


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European Study Days of the School, Barcelona,
January 21 & 22, 2017
“The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst and his Know-how”



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Susan Schwartz
Coordinator and editor of the English edition of *Wunsch*

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Editorial

Wunsch 17 is the first contribution of our ICG 2016-2018 to the SPFLF's international bulletin.

We have chosen from the contributions out our European Study Day of the School that was held in Barcelona, January 21 and 22, 2017, on the interesting question, "The knowledge of the psychoanalyst and his know-how".

We have included the works of the two recently named Analysts of the School, some texts from members of the ICG and other texts.

EUROPEAN STUDY DAYS OF THE SCHOOL,

BARCELONA, JANUARY 21 & 22, 2017

"THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PSYCHOANALYST AND HIS KNOW-HOW"

What is put in tension in this theme is paradoxical since there is unconscious knowledge without the subject and the transference in which the analysand's love is addressed to the analyst as subject supposed to know. How can the knowledge acquired in an analysis be circumscribed, given that Lacan played with this gain [*acquis*] under the form of "for whom?" [*à qui*].

At the least, the psychoanalyst must know about the structure and the effect of language, a difficult knowledge of which, Lacan tells us, "psychoanalysts cannot talk about it".

These texts question psychoanalysis and the limits of transmission that, in spite of all being done for the good fortune of the one who hears, knowing that know-how is not only not predictable but like so much know-how, it responds to the very place of an impossible guarantee and transmission.

Making the way [*Chemin faisant*¹]

Marie-Noëlle Jacob-Duvernet

It is my turn to again take up the question of the knowing-how-to-do [*savoir-faire*] of the analyst that I would define thus: can the end of the treatment and the experience of the Pass modify one's practice? The Pass is a change certainly but it takes some time to get the measure of it. Time also to examine the experience in order that it not be "situated in the ineffable".²

So today I will say that my practice has been modified in the sense of trust. It is affirmed in a trust that is patient, which aims at the saying [*le dire*], which allows for the patient sustaining of the saying.

The mirror of impatience has been given up. It is no longer taken up in the analysand's discouragement when overwhelmed by the repetitions in what he says, in repeated statements, used statements, lying statements. What is repeated can push some to impatience, to the point of feeling irritation. Others, on the contrary, can slip happily into the comfort of the already known. The experiences are certainly very different.

For me, it is the passage from impatience to patience and its correlative *saying*. Patience and saying go together and let me think of a treatment as a way [*chemin*] that one takes, and it is oriented by a *making say* [*un faire dire*].

It is this that I am going to elaborate, the making of the saying as an illustration of knowing-how-to do.

The patience of the real

What is the patience of the analyst?

First, in dealing with this question of patience, I recall St Augustine's interest in its cause, for the cause of patience is important to him and to us, too. He says it must be something other than a passion. If it is not, it is false, a false patience, an impassioned patience that is only the other side of impatience. Patience would then be confused with impatience, both of them full of a passion we could suffer from.

There has to be another cause for the analyst.

Is this patience as technique? There are many times that Freud refers to the patience that is necessary for the analytic practitioner. He needs it when he has to counter the wild drifting of the nascent analysis and in establishing the analytic *dispositif* itself. This is evident in the texts collected under the title of "Psychoanalytic Technique" and in "Remembering, Repeating and Working Through" of 1914. In speaking to a patient about his resistance, he tells us that lifting it is not enough. "One must allow the patient time to become more conversant with this resistance with which he has not become acquainted, to *work through it*

¹ "*Chemin faisant*" is an expression that includes the meanings "on the way", "along the way", "moving forward". I have translated it literally to give focus to the "making" that is the effect of the analyst's practice, which is the theme of this paper.

² Lacan, J. "The Function and Field of Speech and Language", *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*. Trans. B. Fink. New York and London, Norton & Company, 2006, p. 239.

.... The doctor has nothing else to do but wait and let things take their course, a course which cannot be avoided nor always hastened.”³

This concerns patience in terms of advice on technique, which is not without value but it will not prevent the practitioner from suffering from impatience. We need to go further than the technical approach, as Lacan envisages it in “The Direction of the Treatment”.

Wouldn't impatience have something to do with anxiety? In “Function and Field of Speech and Language”, Lacan links anxiety to the opacity of a symbolic action.⁴ More precisely, the analyst's anxiety can arise when he discovers in his action the naked image of his power. Lacan even speaks of a terror that takes hold of the psychoanalyst.

But what is this power of the psychoanalyst? Is it about keeping the upper hand in order not to be anxious? Keeping the upper hand is self-explicit. The cause of which we are speaking at the moment, is full here. And keeping the upper hand takes part in the three passions of the analyst, with ignorance and not deceiving.

Three passions for a full cause that does not leave space for anxiety.

On the contrary, the power of the analyst as a naked face refers to something else. It is about a real nakedness bound to the cause as that which lacks. A real that is impatient for anxiety to cease. An impatience that we could call defensive in the face of anxiety.

It is thus a position: the place of the real in determining patience or impatience. And I would say that the analyst is oriented by the patience of the real.

It is what is hollowed that makes the way [*qui fait chemin*] not what is full.

That refers us to the hollow of the groove [*rainure*], of the saying that Lacan speaks to us about in “*Les non-dupes errent*”. The hollow of the groove allows the saying to flow.

By chance, I noticed that “*patience*” in the French language is also an ancient tool that is split. The object is called “*patience à boutons*”. It is a little wooden board with a slit hollowed down the centre that is used by soldiers. Slid under the buttons of the uniform, it allowed them to be polished without soiling the material.

That evokes for us the great wars of the last century in Europe but also a practice of hollowing called patience, which is able to make what is aimed at appear by distinguishing it.

Patience as a slit makes the button appear. For us the slit is called the groove of the saying [*rainure du dire*]. In our field, the patience of the analyst has no other aim than to intensify the real in order that the true saying of the hollowing appears or happens [*advienne*]. Something flows but it is not the truth and its impatience. Rather, a saying flows in the patience of the groove.

I will also link this patience with the peace that Lacan refers to in his “Proposition” of 1967 on the Pass. Peace is one of the affects of the end of the treatment listed by Colette Soler in her book on the subject,⁵ side by side with enthusiasm and satisfaction. Without being

³ Freud, S. “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through”, SE XII, p. 155.

⁴ Lacan, J. Op. cit., p. 201.

⁵ Soler, C. *Lacanian Affects: The Function of Affect in Lacan's Work*, trans. Bruce Fink, New York, Routledge, 2016.

equivalent, peace is neither enthusiasm nor its contradiction; they are part of the series of positives that testify to a conversion from the horror of knowledge.

In his “Proposition”, Lacan is precise in saying that “peace does not [come] immediately”.⁶ A justified precision, it seems to me, that lets the prevalence of enthusiasm be heard in the immediate time of the Pass, and then afterwards a peace will come “that seals the metamorphosis”.⁷

Making saying [*Faire dire*]

Let’s continue with this groove that allows what is aimed for in an analysis to appear. A groove in order that a true saying flows along it, that of knowledge which is unconscious.

But what is it that the analyst can know-how-to-do with the saying that flows along the groove? Is making saying part of the analyst’s knowing-how-to-do?

We have seen the patience that characterises the desire of the analyst, patience with the real. How will patience know how to be a doing? It seems to me that it will be able to do if it is not an immobile patience, if the analyst aims at a movement. This is how I read Lacan based on numerous references to the way [*chemin*], to the opening of the path [*voie*], to movement.

I will cite some of them:

“I do not say progress, it is known that I claim no such thing, but a movement is necessary (*Discours à l’EFP*)”⁸

“On the way where the real comes into fact” (*Radiophonie*)⁹

“What there is of the real inscribes the way all along the wall of the impossible” (*L’Étourdit*)¹⁰

“The journey of a truth which does not actually erupt anywhere: (*L’insu*)”¹¹

The value of movement is particularly explicit in *L’Étourdit*. There, the saying is quite rightly defined on the basis of movement.

Man is a turning [*volte*], this is man-turning who spins through the rounds of the discourses and imprints a saying. A saying is deduced from movement and not fixity. The statements stay immobile and cumulative. Since they are not forgotten, they are additional. The saying is forgotten but allows movement that is nothing other than going along the wall of the impossible. The path goes along the wall while successively acknowledging different forms of the impossible.

That is the path that does not lead to any truth, a path that does not go anywhere but follows the wall of the real and rubs against it. To rub the body the length of the wall is to experience the different forms of the impossible, to accept them. The path of the wall of analysis.

⁶ Lacan, J. “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School”, trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* 6, p. 10 (translation modified).

⁷ Ibid., p. 10 (translation modified).

⁸ Lacan, J., “*Discours à l’EFP*”, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 279.

⁹ Lacan, J., “*Radiophonie*”, *Autres écrits*, p. 445.

¹⁰ Lacan, J., “*L’Étourdit*”, *Autres écrits*, p. 449.

¹¹ Lacan, J., “*L’insu que sait de l’une-bévue s’aile a mourre*”, lesson of 15 February, 1977, unpublished.

To be rubbed against the forms of the impossible, against that which one will not be able to say completely, or in a consistent way, what one will not be able to demonstrate. And then there is the undecidable, the form that is the most accomplished form of the impossible, excluding any possibility of a conclusion. The undecidable as radically anti-conclusive represents the flaw even of the saying.

The undecidable signals our irreducible precariousness as psychoanalysts but also the possible movement of the saying as knowledge to be invented.

How can the analyst indicate this path that leads nowhere but has to be taken? Is it a matter of showing it with a raised finger? Or is it a matter of incarnating that which cannot be made explicit? How can the acceptance of the impossible pass in a knowing-how-to-do?

I am proposing this to you: it is a matter of a “knowing how to” write without a hyphen, that is without the typographic line that unites the knowing and the doing. Certainly, knowing and doing work together as “know how to do”, but without the crutch of the hyphen. Two terms that support separation, disunity, just as the exit from analysis assumes.

What is important about the absence of a crutch is the disequilibrium produced. That which does not have a crutch falls or topples in the direction of something else, another plane in space, another discourse. That which is without a crutch is without equilibrium, and without fixity. Just as Lacan speaks of “imbecility”¹² and its Latin etymology: “imbecilus” is that which is without a crutch.

So each logic, like each discourse, reveals its weakness, its imbecility in being without a crutch that provokes for each one the tipping in the direction of another discourse. That includes the analytic discourse that takes its place in the round of discourses that constitute the saying. There is no metalanguage, neither of the analytic discourse, nor any other one.

But more than just being integrated into the round, the analytic discourse is the motor of the movement. Not writing the relation of signification S1-S2, like not writing the sexual relation, means that the turn is from this point of absence. This impossibility is its strength.

Then if where there was impatience for the truth there will be patience for the real that waits the beyond of the truth. Patience to make the saying, without the crutch of the hyphen [*trait de union*], of the jouissance that disunites and goes all alone. Patience of the desire of the analyst.

More than a typographical detail, this absence of the hyphen alludes to consenting to the impossible relation that is there in knowing how to do and its strength.

Translated by Susan Schwartz

¹² Lacan, J., “L’Étourdi”, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.

A psychoanalysis cannot be all

Elisabete Thamer

What do we learn from an analysis? That an analysis cannot be all. No, it cannot deliver us from all our symptoms, nor can it cannot deliver the final word of a knowledge that we would like so much to have.

An analysis cannot be all, but it can be something. It can get rid of certain symptoms that lead us to the analyst's office, that's for sure. It also allows us, at the end, to draw a bit of knowledge from it, a bit of knowledge about ourselves in the sense of our fantasy, and also some knowledge about psychoanalysis, its method and its aim. Thus, what the analysis can do is "not all" but what it can do is not insignificant.

Personally, I think that the end of analysis depends exactly on how the subject responds to what the analysis cannot obtain for him. But how can we know what the analysis can do and what it cannot do if not by the analysis itself, that is, in the singular experience of each treatment? How can we attain a knowledge about its knowledge, knowledge of which we know enough to finish an analysis? How to know what the elements of irreducible *jouissance* are? The history of each analysis is the history of the analysand's love for knowledge. Knowledge that he imagines he can obtain through the deciphering for he supposes that there is a subject there, but, above all, because he expects that this knowledge that comes from deciphering operates on his symptoms. For some of them this is indeed the case, as the therapeutic effects of analysis attest, but not for all. No, analysis cannot be all. There is no way of finishing an analysis without knowing something about what, even with an analysis, will not stop.

If we juxtapose two of Lacan's little formulas where there is a question of knowledge we get, in a condensed way, the impasse in every analysis on this point, even, I would say, the inevitable impasse in every analysis. However it is an impasse that is traversable. The first defines the transference, the second, defines the unconscious. Lacan says that the transference "is love addressed to knowledge",¹³ and he says that the unconscious is "knowledge without a subject".¹⁴ Transference love is also prey to a fundamental mistake, for unconscious knowledge is beyond the grasp of the subject.

If I say that psychoanalysis cannot be all, that's because of the limits imposed on it both by its tool, speech, and by the very nature of the unconscious that speech tries to circumscribe, to reduce. Moreover, due to the fact that it is inexhaustible, the unconscious is the "ideal worker",¹⁵ as Lacan said, for it is never on strike; it is also real, that's to say that it will always exceed the effort that is devoted to its deciphering, no matter how unrelenting that may be. This is the perspective of an impossible, that leaves along the way the disappointed or the resigned, who confuse this impossibility with impotence: theirs, that of their analysts, they think. Too hooked perhaps on the Freudian precept of a *Wahrheitsliebe* – "the love of truth" as the foundation of the analytic relation.¹⁶

¹³ Lacan J., « Introduction à l'édition allemande d'un premier volume des *Écrits* », dans *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 558.

¹⁴ Lacan J., « *Compte rendu sur 'L'acte psychanalytique'* », dans *Autres écrits*, op. cit., p. 376.

¹⁵ Lacan J., *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss and A. Michelson, New York, W.W. Norton & Co, 1990, p. 14.

¹⁶ See Freud, S., "Analysis Terminable and Interminable", SE XXIII.

So how can we conclude an analysis, if the unconscious that is to be interpreted dedicates us to an infinite analysis? How can we know that we know enough in order that the analysis satisfies [*satis-fasse*]?¹⁷

It seems to me that the modification of the subject's relation to knowledge, to knowledge that he expects from his analysis, is at the heart of that outcome.

The contingencies of my *history* constrained me no less than “the duty to always speak the truth”. This imperative was the agreed upon result of a strict education, embellished with a Lutheran education reaffirmed by myself, and which without doubt oriented the crushing tone of my neurosis and the modalities of my relation to the Other. For those who do not know about it, in the Lutheran church, there is no confession as there is with Catholics, thus there is neither penitence nor absolution offered by an other. Pardon only comes from a sincere repentance to God alone, without the intermediary of any clergy. This imperative “always tell the truth” reached its paroxysm in childhood, where not knowing if what I said was true, I felt obliged to say **everything** that I was thinking, even if it meant asking immediate pardon from the one to whom I was speaking. But saying what I was thinking was no absolute guarantee of the truth of what I was thinking. Indeed, you can see the infernal whirlwind in this.

If I refer to this, it is so that you can measure why I consider that the major effect of my analysis – that which permitted me to savour all the others – was the effective realisation of the disjunction between knowledge and truth. I can localise the precise moment of that turning point outside the session but not outside the analysis and, above all, not without analysis.

In a moment of extreme self-honesty, I wondered: “ – *Really, after so many years of analysis ... and I am not so stupid as all that, I applied myself to it ... what do all these years of analysis say and what do I still expect from them? Indeed, I continued to speak during the years ... What do I know in my depths that psychoanalysis will not be able to resolve?*” The answer to the question thus posed came to me straight away, I have known it for ever ... During the following session, I announced to my analyst: “I know one thing. In relation to this (...), psychoanalysis can do nothing. I will have to make do with it”. Note well that it was not a matter of some sort of insufficiency *of the analyst's*, but of an impossibility *inherent in psychoanalysis itself*. Strangely for me, this was not a moment tinged with sadness or resignation, far from it. I locate “that moment of truth” as the product of the major interpretation of the analysis, as if the whole analysis had ended at a single, great interpretation that would not have taken place without the act of the analyst.

