each time someone begins to speak, or what horrors will once more confront us. We also don’t know where the analysis will lead, and yet we’re still here. We should have solid reasons to embark on such a venture, to assume the consequences of our inaugural act. The analyst awaits the chance

<sup>14</sup> Lacan, J. (1967b) ‘Proposition’, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>15</sup> Lacan, J. (1976). ‘Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI’. In J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. New York and London. Norton. p. ix.

<sup>16</sup> Lacan, J. (1967b), ‘Proposition’, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>17</sup> “This act which establishes itself in an opening of jouissance as masochist, which reproduces its arrangement, the psychoanalyst corrects the hubris with this assurance: that not one of his peers rushes into this opening, that he himself will thus know how to stand on the edge.” Lacan, J. (1967c). *La psychanalyse, raison d’un échec, Autres écrits*, Paris: Seuil, p. 348.

<sup>18</sup> Lacan, J. (1967b) ‘Proposition’, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>19</sup> Lacan, J. (1967d) ‘Allocutions sur les psychoses de l’enfant’, in *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, p. 369.

of serendipity, this happy and unexpected discovery.<sup>20</sup> There will be different reasons why we each wanted to relaunch the analysing task with our act, even if we have seen the end result.

And yours? What are your reasons? Let's leave the question open. As *debattista* [debater], I invite you to participate in the discussion.

Translated by Esther Faye

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<sup>20</sup> Serendipity is a fortunate and unexpected discovery or find that occurs when one is looking for something else. It can also designate the ability of a subject to recognize that he has made an important discovery even if it has no relation to what he is looking for.

FOR A LESS ALPHA-BÊTE LISTENING<sup>1</sup>

*The psychoanalytic act, neither seen nor known outside of us, that is to say, never located, much less questioned, is what we suppose from the elective moment when the psychoanalysand passes to the psychoanalyst.<sup>2</sup>*

Beatriz Oliveira  
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I choose this sentence of Lacan's from 1969, delivered shortly after he launched his proposition for the dispositive of the Pass, and I ask myself: why do we return quite often to this theme of the recognition of the pass to the analyst? Our School is already 20 years old, and the first Cartel of the Pass took place at least 17 years ago, unless I am mistaken. Since then, there have been many testimonies from passands and passers as well as a reasonable number of nominations. Why do we insist on this question? I say 'question', because although the theme of this round table is presented as an affirmation, I keep asking myself what the conditions for the possibility of this recognition would be?

This question is constantly being raised and remains open since Lacan proposed the Pass in his School. It is posed to each of the members concerned with the dispositives of the guarantee. It was no different in the work of this ICG where we questioned ourselves on our structural reference points present in the logic of a pass that was well heard [*passé entendue*], so that we are open to the singularity of each testimony. From these discussions, we ask ourselves how to recognise this passage to the analyst or, as Lacan says, this supposed act, from the moment when the analysand becomes analyst.

In my opinion, the affirmation 'to recognise the pass to the analyst' evokes what Lacan proposes in the 'Italian Note':<sup>3</sup> it would be up to his fellow analysts to know how to find the mark of an unprecedented desire that could be recognised by the passers. There are many texts in which Lacan gives us clues as to what he gathers from this passage to the analyst: subjective destitution, the pivotal point of this analysing pass.

Thus, there is something to be recognised, a mark, a trait that distinguishes the one who has made himself "the refuse of the said humanity". Lacan says, in the same text, that being refuse is the consequence of having circumscribed the cause of the horror of knowing that there is no sexual relation, a hole that the subject has resisted accepting throughout the psychoanalytic

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<sup>1</sup> *Le terme alphabète est une référence au commentaire de Lacan dans sa Postface au Séminaire XI : "Moi cependant vu à qui je parle, j'ai à ôter de ces têtes ce qu'elles croient tenir de l'heure de l'école, dite sans doute maternelle de ce qu'on y possède à la dématernalisation : soit qu'on apprenne à lire en s'alphabetisant."* (J. Lacan, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 504.) [The term *alphabète* is a reference to Lacan's remark in his 'Postface to Seminar XI: I, however, seeing to whom I am speaking, I have to remove from these heads what they retain from school days, preschool (*maternelle*), no doubt, what one takes in of dematernalisation : namely that one learns to read by alphabetising oneself] Note : Lacan is making an equivoque between 'alphabet' and 'alphabète', where 'bête' means 'stupid'.

<sup>2</sup> J. Lacan, (1969) 'L'acte psychanalytique. *Compte Rendu du Séminaire 1967-1968*', *Autres écrits*, p. 375.

<sup>3</sup> J. Lacan, (1973) 'Note Italienne', *Autres écrits*, pp. 307-311.

experience. Lacan will say that there is an analyst when this desire for knowledge comes to him, an unprecedented desire that is no longer covered by the love of truth.

The difficulty is that of apprehending the way in which each subject has arrived at this point; how to gather the logic of the act of the pass to the analyst in each testimony?

To deal with the question, I will quote a passage from the 'Report on the Seminar on the Psychoanalytic Act', in which Lacan writes: "So the act itself cannot function as a predicate. And in order to impute it to the subject it determines, the whole *inventio medii* must be restated in new terms: it is from it that the object *a* can be experienced as such".<sup>4</sup>

How can we follow what Lacan proposes, by reformulating the *inventio medii* with new terms? The middle term in the Aristotelian syllogism is precisely the one that is missing in order to reach the conclusion; the function of the middle term is to link the two extremes – major and minor – of the propositions. "The demonstrative art of the syllogism is precisely about finding the 'middle term', without which there is no link or possible demonstration".<sup>5</sup>

To affirm that the act cannot be a predicate implies that it can only be demonstrated from this middle term which does not appear throughout this deduction since what the analyst makes himself from is the object *a*. I therefore understand what Lacan will say later about this middle term: it is what is missing in the sexual relation. We can thus think that what would allow a conclusion would be precisely what is missing: the object *a* from which the analyst is made. Now, if what will lead to an act is precisely the object that has caused the subject in his analytic passage, we can say that this pass to the analyst, this act, would depend on a deduction that is made from a void. So, how do we put it to the test?

In *Seminar XX*, taking up the prisoners' sophism, Lacan replaces the function of the little *a* as that which intervenes at the level of what each subject maintains, in order to reach a conclusion: "not in so far as he is 'one among others', but in so far as he is in relation to the other two, to what is at stake in their thinking. Each intervenes in this ternary only as the object *a* that he is, in the gaze of the others."<sup>6</sup>

It is very interesting to think of the sophism of the prisoners as a line of reasoning that requires a test in order to reach its conclusion. That is, one does not arrive at a conclusion without going through this experience. Thus, one might think that this proof of the act, far from being conclusive on the basis of the analyst's propositions – from what he has said [*ses dits*], perhaps closer to the love of truth – would constitute the mode of resolution such as Lacan proposes in his sophism. In short, that the conclusion is drawn from what is not known. Could the fact of not knowing point precisely to the middle term that is missing from the conclusion of the syllogism?

