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AFTER THE INTERNATIONAL RENDEZVOUS OF THE IF
AND THE ENCOUNTER OF THE SCHOOL
IN MEDELLIN 2016

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Interamerican Symposium of the IF 92

"Sexuation and identities",

Rio de Janeiro, September 7-10, 2017

International Rendezvous of the IF-SPFLF 94

"The advents of the real and the psychoanalyst"

Barcelona, September 2018

EDITORIAL

Following *Echoes* 8, this *Wunsch* will be the last contribution of the ICG 2014-2016, it members leave, I believe I can say, with regret. Much of the work has been done together over the course of these two years, thus links have been established, a multiplicity of questions has been raised, and each member has attempted to respond to his or her own capacity, thereby succeeding in sustaining a desire to contribute to this School of psychoanalysis that justifies our gathering together.

Besides the works of members of the ICG, for this number we have kept the presentations from the International Encounter of the School in Medellin in July 2016 on the theme, “The desire of and for psychoanalysis”, as well as the contributions of the three Analysts of the School nominated in 2016.

The presentations of the European Study Days of January 21-22, 2017, on “The knowledge of the analyst and his know-how” will be published in *Wunsch* 17 by the recently elected ICG, with the exception of the contributions of one of the cartels of the preceding ICG, which had chosen as its theme “the knowledge that passes”.

The two next significant dates that await us are September 2017, when the Interamerican Symposium on “Sexuation and identities” will be held in Rio de Janeiro, and September 2018, when the Rendezvous of the IF and the International Encounter of the School – “The advents of the real of the psychoanalyst” – will be held in Barcelona. Details of these two events can be found at the end of this number.

We wish our colleagues in the current ICG two years that will be as reinvigorating as ours, leading up to the International Encounter of the School in Barcelona in 2018.

Colette Soler, Secretary of the ICG, 2014-2016.

THE INTERNATIONAL ENCOUNTER OF THE SCHOOL JULY 2016

The desire of and for psychoanalysis, or “the expansion of the act”.

This theme, “The desire of and for psychoanalysis”, is aimed at the place of psychoanalysis in current discourse – what we usually call “in extension”. However, according to the definition of extension that Lacan gave us, it is not the diffusion of discourse about psychoanalysis, nor even the multiplication of self-declared psychoanalysts, but “the expansion of the act”. That is the necessary condition for there to be speaking beings that are analysed. In other words, talking about our theme of psychoanalysis “in intension” is inseparable from its “horizon” of extension, since it is “in act” that it indicates its difference from the field of polymorphous psychotherapies.

TEXTS FROM THE ENCOUNTER

OPENING REMARKS

Ricardo Rojas, Medellin, ICG 2014-2016

As representative of the Latin America North zone (Colombia, Venezuela and Porto Rico) on the ICG, I have the honour of opening this fifth *Encounter of the School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field*. It is part of a series begun during the time of the first CIOS in 2009, which included Antonio Quinet representative for Brazil, Florencia Farias, for Argentina, Josep Monseny, for Spain and Colette Soler, for France. They said that the idea for these encounters was motivated by “*the necessity to give a renewed impetus to our work*”, and the theme proposed for Buenos Aires – “*How does the School orient the practice of the analytic community?*” – was a way of reformulating the question of the scope and meaning of a School of psychoanalysis. The second meeting was in Rome in 2010, with two sessions focussed on the dispositive of the pass: “*A crucial problem of psychoanalysis*” and “*The experiences of the dispositive*”. In Paris in 2012 the theme that brought us together was “*Psychoanalysis, ends, continuations*”, a title that invited us all to testify, question and develop a theme of particular relevance for our School, after having focussed a day of work on thinking about “*The School, tested by the pass*”. The theme of the last encounter of the School was “*Our experience of the School*”, centred around the School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field, which is 15 years old today.

In 1964, the French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, founded a new institutional model called “School” the purpose of which was: first, *to sustain “the original experience” that is psychoanalysis and allow the training of analysts; second, to give the guarantee of that training through the dispositive of the pass and the accreditation of analysts “who have proven themselves worthy”; and thirdly, to sustain “the ethics of psychoanalysis which is the practice of its theory”*. In his text “The Act of Foundation”, he points out that the term “School” must serve as a refuge against “*the malaise in culture*” and be the place where the logic of the analytic act is elaborated.

We are taking up Lacan’s proposition with the theme of our fifth encounter around the “*desire of and for psychoanalysis or the expansion of the psychoanalytic act*”, which is the condition for there being analysands, with whom we on the side of psychoanalysis “in intension”.