Two dreams came afterwards to mark the turning towards the end, and I would like to say something about the nature of these manifestations of the unconscious that are produced in this moment of the Pass.

In the testimonies of the Pass, we often find stories of dreams, of witticisms or of lapsus, which index the moment of passing in an analysis. How do we understand these dreams or these lapsus that bring about the subject's conviction that a cut has occurred in the analysis?

It is a fact that there are manifestations of the unconscious at the end that remain unforgettable for the subject. So unforgettable that it is possible to testify to them years

¹⁷ Translator's note: the verb “to satisfy” – “*satisfaire*”, contains the verb “*faire*” – “to make, to do”. The hyphenating of the subjunctive form of the verb draws attention to the idea of “making satisfied”.

later, sometimes without even having to take recourse to one's notes. Moreover, I find that the analytic community is often very fond of speaking about these moments, as if those elements could particularly clarify, give body to, what happens at the end of analyses. We hunt for a dream, a signifier, a lapsus, we prepare for our duty to hold forth about or to dissect a neologism. It is worth pondering to what this expectation of the community corresponds. I will leave this aspect aside today.

My experience is no exception to this. So called "particular" dreams also marked this moment of passing that affected me in a new and lasting way. I have never forgotten them, even today, almost seven years after the end of my analysis. But what characterised these dreams in order for them to have so particular an effect? What distinguishes them from the hundreds and hundreds of other dreams spoken of during a good twenty years in analysis? Does this efficacy reside in the dreams themselves?

I wondered then about the reason why someone's unconscious – this ideal worker "that neither thinks, nor calculates, nor judges"¹⁸ – would suddenly deliver a text more revelatory than the others? Finally, a dream or a lapsus that would change everything! Personally, I don't really believe it. I think, I am even convinced, that if unforgettable dreams and lapsus mark the end of an analysis, this is not because the subject's unconscious suddenly delivered him some exceptional material, a "*grand cru*" dream in relation to all those that have been forgotten in the analysis as soon as they have been deciphered. Why, in this precise moment would the unconscious reveal to the subject what up to that point it had refused?

It seems to me that if these manifestations of the unconscious occur at the moment of passing, both surprising and affecting the subject in a way that is different to the point of being unforgettable, it is because on his side, and justifiably, the subject **no longer reads them in the same way**, or it may be that he does not read them at all. In my opinion, it is this that is the most surprising, this that is absolutely new for the subject himself; this that can possibly prove that the relation of the subject to his own unconscious has changed. No more infinite associations, no more enjoyable chatter, no more interpretative libido. That was the case for me and is so still today.

No more loving the unconscious like oneself, that freeing of the libido for other realisations in life, but also for renewing the link to psychoanalysis in the clinic and in the School. And that is certainly worth it (and worth the cost) [*vaut le coup(coût)*].¹⁹

Translated by Susan Schwartz

The accidents of the psychoanalyst

Marc Strauss

Knowledge (*savoir*), whether psychoanalytic or not, is something we have by the shovelful – think only of Lacan and his references – and we find ourselves very busy with it. But knowledge does not say anything about know-how (*savoir-faire*), even if it recognizes its existence.

We know that there is know-how with *lalangue* that precedes the linguist and the grammarian. This know-how resides at the point of ignorance, the point where the Other

¹⁸ Lacan J., *Television*, op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁹ Translator's note: *coup* and *coût* are homophonic in French.

cannot articulate what is at stake; it is a surplus-knowledge that everyone uses to deal with what each one knows that he or she does not know.

So when is it that know-how stops glorifying the subject, to become a question that demands knowledge? Clearly, this happens when an accident occurs, a failure in the fundamental humming of the know-how. Knowledge is then supposed to deal with it, that is, to reduce it to a simple setback that thus has no irremediable consequences.

Our specific know-how is psychoanalyzing which first means calling ourselves psychoanalysts before being authorized as such by analysands, and doing the work.

So, what have we done wrong to produce this current question for our School, a question which therefore concerns all of us?

There is apparently nothing simpler than the work of the psychoanalyst. Who indeed does not want to know the real story behind his or her desire, since this is the very thing that defines desire, that parasitic malady of the speaking being?

We could then ask if it is the analyst's fault that an analysis does not take off or go all the way to term. All the more as Lacan has told us that the only resistance is that of the psychoanalyst. In fact, what we know is that analysts do not all have the same sorts of patients, and Lacan has told us that no common trait characterizes them.

Is it then a matter of the fantasy? In the know-how of the psychoanalyst, what part does it have? Is it really possible to reduce it to nothing? We know that Lacan declined the three temptations to which psychoanalysts are subjected, on the basis of the most notorious deviations from them. The temptation to occupy the position of the complete mother, further described by Lacan as maternal pedagogy; the temptation to be the son-father, which amounts to providing Samaritan-like aid; the temptation to the divine, which amounts to absolute mastery. These can be complemented by a clinic of analysands who correspond to them: those who expect the word of a complete mother are not those who expect a brother-father or a god. But whichever it is, the expectation comes down to the same thing: to be saved. Saved from the presence of a lack, the lack that comes from the radical difference that language establishes between mother and father, between man and woman, between the saying and the said.

But we know that this expectation of fulfillment is impossible to satisfy. The transference that we sustain—does it not rest on a false promise that we know to be such, thus on an imposture, indeed, a swindle? Lacan insisted in different ways on the essential dimension of the constitutive moment of the analytic pact, and he sought to define the coordinates as much on the side of the subject as on the side of the analyst. Thus, in “The Function and Field of Speech and Language,” he identified “the constitutive effects of transference, insofar as they are distinguished by an indication of reality from the constituted effects that follow them.”²⁰

But eliciting transference, that is, a link through speech, is not reserved only to us. Every link via speech presupposes transference; always what is transferred between interlocutors is the jouissance of an object, including what this exchange entails regarding the renunciation of its full jouissance. It is always around this object, token of exchange, that speakers come together and sometimes even couple. Of course, it is a phallic object.

Thus one sees what is original to the inaugural pact of analytic discourse: if every link through speech is a transference, in the relation between analysand and analyst, the agreement is that it be limited to speech and only to speech. Nothing else happens between them, there will be no object other than words. This is the pact that the analyst proposes and to which the patient adheres, even if he or she tries not to do so.

That being said, every pact begins with empty words, even if it also contains the promise of something to be accomplished. We have only moved the question back a notch:

²⁰ Lacan, J., “The Function and Field of Speech and Language”, *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006, p. 284. (In French *Écrits*, p. 308).

what does a psychoanalyst offer that is different from any old guru or moral guide? What is this “indication of reality” that is constitutive of the pact he proposes?

Thus, Lacan does not locate the know-how of the analyst in the fact that he constitutes himself as one addressed, but in the way in which he makes use of this transference to lead a subject to the path of his own desire. This we know, that if someone begins to take up the question of his desire, in the sense of the “*Chè vuoi?*” (“what do you want?”),²¹ it is thanks to the know-how of a partner known as the psychoanalyst.

What is this know-how that allows us to incarnate, with another, the sustained position of an enigma, to be and to remain in the position of oracle, all the way until this very same function of oracle is unveiled, to the satisfaction of the subject? Clearly, it is not enough to say that the analyst wants nothing. That he calls himself an analyst in the first place is sufficient to indicate that he wants something. What does he want, what is his one-saying, as Colette Soler speaks of it, if it is not some already identified version of the phantasy of saving himself by saving the other?

The know-how of the psychoanalyst comes from the knowledge that he or she can acquire only from analysis, even if we learn about it and repeat the formula: the subject is subjected to failure, the failure of the One of relationship, on account of the One of phallic jouissance.

What then is the place of failure for the analyst, in whatever he is able to say when he speaks as an analyst, beginning with his statement of the fundamental rule? Does this failure have to be dissimulated, could it not just remain implicit, inaudible?

We need to remember that this failure is present from the moment the pact is constituted: nothing will happen except words, today and tomorrow. There will be no failure from the failure, no beautiful real-life story, one of those that make us dream of a realized relation.

We know very well that, between analysts and analysands, there must be no beautiful love stories. “Never that with me” is a message we are trained correctly to deliver.

But there are other beautiful stories that are not romances, nice collective stories where it is not a couple but a group that makes one, to triumph over dangers and misfortune. “A beautiful institutional adventure,” is that not the more or less explicit promise of certain analyses? Whether happy or sad, in accordance with the tastes of the subject, is this beautiful adventure not just as much a failing as the passage to the amorous act, since they both rest on the same refusal of division?

I am interrogating here the distance that separates the series of singular pacts establishing an analyst from what constitutes him as a teacher in the analytic group. There are actual teachers, said Lacan, just as there are actual analysts. He always insisted on the freedom that must govern the choice of each of these, in other words, on the effect that their know-how may produce on whomever.

Certainly, analytic hystorisation can put an end to maternal and fraternal fictions, and analysis can cure us from the temptation to relate by way of sex. But how about the one of the group? It seems to be less simple to drain away the third temptation that is hidden by speech, that of the absolute master. It evokes the magisterial saying where, much later, Lacan situated Joyce’s wish. Indeed, it can always insinuate itself whenever a psychoanalyst takes the floor and makes a case for his knowledge.

We are thus faced with a paradox: how to commit, in the name of the failure, not only in the one of the couple, but also in the one of the group; yet to exist, subsist, develop as a group? Especially when teaching analysts offer themselves as the leaders for their analysands. The question of the “clique” that Colette Soler evoked in November, and that Lacan tried to resolve in the EFP, by dissociating the hierarchy from the gradus. Tried,

²¹ Lacan, J., “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious.” In *Écrits*, op. cit., p. 690.

because that did not prevent repeated splits. Some splits which, besides, appeared to the public as a sign, even proof, of a breakdown of the know-how of analysts.

In summary, are we not always ill from the group, whether we are too much in love with it, or too much in hate? Could we not instead sufficiently dismiss these two passions, so as to know both what the School can offer and what it would be pointless, even wrong, to ask of it? It is not because the School does not make us one, that it must isolate us one from another. Between these two pitfalls, there is certainly a possible, secure zone, to better allow the know-how of each one to express itself, not only at entry into analysis, during its course and at its exit, but beyond, in the School.

Translated by Devra Simin

To Interpret: A savoir faire?

Patrick Barillot

The analytic act supposes at least two pillars to sustain itself:

The first, Lacan calls the handling of the transference; the second one is interpretation that is, as he says, a duty for the analyst.

Do these two axes of the act have the same link to the knowledge of the psychoanalyst?

The first one, the handling of the transference or, in other words, the analysis of the transference, lies in the acquisition of a specific knowledge acquired during the course of his own analysis.

Transference exists in the encounter with psychoanalysis, and its resilience resides in the subject supposed to know. Transference did not wait for us!

What drives a psychoanalysis to produce a psychoanalyst is, as is well known, the fall of the subject supposed to know (SSS).

In effect, the analysand, at the end of his task, destitutes the subject supposed to know and ends up reducing the analyst to what he was at the beginning of the treatment, that is to say “the object *a* in-itself”²² to test the cause of his desire. It is, then, in the function of the object *a* that the psychoanalyst operates in the analytic act. The analysand does not know about it, he believes in the SSS.

Does the analyst know better than his analysand that he is not the subject supposed to know, but the object cause of desire and of demand of his analysand?

We know the answer: not necessarily. But not knowing about it does not prevent him from functioning as analyst.

However, it is expected that he knows about it, particularly in the testimonies of the Pass, the *dispositif* that authenticates this knowledge. It is preferable that he knows about it in order to know the position in which he operates in his act. The analyst should then know more than anyone, that in the place of object *a*, he is not the SSS, and that he is destined to “dis-being” [*désêtre*], that is to say, his rejection as object at the end of the analysis.

It is remarkable that he is the only one who, in his practice, can put into question this function of the SSS, which distinguishes him from psychotherapists.

²² Lacan, J., “*Compte rendu de l’acte psychanalytique*”, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.

This implication is indeed necessary for an enlightened analytical practice, but it seems that a necessary logic needs to be added, one linked to the structure of the unconscious as knowledge without subject.²³

A knowledge without subject: what does this mean? It is a knowledge that the subject knows nothing about. It is subversive to say this so simply. We function, the world functions, with this belief that if there is knowledge, and there is a subject of this knowledge. As soon as you have a production of knowledge, in all registers, even scientific – shall we say mostly scientific – then the question undoubtedly arises of who knew it before. That is to say, the Other supposed to prior knowledge is called upon. By posing the existence of the UNCS as knowledge without subject, psychoanalysis goes against this belief.

This is why, in his report on the act, Lacan states that all the “logics” – philo, onto, theo, cosmo, and psycho – contradict the UNCS²⁴ as unknown knowledge.

Thus, the analytic act is an incitement to knowledge in this luring link made from the belief in this subject supposed to know. But to know what?

Lacan answers: the truth. Indeed, as object, the analyst causes the analysand’s speech that aims at knowing the truth. This is testified to by the regular quest of our analysands derived from a traumatic event in infancy that is attributed to the Other, and that would give the truth about the symptom. But the problem is that the one who seeks the truth does not want to know. For Lacan, it is either the truth or the knowledge of the unconscious. It is his thesis that in wanting to know too much of the truth, we miss UNCS knowledge.

Hence, the need for a destitution of the SSS in order to come closer to the knowledge of the UNCS as a knowledge without subject.

This operation is not done without implying castration.

In fact, at the end of his task as analysand, the subject needs to be realized as a subject in castration.²⁵

What is expected of the analysand in the grip of castration is to realize that he does not have the organ of jouissance that unifies in its convergence with the opposite sex. The subject has to be realized in castration, as fault in the jouissance of sexual union.²⁶

It is a task that aims to finally include castration in the sexual encounter that is not.

There is a substantial benefit from this operation for the analysand. It relieves him of his cross: “since it is then to resolve what he represented as passion.”²⁷

Second Axis, the Interpretation

To sustain itself, does interpretation rely on a knowledge specific to its practice? In other words, do we learn how to interpret?

²³ Ibid: « *Qu’il y ait de l’inconscient veut dire qu’il y a du savoir sans sujet* » [“That there is the unconscious means that there is knowledge without a subject”.]

²⁴ Ibid: « *C’est là par quoi toutes les –logies philosophiques, onto, théo-, cosmo-, comme psycho-, contredisent l’inconscient. Mais comme l’inconscient ne s’entend qu’à être écrasé d’une des notions les plus bâtarde de la psychologie traditionnelle, on ne prend même pas garde que l’énoncer rend impossible cette supposition de l’Autre. Mais il suffit qu’elle ne soit pas dénoncée, pour que l’inconscient soit comme non avvenu.* » [“It is in that way that all the philosophic –logies: onto–, theo–, cosmo–, like psycho–, contradict the unconscious. But since the unconscious can only be crushed by one of the most bastardised of notions, traditional psychology, we do not take care, even so. that state it renders the supposition of the Other impossible. But it is enough that it not be denounced for the unconscious to be as if it had not happened”].

²⁵ Lacan, J., *Le Séminaire XV*, “L’acte analytique”, lesson of January, 1968.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ *Compte rendu*, op. cit. p 3.

To this question, we have a precise answer from Lacan. In his seminar on the act, when he tells us that the interference [*immixtion*] of the signifier, of which interpretation consists, is not susceptible to any generalization that can be called knowledge. This means that there is no universal key to open every box.

Thus, interpretation does not rely on an acquired knowledge, but a supposed one, that of a *savoir-faire*, even an art.

The question remains: What does this *savoir-faire* rest upon? Is the way of lengthy companionship between the analyst and his analysand enough to serve as an apprenticeship for the practice of interpretation?

I don't think that the analyst's practice of interpretation would be a way to learn it, except by falling into imitation. And imitation, it seems to me, is doomed to fail since the interpretative intervention is not reproducible. The Lacanian adage, "do as I do, but don't imitate me", fits very well with interpretative action. Perhaps at most, analytic companionship imprints a style of interpretation.