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<sup>4</sup> J. Lacan, 'L'Acte Psychanalytique', op. cit. p. 378.

<sup>5</sup> M. Chauí, *Introdução à história da filosofia: dos pré-socráticos a Aristóteles*, volume 1, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. -São Paulo : Brasiliense, 1994, p. 26

<sup>6</sup> J. Lacan, J. *Le Séminaire Livre XX, Encore*, Paris, Seuil, 1975, p.47 *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX. On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore 1972-73*, ed. J-A Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, p. 49.



What is at stake in what will lead the analysand to this pivotal point, in order to face the horror of knowing, is precisely to come across the fact that this object that has sustained the crossing is a void, a void that operates, in front of which the exit is decided since the subject consents to the impossible access to the Other. Lacan then takes a wager on another relation with unconscious knowledge, a knowledge without a subject, a knowledge about the impossible. It will not be the act as a predicate but rather its effects; “a knowledge that proves itself only as being readable”,<sup>7</sup> a knowledge in the Real. This leads us to think that one of the consequences of the act of the pass to the analyst is precisely another knowledge, no longer supposed to come from the Other but “which must take into account the knowledge in the real”.<sup>8</sup>

Lacan affirms that this knowledge must be invented. If “the analyst pertains to the not-all”,<sup>9</sup> it is as a consequence of an open set. This knowledge must be invented and extracted from this open field in which what does not cease to be written is eventually written and becomes readable. But how can this knowledge in the Real be extracted? Could it be from the open set of *lalangue*? In 1973, Lacan will say: “The unconscious evinces knowledge that, for the most part, escapes the speaking being. (...) Language is, no doubt, made up of *lalangue*. It is knowledge’s hare-brained lucubration [*elucubration*] about *lalangue*. But the unconscious is knowledge, a knowing how to do things [*savoir-faire*] with *lalangue*. And what we know how to do with *lalangue* goes well beyond what we can account for under the heading of language”.<sup>10</sup>

If the unconscious is a know-how with *lalangue*, we can suppose that this unprecedented desire, the desire to know which is the consequence of the act, and which allows the pass to the analyst, implies this know-how with *lalangue*. How then can I recognise it in the testimonies of the pass? C. Soler deals with this question in the text *The pass to lalangue* in *Wunsch* 22, and at the end she will say that “Hystorisation is the detour through the narrative – and the narrative is always integral to meaning – for want of being able to testify to the UCS outside sense. It is thus entrusted to the *saying* [*dire*] of the lying truth of letting what is not said be heard, or to induce what it is lying about.”

What I want to stress is that, in order for this *saying* of the lying truth to be heard, it is enough not to be deaf (in order to hear it).

If this unprecedented desire implies a knowledge in the Real, to what extent would our relationship with *lalangue*, this singular language that inhabits us, our ciphers and traces, be a condition of possibility for listening to what is attested and transmitted of this knowledge in the pass? I am referring to those who participate in the dispositive of the Pass, passers and members of the Cartel of the Pass, on the basis that the passand would give a testimony of this passage. Lacan says that words make us slip and he wonders if the effect of sense in its Real can resist the use of words...<sup>11</sup> If it is not through the *said* [*dits*] collected by the passand that we will have the proof of the act, since it is not a predicate, how then can we listen to the effect of this act,

<sup>7</sup> J. Lacan. ‘L’acte psychanalytique. *Compte-rendu du Séminaire 1967-68*, *Autres Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1975, p. 376

<sup>8</sup> J. Lacan, (1973) ‘Note italienne’, *Autres écrits*, *op. cit.*, p. 308

<sup>9</sup> Idem, p. 308

<sup>10</sup> J. Lacan, J. (1998) *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX*, *op. cit.* p.139 (Trans. Mod.)

<sup>11</sup> J. Lacan. *Le Séminaire Livre XXII, R.S.I. Leçon du 11/02/1975.*

whatever this unprecedented desire is? Would it be the effects of *lalangue* or a know-how with *lalangue* that we could gather from the testimonies?

To conclude: if this knowledge in the Real, outside sense, an effect of language that demonstrates the impossibility of making a relation, can only be transmitted in a contingent manner, one must be attentive in order to read what supports the statements of the passand, and one must also know how to read in a less '*alpha-bête* way'.<sup>12</sup> Lacan did put the passers in the place of those who, being at this moment of the pass in their analyses, could make something of the real unconscious knowledge pass, the fruit of the passage from the analysand to the analyst. And the Cartel of the Pass? Would its members be open enough for the thick shadow that covers this Real not to block their ears? Hence my proposal for a less '*alpha-bête*' relation to an unconscious knowledge that comes from the solitude of the end of this pass to the analyst which makes us less deaf in order to speak about the passand who passes through the saïds [*dits*].

This does not happen *a priori*. With each Cartel, with each passer, with each experience something is gathered. This is why Lacan created the Pass. Despite the impossible at stake in the transmission of psychoanalysis, something of unconscious knowledge is written in a contingent manner. Whence one recognises that there has been a pass to the analyst.

*Translated by Chantal Degril*

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<sup>12</sup> In the '*Postface au Séminaire XI*', Lacan says that at pre-school [*école maternelle*], "one learns to read by making oneself more stupid" [*on apprend à lire en s'alphabétisant*].

FLASHES

FIRST STEPS OF ENTRY INTO THE FUNCTION OF THE ANALYST

**THE ANALYST REMAINS TO BE SEEN**

*Adriana Alvarez*  
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Questions about the first steps in the function of the analyst have been present in the history of psychoanalysis. Questions about the necessary requirements for the practice of analysis arose with Freud. We see this in the texts he addressed to young students, in which he expressed his scepticism about the value of disseminating the details of analytic technique and in which he proposed the requirement to undergo analysis with an expert before beginning the practice. He did not expect a perfect man to engage in analysis, for the novice analyst can only acquire that ideal aptitude in his own analysis, which is brief and incomplete for reasons of the urgency of the times (Freud, 1912). Analysis has been the fundamental condition for the analyst's practice, the ethical and technical stake from the beginning. However, to this day we ask ourselves if this is enough, if it is sufficient and what would be the necessary transformation in an analysed subject.