If this is an operation that always needs to be reinvented from one analyst to the next since it is not transmissible, how does our interpretative compass orient itself in order for us not to lose our direction?

We have Lacan's thesis: Every analytical interpretation is oriented to giving to each proposition that we meet in the analysand's speech, its relationship to *jouissance*.²⁸

For we analysts, to interpret is always to aim at *jouissance* submitted to castration. We aim at benefits of *jouissance* in the subject, in what affects him, the complaints and symptoms, the *jouissance* to which speech guarantees its dimension of truth.

This is why we proceed by deciphering speech in extracting certain signifiers from the flux of this speech. We interpret the unconscious by reading in the analysand's speech those letters – isolated signifiers – extracted from the sayings of the subject.

The question arises, however, about the link between interpretation and the knowledge of the psychoanalyst.

We say that there is no interpretative key, but does that exclude, then, resorting to the knowledge of the psychoanalyst? For the interpretation to be analytic and not therapeutic or counseling requires, in my opinion, the acquired knowledge of the psychoanalyst. Without this last, how to interpret phallic *jouissance*, necessarily castrated, without having taken the measure of castration oneself, and how to be protected from the mirages of truth that can only be half-said, without having perceived its fictional structure, even its lie?

Thus, there is no analytical interpretation that is not concerned with the link to *jouissance* that is manifested in speech. With this thesis, our interpretative compass finds its direction through the field of *jouissance*.

However, in his epilogue to Seminar XI, Lacan gives us an additional indication to the aim of interpretation.

It is the demand that is to be interpreted, he tells us. To interpret, therefore to read, what of it has been written.²⁹

²⁸ *Le savoir du psychanalyste*, lesson of December, 2nd, 1971.

²⁹ "Postface au Séminaire XI": « Mais la fonction de l'écrit ne fait pas alors l'indicateur, mais la voie même du chemin de fer. Et l'objet (**a**) tel que je l'écris c'est lui le rail par où en vient au plus-de-jouir ce dont s'habite, voire s'abrite la demande à interpréter. » ["But the function of writing is not an indicator, but the very path of the railroad. And the object

This indication is accompanied by a warning, since what is to be read of this demand, what is channeled through speech, is not located at the level of what it says, but at the level of its saying.

I wondered if there is not a displacement in what orients our compass, a sliding in the field of *jouissance* in the register of demand.

Indeed, emphasizing the interpretation in the saying of the demand could surprise us, especially if we remember that, at the time of the “Direction of the Treatment and the Principle of its Power”, the demand is intransitive, without an object,³⁰ and that the interpretation concerns the cause of desire, namely the object *a*, that the demand reveals as missing.³¹ But we are no longer there, and this demand in which the saying is to be read has this particularity now of being inhabited by object *a* in its dimension of surplus *jouissance* [*plus de jouir*].³²

The demand is no longer intransitive: it is the demand for surplus *jouissance*.

What is being written, by its saying, is the recurrence of what is being asked for as surplus *jouissance* in the speech of the analysand.

As for the object *a*, Lacan makes it the railroad by which one comes to this surplus *jouissance*.

Talking about the object *a* as the railroad is colorful, but I think that this shows us the path from the object *a* as cause of desire to the object *a* as surplus *jouissance*.

Finally, our interpretative compass remains oriented by the field of *jouissance* and it points to the Lacanian north, since the field of *jouissance* is the Lacanian field, surplus *jouissance* that takes the demand, the real that inhabits it, even finding its refuge there.

Translated by Barbara Shuman

(**a**) as I write it is itself the railroad by which one comes to this surplus *jouissance* which inhabits, is even sheltered, in the demand to interpret.”] *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 505

³⁰ “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power”: “If I frustrate him it is because he is asking [*demande*] me for something. To answer him, in fact. But he knows very well that it would be but words. And he can get those from whomever he likes. It is not even that he would be grateful to me if they were fine words, let alone if they were lousy. It’s not these words that he is asking for [*demande*]. He is simply demanding of me ..., by the very fact that he is speaking: his demand is intransitive—it brings no object with it” p. 515.

³¹ *L’Étourdit*: « *L’interprétation - ai-je formulé en son temps - porte sur la cause du désir, cause qu’elle révèle, ceci de la demande qui de son modal enveloppe l’ensemble des dits.* » [“Interpretation – I formulated it back in the day – bears on the cause of desire, the cause that it reveals, the demand which, envelopes the set of the statements (*dits*) with its modal.]

³² Postface séminaire XI : « *Et l’objet (a) tel que je l’écris c’est lui le rail par où en vient au plus-de-jouir ce dont s’habite, voire s’abrite la demande à interpréter* ». Op. cit.

The analytic operator

Françoise Josselin

Man, Lacan tells us, does not know how to do with knowledge [*ne sait pas faire avec le savoir*]; he is even condemned by the effects of the signifier to feeble-minded thinking because language cannot account for the affects of *lalangue*.³³

Why is your daughter dumb? What is important is not to know why she is dumb but to know how to make her speak. Lacan will progressively distance himself from causality, so dear to Freud, to move towards the effects of the real of original jouissance, moving from knowledge [*savoir*], which he reduces to lucubration, to the savoir-faire of the unconscious with *lalangue* “a knowledge that is good for nothing” [*un savoir qui n’a rien à faire*].³⁴ The question concerning the knowledge of the psychoanalyst is not whether it is articulated or not, the question is to know where it must be in order for it to be sustained.³⁵

So how should the analyst operate? Should he be a surgeon, a skilled craftsman or a rhetorician so that he can undo by speech what is made by speech, avoiding the inclination which is always a great temptation for analysts of becoming a clinician, forgetting that the analyst is part of the transference, part of the analysand’s, board and especially its lacking key? Freud provides an example here: accused by Adler in 1926 that this dream of wolves is his own and not Sergei Pankejeff’s, Freud writes to the Wolf Man asking him to authenticate his dream, thus opting out of the transference. It is a cataclysmic rupture for this man who, the day after his reply, is overwhelmed by a boundless despair that pushes him to an unceasing delusional appraisal of the degree of mutilation of his nose.

The subject is supposed to know how to operate. It would however be quite excessive, Lacan tells us, to say that the analyst knows how to operate. To operate properly he needs to take account of the significance of words for his analysand, about which he is undoubtedly ignorant.

How should the analyst operate in order to be an adequate rhetorician³⁶ considering that the unconscious knows no contradiction? He proposes – this is the business of the rhetorician – that’s to say, he imposes nothing that would have consistency and this is even why, Lacan adds, that I designated with *ex* what is only supported as ex-sisting. Lacan plays with the homophony between rhetoricization [*rhétification*] and rectification³⁷ to designate the analyst’s primary task in the direction of the treatment. At the same time the analyst operates like an emergency doctor of satisfaction from the beginning to the end of the treatment. Thus he operates more like a couturier than a surgeon, cutting and sewing with the scissors of interpretation when it plays with homophony and equivocation, practising transverse cuts, longitudinal in the opaque fabric of jouissance, in order to operate crossings and reversals.

A weaver, furthermore, he uses his artifice to make himself the semblance of the object, the semblance of being, guided by the letter of the analysand’s text to knot the thread of

³³ Lacan J., Seminar XXIV (1976-1977), *L’insu que sait de l’une-bévue s’aile à mourre*, unpublished, lesson of January 11, 1977.

³⁴ Lacan J., Seminar XX (1972-1973), *Encore*, lesson June 26, 1973, Paris, Seuil, 1975. [Tr. note: the words quoted here do not appear either in the Seuil edition or in the English translation by Bruce Fink, but do appear in other unpublished versions. See for instance Patrick Valas.]

³⁵ Lacan J., Seminar *Le savoir du psychanalyste*, unpublished, lesson of November 4, 1971.

³⁶ Lacan J., Seminar XXV (1977-1978), *Le moment de conclure*, unpublished, lesson of November 15, 1977.

³⁷ The homophonic play between these words is not reproducible in English.

‘qu’arter-saying’ [*qu’art-dire*]³⁸ (with an apostrophe between ‘that’ and ‘art’) of the *sinthome*, which would allow him to find his style, to authorise himself to a transmission that resonates (we can grasp the poetic dimension in some works of the ASs).

The analyst is however neither a one-man-band nor an apprentice sorcerer. In front of the gap between the Imaginary and the Real, he is pushed by his analysand to invent the analytic act so as to raise inhibition to imagine the R.³⁹

Translated by Esther Faye

Knowledge and Knowing-how-to-do in psychoanalysis

Colette Soler

I am going to assess the difficulty of this theme.

For my part, I am under the effect of the change of perspective Lacan introduced with the modal “That one says remains forgotten”. It suspends every assertion, in this case every possible assertion about the psychoanalyst, his knowledge, his knowing-how-to-do, with regard to the ex-sistential option of the act of saying [*dire-acte*] of the one who speaks. Now, the aim of the saying of the One-saying *sinthome* [*l’Un-dire sinthome*] that I recently spoke about, is not primarily that of knowledge, if we are to believe Lacan, and on this point I do not doubt him. This suspends every assertion, namely every “what is said”, about the question of knowing what the being who proffers it means.

“The knowledge of the psychoanalyst”, Lacan says belatedly. Over the course of history much has been said about the being of the analyst, and what he must already be; cultured said Freud, well-read, a specialist in textual knowledge said Lacan. *Television* spoke of the need for something like a gift for mathematics, more essentially ethical criteria have been deployed, and terms such as conversion, metamorphosis have been uttered.

The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst dates from 1970.

The expression implicitly reaffirms psychoanalysis’s link to rationality despite the fact that the effects of *jouissance* of the unconscious as knowledge without a subject, already put forward at this time, seem to point to what is most rebellious to rational domestication.

So in 1970, why does he say it? And to whom? For once, not to psychoanalysts, at least not explicitly, but to psychiatrists, and not to those in office at the time but to future psychiatrists, to the interns he imagines are present. There is a message in these lectures. Basically he warns these junior psychiatrists, those who will be professionals in the so-called public health system – and we know what public health has become – something that psychoanalysts are not. He warns them against forgetting or ignorance whenever the dimension [*dit-mention*] of the truth of subjects, and of their unconscious, always singular, speaks. Against forgetting what the analyst attests to of LOM, as he writes it, as always up against the wall of language. It’s a kind of intervention into the debate about civilisation but with a lightness of style that avoids a dogmatic tone.

There is a second contextual element. In his School this knowledge of the psychoanalyst appears as a reply to what was said following the “Proposition on the Psychoanalyst of the

³⁸ Again, the punning is difficult to convey in English.

³⁹ Lacan J., idem, lesson of May 8, 1978.

School” where one can read the following formulation on the knowledge of the end of analysis: “vain knowledge of a being that steals away”. It registered the fact that the knowledge-unconscious does not produce knowledge about the being of the subject and is therefore inadequate to respond to the question on entry into analysis, “what am I?” A vogue about the end of analysis by non-knowledge took off among contemporary analysts, non-knowledge redoubling sexual castration with a castration of knowledge, and I underline this, at a time when Lacan’s elaborations on knowledge were largely contested by those very same ones. In reply, Lacan denounces a “mystagogy” [*mystagogie*] in saying that analysts are not the grand priests of the mystery of the unconscious. The term assonates with mystification, and he objects, for the question regarding the psychoanalyst is “of what he has to know” [*de ce qu’il a à savoir*] (*Discours à l’EFP*), an expression that promotes a duty of knowing: that which necessarily conditions his practice and the results it may produce. This was thus also an intervention into his School. This context is no longer; it is even quite the opposite, for today what is demanded is knowledge not non-knowledge.

There is then a question: what must I know to operate as a psychoanalyst? But this question concerns the analyst function and not an analyst in particular. It is therefore a question about psychoanalysis itself and its theorisation within the Lacanian definition. All of Lacan’s indications on this point go in the direction of saying that what is necessary for the analyst is a knowledge about the structure, in its double definition of structure of language and effect of language. We know the sentence: “what he has to know is that there is a one to know who ...” etc. I do not see there a reason to treat our title by folding it back onto the knowledge of the structure. In fact everything we have learnt from Lacan, does not say what, for each analyst, is the knowledge from which he operates effectively.

The other way of treating the knowledge of the analyst is to remember that the analyst is not just any analyst. If there is a necessary knowledge, for each analyst the question is how this knowledge comes to him, and what role does his analysis have in his knowledge? It must have a role since everyone agrees that without an analysis there is no analyst, and very soon Lacan will write “analysis, didactic” in all cases of analysis. In each analysis, one can ask what knowledge has it left the subject with, what has it allowed him to know? This is one of the things that the Pass sometimes illuminates, but not always. And is this knowledge, if there is knowledge, going to allow him to operate as an analyst for others?

The problem, for each analyst, about the knowledge deposited through an analysis is that this knowledge is barely knowledge. A knowledge of which one “cannot say a word”, as Lacan said, that only concerns the one who speaks, that he is the only one to know and none other, does it merit being called knowledge? Instead it makes analysts into fellow human beings, as Lacan writes in the letter to the Italians. A knowledge that resembles conviction so much that its status as knowledge is in question. Especially as in analysis one experiences another pseudo knowledge, the fantasmatic conviction concerning the object one thinks one has been for the Other. Lacan noted this difficulty, saying that it was amusing to see how much we imagine we know when there is simply belief. The knowledge of science is important to him because it has real effects, evidence of which is in the reach of everyone and which, in addition, drastically changes our lives. Besides we do not speak so much of the knowledge of scientists as of the knowledge of science. For the scientists, their knowledge [*savoir*] is tested at the level of their knowledge [*connaissances*] and their written output. We certainly say that the knowledge of the unconscious also has real effects, in the symptom, but these effects are always for one alone, they are not ascertainable by all. No test for them. What one knows cannot be made to pass to transmissible knowledge, that which resembles scientific knowledge. The *dispositif* of the Pass is constructed on the postulate of this non-transmissible, and as a palliative.

We can certainly make a list of Lacan's formulations about the "knowledge acquired" at the end of an analysis, and in fact he himself puts it in question when he says knowledge acquired but to whom? From memory, I recall, knowledge of castration, knowledge of the cynical balance [*solde cynique*], in "Report on the Analytic Act". And then also, at the end of his analysis, "he knows better than anyone what the one that commanded him has been reduced to" and even, another expression, "he knows he is refuse [*rebut*]", and there are others like this. These are all remarks where Lacan put forward not the knowledge that he had but the knowledge he has constructed, in so far as he was one of these "beings from which the letter is constituted", according to the expression in *Encore*. We make use of this knowledge in order to speak about psychoanalysis, even here, and likewise in receiving testimonies of the Pass, but who can say what he did with his knowledge, I mean, the knowledge from which he operates?

So in conclusion, I am wary about the immoderate use of this term. It is not to be forgotten, since Lacan introduced it, and in context, and for the reasons I have stated, but it is not any longer to be taken up as self-evident, and still less to make it the banner of the analyst in need of transmission

Does this mean that the most certain knowledge of each analyst is reduced to a knowing-how-to-do? The question arises. Yet again if we say the knowing-how-to-do of the psychoanalyst, this is not the knowing-how-to-do of any psychoanalyst. Hence the risk of the reduction that our title has produced, the question of knowing-how-to-do reduced to what is called analytic technique, with its more or less explicit rules, quite a list: what an analyst does, can do, must do, or not do: to know how to speak without directing the patient, to know how to keep silent but also to be present, to decipher and how far, to interpret and in what way, and with whom, children, psychotics, etc. Taken in this way knowing-how-to-do leads us to one of the oldest classic questions where the answers are already given, for there are in fact rules of 'how to do' which define the *dispositif*, these are the rules simultaneously of abstention and of interventions, sometimes with arguments and changes particularly with regard to the so-called *setting* [in English in the original]. Basically it's about a preformed knowing-how-to-do, which is not unrelated to the knowledge that Freud and Lacan elaborated concerning the unconscious and the transference. Furthermore it easily turns into simple habit. This is what Lacan denounced in relation to the duration of sessions and later, in a still more critical fashion, when he pilloried the auto-ritualised psychoanalyst as a functionary, one who clicks on the correct buttons of technique.

Now, if there are enunciable rules, there is no rule for the application of rules, and moreover not only in psychoanalysis. As a result all these rules concerning the psychoanalyst's action as such, that one could largely roll out, well, they dig a big hole: it's what one does not know that allows *an* analyst to apply or not, and how far, the prescribed rules, these rules which inaugurated the Freudian *dispositif* and which were further developed with Lacan's elaborations on knowledge. Only, this hole deserves our interest, for it's there that is lodged the true knowing-how-to-do of each analyst, about which our title raises a question, which was not in my view a question about the technique of the psychoanalyst.

How should we approach the knowing-how-to-do of the singular non-functionary?

By definition a knowing-how-to-do [*savoir-faire*] is a doing [*faire*] to which there is no knowledge [*savoir*] that responds; which is thus not the application of knowledge, its difference from techniques. This is moreover also true for knowing-how-to-do-with [*savoir-y-faire*]. It is carried out in different fields, and knowing-how-to-do in the field of speech is not equivalent to practical knowing-how-to-do. These latter are acquired, more or less, by apprenticeship and by example. In the field of speech, that's to say in the social bonds, it's something else: it concerns the field of persuasion, the field of various proselytisms,

political or religious, or on the contrary it concerns the field of the analytic discourse where the unconscious is incumbent.

In the field that pertains to the knowing-how-to-do with the rules of the *dispositif*, no coaching takes hold; it is not transmitted; it is not learnt. The knowing-how-to-do only makes sense at the level of the operating singularity, and in fact, although we speak with Lacan of *the* psychoanalyst, despite this *the*, nobody doubts that analysts in act do not constitute a class, not even a set, but a collection of singularities, regardless of the homogenisation effected by theoretical and institutional references. They fall under the not-all [*pas-tout*].

Hence the question: is knowing-how-to-do in the singular a natural gift like talents – that analysis does not change much, at best it lifts inhibitions? Is it a kind of equivalence of style, namely the most immovable thing, the most un-programmable, and however so determining? Or, is it that the analysis of the analyst conditions this knowing-how-to-do, beyond competence, a little, much, how far? Lastly, what is the extent of its impact in the effects of the analytic act? Actually, I don't know if you realised it, at the time of the conceptualisation of the act, Lacan reduced the reference to knowing-how-to-do [*savoir-faire*] in the singular, since the thesis is that in “the ethic of the analytic act” it is “logic that commands”, and if it is logic it is not knowing-how-to-do in the singular since logic is for all.

What did Lacan have to say about the knowing-how-to-do of analysts? I only see a few remarks that refer to it directly.

In the “*Discours à l'EFPP*”, he says, the analyst is “to be taken as he is” and that does not allow him to do well in every case. This is another notion relevant to the analyst subject that is not that of a knowing-how-to-do but that of doing well or badly. It defines what Lacan called analytic “competence” and concerns what is necessary to respond to in what the analysand brings in order to remain within the analytic framework. Because basically what does an analyst have to do? The answer is a function of how we conceptualise analysis. In the manner in which Lacanians think psychoanalysis with Lacan, the first thing he has to do is to make himself cause of the speaking of truth. This is the first step: to make the subject enter into this register of speaking called free association, a way of speaking where the subject withdraws from what he had intended to say, thus summoning the said subject of the Unconscious, and this is something other than interpreting, it's its prerequisite. It passes through the operation of the transference, namely that of involving the desire of the Other in the interlocution. With the supposition of knowledge that the transference is, we could very well speak here of a knowing-how-to-do-with [*savoir y faire*]. It is not to be learnt in books, and there we also have the link with one's own analysis. This knowing-how-to-do-with cannot be without a relation to the analyst's analysis, and to the point exactly where it led him in his relation to the subject supposed to know, and to the knowledge of what the unconscious is.

“The unconscious is knowledge [*savoir*], a knowing-how-to-do things [*savoir-faire*] with *lalangue*. And what we know-how-to-do-with *lalangue* goes far beyond what can be accounted for under the heading of language”.⁴⁰ Suffice to say that the first knowing-how-to-do is not that of the analyst.

The expression knowing-how-to-do with *lalangue* is found at the end of *Encore* and unequivocally designates a use of *lalangue*, all knowing-how-to-do being at the level of usage. Here, it's a use of *jouissance* since the unconscious is here defined as knowledge of the

⁴⁰ *Encore*, p. 139 [Tr. note: the French word *lalangue* has been left untranslated rather than the translation used by Bruce Fink, *llanguage*. As well, hyphens have been used to keep the sense of this term as a phrase.]

enjoyed signifier [*signifiant jouir*]. Lacan has largely made clear that, as regards *lalangue* usage of jouissance precedes semantic and communication usages, which are only secondary. For the unconscious, as for the speaking *infans*, moreover, usage precedes the fact of knowing (verb): we do not need the linguist to learn how to speak, we do not need the analyst in order to have an unconscious from which to enjoy [*jouir*]. When one asks about a child, does the little one know how to speak, this means, does he use the tongue [*la langue*]? And if yes, it's a knowing-how-to-do, and singularly so, that functions before the rules of language and which has no other law than that of a bonus of jouissance. Lacan goes as far as stating in 1975 that the structure of the effect of language originates from there. As much to say that Lacan names the knowledge of the unconscious itself as nothing other than a knowing-how-to-do, namely a knowledge that uses [*savoir user*] the material of *lalangue* for the purpose of jouissance, an enjoying-knowledge [*savoir jouir*] of which the symptom is clear evidence. The unconscious knows how to fabricate some enjoyed-knowledge [*savoir-jouir*] with the tongue. And each one of us is made of this knowing-how-to-do that is called his unconscious, the monger of symptoms. For the unconscious it seems to me that the link between knowing-how-to-do and jouissance is indubitably established.

I should not have been surprised, as I was at an earlier time, when I read in *The Sinthome*, that the knowing-how-to-do of the artist indicates that for those of us who are not artists there is something which we cannot enjoy, that it manifests a jouissance which is not ours. And didn't Lacan demonstrate in relation to Joyce that his art-saying [*art-dire*] is an art-saying that promotes the singularity of jouissance of his "stepladder" [*escabeau*]? Moreover, it is in relation to Joyce that Lacan introduced the term for the first time. More generally, this jouissance of the artist (and here he generalises) is the jouissance of god, thus inaccessible. If this is so, the love of art is illuminated, it allows us to approach a jouissance of which we are deprived, that of the absolute Other. When we read that for the first time, obviously we remain a little taken aback. I merely note the link here between knowing-how-to-do and jouissance, already posed by Lacan at the level of the knowing-how-to-do of the unconscious. So I conclude: from the unconscious to the artist, the knowing-how-to-do is a doing that has use of jouissance. This use goes from the real, opaque jouissance of the symptom, to the jouissance of the stepladder [*escabeau*], which the artist pushes to the extreme.

It is from this point that I return to the practising analyst who is not an artist, and I now see more clearly why he dreams of artists. I will highlight some apparent contradictions in the discourse on the knowing-how-to-do of the analyst.

On the one hand there is agreement on certain points of analytic competence, for we speak of the formation of the analyst. Essentially, it consists first of all in acquiring an aptitude for abstention. This is not just any kind of abstention; we could provide a host of precepts but they come down to one single rule: no interlocution between two subjects in analysis. It takes quite some discipline to put on hold the person of the analyst, with his characteristics, his viewpoints, his existential choices, his drives, etc. This is what Ferenczi found very inhuman. In other words, to make oneself the semblant of the object supposes relinquishing what one is, I am not going to say as subject, but as *sinthome*, as the One-saying of the Borromean jouissance that constitutes you. We know that Lacan goes as far as to say, that it doesn't matter whether one is a man or a woman, if one is an analyst, there is a radical eradication of the personal singularity of the analyst.

On the other hand to make oneself cause, and to interpret, one needs a libidinal engine, this is why Lacan spoke of "desire of the analyst", which is a logically requisite function. But Lacan also says that the analyst, each analyst, must pay with his most intimate judgement, with his person, and even with his ethics. He said, in relation to Freud, that in order to

interpret in analysis, ethics requires the courage to conclude. There's a problem here, for at the level of intimate judgement and of ethics there is no competence that holds, as no person resembles another. I note that this combination of neutral abstention and responsible ethical initiative that the *dispositif* requires is untenable, and can only produce analysts that are always on the edge of failure. It is perhaps furthermore what induces them to become ritualistic. I close the parenthesis. Where to position the knowing-how-to-do in this opposition? It's difficult to place it on the side of the not acting, of analytic abstention. Rather, it works actively on the side of the incitement to speech and interpretation, on the side, then, of the saying of the analyst, to be distinguished from all his statements as well as from the analysing saying. It's a saying in which it is not the analyst who says it. I had, at one time, employed the expression "a saying that says nothing". In any case, a saying without statements that bear the singular truth of the one who said them, or a silent saying, one that silences the analyst. I tend to conclude that for the analyst, as for the unconscious, his knowledge, I mean that with which each one operates, is nothing other than knowing-how-to-do. In his case, the knowing-how-to-do of the existential saying at the double level of his own apophantic saying, as well as the saying of the one who speaks to him and that he has to interpret. Besides, when Lacan says Freud and Lacan, these beings of the letter, he places the analyst beyond competence, at the level of the existential register of the fecundity of their saying.

Having posed that the jouissance of the stepladder [*escabeau*] is primary for man, that is, prioritised in each one, and in addition generalised (I do not demonstrate this here), on the basis of this thesis Lacan announces or postulates the castration of the stepladder [*escabeau*] with regard to the analyst. He even goes so far as to say that the more he has lived up to this task the less he will be spared. Spared is his term. The knowing-how-to-do of the analyst, in other words, his use of the saying, would not be usage of jouissance. In this way he would be distinguished from his two relatives in interpretation – the oracle and psychosis. I interrogate this saying of Lacan.

Is it simply conceivable that an act of saying, were it apophantic, has no relation to the saying of the One-saying of jouissance particular to the one who supports this saying of interpretation?

We would then have to explain why analysts are so proud of [*fiers*], I would even say fierce in [*"fiéros"*], their interpretations, interpretations they have received with which in an amusing way they often sanction their analyst, we see this in the Pass, or of interpretations they have made themselves, we see this in case presentations. We would also have to account for the fact that no one in the analytic world believes that one analyst has the same value as another, which leads to the question of the role that his singularity plays in his function. What is the jouissance specific to that knowing-how-to-do, or if you prefer what is the desire, it's the same thing, if it is not that of the stepladder [*escabeau*], and indeed doesn't one make oneself a stepladder by interpreting?

Difficult questions regarding which we must surely not rush to a conclusion. But it seems that Lacan himself changed his position. I want to prove it with a certain number of belated remarks which are we can suppose the fruit of more experience.

He said analysts, those who say they are such, accordingly I'll allow it. What a reduction of requirements! Neither knowledge, nor knowing-how-to-do would be required? It would be enough to say one is an analyst [*se dire analyste*] to be put in the place of object by the one who consults you and who is going to analyse himself with you, said Lacan. Now we know that with regard to those who "say one is an analyst" they need not have even had an analysis.

And then a remark, the reference to which I have not found for today, in speaking of the analyst's interpretation he notes that it comes from that which is the most obscure, the most opaque of this analyst. He had already said in Seminar XI that we could see what each analyst would like the transference to make of him, but he goes even further. It designates everything that is not reduced to known rules of good analytic acting, so it must be that it is on the side of what I have called the fecundity of the *sinthome* saying. This goes well with the idea that each one must "reinvent" psychoanalysis, another comment by Lacan at the end. And if you take into account the remark in the "Italian Note", which says that to be an analyst and not only to function like one, we must have been led to the enthusiasm of ... knowing oneself as refuse, it is clear that with this affect a strange element is added to every formation. A strange affect of jouissance which would be produced for some, confronted by, not the immensity of a divine or other transcendence, but one's own status, without doubt useful for preparing oneself for what will become of the analyst at the end of the analysis, since the refuse is what is useful for nothing.

Translated by Esther Faye

"He will know how to conduct himself"

Gladys Mattalia

When I decided to write for the Journées of the School there were other themes that interested me...but one phrase from a text that Jacques Lacan wrote at Beloeil (Belgium), July 14, 1972, and that we know as "*L'étourdit*," never ceased to resound in me, again and again.

What resounded, I must admit, was only this piece: "He will know how to conduct himself." I quickly realized that I had gotten myself into "an eleven-stick shirt."⁴¹ To try to articulate: "He will know how to conduct himself" with the analyst's knowledge, his "*savoir-faire*"; or with his "*savoir-y-faire*," [knowing how to do] or with his knowledge in act: would this not be to get myself into "an eleven-stick shirt"? Would it not be to complicate life unnecessarily? Exactly like in the Middle Ages, when the ceremony for paternity could not take place without the surreal detour of putting the child through the sleeve of a shirt and making it come out through the collar of the garment. Today, the expression means, "getting involved in business or problems that one knows nothing about, that fall outside one's competence, or that yield no profit." Would this not be getting into something useless?

So I said to myself: this is the very thing we do: make someone enter by way of the shirtsleeve, perhaps we are able to make him come out...through the collar? Through the buttonhole? Or we cannot make him exit... And this trajectory, this journey is not without consequences: it is a new knowledge, a "*savoir-faire avec*," ["a know-how with."] A new direction, an orientation in existence.

"He will know how to conduct himself." "He will know" is the third person future of the verb "to know," together with the present infinitive of the verb "to make, to construct." This grammatical form is useful for expressing the idea of an action that is general, not specific as to the precise circumstances of its realization (how, when, what, who).

⁴¹In Spanish: "*meterse en camisa de once varas*." To get oneself into something unnecessarily complicated.

Let us go into more detail about the phrase from the text “*L’étourdit*”: “From all this, he will know how to conduct himself. There is more than one way, perhaps quite a few, that fit with the three dit-mentions of the impossible, as they unfold in sex, meaning, signification.”⁴² Starting from these three “*dit-mentions of the impossible*,” (sex, meaning, signification), he will have the ability to construct a conduct for himself, founded on the knowledge [*savoir*] articulated by the logic of the impossible.

There is no doubt that “he will know how to conduct himself,” from *L’étourdit*,” is an affirmation that concerns the end of analysis, that which changes life after analysis. And I asked myself: how could one think the analyst’s field of practice (*savoir-faire*) without this “*he will know how to conduct himself*”?

In the same text –“*L’étourdit*” –Lacan tells us that there is no formation of the analyst without “Freud’s saying.” We could add: there is no formation of the analyst without the “saying” of Lacan. But also, not without the “saying” of the analysis. The saying of the analysis is what is most important for the qualification of the analyst. The analyst’s analysis, taken to its end, presupposes the impossible in its three *dit-mentions* (“the wall of the impossible”).

The “ideal qualifications”⁴³ that Freud expected would be acquired by the “poor wretch” undergoing analysis for the sake of practicing the profession—we could suppose that, in Lacan, these are the detours of the real circling round and round in an analysis.

An enigmatic phrase! “From all of this, he will know how to conduct himself.” Ways to conduct himself: “quite a few”. The traces, the remainders of the encounter with the *impossibles*, and which leave us far from notions of aptitude, ability, capacity, personality... Specialty! The fact that there are “quite a few” indicates to us that there is no one model of conduct, ideal, “in the manner of...”

I asked myself about the *how* in “He will know how to conduct himself.” Is this about creating a style? The analyst, one by one, to each his own style? “We can assume that the *savoir-faire* of the analyst, like his symptom, is proper to each one and inimitable.”⁴⁴ The proof of the analyst is his style, his symptom, in the solitude of the analytic act.

“He will know how to conduct himself” knots something of the order of *savoir* [knowledge] with the grammar of the drive and the field of the act.

In Seminar XXIII, *Le Sinthome*, Lacan speaks about “sexual responsibility” as the singular response of each one to the fact of the sexual non-relation. Encounter with the impossible of the relation is not enough in analysis. A response is necessary. It is a matter of knowing “*how to conduct oneself*”, the ethical question of what each one does singularly and what changes in the *savoir-faire* of the link with the Other. Knowing how to sustain and adjust one’s conduct on the basis of the sexual real.