With Lacan, we take a turn, he blurs any image of preparation and questions the pairing between an experienced analyst and an analysand as an apprentice. What is to be expected in an analysis is rather that movement in which the subject overcomes the horror of knowing that inhabits him, the encounter with the disappointed hope that it will be possible to know as long as the Other knows, and the appearance of that new desire that we know as the desire of the analyst. Nor will there be the possibility of a knowledge, like that of the craftsman, to be taught, to be transmitted in a craft, because for Lacan the analyst is placed in the illusory place of all knowledge. "The analyst is a will-o'-the-wisp": he does not illuminate anything, he even ordinarily comes out of a certain stench, and therein lies his strength (Lacan, 1974).

We are invited here to think about the first steps in the function of the analyst. Beyond the multiple ways in which these first steps can be taken or the stumbling blocks that accompany them, in general, the beginning tends to be a splicing, forcing, or precipitation. Beginning in the function of the analyst can be quite a fruitful step. The contingencies that arise in the clinic re-launch the analytic work; the realisation that the dispositive is working is a source of enthusiasm, as well as the movements in the analytic process itself manifested by "being able to listen to something else" and the verification of the didactic effects of the analysis.

Most of us analysts begin our practice with the analysis in progress, without having yet passed to the analyst, let alone finished the analysis. It is an uncomfortable moment, accompanied by questions such as: What kind of clinic am I doing? Where is this going? Am I getting in the way? These are questions that may eventually cause subjective movements, and sometimes movements leading to an expected end. It is also a fertile moment for the super-egoic obstacle:

‘You are not sufficiently analysed’, ‘A little more analysis is missing’, the idealisation of psychoanalytic discourse or the tendency to make the always unattainable Other of theory consist.

In these first steps the analyst remains to be seen, even if it is confirmed that he functions in the task

of setting free association in motion or in receiving a demand, it is in the future, in what is yet to become [*porvenir, por-de-venir*]. Then he will be able to give an account: not that he works as an analyst but that he is one (Soler, 2008): he can do it if he wants to, but always *a posteriori*.

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*Translated by Leonardo Rodríguez*

## A SINGULAR TURN

*Ida Freitas*  
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When the effects of a certain conjuncture affect the personal life of an analyst, bringing about the risk of contaminating her practice, is it necessary ‘to repress the pass’, resort to her ethics, question her desire on the function of the analyst’s desire and, maybe, find out if it is possible to go beyond where she held herself in what was then considered to be a concluded analysis and have another tour around the *historia*, review her relationship with the other and with the object and reposition herself before her desire, taking on a renewed position before the impossible?

‘To repress the pass’ in a new analysis produces effects in the ‘analyst subject’, who puts herself once again in the analysand’s position. Amongst these effects, I highlight the question on the ‘authorize oneself from oneself’: does the one who authorized herself also have the authority and the ethics, to question this authorization through verifying her own clinical know-how? Is one suspended from the function of analyst until the treatment given to the symptomatic enjoyment and the consequences of a new experience of the end, wake up the desire of the analyst that was overshadowed in the weft of life, making it possible to take up the function once more?

Let’s take a step back to address the wrong step and follow the first steps of a desire renewed by the recent experience, which results in the separation from the Other, the fall of the object,

subjective destitution, the re-encounter with the analyst's desire, the re-affirmation of the authorization of oneself from oneself, but not without some others, besides a new wager on the School and on psychoanalysis in its trans-formative power.

The first steps of entering into the function of the analyst, therefore, were marked by the satisfaction in perceiving the clinical effects of the singular shift that made it possible once again to sustain the analyst's discourse, in occupying the place of the semblant of *a*, orienting analyses towards the real of sense, when before, in some instances, they were perceived to be adrift, without any command, "as language is like this, this drifting",<sup>1</sup> it being necessary, however, to orient it, reduce it towards the real of *lalangue*.

Amongst the first steps, I highlight the loss of the horror of the act, which before was covered up by mistaken gestures of kindness and even charity, which are, little by little, overlapped by "discharity",<sup>2</sup> which does not mean wrongdoings, but to "lend oneself to being refuse", without the anxiety of being discarded, "allowing the subject of the unconscious to place the analyst as the cause of its desire".<sup>3</sup>

A significant change that hit the interpretative response full on, which suffered a real blow in sense or of the real of sense, thus becoming feasible to operate sometimes in the weighbridge between the minimum suggested by Lacan – "it's you who says it", "I don't make you to say it" – and the silence that allows the analysand the freedom to choose his or her own signifiers.<sup>4</sup>

A surprise, noticing something unprecedented in some responses to the analysand's sayings, an uncommon touch, subtle humour, laughter together, a certain lightness before the density of the tragedy. Unlike negligence or indifference, the humour, the lightness, the laughter, operate the function of the "say that no" in the direction of the saying of the demand.

*Translated by Gabriela Costardi*

## MY FIRST STEPS IN THE FUNCTION OF THE ANALYST

*María Jesús Díaz González*  
Sariego, Spain

First of all, I want to thank the ICG for the invitation to participate in this space, which encouraged me to come to Buenos Aires and also made me reflect on my beginnings as analyst.

I will start by telling you that I do not come from the Psy world; I am a doctor, specialist in Orthopaedic Surgery and Traumatology, a profession to which I dedicated myself for 39 years.

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<sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. [1972] 'L'étourdi', *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Lacan, J. (1990) *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson. New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company.

<sup>4</sup> Soler, C. *Stylus* 26, 2013, p. 24.

I point this out because, as it will be seen in my presentation, it had its importance in the vicissitudes of my experience in the function of analyst.

Psychoanalysis was unknown to me. I was working in the hierarchical service of a hospital as traumatologist, when in 1989, I was forced to start my analysis because of my discomfort, because of my suffering.

Seven years after beginning, I felt the need (it was imposed on me) to verify that there was a theoretical corpus, a body of knowledge that endorsed and supported what I was finding in therapy. This led me to the encounter with theory in 1996.

I emphasize that from the beginning, I was going from the experience of my own treatment to the theory.

Four years later, in January 2000, after 11 years of analysis, I decided to open my practice as psychoanalyst and I received my first patient.

This decision was coupled with a certain detachment from what my profession had been until then.

Given that I had the possibility of returning to my initial position, outpatient care, which required less dedication, I resigned from the hospital in order to be able to combine my work and my practice as a psychoanalyst.

This initiative, seen *après-coup*, did not respond to a vocation or even a desire to be an analyst; it was rather a response to what I interpreted as a demand/desire of an Other. I acted according to what I interpreted as the desire of the analyst.