Lacan articulates “He will know how to conduct himself” when he speaks of the “impossible relation between the sexes” and concludes with the “*savoir-faire* with the symptom.” There is a concordance between “he will know how to conduct himself” and “*savoir-faire* in this domain.”⁴⁵

These are knowledges that do not correspond to any ontology. Perhaps they correspond to variations in Lacan’s conceptions of the real: the real defined modally as impossible (negativity) and a symptomatic, necessary, real (positivity). Like Democritus, Lacan does not subscribe to ontology; neither one starts from *Being* as the essence. They start from the *nothing*, in order to extract the *being* of *objet a* and the *par-être* of the barred subject which are, respectively, the atom and the void.”⁴⁶

⁴² Jacques Lacan, “*L’étourdit*,” in *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 487.

⁴³ S. Freud. “*Analysis Terminable and Interminable*.” S.E. XXIII (1937-1938), p. 428.

⁴⁴ R. Cevalco, *Pré-texte*, *Journées de l’Ecole* 2017.

⁴⁵ See Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire, Livre XVI, D’un Autre à l’autre* 1968-1969, Paris, Seuil, 2006.

⁴⁶ Christian Fierens, *Lectura de L’étourdit*, Editions S&P, p. 406.

“He will know how to conduct himself” puts a limit to “everything is permissible for analysts.” The “everything is permissible” forgets that the “challenge” is to the place of the saint’s abjection, to the conscientious soldier, neither heroic nor patriotic, nor pacifist. “He will know how to conduct himself” orients us regarding the *desire of the analyst* as a desire that opposes the unlimited sacrifice of Kantian law. It opposes the pull to identify desire with captivity in the Other. “He will know how to conduct himself” works toward the dis-alienation wherein the desire of the analyst marks absolute difference. “He will know how to conduct himself” is about “knowing how to do it.” If he wishes, he could devote himself to the task of “serving *the* others,”⁴⁷ or “...dedicate himself to meeting those urgent cases” of the *Preface*⁴⁸ out of the duty to answer for the existence of the real. Not from religious morality, nor from Kantian ethics, but through the cut that interpretation produces for the production of a One-saying [*Un-dire*], testimony to the existence of the real.

Michel Bousseyroux⁴⁹ calls it the analyst’s DVD: “**D**esire to do it, **V**olition to do it, **D**uty to do it.” For this, he will know how to conduct himself. Can someone put this into practice? Something which—we experience this everyday—is far from “rosy” and sometimes stinks.

Can someone *desire, wish, have a duty* “to get himself into an eleven-stick shirt”?

We know that the analyst does not direct the treatment from his own ego identifications (imaginary identifications) or as a subject (destitution of the subject) or with his *symptom*, his partner in jouissance. He lends himself to the analytic act only as visage for an operative function, the analyst, a function of the knowledge acquired in his own analysis. But the *savoir-faire* (know-how) supposes something more (*surplus*), something particularly singular and different each time, which brings us back to the “contingencies of particularities.”⁵⁰

Translated by Devra Simin

What kind of knowledge is it about?

Cora Aguerre

This work was completed at the end of a Cartel that met from 2104 to 2016, of which I was a member, alongside Ramon Miralpeix, Vicki Estevez, Beatriz Zuluaga and Lydie Grandet as plus-one.

Every time we meet someone in our practice we make the wager of listening, and the work starts, and starts again, and again. It is always for the first time and there is no such thing as “accumulated” knowledge. For that reason, there is something of one [*il y a de l’un*] in psychoanalytic practice; there is the series of the ones.

Sometimes it is surprising that some patients, who have no connection to psychoanalysis at the start and don’t know anything about it, come back again and again. They feel touched by this encounter, which is nothing other than an encounter with the unconscious.

⁴⁷ Lacan said: “In this trade, I have learned the urgency of serving, not others but *the* others—if only to show them that I am not the only one to serve them.” In *Arcturial* (courtesy of R. Cevasco for S&P).

⁴⁸ Jacques Lacan. “Preface to the English Edition of *Seminar XI*,” in *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 572. Also in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XI* (trans. Alan Sheridan) New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. ix.

⁴⁹ Michel Bousseyroux. *Lacan el borromeo. Abondar en el nudo*. éditions S&P, p. 37. Colette Soler speaks of the analyst’s GPS.

⁵⁰ See Colette Soler, *Pré-texte, Journées de l’Ecole* 2017.

“Not only do they come to us, but they come back to it”, said Lacan to the Americans in 1975 .

To be traversed by analytic experience has some effects that go beyond we analysts. These are effects of discourse and of the structure of the analytic *dispositif*.

The experience of an analysis taken to its end gives the assurance that “it” [*ça*] has some effects. “It” produces an unprecedented and singular desire, the analyst’s desire that can be transmitted in act in the treatment. The analyst is in the position of semblance of the object and therefore he allows the analysand to pass through the experience and go as far as possible on that path. For that, the analyst must be open to contingency and to the surprises it produces.

During his conference at Yale University, Lacan asked the audience what brought them to choose that hard and difficult “job” [in English in the original] (1). He made reference to Freud’s desire and to his own. Freud started by listening to hysterics and this led him to ask himself questions about sexuality, about what does not go well and what becomes an obstacle.

Lacan tells us that he became a doctor because he suspected that relationships between men and women played a determining role in human symptoms. In his work as a doctor, he heard very early on that people suffered because of what did not work for them. He made reference to love and he spoke about psychosis as a “failure” [*faillite*] with regards to love.

On the one hand, there is that which triggered in each of us an interest in psychoanalysis, what led us to be in analysis and, on the other hand, there is the path that produces an analyst, beyond the personal question that animates him.

Singularity is at play, but the analyst operates in the *dispositif* from the place he occupies and also from the position the analysand gives him. The analyst is the product of an analysis taken to the end.

In the conferences on “The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst”, Lacan asks himself the following question, which is recurrent in his teaching: “How can an analysand have the desire to be an analyst? It is unthinkable! [...] They come to it without having the slightest idea about what is happening to them” [...] Well, once they are here, they are in it and, in that moment still, something is woken up, this is why I proposed to study this”(2).

This is not of the order of thinking but instead, of “a knowledge without a subject”, of something that happens and that provokes a surprise. It is a way of emphasising contingency, but also the real at play and, the awakening at stake in the passage from analysand to analyst.

It is then in the act, through the analysand’s jump to the place of analyst, that a change occurs, for there is a loss in the analysand becoming an analyst.

The analyst as subject supposed to know falls, and the analysand is confronted with castration, with the hole. The analytic experience takes time because, as analysand, one does not want to know anything.

How did the analysand analyse before arriving at the end of his analysis? He operated because analysis has some effects before the final jump occurs. This is a fact, that we, as analysts, authorise ourselves before the end of analysis. What gave us the nerve (3). to receive patients in the name of analysis? It is interesting to be able to precisely locate the moment one authorised oneself as analyst. This is something one can respond to in the *dispositif* of the pass. This step is a response to a turn [*virage*] in analysis, a turn which

supposes the fall of identifications, a moment of separation that allows one to place oneself on the side of semblance of the object.

What does change, what knowledge is produced at the end?

We analysts are dupes of our unconscious but we are also “informed” [*avertis*].

Analytic ethics, as Lacan indicates to us in “Les non dupes errent”, is based on the way unconscious knowledge becomes increasingly but also strongly the dupe. This kind of knowledge is ultimately our only share of knowledge.

I find this affirmation very strong and precise. The knowledge that sticks to us [*qui nous colle à la peau*] is the only one we have.

An analysis conducted to the end produces an engagement with the analytic community and with the school, which, finally, is no longer the school of the others but our “own”. We become responsible for it, we cannot complain any longer, but instead we have “to make a school” [*faire école*], and take the wager of having an effect on it, with the means that are proper to the School community: the Cartel, the Colleges and committees, and the work we do in the community.

“The knowledge of the psychoanalyst” obtained from the experience of analysis is difficult to transmit. This difficulty is not found so much in the *dispositif* of the Pass, in the encounters with the passers and in what they transmit to the Cartel, but more in the efforts that the analysts named by the School make in their transmission to the community. The knowledge they want to make ‘pass’ is always a missed [*raté*] knowledge, which is half said, but which produces some questions however, an awakening, although sometimes it can appear insufficient.

What kind of knowledge is this knowledge about? It is not a finished knowledge, but a knowledge that I would call “lucid”. It is made of bits, of remainders. It is not about what institutes, it is rather about what is deposed and allows it to operate as such.

The AS says something of what led him or her to occupy this place, something of that crazy desire, of how it happened. At times something passes and, at other times not, because it is not about sense, it is about non-sense (*pas-de-sens*). Not all can be said, as there is an unsayable at play.

In “Les non dupes errent” Lacan refers to the pass by saying “It gives the opportunity to suddenly see in a certain relief for one has to step back in order to have a perspective” (4). On the other hand, relief refers to writing, to a kind of erosion [*ravinement*] that is not metaphorical. The traits, the marks, constitute a topography, a relief. Writing is of the order of the real, of the erosion of the signified. Re-petition produces an effect of erosion. When sense is exhausted, one could say that the particles that have remained in suspense appear. The particles were there from the start, however the analytic path was necessary for them to be decanted.

The expression “To suddenly realise” is an allusion to the dimension of time and that very moment that defines ‘a before’ and ‘an after’.

From 1970 on, Lacan’s elaborations came to knot the register of spoken language to that of jouissance. Writing became a trait in which an effect of language could be read.

Repetition occurs in a way to say that the One, the trait, is single, and the ‘two’ cannot happen. One must make the formula “Y’a d’l’un” and “There is no sexual relation” correspond. The latter makes reference not only to “there is no sexual relation” with the partner but also to the lack of harmony proper to the speaking being. This One is a very

particular “One” as it separates the One from the Two, and this separation constitutes an abyss.

The “It speaks” demands that “it” writes itself, which produces repetition, repetition of the loss because the ‘two’ does not happen. The dimension of re-petition obeys what does not cease to write itself, it obeys the principle of necessity, and it leans on the mark that configures the symptom which becomes a suppliance to the lack of sexual relation.

What does change after an analysis? Michel Bousseyroux, in his paper “What Kind of Knotting Between the Unconscious and Satisfaction at the End?” (5), refers to the lack of sense and to the possibility of a new writing. It is a bit like when we send a text to the printer and we write in the margin a sign of correction to indicate that a letter, a word, a line or lines must be subtracted, deleted, written in a different “erase-fashion” [*« effaçon »*]. Rightly here, “erase-fashion” conjugates “in a different fashion” and, at the same time, it makes reference to erasure. This shows that the rules of writing change. It is about subversion at the level of writing, which has an effect on the life of the subject as well as on his practice as analyst. The effect of analysis is that of writing and this could not be any different.

In their transmission the ASs, in their own fashion and their own style, try to give an account of what happened for them. What do we expect from the ASs?

Lacan expected that they help psychoanalysis progress through their experience and also, that they enlighten the question of the passage from analysand to analyst.

The AS is the one who has wanted to prove him or herself [*faire ses preuves*], who has been able to transmit something of what he or she has captured of his or her own experience. This is why the AS is particularly sensible and aware as to what concerns the unconscious.

The analysand who has arrived at the end of his trajectory, at the end of his analysis, experiences and feels the hole, the hole that horrifies us and from which we defend ourselves by forgetting, sleeping or in the way we depend on an instituted knowledge, closer to the university discourse than to the analytic discourse. It is for that reason that the pinnacle of analytic experience is precarious. This is also because the moment of the opening of the unconscious is fleeting, a moment in which something real scintillates and can only be glimpsed briefly. In the very same moment the unconscious closes up and obscurity returns. This real provokes misrecognition (*méconnaissance*) that is its negation.

The AS brings us not only a breath of fresh air but also something novel that we can't always grasp but which, however, touches us and produces a whirlwind. The ASs, through their testimonies and their work, address the theory from the perspective of what happened in their own experience and from a position that is new to them. They transmit something singular, of their own making. While we listen to them with some naivety and without trying to make all the pegs fit the little holes, they put us to work because they address the crucial problems of psychoanalysis.

Lacan wanted there to be a whirlwind in his school, he wanted to see the school animated and alive. Something new can come particularly from the AS, something that pushes us to work and keeps us awake because the ASs are still on the go, and they work from the split [*faille*].

We cannot forget the fact that as psychoanalysts we have a complex relationship to knowledge because we deny it, we repress it and it sometimes emerges even when we don't want to know anything about it. In my opinion, it is for that reason that Lacan so often insisted on the fact that the “young analysts”, the ones who are still very close to their analytic experience, can listen to some things that escape the veterans' attention. It is in the

very fact of keeping the experience of the unconscious alive that we are provided with a certain know-how.

*Translated by Chantal Degril
from a French translation revised by Lydie Grandet*

Notes:

- (1) Lacan, J. “Yale University, Kanser Seminar. 24.11.1975, p. 3
- (2) Lacan, J. “Ou Pire and The Analyst’s Knowledge” 06.01.72
- (3) Lacan, J. “Yale University, Kanser Seminar. 24.11.1975, p. 2
- (4) Lacan, J. 1974-75 Seminar “Les non-dupes-errent” on Patrick. Valas’ website
- (5) Bousseyroux, M. “Lacan le Borroméen. Quel nouage entre inconscient, symptôme et satisfaction à la fin?”, p. 270

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“Savoir y être”?

Camila Vidal

“This knowing how to make do with it [savoir-y-faire] is still a bit too close to the know-how [savoir-faire], concerning which there might have just occurred a misunderstanding, which I was, on the other hand, in favour of – it is catching you where one ought to, in the gut. It is rather a knowing how to be with it [savoir-y-être].”

Seminar XVI, *From an Other to the other*, March 5th, 1968 (Seuil, p. 207)

What psychoanalysis teaches us is that there is a hole within knowledge, a hole within knowledge about the constitution of the subject. Only a mark is left from this constitution, a mark of jouissance, which no knowledge will ever cover over again. It is an impossibility that concerns psychoanalysis just as much as its transmission, and as a consequence, the

very formation of the psychoanalyst. We could say that the origin of symptoms lies therein – to give meaning to this lack. As subjects, we rush to transform this impossibility into impotence as part of an ever-fruitless attempt to escape the horror produced by this origin that is secondary with respect to language.

For Lacan, the psychoanalyst is the product of an analysis taken all the way to its end, rather than the product of a formation. That is to say that the psychoanalyst is the product of analysis itself, in the same way as the subject is the product of the operation of language, and that is why at a given moment, Lacan was able to say that he never spoke about the formation of the analyst but that he spoke about formations of the unconscious, playing upon the 'de-formation' introduced by formation.

It is necessary to ask what is the knowledge gained at the end of analysis, and in what way does this knowledge allow the analyst to have a different *savoir-faire* in the direction of the treatment.

The course of the treatment and its end have allowed me to verify how the point upon which neurosis is constructed is at the same time the point of separation. There, where the contingency of my birth made obvious the difficulty that my mother had with the name, it was precisely in that place that the knot of the neurosis was constructed; it is the same point that produces this missed, premature encounter between the two, and which obliges me to search outside; it produces a point of radical separation, which will later render possible the encounter with psychoanalysis. That is to say that there, where the operation of separation made the advent of the subject possible, it is there that the neurosis was constructed, and this is why analysis allows this subject to separate herself from her own act, not to become confused with it herself, a crucial question for the direction of the treatment if we take into account what Lacan tells us: “The analytic act is an act without a subject” (“*c’est un sujet qui dans l’acte n’est pas*” [“it is a subject that in the act is not”]), lesson of January 10th, 1968, from the Seminar, “The analytic act”.)

Is it possible to relate this knowledge obtained at the end with the *savoir-faire* of the analyst? Is it possible to establish an articulation between the two?

A practice doesn't have to be explained in order to be operative, as Lacan tells us, but nonetheless, we can affirm, without straying too much from his position, that the *savoir-faire* not only necessarily requires clarification, but also is also intimately bound with it.