With this premise, I practised as an analyst the best I could and in spite of the fact that I was quite used to divesting myself of my subjectivity for my profession, I remind you of what Freud said in 1912, “that the analyst must be neutral and must take the model of the surgeon who imposes silence on all his affects and even on his human compassion and concentrates all his psychic energies on a single purpose: to practice the operation according to all the rules of the art”.<sup>1</sup> As I say, in spite of that, as I had little theoretical knowledge that would function as a parapet and help me deal with the anxiety of placing myself in the lack of knowledge, and in an attempt to defend against the real, at this first moment I functioned with an identification to the analyst.

Identification, as the name indicates, creates the same, seeks the identical and I intended to reproduce, imitate, copy... my analyst’s way of doing things. But this identificatory way of dealing with anxiety did not work in the clinic and what Lacan says in the “Direction of the Treatment” became very clear to me: it is not via identification that one becomes an analyst.

This difficulty led me to rethink my decision several times.

Four years later, in 2004, when attending the International Encounter, which took place precisely here in Buenos Aires, along with other circumstances that occurred at the same time, the separation from this first analyst, with whom I was in analysis for 15 years, took place along with changes in my subjective position and in the function of the analyst, in the sense of authorizing myself. This led to a satisfaction, as I could see that the treatments began to progress.

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<sup>1</sup> See Sigmund Freud, ‘Recommendations to physicians practising psychoanalysis’, SE XII, pp. 111-120. Freud’s words in this text are translated into English from the Spanish translation of Freud’s work: ‘*Consejos al médico en el tratamiento Psicoanalítico*’. 1912. Biblioteca Nueva. Tomo II. Cuarta Edición. Pág. 1656. [Translator’s note]

After a while, I returned to my analysis with a new analyst and undertook a second round, which lasted another few years and allowed me to go further; to look at and to better grasp the deceptive structure and montage of my fantasy.

Later (in 2010) I intervened in the dispositive of the Pass as a passer, an experience that also had effects.

Over time I was able to grasp the impossibilities imposed by the structure, which allowed me to change my position in the transference and in the way of orienting my intervention.

It was no longer a question of identification, but rather I was able to divest myself of it, to consent to the lack in being and knowledge and present myself to the encounter with the analysand, ceasing to refuse to occupy the place of semblant.

However, this effective subjective change, which would indicate the end of my analysis, does not solve the problem of the desire of the analyst and what makes an obstacle to this function. Desire of the analyst, a complex notion that questioned me and questions me still.

*Translated by Daniela Avalos Gonzales*

## FIRST STEPS AS AN ANALYST

*Marta Pilar Casero Alvarez*  
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I started an analysis because of my personal difficulties, but within my professional practice – I used to work in a mental health centre as a social worker – I soon realised the great advantage that analysis also brought to my clinical social work in public mental health services.

Social intervention in the field of psychiatry requires in the first place the establishment of a transference with the patients, a relationship of trust and support. When this has finally been built up over time, it is then possible to suggest, orientate and intervene by providing economic and social support to improve their quality of life in order that they are able to govern their destiny as much as possible, to exercise their rights or to manage their government benefits. If there is no transference, it is not possible to move forward.

Through my analysis, I have learned to establish firm and supportive links and above all, I have learned to listen to and understand madness. My search in life – I didn't realise I was continually searching and questioning – my questions, let's call them existential, revolved around the madness that surrounded me and the effect it had had on my own history.

I became aware that this personal search was orienting me. The knowledge sprang from my analysis, in realising skills that I had developed out of necessity to deal with the madness that surrounded me, and that I was still learning about. In verification of that, after the elaborations some answers to my questions appeared; I understood that I wanted to get closer to this madness and build something more vivifying with it. I wanted to contribute, because I considered myself guiltily privileged for not having myself suffered this terrible evil.

I did suffer great rage, anger and rejection in the face of the absurdities that surrounded me, but analysis soothed me and transformed this push into a commitment, into a need to give back part of what I had received, of what I had learned. Analysis had allowed me to develop and to better situate myself in the face of this suffering and, from this, was born the desire to put myself in front of other mad people to help build more liveable lives.

I often asked myself whether or not I would be able to do a worthy job, to be up to the task; I felt like an impostor, but the response I received from the patients I worked with in the public service countered my fears and gave me the courage to continue.

It was after about ten years of analysis that the question arose in me: Do I situate myself as an analyst, or not? I say 'situate myself' and not 'desire to be an analyst' because that, I can see in hindsight, appeared much later.

In taking the first step towards the position of analyst – today I realise and not without surprise – the desire appeared as a kind of identification with others. I was encouraged by a super-egoic imperative and a desire to work with suffering and subjectivity in a different way than I could in the public service. Thus a 'potential analyst' was forged, as Colette Soler said at our VIIth Study Day of the School in Buenos Aires.



In addition to analysis, I had begun training in seminars, participating in cartels, attending conferences, and I was studying a Lacanian theory that I barely understood. I remember my prejudices weighing me down and making it difficult for me to accept the differences in jouissance from my first analysands, but now I can say that in those first steps there was nothing of what I was later able to find which led to finding my place as an analyst.

Now, I think that what was there then was a desire to authorise myself as an analyst, a desire accompanied by a 'formidable' analysing hysteria and later, as I continued my training and gained experience with practice, I was able to grasp in all its breadth what the analyst's desire really meant, the act and its horror and the juggling of strategy and tactics necessary to sustain it. Twenty years of analysis were necessary to limit the '*furor sanandi*' and to adapt to the impossible, to accept these small differences of particular jouissance, something necessary for psychoanalytic ethics, a long pathway....

At the moment, I have only 17 years of practice as an analyst and I consider that there is still a lot of learning to be done. At the beginning, I remember that I felt an enormous insecurity, I was afraid of not following the rules, of making mistakes, so with each case I took on, I rushed to my supervisor. I was afraid of becoming disoriented with the patient's structure and losing myself in the direction of the treatment. I was afraid I wouldn't know how to do it and that the patients would decide to give up. I doubted whether I was following the patient's rhythm, whether I was forcing them or not, whether I would capture the subject and its positions in relation to desire, in relation to the Other....

I was afraid that by presenting the cases to my colleagues, my ignorance would become obvious. I was afraid that the patients would realise that I had almost no experience as an analyst and that I was not able to connect with them. At each session I reviewed the previous one so that no information would escape....

Fortunately, I had been following patients for 30 years and although at that time I was only an apprentice analyst, none of the feared disasters ever occurred and all fears were resolved when I began to realise that it was necessary to accept that I did not know and that a significant part of the work had to be taken on by the patient; that "it takes time to get used to being" (*il faut le temps de se faire à être*).<sup>1</sup>

The School and the links with colleagues were a support at the time and are now more necessary than ever, especially when the ideals have already evaporated and there is still work to do both in the clinic and at the level of the association. It is now that I am aware that I have decided to choose this silence and solitude in order to listen to the absolute difference that each patient carries. It is the links with the colleagues in the School that support us in this impossible profession, that act as a motor to sustain the commitment.

Clumsy first steps and a long way to go....

*Translated by Chantal Degril*

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<sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. '*Radiophonie*', *Autres Ecrits*, Buenos Aires, Païdos. 2012 p. 449. This phrase could also be translated as "it takes time to make oneself be".

## WHAT CAUSES?

Claire Parada  
Paris, France

This paper has given me the opportunity to go back to the embarrassments of the beginning. It takes some time to really enter into the function and I realise that the two points I wanted to address are still relevant, remaining as questions to be constantly put to work, like spurs that stop one from falling asleep in the function.

The first point was the question of the position of the analyst: how to occupy it? And with what legitimacy? Indeed, that 'the analyst is only authorized from himself', is far from making things easier: on the contrary, 'then anyone can set up whenever he wants', introduces a major difficulty. No legitimacy based on any diploma, or on a big Other who names or validates. So where would the legitimacy come from? This is a question that one can't help asking oneself at the beginning. It certainly does not come from an academic knowledge, or from the self [*moi*] that makes the decision. The tendency then is to cover this lack with an imaginary dressing and to 'make the analyst', to embody a 'social reason' which in the end will hinder the practice. So how to occupy this place, how to be the cause, the cause that the other causes, in order to say a little more about what causes it? With what do we operate, since we quickly realize that it is not with a know-how learned at university? I would say that it comes with the work of one's own treatment, with the fall of identifications. This is quite subtle but very perceptible when grasped. No longer being in the representation of the figure of the imaginary analyst, there is something that falls and that uncovers the function of the cause, of the cause of desire.

The other point concerns what the analysand's words are aimed at. How can we not get caught up in the little story he tells us and in which he would like us to participate while waiting for us to bring concrete answers? By sticking to the hard line that the only chance of being able to respond to the properly analytic demand is not to respond to the little story. Nor is this to say nothing either. So where should we focus our attention? Floating attention Freud tells us, not attaching to anything in particular in order to hear what is repeated, what insists in what is said [*les dits*]. That assumes not letting oneself be fascinated by significations, thus allowing what causes the saids [*les dits*] to appear rather than what they signify. Difficult task if one has not experienced it in the treatment. One must be able to let go of one's initial desire for knowledge, or perhaps one's desire for the knowledge of the analysand, always aiming beyond what is said to where desire is lodged and where jouissance lies.

We note how these two points are necessarily intimately intricately: the position of the analyst and what is aimed at in the treatment. What is aimed at guides, in a certain manner, the way that the analyst is going to occupy his position, which in itself induces a certain orientation in the discourse of the analysand towards what causes it.

*Translated by Susan Schwartz*

## FIRST STEPS OF ENTRY INTO THE FUNCTION OF THE ANALYST

Lina Velez  
Paris, France

The question, ‘How does one become an analyst?’ revolves around the question of the ‘Desire of the analyst’. In other words, what function, as such, does the analyst fill? What sustains him in this place? The desire to become an analyst is one of the possible consequences of the treatment. What leads an analysand to consent to the moment in the treatment when the subject traverses the fiction that possessed him? This is an encounter in the treatment that allows the “desire of the analyst” to emerge. This encounter implies a response: consent or refusal.

This desire is the result of a contingent encounter with what is at the very origin of desire: a lack where the subject lodged something of his being. The emergence of that desire can only begin with this void, and in a way that is particular to each one. What to make of this void? In *Seminar XI*, Lacan specifies, “It is at this point of lack that the subject has to recognise himself”, the point “where the subject sees himself as caused as a lack by *a*, and where *a* plugs the gap constituted by the inaugural division of the subject.”<sup>1</sup>

What pushes an analysand to pass to the place of analyst? In my case, it was the moment in the treatment where the encounter with the void led me to recognise myself in this point of lack, and in this experience I was confronted with castration in another modality than that of imaginary impotence. The void arose from the encounter with an absolute point. I think I grasped the co-ordinates of the desire of the analyst with the mutation in the desire for knowledge, particularly with the renunciation of absolute knowledge about the signifier of *jouissance*. The love of knowledge, taken as object, led to a failure. This lack in knowledge touches the impossible to say. The void is real; it is not articulable to a signifier. I could have confused the disillusion of love life with the end of analysis, that is, with the ‘de-supposition’ of the partner. The love, of which he was the object, and his algamatic strength, were dissolved after the traversal of the neurotic co-ordinates of this passion. I discovered a certain masochism of *jouissance*, and the love of deciphering passed from clear to obscure. Love for the man, and for truth, were equivalent. One dissolved into the other. At that moment, I was designated as *passer*. I crossed a tumultuous zone from which arose affects like anxiety, mourning, and the *jouissance* of a final phase of a treatment that was not completely finished, even though there was a change in the transference relation.

How to consent to occupying the place of analyst? Was daring to make this step an imposture? The oscillation did not allow me to decide even though I had had a clinical practice for many years with psychotic adolescents in an institution. I received a call from which I could not shy away: She wished to start an analysis; she was a psychologist working in a detention centre as she needed walls to find a framework. I consented, but not without hesitation. To consent to the desire of the analyst implies saying that “yes”: a choice, a decision. It was not the time to procrastinate; I could only occupy this position. It is from this point that the passage to the analyst proceeds, in so far as he consents to make himself the cause of another’s desire. The

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<sup>1</sup> Lacan, J. *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, trans. A. Sheridan, ed. J-A Miller, London, W.W. Norton & Company, p. 270 (trans mod.).

desire of the analyst maintains the analysand at his task until the object *a* is evacuated “in the very same movement that the psychoanalysand falls, for what he has in this object, verified the cause of his desire”.<sup>2</sup> The desire of the psychoanalyst is only identifiable in his act, and as a consequence, only afterwards (*après coup*).

How to ensure that the analysis continues beyond any therapeutic effect, and that the conditions of transference are maintained and that it operates in the field of analysis?

*Translated by Susan Schwartz*

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<sup>2</sup> Lacan, J. *Ornicar?* N°29, p. 18.

POLITICS  
THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF THE PSYCHOANALYST

RENDERING THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS PRESENT

*Manel Rebollo*  
Tarragona, Spain

Addressing the social function of the psychoanalyst, takes us to its place in the different discourses, since they are different modalities of the social link.