Let us go into the clinic.

“Not to let oneself be used” is the clinical wording that the point of separation takes on for a man, in his relation to an abusive mother. I think that this example is telling, on the one hand, of the efficacy of the wording with respect to separation (not to let oneself be used), and on the other hand, of the pathological aspect – in the sense of the pathos of the neurosis that was constituted therein. Analysis operates on the fantasy sustained by the said wording, but cannot do anything with the mark left by such a constitution. Genuinely incurable, then, since “not to let oneself be used” is not a response of the subject, but the subject himself is this response, the unfathomable decision of being, which founds the mere possibility of the operation of separation, which will then complete the advent of the subject.

“Cucaracha” is the minimal point taken from the Other, necessary to produce a knotting there where the maternal oxymoron summons solely the opacity of a *jouissance*, that “which shouldn't...”. To make a name for oneself with the insignia of the Other is a fantasmatic axiom, constructed in relation to this oxymoron, and “making oneself be crushed” [*se faire écraser*] is on the side of the drive, linked, via the signifier, to the “cucaracha”.

The unexpected arrival of this axiom allows for an interpretation of history: “Cucaracha” had marked existence with a “making oneself be crushed”. The discovery that hiding beneath this “cucaracha” is the maternal difficulty with respect to the name, allows the opacity of maternal desire to be discerned between the lines and produces the fall of the Other: “... it wasn’t a difficulty with the daughter, it was a difficulty of herself”.

Arriving at this point, “cucaracha” is the same thing as any other signifier that would have been there, endowed with any other possible signification. It’s of no importance, even though it obviously isn’t indifferent, and even though this signification had been of great importance throughout the whole history. The meaning is of no importance, because the signification falls, it is no longer necessary to make oneself be crushed in order to support the symptom, to support the Other, as the “cucaracha” which became the *sinthome* allows for a subjective consistency outside of the act which had rendered it possible.

Thus, what of the drive is always linked to the signifier, which has no other way of translating itself than in the form of thought, works against separation and in this way allies itself with knowledge and with thought. “Once again, I got myself hoodwinked”, said one patient, referring to the mess, repeated a thousand times in relation to a precise wording, “it isn’t fair”. It is the muddling with [*s’embroûiller*] that Lacan makes a reference to, which always leaves the subject suspended in his symptom, at the mercy of this other who doesn’t exist.

Thus, the act on the one hand, and on the other, the thought – two faces of a polarisation at the service of identification and a lack of separation of the proper speaking-being. It is the formula of the act, Lacan tells us, its effect of rupture upon the cogito.

The falling of meaning at the end of analysis will allow for a traversing of the fantasy and the fall of the Other. As a consequence, as I would put it: it is no longer necessary to “make oneself be crushed” in order to support the Other, to support the symptom, because the latter sustains itself (cucaracha). Meanwhile, something of this will be played out in every decisive moment of separation for this subject; it cannot be otherwise, because this is how the subject was constituted, and this mark of jouissance is impossible to separate from the speaking-being itself. From the moment of this clarification, in case of failure, far from neurotic suffering, the subject will be able to read in this “letting oneself be crushed” the mark of a separation effectuated in the real. An incurable real, then – but also one that allows for a different and certain “*faire*” [“doing”] with the drive... sometimes. To get out of the muddle, to recognise in it one’s own mark, and to recognise the consequences coming from this.

The “*savoir-faire*” of the analyst is nothing other, according to me, than the result of this clarification.

Firstly, that finding of what is incurable. Verifying the subject as a product, that is, a remainder of the operation of language as a necessary position for the operating of the analyst.

A difficult place, because analysis can destitute knowledge and the desire of psychoanalysis, creating an unprecedented desire, the desire of the analyst that is sustained by the observation of the hole within knowledge. But what isn’t deployed is the very mark, the mark left by the way in which the subject was constituted in the act of separation, an authentic singular real which makes of the speaking-being itself a remainder of the operation of language.

A clinical case, presented during the Study Days of the SPFLF in Vigo brought us the case of a man who presented himself for a consultation as an outcast of society, and the meeting with a psychoanalyst allowed him to take up the question of the remainder in such a way as not to have to incorporate it. Between negating it, as capitalism tries to do, and incorporating it like this subject has done, there is another way of dealing with it that is possible. This is the wager of psychoanalysis.

We could say that psychoanalysis is in itself a remainder, a product of civilisation, of the knowledge of science. A discourse which recognises itself as lacking [*manqué*], and of a particular moment in the history of mankind – it is not a universal discourse, and in its turn, it also produces its own waste, let us not forget that. Our School of the Lacanian Field could conceive of itself as such.

As a consequence in analysis it is the record of the subject's position as a remainder of the operation of language that will allow the analyst to operate in the position of the object, destined to convert itself into a remainder, a necessary place for the unfolding of any treatment.

Secondly, if we can say that neurosis is constituted at the very point where the act of separation allows for the constitution of the subject to be achieved (alienation-separation), we find ourselves faced with the fact that indeed, there is an act without a subject, prior to its constitution – as it is a necessary act for the subject to be able to constitute itself. This can now be used for the direction of the treatment, because the act of the analyst is also an act without a subject. This record of the end brings with it not a model, but a structure that allows for a positioning of the analyst outside of his subjective position, and outside of thought.

It is as subjects that we can say yes or no; in the position of the object there is only the yes. To allow for the analysand to unfold in his jouissance, to leave him to develop the line of argument, the testing and the proofs, in order to arrive at the conclusion of its evidence, as we could say, making a use that science does of benevolence, to let oneself be used – now yes, in order to put the other to work.

The mere work of free association doesn't ask anything else than the "abdication" of the subject, the separation of the subject from the act of "saying" (Seminar XV, "The Analytic Act", lesson 9, of February 7th, 1968) in order to aim at the real of its own constitution.

Thus, to separate oneself from the act, and not become muddled with it, includes a distancing of oneself from the ethics of good and evil, in order to enter the political territory of that which is possible, liberating the subject from all demands for the impossible – and it is there that the superego is emptied of its sadistic demand.

It is about making the real a reference, a compass, it is the Lacanian orientation, "*savoir-y-êtr*e", as Lacan tells us in the quote cited in the beginning.

The "Daze" ("*Brouillard*") appears as that which, in this work of symbiosis that thought and acts produce within the mind of the human being, grants a point of rupture. The oxymoron of the Daze is a point of arrival, because it had always been the point of departure, but in and of itself it isn't anything, all the way up to the moment where a separation from this real is produced.

Only this, and no knowledge at all, nor any real – because it is not the point to stay in the Daze, but simply to be within it, separated from it, that is where the analytic position is. In

Freudian terms, it is nothing other than the free-floating attention. A daze of listening to words separated from this listening.

Translated by Sara Rodowicz-Ślusarczyk

The Transmiss(i)on of Psychoanalysis

Marie Annick Le Port Gobert

What is it that's changed since Jacques Lacan's conclusion in 1978 at the congress of the *Ecole Freudienne de Paris* on transmission, when he says that with his invention of the Pass, he believes that there is a possible transmission of psychoanalysis? He ends up thinking that psychoanalysis is untransmissible, and that each psychoanalyst must set himself to reinventing psychoanalysis.

This was two years before his death and well after *l'Étourdit*. Even his hypothesis advancing a mathematical inscription of the question of the drive, or of *jouissance*, seems no longer proving to be possible. Is it his work on the Borromean knots that makes him abandon the hypothesis of transmission?

I base my argument on Lacan's phrase in *l'Étourdit*: "That one speaks remains forgotten behind what is said in what is heard", and it sets me the task of doing what Lacan proposes, to conceive the transmission of psychoanalysis from the perspective of the impossibility of it being transmitted. I keep well in mind the notion of the real of the experience in psychoanalysis. This experience, as we know, passes to the body. Between *Dire* and *Désir* there is indeed the tenuous space of psychoanalysis in its real, of which one always asks the question, how it is to be transmitted?

I was present last January in Avranches at a lecture offered by Vicky Estevez, who was "traumatized" Analyst of our School 5 years ago. She got us to listen to the background sound of different languages recorded by two researchers (Vincent Barras and Jacques Demièrè). Her intention was to get us to hear the singular background sound of different languages and to highlight what Lacan tells us in *Encore*: the *Dire ex-sists* to the signifier.

It immediately gave me, without my knowing it yet (in the body), a glimpse of what the sound effect of language could be on the subject. Mainly on the little baby who perceives from birth the sounds of the Other who speaks to him. I 'caught' something of a *Dire* of my colleague that passed through me at the very moment I heard those recordings. What resulted is this work on transmission that I can write with the small 'i' in brackets. The little 'i' of the imaginary is excluded from this transmission, which is not mission, but sound [*n'est pas mission mais son*].

It is an improbable sound-tone that I propose to you then: the *transmission*.

There would be a *Dire*, which passes through what is said, heard in the words of language, and which is forgotten. Probably nothing other than a little music that is heard in any transmission whatsoever. I think here of Primo Levi's book *If This is a Man*.

It is the first music of *lalangue*, traversing the body of the baby, a *Dire* on the desire to live coming from the Other, which will allow the baby to make a body and to traverse the wall of language in order to pick out via some little holes the signifiers that he will choose when he decides to speak. How does this happen ?

The arrival of the sound-tone of the said of the Other is going to collide with, is going to make an assault on, the body. The first reaction will be refusal of this impingement of the real on the body of the infant. This refusal constitutes the first affirmation of the subject. Then comes the ethical position of the subject, yes - already there, to allow the sounds coming from the signifiers of the mother access to the body. The corporeal weaves with the signifiers of language, in its sonority, the notches, the furrows (as Marie-Noëlle Jacob Duvernet also said), which will make a trace.

It is the resonance, like a distant echo in the body, that will make the cut, the radical separation of the subject from himself. It is the echo in the body, as Lacan says. This echo, agreed to by the little subject, will produce nothing other than a phenomenon of jouissance of the body. It is this *Dire* of the body that will remain forgotten, the first original repression, the first *Bejahung* of the subject of the unconscious.

We see this experience clearly when the baby is practicing to produce his first lallations. He makes grimaces, undertakes an extraordinary effort with his mouth, his throat, his muscles, to finally produce an improbable lallation, which will make new knowledge, acquired forever, and provoke a very exteriorized jubilation. This jubilation will be contagious, and the Other will make reference to it, repeating with the baby in order to find it again quickly, before it is lost, the jouissance produced by this invention of the new lallation, preliminary sketch of the language that will come later. What is transmitted there is of the order of the desire to live, a drive towards life, induced by that of the Other.

Via this pure musical listening, the sound background of the words spoken by the voice of the Other, passes from the event of sonority to the incorporated advent of the signifier of language, from where a radical novelty comes to constitute itself, a possibility of speech that will bring language and a link with others.

I have spoken about the ethics of the subject, because it is obviously for the baby to consent, not only to let itself be shaken up by the real sonorities of the Other, but also to admit that the passage to the body gives rise to the jouissance provoked, and thus makes a cut to leave a place for the signifier of language.

What comes of it is completely new, the never said that will be born of this encounter with the *Dire* that is impossible to say. The choice of sound will be made a saying, a choice both arbitrary and improbable, unknown to the subject, surpassing him completely, making him other to himself. But to his great surprise, he will have invented a sound/signifier that will be his trademark in the desire of the Other, and will inscribe it forever in language.

The one refusing this collision, this jouissance first agreed to, and holding to this refusal without being able to pass to knowledge, will this subject be autistic? And for the psychotic, how can the passage be supposed? Perhaps before the sound there is consent to jouissance, a passage to the body, but the passage to language would be made in the non-choice of these sounds, all of them the same without distinction, without the desiring instigation of the Other which insists that the passage to the signifier be directed by its desire. *From that point*, all future signifiers of *speech* will be caught up *higgeldy-piggeldy*, with no choice possible, which will yield a subject who can handle and learn the language, but without quilting, without the punch of the paternal metaphor, without tracing the chosen furrow to the words of future speech. One could therefore verify here that it is indeed between *Dire* and *Désir* that life is transmitted. And that Desire is first the desire of the Other.

It will also be what's involved, no more nor less, in the procedure of the Lacanian Pass. This is how I understand the enthusiasm after the Pass for the analyst who, having never been able to say anything about the desire of the analyst, will come to a knowledge from having heard it. Maybe not just him, but also the cartel.

Enthusiasm has made its way through this moment, there where the remaining jouissance that makes for life becomes only, simply, a little music that has been heard and will not remain, which will be forgotten, until the next moment when the automaton of life veers towards depression, and all at once, without any warning, this music again comes to tickle the ear of the subject of the unconscious, wakes him up, offers him a new passage in the face of the unexpected of the real. The preceding passage from jouissance to knowledge heard will have left a trace.

This chosen sonority, this *Dire* which situates the subject in relation to *Désir* which cannot be said, and therefore to castration which is pure real, will always be the salt of transmission. Particularly that (salt) that the Cartel of the Pass in the apparatus of the School can hear from the desire of the analyst, which is also a *Dire* that is heard. The nomination of AE is probably based on that hearing of each one who constitutes the Cartel. This is what I suppose to be what prompts or not a nomination of AS.

The *Dire* would therefore be to situate a capital D at the level of the transmission of desire which cannot be said, but which is heard. It will be necessary that the analyst knows how to make this impossible knowledge of the Pass sound with his body, in his act, each time it is required. He must therefore have incorporated his own knowledge, but also that of others, of his peers, of Freud and Lacan.

Dire is an act. This is what Lacan tells us, *dire* is not speech, nor a song, only the music that indicates that one is passing through a moment that marks, which will be forgotten, but which will make a trace.

In the conclusion to the ninth congress of the EFP in July 78, to which I referred in connection with transmission, Lacan asks the question of how the analyst gets to this possibility of curing patients of neuroses, in the very absence of the desire to cure. He assumes that there is a "trick"; that it is a matter of special effects. Why not suppose that this trick has to do with the voice of the analyst, which is the most real of his person, and upon which the patient is going to support the symptom? The voice escapes everyone, as is well-known, one has no idea about it, no representation, it goes beyond the subject. But it makes it possible to return the body to itself. The trick of the Pass, the trick which is transmitted, in a passage that goes from the meeting of the impossible to say to the jouissance of life that is assumed, up to the founding act of a very particular knowledge, it is indeed a trick, a trick that pleases me to call today a sound, or something that resembles that, a musicality. An improbable musicality.

The passage before the wall of language, like the impasse of the subject who is seen emptied of the object in the Pass, comes about in my opinion in the same way. It is the confrontation with a jouissance absolutely linked to nothing, to the emptiness of sense. There is a direct hit to the body (a tuché), an immediate link to the fact that there is nothing there to understand, followed by a discovery that takes the place of knowing. That is why this jouissance which is not linked to anything explicable, can be called *Autre jouissance*, jouissance of The woman who does not exist. Jouissance impossible to say, which only experiences itself.

Or another question: If there is a probable contingency between feminine jouissance and the transmission of psychoanalysis, is it that the musical "trick" is heard in the same way in men and in women? Or, how does *Le Dire* pass to women, and pass to men? How to grasp the sexual of language?

If *Dire* is a matter of feminine jouissance, and the grammar of language proposed by the Other is also a matter of sexuation, the *Dire* of this Other is not absent in its desire to interpellate its infant by indicating its sex in its desire. The mark of language will thus

inscribe in the body of the infant a sexual identity, whatever the anatomical sex of that infant. It's only later, with the phallic, that the infant will perhaps orient himself differently. This reflection comes to me, in part, from a conversation with my colleague and friend Elisabeth Léturgie, who was also 'traumatized' AS in December 2004.