We will take as a starting point the psychoanalytic discourse in which the analyst has the prime place as the semblant of the object *a*, causing the analysand's saying in that singular bond between the two, thereby producing the S1 that governs the subject without knowing it: its unconscious.

To talk about the social function of the psychoanalyst can only be thought in terms of its function in the particularity of the treatment being extrapolated to the collective aspect of more or less human relationships.

“Let whoever cannot meet at its horizon the subjectivity of his time give it up then”,<sup>1</sup> wrote Lacan in ‘Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis’ in 1953. He continues: “Let him be well acquainted with the whorl into which his era draws him in the ongoing enterprise of Babel, and let him be aware of his function of interpreter in the strife of languages.”

Five years later, in ‘The Direction of the Treatment’, he presents this question: “What silence must the analyst now impose upon himself if he is to make out, rising above the bog, the raised finger of Leonardo’s ‘St John the Baptist’ if interpretation is to find anew the forsaken horizon of being in which its allusive virtue” must be employed?<sup>2</sup>

This quote refers to the psychoanalytic literature of its time, which he considered dung (the Augean stables) from which the denunciation of the analyst emerges: the pointing finger.

From those two quotes I can draw my idea of what the social function of the analyst can be: an interpreter of the discord in discourses.

Freud presented three impossible positions: to govern, to educate and to psychoanalyze, which Lacan extrapolates to his discourses, adding another impossibility: “to make desire”, which structures the hysteric’s discourse, the only discourse in which the unconscious is assessed as

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<sup>1</sup> J. Lacan ‘Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis’ in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006, p. 264.

<sup>2</sup> J. Lacan ‘The Direction of the Treatment’, *Écrits*, p. 536.

knowledge [*savoir*] that does not think, calculate or judge, as he commented in *The Triumph of Religion*.<sup>3</sup>

To govern and to educate are two highly-valued functions on a social level, with a long tradition in relation to which the analyst is in the position of the newly arrived. Referring to analysts he said: “Since they are in a state of awakening, they perceived that people who govern and people who educate have no idea what they are doing, which does not get in the way of doing it, and even not too badly.” (...) “The analyst’s arrival in his own function allowed the subtle elucidation of the other functions”.<sup>4</sup>

Freud did not talk about the position of the scientist – which for him was taboo according to Lacan – for it is also an impossible position, only science has very little idea about that, and that is fortunate. Even without having an idea of what they do, on occasions, scientists have bouts of anxiety during their unexpected encounters with the possibility of the destruction of life, which is always pending in their experiments. Thus, “Analysis is an even more impossible function than the others”.<sup>5</sup>

If the world is what turns (marches, spins around, as is its function as the world), psychoanalysts occupy themselves with what does not march on: the Real. On this point, they confront the Real far more than scientists do. They confront the filth of the world [*lo inmundo del mundo*].

During the Seventies, Lacan put the analyst’s discourse in counterpoint to two others: science, which forecloses the subject and religion, the master of the field of the attribution of sense. It was not about competing with such discursive structures, but to differentiate the social function of the psychoanalyst from them: to make present the hypothesis of the unconscious beyond the reductive context of the psychoanalyst-psychoanalysand couple.

At the Paris meeting of 2014, Antonio Quinet talked about the psychoanalyst as a “foreigner to his own tongue” an image that I found highly suggestive, not just about its function in the treatment, but also about its social function: a foreigner in relation to the prevailing discourse, the one who presents the uncomfortable questions, the questions which the natives do not ask because they inhabit and are imbued by that discourse from the beginning. I borrow the idea of the foreigner from Luis Izcovich, who extracted it from Franz Kafka, who presents these terms in *The Castle*.

Only from the place of the foreign, of the exiled can emerge the interpreting finger of the psychoanalyst pointing to what makes holes in the structure and questioning the knowledge [*savoir*] constituted in any discourse. Remember that “...history is nothing more than a fugue of which only exoduses are recounted. By his exile [Joyce], sanctions the seriousness of his judgement. Only the deported participate in history”.<sup>6</sup>

The particle ‘ex’ is very present in Lacanian terminology. One of its more original uses is found in Seminar VII, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, where the term “extimity” is coined, the “intimate exteriority” which is attributed to the Thing (*das Ding*) and which we can refer to as object *a*.

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<sup>3</sup> J. Lacan, *The Triumph of Religion*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> J. Lacan ‘Joyce le Symptôme’, in *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 568.

If the analyst's position is one of 'semblance of object *a*', cause of desire, an object that even if it is external is situated in the heart of the analysand's saying and causing it as well. The psychoanalyst in his social function also occupies the position of exile in the discourse of his time; an exile who allows the stating of his 'non-understanding', which questions and at the same time points to the jouissance that the discourse disguises.

Among the Lacanian terms, there is a verb that presents itself in Seminar VI, *Desire and its Interpretation*, and which proliferates in several of the *Autres écrits*, especially in 'L'étourdi' and 'Radiophonie'. It is the verb 'ex-sisting' with a hyphen between 'ex' and 'sisting'. This spelling alerts us to the separateness of the particle 'ex' that denotes exteriority and 'sist', the Latin verb that can be translated as 'establish', 'situate', 'fix', 'to be', and which refers to the "state" or "status" of something. To place the 'ex' in relation to 'sist', produces the signification of 'being' from the outside and thus the 'ex-sistence' that Lacan refers to with regard to analysts. "Now it is a fact that there is [self-authorization]; it is with this that they function. This function only renders the ex-sistence of the analyst probable",<sup>7</sup> Lacan states in the 'Italian Note' in his reference to the Analysts of the School (AS).

In the same text, he talks about the object *a*, which ex-sists because he constructed it. Further on, and in line with this, he affirms the non-existence of the sexual relation, a non-existence that would have to be shown to be impossible to write if psychoanalysis were to be equal to science. Also, "the saying ex-sists from what it is said"<sup>8</sup> and the subject "is no more than "ex-sistence" in relation to the cut that makes the double loop from which the Moebius band results".<sup>9</sup> Finally, the unconscious "ex-sists to the hysteric's discourse".<sup>10</sup>

"The unconscious ex-sists, it is motivated by structure, in other words by language".<sup>11</sup> Then, to make present the hypothesis of the unconscious also specifies a position of ex-sistence which makes it difficult to overlook.