In conclusion:

The five logical times that I propose to extract from the process of integration of the real with the body of the subject of the unconscious, aim at saying something of a possible hearing of transmission, whether it be of psychoanalysis or transmission of any kind:

Collision with the real / Refusal / Ethics of the subject / Act / new know-how with unspeakable jouissance

It is to indicate that this passage compels the invention of a new knowledge, the generation of something completely new, whether in life or in analysis. This new knowledge is a knowledge which cannot of course be said, explained, contradicted, a knowledge that cannot be opposed to anything. It raises an indisputable point about life, incomprehensible and unexpected, that of the first jouissance arising on the occasion of an attack, a cut to the body of the human, language, of which he has to swallow the consequence, that is, the jouissance which imposes itself and of which one has to - at any moment of life, and as many times as it imposes itself - make oneself rather the friend, the partner and the conquered. This helps on subsequent times to feel first defeated, then later to defeat with the efficacy of the castration met with the previous time. And this may indicate to us perhaps that for psychoanalysis, its transmission and its future is probably nothing other than this music, this trick, this "melody" ["mélodie"] (*mêle au dit*) [mingled with the said] as proposed by Jacques Tréhot ... this breath, who knows ...?

Translated by Deborah McIntyre

From 'Knowing-how-to-do' to 'Knowing-how-to-say'

Albert Nguyễn

I am going to try and develop a few remarks on the question of knowledge, a question that I will examine differently this time, separate from the question of the supposition of knowledge that is at the core of psychoanalysis in transference. However, the supposition of knowledge is precisely the motor of the production of unconscious knowledge and, after all, the two terms that I bring forward in this presentation are the result of it: firstly, on the side of the analyst, both in his 'knowing-how-to-do' [*savoir faire*] and his 'knowing-how-to-say' [*savoir dire*] and, secondly, on the side of the analysand, with the incursion of the saying [*dire*] among the 'sais' [*dits*]. In '*L'Étourdi*', Lacan showed that the dimension of saying is of the order of the real, and the saying supports the 'sais' in the treatment, it ex-sists to them.

We can easily link the 'know-how' with what we call the psychoanalyst's experience. The psychoanalyst's knowledge concerns what we refer to with the expression "being wise" [*avoir de la bouteille*], which is equivalent to "being experienced", to "having gone through the mill" [*en avoir vu de toutes les couleurs*].

I think we can correlate this with what Lacan said elsewhere, namely that it is not sufficient to know how to press the right buttons to make knowledge happen and solve the

analysand's neurosis. This constituted Lacan's reiterated criticism of the psychoanalyst-bureaucrat. You know that he never refrained from pushing analysts out of their comfort zone and the bureaucratization of the psychoanalyst was one of his targets.

Besides, from that criticism, as we shall see, he questioned the 'know-how', particularly in the Seminar *The Sinthome*, in a way that is very relevant to the point I'm making here: in effect, he broke down this particular knowledge into 'know-how' and 'knowing-how-to-do-it' [*savoir y faire*], and even elsewhere, into 'knowing-how-to-be-in-it' [*savoir y être*] and 'knowing-how-to-enter-it' [*savoir y entrer*]. Each of these formulae has a different meaning and one can see a correspondence between this particular declination and the ternary series 'artisan-artifice-artist'.

'Knowing-how-to-do' is of the register of the artisan, whereas with the artist, there is something that goes beyond 'knowing-how-to-do'. We cannot think of the artist's practice as being any different to a practice based on a certain usage of artifice, that is, of the symbolic order: the artist produces something singular, unique, however, not without using an artifice.

I think we can approach the artisan's practice in a lighter way though. His production stems from a certain craft, a certain DIY, upon the model of the analyst who has gone beyond a certain artifice to arrive at a certain art in his practice of interpretation (one example of artifice is the analytic *dispositif*, or resorting to certain social representations). The art of analysis stems from the art-saying [*art-dire*], which is much more difficult. The analyst who begins practicing is often closer to the artisan (Lacan said of him: he is like a bull in a china shop).

So, what we call the analyst's experience is the experience of the treatment, to which one has to add the psychoanalyst's experience based on his own use of the doctrine, of the established analytic knowledge; thirdly, the experience he draws from the knowledge based on his own analysis and, finally – this is the most important – the consequences he drew from that access to the real which, one must recall, is the sexual real in psychoanalysis: there is no sexual relation.

The analyst's 'art-saying' [*art-dire*] depends on that ternary knowledge, on the knot that is made from what he hears in the treatments he conducts, his own working through (*Durcharbeitung*) of the knowledge produced by his own treatment and, his relation to analytic doctrine. This last point would require writing a whole chapter on the evolution of the analyst's relationship to the doctrine of knowledge. Here, I will present only one axis because the question is both vast and risky: the relationship to doctrine is illuminated by the development of knowledge that stems from the consequences that the analyst draws from the knowledge of his own analysis and, foremost, one must obviously place in it one's own relationship to the real and to truth.

I leave this question on the side for a moment. I think it is somehow a thorny one, but I am sure that the work of the School, on the condition of being cleared of what Lacan called in his Discourse at the French School of Psychoanalysis [EFP] "the stagnating production of psychoanalysts" (this is why he expected that the Analyst of the School (AS) [*AE*] has some knowledge about the crucial points of psychoanalysis). It is only on that condition that the work of the School can contribute to advancing and widening the work of the doctrine, by using the promising furrows that Lacan left us.

I would add that the saying is not exactly juxtaposed to the act because if "the act is in place of a saying that changes the subject", it cannot however be assimilated to a saying itself – unless perhaps we consider that the saying and the act constitute two modalities of the cut. In effect, the saying can be represented as a silent cut and even a splicing. What is clear at

least is that one can consider that both the saying and the act are important. It is about re-doing, repairing the knot between the symbolic, the imaginary and the real, with object *a*, which was made wrongly by the neurosis, squeezed in the middle.

I have already said it in my discussion, but I repeat it:

“It is about the analyst being able to open up the way [*voie*] for the analysand; this cannot be done in the best of ways without “making oneself heard” [*donner de la voix*]. But what does “making oneself heard” mean?

Is making oneself heard, equivalent to “saying”? And to what extent is “making oneself heard”, related to the real? One must take up again the question of the voice that Lacan was fine-tuning while establishing the theory of object *a*. He gave a particular status to the voice, linked to its structure, which is different from the structure of the other drives because it implies an organ that cannot be closed: the ear. For this reason, in this case, the drive trajectory is modified: it constitutes a trajectory that is one-way only, without the possibility of a return.

In the treatment, the psychoanalyst is in the position of semblance of the object and it is from that position that he can open up the way for an update of the analysing knowledge [*savoir analysant*], not without wanting to ... say it, and the “it” in “say it” is of the utmost importance. I am going to try and make you hear (understand) it.

Lacan’s Seminar ‘*L’Insu*’ immediately followed the Seminar *The Sinthome* in which Lacan introduced “*l’Une bévue*”. In November of that year, he put forward the idea of the end of analysis as the identification with the sinthome and he came to interrogate, on 21.12.1976, the difference between knowledge as ‘*savoir*’ and knowledge as ‘*connaissance*’:

“The know-how is demonstrative in the sense that it does not go without the possibility of *l’Une-bévue*. For that possibility to be extinguished (i.e. to arrive at ‘ceasing to be written’) one requires a means”. And he says: how to distinguish between ‘*bévue*’ [blunder] and knowledge [*savoir*]?

There is “the knowledge that one knows” [*le savoir qu’on sait*] and “a *bévue*” substitutes “the knowledge one knows” [*le savoir qu’on sait*] for the principle of “one knows without knowing it” [*qu’on sait sans le savoir*]. This “it” is not equivalent to a knowledge [*un savoir*] but to the fact of knowing. And he adds: “this is how the unconscious lends itself to the *bévue*”.

You will have noticed that here he uses the expression ‘One knows’ [*On sait*], that we find again the same year in the Preface to the English Edition to Seminar XI: “One knows it oneself” [*On le sait soi*] “of the space of a lapsus” [*de l’esp d’un laps*] that he concludes with the formula “One knows one is in the unconscious” [here he speaks of the real unconscious].

It is from that point on that Lacan’s expression “knowing-how-to-do-it” [*savoir y faire*] which he put forward together with “knowledge” [*savoir*] and “know-how” [*savoir-faire*] makes sense. Knowing-how-to-do-it does not have the same meaning as ‘know-how’. The difference, says Lacan, lies in the fact that in order to know-how-to-do-it, one does not take the thing as a concept. This allowed Lacan to add, on 15.02.77, the relationship between knowledge and the unconscious in “One knows it oneself” [*On le sait soi*]:

“The unconscious is an entity that I tried to define with the symbolic but it constitutes, in the end, only one more entity. It is an entity that requires knowing how to do with it (*il s’agit*

de savoir y faire]. To know how to do with it is not the same as a knowledge [*un savoir*]. The unconscious is what brings a change, what reduces the sinthome”.

For example, he makes a remark about the title of the seminar “*L’insu que sait de l’une bête s’aile a mourre*”. In this title, “*s’aile*” is homophonous with “it/she” [*s’aile c’est elle*], and it/she or it” the unconscious is/knows [*elle ou il c’est l’inconscient*], [*c’est*, it is, is homophonous to *sait*, knows, in French] that it bears knowledge. I draw your attention to Lacan’s conclusion which seems to me to be perfectly illustrative of, and also to give weight to, both notions: “what one knows without knowing it” [*ce qu’on sait sans le savoir*] and, “one knows it oneself” [*on le sait soi*], that one is in the unconscious. It is in that sense that, if the unconscious is a knowledge, as he says at the end of his Seminar “*Les non dupes errent*”, it is an annoying knowledge [*un savoir emmerdant*], and it is annoying because it is a particular type of knowledge: it is a knowledge one knows but which does not say its name. I quote Lacan:

“The unconscious knows, in the absolute and only in the absolute, it knows that I know what was in the letter (I add here: the love letter [*la lettre d’amour*] of Seminar XX, S(barred A)), the letter that only I alone know [*que je sais tout seul*] as, in effect, there is no Other of the Other. In reality thus, it knows nothing, except that I know it, but this is not a reason to say it to it.” (But this is not a reason either to ignore what one knows [*qu’on sait*]).

I must say that I made this discovery while working on this paper, and it made me grasp at last the two sides of the unconscious: if, on the one side, the unconscious is being grasped in the formations of the unconscious, on the other side – that of the real unconscious – it can only be grasped from that saying: ‘that one knows’ [*qu’on sait*], which is equivalent to ‘one knows it’ [*qu’on le sait*], knowledge without any determined knowledge, without knowledge in the symbolic order. I would say it is an impossible knowledge and it is real for that very reason. On the one side, there is the knowledge of the symbolic which is said, which can pass to the *said*, and, on the other side, the knowledge that cannot pass to the *said*, which is of the order of the letter that is written, and thus, it is of the order of the one-saying [*un-dire*]. (I apologise for the aridity of my discourse but I think this difference is crucial for analysis itself and for analysts).

The unconscious as real, the real unconscious, is also marked by the impossible: this is the most important consequence of the formula ‘There is no sexual relation’.

All this is not without consequence for analytic practice, where the saying is at stake. And saying implies the voice. One cannot talk about knowing how to say without taking the voice into consideration, this voice that Lacan raised to the rank of object *a* par excellence.

For he who positions himself as analyst, there is always something to listen to, even before being able to hear the strong link between voice and language. It is certainly about writing, however, writing is heard as voice and, moreover, a unique voice. This gives us some indication about the field that the voice covers: each voice bears a saying. Therefore, there is always something to listen to, without however falling into the mania [*hypochondrie*] of listening in order to pick up the saying at the core of what is being said or written.

‘*Samuel Wood’s Last Lines*’ by Louis René Desforêts⁵¹ is an invitation to this kind of listening:

If to make a voice that comes from elsewhere be heard

Although it is inaccessible to time and wear

Is no less illusory than a dream

There is however something that lasts in it

⁵¹ Tr. note: The common expression in French is the reverse: Rather be deaf than having to hear it.

Even after its meaning has been lost
Its tonality vibrates again far away like a thunderstorm
And one does not know if it is coming or going.

In effect, if we listen, it is because there is something to be heard, something which is not explicit in the *sais* [*dits*], however necessary the latter are, but which tries to pass the bar of deafness. What is being heard between the lines, between the sentences and between the words? What is trying to make itself be heard?

Lacan was a living example of that problematic throughout his teaching. Claude Jaeglé's book "Jacques Lacan's Silent Portrait"⁵² emphasises it. Who has never hoped, wanted or dreamed of making oneself heard when speaking? This question is difficult.

Lacan's voice was so particular, chanted [*scandée*], sometimes so sweet, at times booming, at other times eaten by silence, sometimes angry, or suspended, hesitant, sighing, never fluid although at times precipitated ... and one could prolong the series of those attributes that I summarise here in one word: omnipresent. Such was its characteristic, although the official transcription of the Seminar singularly stifles it. However, one can oppose this inflation of voice in the Seminar to Lacan's relative discretion on the specific topic of the voice in his works. However, one has to emphasise Lacan's "insistence", if not relentlessness, in making himself be heard, and one must say, often without any success, something he never ceased to point out.

Paul Celan writes "*Horst-du*", "well heard", as he himself was quite sure of not being heard, especially by Heidegger.

Beyond the content of his seminar what did Lacan want to make heard that made him so profusely lament not being ... heard? Did he simply want to make this drive "to make oneself be heard" pass through? Or else, was he certain of not being heard, hence his frequent bouts of anger?

I think that beyond all these hypotheses he wanted to make "som'thin" [*kekchose*] pass through, something linked to the transmission of psychoanalysis, a transmission that failed with his approach wholly based on mathemes. The knots plunged his audience and readers into perplexity. In the end, what Lacan obstinately tried to make pass was nothing else but the psychoanalyst's desire.

Therefore, it was about desire to make oneself be heard. What becomes of the drive after the fundamental fantasy has been traversed? Lacan gave his response to this question in act: he made of the voice the object that responded to it.

"The drives are the echo in the body of the fact that there is a saying". In order to resonate, to make consonant – another word for "*sinthomadaquin*" – there requires the body to be sensible to it. The body is sensible, this is a fact. It is because the body has a few orifices, of which the most important one is the ear because it cannot be blocked or closed or shut. It is via the ear that what I called the voice responds.⁵³

As for me, I hear the question of Lacan's voice as a lesson, his lesson on the analyst's desire, which I notice suffers no definition. By contrast, Lacan speaks while putting this desire in act, showing in some way the analytic act. In Lacan's act, one can hear why he could say, from the Proposition of 1967 on, that the analyst "sees himself become a

⁵² Claude Jaeglé, 2010. *Portrait Silencieux de Jacques Lacan*. Editions PUF, Paris.

⁵³ Lacan, J. *Le Séminaire, Livre XXIII, Le Sinthome*, Paris, Seuil, p. 17.

voice”,⁵⁴ to be completed with the famous formula about his School: “I found, as alone as I have always been”. I deduce from this a conception of the voice as a solitary voice, as a necessity to posit it, to place it, to find it, to which the analytic experience responds: the act goes without the Other and it is precisely for that reason that it becomes possible to hear other ones, beyond the screen of fantasy.

This is the whole question: Lacan gives us in his Proposition on the Pass two examples of the end of analysis that converge on one point: the fall of the subject supposed to know, whose modality is detachment or fall.

The one [L’*um*] who “found the key of the world in the split of the pre-pubescent”. At the end, the analyst does not have “to wait for a gaze from him anymore, but he sees himself become a gaze”. And the other who traverses the newspaper behind which his genitor “was sheltering the sewer of his thoughts”.⁵⁵ This throws back on to the psychoanalyst the effect of anxiety in which he tips over in his own dejection”.

How to hear “to see oneself become a voice”? I note that the analyst does not have to wait for a gaze anymore, i.e. the privileged object of the analysand’s fantasy, fantasy that he traverses and that the analyst supported until then. But, and this is the point, he sees himself become a voice. The key lies in the conclusion of the second case: “he tips over into his own dejection”. The analyst is sent back to his dis-being [*désêtre*] and becomes a rag, a residue left by the analysand. End of analysis.

Two remarks:

The first one: “He sees himself become a voice” means a gaze which detaches itself in order to leave room for what can be interpreted as the invocatory drive. Thus, in the treatment there occurs a movement that concerns the two partners of analysis. One must put the emphasis on the fact that the expression “sees himself” has nothing to do with the gaze. It is a logical “sees himself”, it is of the order of “I see the solution”, “I see what you mean”, which does not imply any gaze but introduces a tempo, a temporality by logical deduction.