To finish, I would like to add that my recent work on the CAI has given me much to think about the function of the AMS [Analyst of the School], not only in our School, but also in relation to the world in general, as much in respect to its humanity as to its filth. When Lacan states that the School can nominate as AME those analysts who have given proof of themselves, with all the enigma contained in the use of the term 'proof', I understand that the social, the collective, is an element to be used as a criterion, given that it is the School that has the power to 'guarantee' the suitability of such candidates for nomination. This is done by means of a manifestly collective procedure, where not only their clinical work is valued – a fundamental datum – but also their commitment to the 'possible' social insertion of the hypothesis of the unconscious, a hypothesis which in principle is not 'socializing', but rather hinders the social bond in pursuit of the singularity of the subject's desire.

*Translated by Karla Roman*

<sup>7</sup> J. Lacan 'Note italienne', *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 307.

<sup>8</sup> J. Lacan, 'L'étourdi', *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 449.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> J. Lacan, *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1990.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

## RENDERING THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS PRESENT (RESONANCE)

*Mikel Plazaola*  
San Sebastian, Spain

Easier to say than to do, particularly since after his whole theoretical, clinical and practical construction, Freud himself described his work – psychoanalysis – as an impossible task.

Despite his determined will to defend and transmit it, he knew that the aim of the spreading of psychoanalysis was not social comfort, thus it was difficult to accept it. It was, rather, something dangerous and contagious.

From his return, and after journeying for years in the elaboration and extension of psychoanalysis, Lacan proposes in 1978, “As I am thinking of it now, psychoanalysis is untransmissible.”<sup>12</sup>

Although the intransmissibility refers to the unfortunate condition that analysis has to be reinvented each time. That is to say, it is not transmissible to the extent that a standardised protocol does not exist which could facilitate either its teaching or its transmission.

However, in 1974, his opinion is a little different, with another perspective which better corresponds with the question that brings us together:

“Analysis is the artificial lung thanks to which we try to assure what is necessary for us to find pleasure in speaking so that the story continues. We haven't realised this yet, and it's a good thing, because in the state of insufficiency and confusion in which analysts find themselves, political power would have already taken them in hand. Poor analysts, who would have taken away all possibility of being what they should be: compensatory. In fact, it is a wager, it is also a challenge that I have supported for I put myself at the most extreme risks. But, in all that I have said, some happy formulas will perhaps survive, for everything is left to chance in the human being.”<sup>13</sup>

Wager and risk then, with chance as the backdrop, applicable to this possible social function of the analyst.

Between the after-effects of the pandemics, in which we became habituated to medical terminology and so many forced choices, we could easily choose the plague or free ourselves from breathlessness in making present the hypothesis of the unconscious as a breath of air in a context of overwhelming scientific evidence, of closed discourses, of ephemeral superficialities and banalities.

The first question: what are we speaking about when we think of the “Social function of rendering present the hypothesis of the unconscious.”

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<sup>12</sup> Lacan, J. (1978). 9<sup>o</sup> Congrès de l'École Freudienne de Paris sur «La transmission», 6-9 juillet 1978. *Lettres de l'École*, 1979, 25(II), pp. 219-220. (En castellano en *Psicoanálisis inédito.com*).

<sup>13</sup> Lacan, J. (1974). ‘Déclaration à France Culture en 1973’. *Le Coq-Héron* 46-47, pp. 3-8, p. 5.



We take it for granted that, in the process of an analytic treatment, both the role of the analyst (singular and non-social in this case) and the presence of the unconscious are plausible and verifiable.

Of course, in a different way, that is also produced in other activities (seminars, notices, congresses, publications) for frequently, since we listen or read, the echoes and questions tied to our own unconscious resonate.

Generally, we can think of the effect, outside of the conditions of the dispositive of care and of our structures of formation. There, the ‘social function’, would be like causality, an effect of the extension of psychoanalysis, in the exterior context to the dispositive and teaching activities.

This is perhaps a little ‘artificial lung’.

So, what can be done, or better, what is it that makes the hypothesis of the unconscious become present as a social function of the analyst?

There are invaluable aids in this task, such as the recent lapsus of the former president Bush. As he was vehemently condemning the war in Ukraine and Putin, his discourse gets muddled and each time he says “war in Iraq” instead of “war in Ukraine”, and does not know how to get out of it.

The anecdote is a pearl without price, but I don’t think that it has greater import than as a viral joke and the ridicule of a personage.

Echoing what Manel [Rebollo] was proposing, we know well the rejection generated, justly I think, of all interpretation claiming to be analytic – outside the analytic context – of someone who is confronted with his way of doing or saying things: *Ansia interpretandi*. More frequent, but not only, is when one makes one’s debut in the world of analysis and tries to show the marvels of psychoanalysis and the manifestations of the unconscious, it is the unconscious of others, certainly.

Here ‘strangeness’ intervenes, but also the fact that the unconscious, which is so for a reason, and which works with it, requires specific conditions.

This rejection is due to a nuance: the infatuation [*engouement*] that this type of intervention transmits, as if the truth of the other was held by the person who makes it. As the well-known refrain has it: ‘interpretation outside the session is aggression’.

Is this perhaps the same reason that frequently generates the social rejection of all reference to the unconscious, and in general, to psychoanalytic ideas?

Dead-end, then, as a way of presenting the hypothesis of the unconscious....

This also shows that in the social aspect outside of the analysis, as much or more important than **what is said**, is **how it is said**, the song’s melody, beyond the words: how, at what moment, from what position? Knowing when to be silent in the moment, silence also takes part in the melody.

In this function of presentification we are speaking about, there is an inherent difficulty with regard to what the transmission concerns: to transmit what is the most intimate and singular of a verifiable experience of oneself, to the universal, to others. The most obvious case being what we have in the Pass. But this difficulty also extends to all domains of social discourse.

There is also a lung missing in current social discourse, where, in order to be quick, the utilisation of science by capitalism suffocates subjects. The subject drowns, foreclosed by classifications, tests, categories, protocols in all the domains of health: the obligation to gain permission to go to the toilet by protocol and time trials.

The exclusivity of positivism and ‘scientific proofs’ in official media culture, as at the University.

And with that, something that sounds now like a new ‘threat’: development and almost blind trust in the progress of the neurosciences, which seem to reveal the neuronal mechanisms of the human soul as well as its sins in a way that is foreseeable.

Yet, at another time, a similar fascination was manifest in the university milieu, for the ‘map of the human genome’: it was going to explain everything that concerned the psyche and the clinic. This should have been a gigantic advance in scientific diagnosis and the treatment of mental illness.

The map of the human genome has been achieved already, and enormous sums of money have been invested, and as for what concerns the psyche it seems, at the least, that it was destined to be paid for with the same money as the laws of the market. It has been devoured by the new enthusiasm for the neurosciences.

However, neither the human genome, nor, as anyone could have anticipated, the neurosciences, did not prevent the illness generated in subjects by its own efficacy. By way of example, the subjective malaise is increasingly diffused, more difficult to circumscribe by subjects in spite of medical progress, medications, technology, etc.

But if one listens to Freud, isn’t there a similarity between the unbreathable ‘ecosystem’ of the subject and the objections that meet the unconscious function of presentification...? Aren’t they made from the same material?

For this reason, these objections are often qualified by resistance in social discourse. So, let’s reflect on what we can take from Lacan’s affirmation: “the only real resistance in analysis is the resistance of the analyst”.<sup>14</sup>

One option is what the Chinese proverb says: “Sit down at the door of your house and you will see pass by ...”.

In spite of this appeal to the virtue of patience for analysts, I do not think that it is a matter of staying seated and waiting. Lacan has already indicated a path: the teaching of psychoanalysis can only be transmitted from one subject to another by means of a transference to work.<sup>15</sup> And

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<sup>14</sup> Lacan, J., (1991) *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II, The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis* 1954-55. Ed. J-A Miller. Trans. J. Forrester. New York and London W.W. Norton & Company, p. 324.

<sup>15</sup> Lacan, J., (1990 [1977]) ‘Founding Act,’ in *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*. Trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson. New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 97-106.

there must be a work transference, for despite everything, after 120 years of practice in hostile territory, the analytic discourse persists and for a longer time than other more or less fascinating solutions and practices.

So – (and here I change the title) – What is it that **makes the evidence** of the unconscious be transmitted, that is, be present? For the truth is that as in the transmission, and in spite of all regrets, those enumerated and others, the unconscious is not an hypothesis, but evidence, that is lived and is verified, whether it is recognised or not.

Beyond the anecdotal character of the lapsus, the anxieties (with various names today), which take into account subjective sharing, it is frequently verified that something outside of the dispositive of the treatment has been heard, has been said or has been read in an instant, which has had a determining effect on someone: sometimes that opens the way for articulating or wanting to elucidate these discomforts [*malaises*], and these stimuli are pushed by a certain desire.

This is a postulate that what is transmitted is desire.

Thus, perhaps someone's desire, which is supposed to be tied to psychoanalysis, would be a way of making evident the hypothesis of the unconscious in its social context, through his way of acting, of referring, of considering, of expressing an opinion, of asking or being silent... that is to say, 'his style'. His style of acting in the face of what his contemporaries divide up through what they are subjected to.

To the extent that desire cannot be spoken, this would be a desire that is attested to and perceived rather than a desire manifested through an intention. One could suppose then that what is revealed is the way of living desire, which is accompanied by an ethics, and which can make a sign. In resonance with the exposed other: sign of the stranger. From there it is contingency or chance that this ethics has effects on others.

*Translated by Susan Schwartz*

## TO CONCLUDE

Ana Alonso  
Madrid, Spain

In the ‘Proposition...’,<sup>1</sup> Lacan assigns to the School the task of endeavoring to dissipate the thick shadow that covers the joint where analysand becomes analyst. And this VIIth International Encounter of the School which we are about to conclude is dedicated to this.

For this purpose, he put forth the Pass as the test of the historicization of the analyst, in other words, to recount how and why he/she became an analyst. Historicization is always ‘one by one’ as the AEs of the School pointed out in the first sequence.

In this same text, he says that “the end of a psychoanalysis, superfluously said to be training (*didactique*) is the effective passage from psychoanalysand to psychoanalyst”.<sup>2</sup> But, does passing to the analyst necessarily require that the analysis is finished? Or would it be a matter of differentiating between the end of the analysis and the appearance of the desire of the analyst, as a moment of passage from analysand to analyst?

How to read the pass to the analyst? How to recognize the mark of the analyst? If in 1967 Lacan affirmed that the fall of the subject supposed to know would assure this pass, in 1973 he will say that this is a necessary condition but not sufficient. And from the moment of the appearance of a new desire, a new knowledge, a knowledge to be invented, a track can be followed. These are points that have been approached in the two sequences of the second part of this morning.

So is the point of entrance into analytic practice the same as passage to the analyst? Lacan points to a certain naïveté in this passage to the analyst, an inability to measure its consequences, as given in the testimonies from this afternoon’s first session.

And in the ‘Preface to the English-language Edition’<sup>3</sup> of Seminar XI Lacan leaves open the question: what motivates someone who has resolved his transference to want to take up this function? What reason other than earning money pushes one to become an analyst? Perhaps the profit you have had from your own analysis?

Finally, the last sequence was on the social utility of the analyst beyond the context of the analyst/analysand couple. The analyst will bring his social utility in presenting the hypothesis of the unconscious, in occupying a position of exile from the discourse of his time. This will surely be with his style, through which the way of living his desire shines and which can, perhaps, signal something foreign, singular, that makes a cause for others.

In our journey today, open questions remain on which each of us hopes to work and which can serve in continuing to construct a community of work in this knowledge to be invented that psychoanalysis proposes to us.

First of all, we would like to thank the speakers for their work, as well as all the participants, both in person and online, who, despite the time difference, attended and participated in the debates. And of course, to the organizing committee, to the translators and computer specialists,

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<sup>1</sup> Lacan, J., ‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’, trans, Russell Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Lacan, J., (1981 [1976]) ‘The Preface to the English-Language Edition’. In *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*. London, W.W. Norton & Company.

especially our Argentinean colleagues who welcomed us so well, and to all those who made this meeting possible.

We conclude the VIIth Study Day of the School.

Thank you very much.

*Translated by Devra Simin*

**FORTHCOMING EVENTS**

**V<sup>th</sup> Interamerican Study Day of the School  
23 June, 2023**

**V<sup>th</sup> Interamerican Symposium  
Of the Forums of the Lacanian Field  
24 – 25 June, 2023. San Juan, Porto Rico**

**‘Segregation and Singularity’**



**III<sup>rd</sup> European Convention**  
**14–16 July, 2023. Madrid, Spain**  
**Study Day of the School**  
**‘The imperative of the social link’**

**Study Days of the IF**  
**‘The ethics of singularity’**

**III Convention Européenne De L'IF-EPFCL**  
Internationale des Forums  
École de Psychanalyse des Forums du Champ Lacanien

**Madrid 14, 15 et 16 juillet 2023**  
Ateneo de Madrid - c/ Prado 21, 28014 - Madrid (Espagne)

JOURNÉE D'ÉCOLE EPFCL  
**14 JUILLET**  
**L'IMPÉRATIF  
DU LIEN SOCIAL**

JOURNÉES DE L'IF  
**15 ET 16 JUILLET**  
**L'ÉTHIQUE DE  
LA SINGULARITÉ**



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