The latter can be deduced from the former: one must then complete the formula “sees himself become a voice” with “the time that it takes to say it” that Lacan made into the structure of the voice itself in “*Les non-dupes errent*”. Besides, the handling of the object voice, as well as of all the objects *a*, is linked to time. I remark that this traversal of time is the time of the ejection of the analyst: the traversal of the fantasy does not only concern the analysand, but the two partners and, I see here an occurrence of what could have made Lacan say that the analyst has a horror of his act, an act that leaves him stranded. This is also why, perhaps, he qualified the object *a* as junk [*saloperie*]. If for the analysand the end of analysis “grants him some liberties” it is clear that, for the analyst, the end of analysis is not funny. However, it is also true that the latter must have taken the measure, in his own treatment, of what is to be expected in his practice as analyst. Being reduced to *objet petit a*, implies for the analyst that he can no longer sustain himself on the basis of any image. Between that point and thinking that analyses can last – and some can last without any visible prospect of ending, due to some defect in the analyst’s desire – there is only one step... (I leave that question in suspense).

⁵⁴ Lacan, J., 2001. Proposition sur le Psychanalyste de l’Ecole. Autres Ecrits. Editions du Seuil, Paris p. 254.

Proposition of 9 October on the Psychoanalyst of the School, Trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* no. 6, p. 10.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 255.

If I may say, the introduction of the voice makes the ear prick up because there is something to hear, “the alterity of what is being said”. Lacan said that after having introduced the Shofar, a ram’s horn that is blown during some Jewish festivals in order for the people to recall the pact. Each time, it is about renewing the Alliance. Lacan calls this sound “God’s bellowing”. The bellowing is assimilated to God’s voice.

Lacan gave us some indication of the temporal structure: the voice is “the time one takes to say something”, “the voice is the scansion with which I tell you all that” (*Les non-dupes errent*) and it is an echo of the expression he used in *Radiophonie*, “It is the time it takes to make oneself into being”.

I quote again the passage in Lacan:⁵⁶

“There is something like that which is linked to the time I take to say things, as the object *a* is linked to this dimension of time. It is totally distinct from the saying” (ALI, p.174). And he insists: “the saying is not the voice”, but “it is not the writing either”: the saying, the writing and the voice are knotted by time, or silence knots the voice, the saying and the writing. The voice does not gurgle [*borborygme*], it *borromeanises*.

There remains the question of what kind of silence is at stake here: assuredly it is silence intended in its double version: “*silet*” and “*tacere*”. “*Silet*” is at stake here because *tacere* always leaves the possibility of lifting silence by speaking, whereas *silet* is linked to an impossible, to a real.

To say it briefly, the voice as object is not reducible to sound, tonality, phonation, or noise. It has more to do with separation, with the transferable and with silence. Does it have anything to do with writing?

Lacan, who always complained about not being heard even when a crowded audience was listening to him, introduced in this “hearing” different levels: clearly, hearing does not only concern a physical ability, but the intention of saying cannot be neglected in it.

The “said-mention” [*dit-mention*] of saying is not so crucial because of the presence of an intention, but because the one who listens hears something that is different to what the subject wanted to say: a knowledge that does not know itself or a knowledge that the subject does not know he knows, this “pedicle of knowledge” that is the unconscious. The analytic experience shows that, whatever the intention of saying is, what of it is said is always offbeat: it is what we call the unconscious, which comes in the way of the intention in order to let through some irregularities of language, as Sollers says about Joyce: slips of the tongue, wit, grammatical or syntactical errors. However, these irregularities constitute precisely the “it” [*ça*] in the expression: “It’s better to hear it [*ça*] than being deaf”.

Beyond the play of signifiers, on the analyst’s side the most important thing is to hear what is not said or, what is being said without the subject knowing it. On the side of the analysand, what is to be heard supposes that he does not listen when he speaks because to listen to oneself speak constitutes unquestionably an obstacle in hearing oneself. On the analysand’s side, what is to be heard supposes having to draw the consequence of the *said*: to take act [*prendre acte de*]. Isn’t it the most difficult thing throughout one’s analysis and isn’t

⁵⁶ Lacan, J. Seminar XXI, *Les Non-dupes errent*. Unpublished . Lesson of 9 April 1974.

it why Lacan indicated once that the end of analysis occurred when the analysand ceased to contradict himself all the time?

Both expressions “What is heard” [*Ce qui s’entend*] and “That one says” [*Qu’on dise*] emphasise the value of the dimension of saying beyond the *said*s [*dits*]. In order for that kind of saying to become effective and make “*réson*”, the condition is that ... it be heard.

I won’t detail everything Lacan said about the voice during his whole teaching but I will only point out a few seminars: Seminar X on Anxiety, Seminar XI and the invocatory drive which introduces a radical change, that of a new trajectory of the drive, Seminar XVII with his comment on the voice as support for the astronauts’ pelvic floor in space, Seminar XXIII and the question of a transmission which does not pass via the father anymore but via the function of phonation in Joyce’s case, to which we can add “Subversion of the Subject and Dialectics of Desire” in *Ecrits* and, “*L’Etourdit*” in *Autres écrits*. Let’s note too the excellent paper by Erik Porge in the journal *Essaim*, no. 32, and what his books “Echo of the Voice” and “Lacan’s Rapture” bring to the invocatory drive and its one-way trajectory.

On p. 490 of *Autres écrits*, in *L’Etourdit*, Lacan writes:

“This saying proceeds only by the fact that the unconscious, being structured as a language, that is the *lalangue* that it inhabits, is subjected to the equivocity upon which each *lalangue* is being distinguished from any other. A language among others is nothing more than the complete set of all the equivocities that its history made persist in it. It is the vein in which the real (the NRS) ... has created a deposit across time”.

This citation is to be connected to another one: *lalangue* precipitates in the letter: writing, lively echo of “*Littérature*”:

“Between centre and absence, between knowledge and *jouissance*, there is a littoral which turns into the literal only if the turn that one is able to operate is the same at all times. It is only on that condition that you can hold yourself as the agent that sustains it” (*Autres écrits*, p. 16).

How does this work? Via the erosion, the ploughed furrows, via the traits that leave a trace from the passage of language:

“Writing is in the real the erosion of the signified, which has rained off the semblance in so far as it makes the signifier”.

And let’s emphasise the following sentence:

“It [the writing] does not trace [*décalque*] the latter [the signifier] but its effects of language, which are forged by the one who speaks it” (*Autres écrits* p. 17).

The voice touches the Real because there is an impossible to say in it, an impossible at the core of the play of the *said*s that the saying circumscribes. It constitutes an alterity to what is being said, it is voiceless [*a-phoné*], like object *a*. These *said*s are chanted [*scandés*], the voice is a trait of scansion, a trait of writing that lets temporality enter its structure.

This is the reason why, at least for one part - its organic part- the voice resonates, it has a tonality, it can scream, it can “*phoné*” the other, it can echo. For another part, the voice is involved in what writes itself in silence, the letter. The voice has *si-phoné* [*si-phoné*] the Other to let the poem happen [*advenir*] where the chant is heard, in the form of the voice as cause of desire: this constitutes evidence of the link between *lalangue* and the letter and also, to the unconscious.

Because this makes a singularity, a trait of humanity that nonetheless allows for a voice to be imitated, however, in reality, a voice is never equal to any other. There is an absolute difference that makes everyone's style unique. An analysis that is pushed as far as its sinthomatic point can reach. Taking act from it opens up the series of its consequences, in particular in the way analyses are conducted and, of course, in life in general where a few events, indices of the Real, can occur, love for example, which is a saying-event.

And if Lacan has seldom spoken about "his voice", it is precisely because the function "cause of desire" of the voice does not suffer any comment for a given subject. What is expected or heard of it is verified in act, this analytic act that Lacan, let's say, "invented" in the same way he invented the concepts of object *a* and of Real.

If everyone is determined by one version of the father, Lacan added at the end of his teaching one version of the voice for everyone, which goes beyond the Name of the Father.

The voice of the act, the voice for the act, is the only path a psychoanalyst who has experienced the real silence can take. It is inasmuch as the analyst has been able "to make his desire enter his voice" that he has a chance of attuning himself to the wavelength of his analysand's language.

Translated by Chantal Degril

The Advents of the Real and the Psychoanalyst

Xth Rendezvous of the International of the Forums of the Lacanian Field

The School and the Discourses

"What joy do we find in our work?"

VIth International Encounter of the School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field (IF-SPFLF)

Presentation of the theme of the Rendezvous of the IF

It will be twenty years since the creation of the Forums of the Lacanian Field following the initiative launched in Barcelona in July 1998. This was a new course which, following the path traced by Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, appeared as a movement of counter-experience with the goal of creating a School of Psychoanalysis that was effectively born in 2001.

Twenty years later, we are meeting together once more in Barcelona, these and many others, on the occasion of the Xth International Rendezvous of the IF-SPFLF and of the VIth International Encounter of the School. We have the essentials: the impetus from the desire for an international community, the involvement of the Forums of Barcelona and the rest of Spain in its organisation in order that it arrives safe and sound, and the title of the

Rendezvous that is going to give us, during this time, the axis to the work of the community.

The advents of the real and the psychoanalyst. An enigmatic title in the semantics of “advent” in the plural – plurality of the diversity of elements of what is real, thus the plurality of its accepted meanings, from “what always returns to the same place” as obstacle to well-being, to the real that can overflow —; enigmatic too in the complex relation between these two terms, the dependence of the second in relation to the first, but not only that ...

If, as Lacan affirms in “*La Troisième*”, the future of analysis depends on what comes [*advient*] from the real and not the inverse, what are the consequences from these advents — sustained by the scientific discourse — for social links and in particular for the analytic discourse, that which solders the analysand to the pair analyst-analysand?

Thus a title that produces questions for us, that keeps us awake, a title that will make us work. There is no advent of the real that does not truncate the illusory and wished for experience of continuity in the speaking being, it is a matter of the trauma of the Other as constitutive, or of the real of the jouissance of the body, that of the accident, or of what the advances of science produce. That is to say that every advent of the real implies an effect, an immediate effect that is one of affect – anxiety – or more silent, incalculable effects, that are diffused in the social and we observe that they do not cease to produce new forms of segregation. It is not in the hands of the psychoanalyst to reduce the advents of the real; the psychoanalyst can respond, he can, as Lacan tells us, counter it.

Rosa Escapa and Ramon Miralpeix

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Presentation of the theme of the International Meeting of the IF-EPFCL

“... There is for you – you should want it – another way to overcome your revolt of the privileged: mine for example. I only lament that so few people who interest me are interested in what interests me.”

J. Lacan, Ornicar no 49, p. 7.

Lacan’s founding of his School of psychoanalysis is inscribed in a history of discourses. The latter gives the School its place in the social field and it also assigns its tasks.

Admittedly, Lacan’s founding of his School precedes in fact the writing of his mathemes of the discourses. However, it does not precede his effort to give an account of the analytic experience through a discourse that did remain unprecedented until Freud. Its emergence responded to a reality that was itself unprecedented, in the form of a symptom that had become untreatable. In effect, the symptom does not date back to Freud. It is correlative to the very existence of speech. It needed to be recognised as such though in order to retrospectively shed light on its historical avatars.

As such, the master’s discourse and that of the hysteric show solidarity in their confrontation with one another. The signifying order imposes a division, which responds to an irremediable cut between the signifier and the signified. As a result, the master’s discourse, which relies upon consenting to the One that makes an exception of itself, never goes without the subject’s shaded part that the hysteric attires herself with, in order to complete it.

These two were once sufficient to order the world. However, faced with the disintegration of the empire of the One, the master had to find refuge behind knowledge in order to continue speaking in the name of all.

The university discourse constitutes therefore a “regression” with regard the hysteric’s effort in her call for truth. The subject finds himself cut off from truth, in a suffering that has become impossible to articulate and thus has been made inaudible. This suffering, in that way delegitimised, became all the more loud as science – by becoming based on measurable counting - erased the interlocutors of the time: the priest and the physician.

From then on, a new interlocutor was born for the subject, the psychoanalyst of course. As he himself suffered [*pâti*] like the hysteric from the violence of the new master, he knew how to listen to her and give her back her reason.

Freud’s project was to make the new forms of violence in civilisation more bearable, even attenuate them. We can say that he succeeded in changing his contemporaries’ view on the human species, its motivations and its achievements. But at the same time, he perhaps triggered exaggerated expectations. Today, the market’s triumphant discourse increasingly undoes the traditional links.

In reaction, Lacan never promoted in the name of Freud the ideal of the “collective”. On the contrary, he insisted on the link based on the ‘one by one’. However, he founded his School, thus a collective, and he wanted it to be unprecedented, on the same scale as the novelty of the analytic discourse, by integrating its acquisitions in its functioning, including those relating to the analysts’ selection and guarantee.

This concern for coherence aimed at, not only the School’s internal functioning, but also at the function Lacan assigned to psychoanalysis: to be an operation against the discontent in civilisation, of which the School was to constitute the base. However, the School must

make itself be heard as a recourse, whether it is in defending and preserving its field or in conquering a larger one, whether it is limited to perpetuating the analytic experience or to having an influence on societal choices.

However, we know that the contemporary discontent is based on a thirst in relation to the lack in *jouissance* [*manque à jouir*]. In effect, the originality of the capitalist discourse, in which Lacan saw a performance, is that it proposes its own treatment in the form of an endless pursuit. Whether they know it or not, the subjects that are determined by this discourse are caught in it. So how can the analytic discourse indicate another solution [*une solution autre*]? Why renounce the thirst in relation to the lack in *jouissance* and its intoxicating torments, and in the name of what?

It is clear that, today, we find ourselves in a particular moment within the psychoanalytic movement and the models are lacking that could help respond to this. After having aroused an almost blissful incredulity among the opinion makers, psychoanalysis is again the object of a strong suspicion, if not a rejection for charlatanism. Besides the methods based on the chemistry of molecular interactions and on statistics, neuro-behaviourism competes to gain its own place on the market.

A call for the psychoanalyst's intervention obviously suffers from that devaluation.

A few questions arise from this:

What does, in our functioning of the School, discernibly pertain to each discourse?

How do we control in our School our processes of selection and guarantee? How do we situate them within the order of the discourses, if we accept that not one of them can go without the other three to form the ordered round of desire?

How does the fifth discourse, that of capitalism, which undoes the round in order to impose itself alone, intervene in it?

How can psychoanalysis offer to treat the impasses of the subject if the contemporary discourse sustains itself on the fact it does not accept any impasses?

Between a monastic withdrawal and the threat of fragmentation that accompanies it, and an imposture doomed to collective reprisal, what strategies could we adopt in order to sustain the re-conquest of both the Freudian and the Lacanian fields.

Marc Strauss, 2 September 2017

Translated by Chantal Degril

The VIth International Encounter of the School will take place on September 13th, 2018, in Barcelona; the Rendezvous of the IF follows on September 14th and 15th.

The CIOS and the ICG 2016-2018 will be responsible for determining the programme.

On September 12th, 2018, from 16h to 20h, the fourth Symposium on the Pass will meet with the last two ICGs, the corresponding Secretariats of the Pass and the passers who took up their role during that period, for a reflection on the functioning of the *dispositif*.

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Programme

12 September 2018: Symposium on the Pass

13 September 2018: International Encounter of the School

14 & 15 September 2018: Rendezvous of the IF

16 September 2018: Assemblies

Tariffs

	Full fee			Students under 28 years		
	Encounter of the School	Rendezvous	The three days	Encounter of the School	Rendezvous	The three days
Before the 28/04/2018	140 €	240 €	280 €	70 €	120 €	140 €
Until 13/09/2018	160 €	290 €	330 €	80 €	150 €	170 €

*

The ICG 2016-2018 thanks all colleagues in all languages who have contributed to the work of translation. Without this collective effort, it would be impossible to publish our debates on the School periodically and thus make it live in an international dimension.

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