In his Proposition on the pass, Lacan presents to us the psychoanalyst in intension as intimately linked to textual knowledge and the psychoanalyst in extension to referential

knowledge. At this time Lacan introduced a new dimension of knowledge deduced from the experience or from psychoanalytic practice, the unknown [*insu*] that is organised as a mark of knowledge, a knowledge without a subject that is only demonstrated by its readability, a real unconscious that will orient his teaching in the final years. He presents all this with his brilliant proposal – the dispositive of the pass – Lacan’s creation aimed at obtaining the real knowledge that arises from the analytic experience. A form of guarantee for psychoanalysts that was unimaginable at that time. A process is offered for all those who wish to prove that they have finished their analyses. Giving the pass the structure of the witticism [*mot d’esprit*], the one who decides to attempt it, the passand, does not do so directly in front of a jury. He will draw his two passers from a hat. He testifies in front of them, for as long as is necessary, and the passers will have the particular task of constructing two versions of the hystero-historisation of that passand’s analysis. A historisation of his own treatment, again evoking his speech in front of the agent of the hysteric’s discourse, that is, as a subject divided who seeks his master signifiers in order to try and find an intimate product bound to a knowledge. Then follow the “passers” – a word which in French also designates smugglers who delivers their load to the other side of the river – who bring it to the cartel-jury of the pass in front of whom their version of the testimony is constructed, while the cartel is concerned with the possible elaboration of the knowledge about that which has been heard. But they are also a jury because their listening to the testimony will conclude obligatorily with a YES or NO, according to their conviction whether or not the testimony demonstrates that that analysis has produced an analyst. In the case where the response is positive, there is a nomination, that of Analyst of the School, the second possibility of nomination that the School guarantees. As Lacan said, “*a psychoanalyst depends on his training*” and not only on the School; the analyst depends on the *ek-sistence of psychoanalysis*, since in our School there are not only those named as analysts of the School, but also other analysts who also make psychoanalysis *ek-sist* in the world beyond our School.

In the dispositive of the pass there is not only the Discourse of the Hysteric, there are three other structures, including the analytic discourse which is the one that produces the turn that makes discourses revolve. I am trying to present some aspects so that those who approach psychoanalysis can have an idea of the dispositive of the pass, since that is the important vector that will occupy our reflections on the School this morning. Following that, we will listen to the testimonies “post-pass”, those of the two latest people named as Analysts of the School (AS) by the cartels of the pass who worked within the ICG in the *School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field*. To conclude the morning we will have some reflections and a discussion on the theme “*The dispositive of the pass and the desire of and for analysis*”. That is, we will be on the side of psychoanalysis in intension and the textual knowledge it involves, this knowledge that is readable in the text of the unconscious and which implies the real.

This morning, the relations between the desire of and for psychoanalysis and the desire of the psychoanalyst will be central. It is not by chance that Lacan uses the expression “*expansion of the act*” in his text “Discourse to the EFP”, which was written in response to opinions given within his School following his “Proposition”. We know that the act is intimately bound to the passage from analysand to analyst, specifically this step of the pass that examines the dispositive and that is not without consequences, we hope.

The first part of the afternoon will be devoted to the desire of and for psychoanalysis in the treatment, in part to the relations between the desire of the analysand and the desire of the analyst and its vicissitudes in the treatment with regard to giving *ek-sistence* to the desire of and for psychoanalysis. And finally, to conclude the day, the desire of and for psychoanalysis outside the School: the relations between desire of and for psychoanalysis and the desire for the School. This concerns the question of how to sustain the *ex-sistence* of psychoanalysis while conserving its specificity, and in that

context I refer again to the School and its objectives: “*to sustain the original experience of which psychoanalysis consists*” and to sustain “*the ethics of psychoanalysis which is the practice of its theory*”. Clearly it would appear that in the desire of and for psychoanalysis it is not a matter “*of the diffusion of the discourse of psychoanalysis, nor the multiplication of self-declared psychoanalysts, but of the expansion of the act*”. I will refer here to a colleague’s thesis during a study day in preparation for this Encounter, on June 5 this year in the Forum of Medellin: the desire of and for psychoanalysis is the writing of a Borromean structure constituted by three rings – the desire of the analysand, the desire of the analyst and the desire of the School – all three desires in the genitive subjective thus implying a School and a holed textual knowledge.

Before declaring this fifth Encounter of the School of psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field open, I would like to thank the Organising Committee of the IXth Rendezvous for its efforts in ensuring that all the logistical aspects are in order for the smooth running of our activities, and also to thank my companions in the ICG who shared in the construction of the elements capable of producing a reflection, and, as those who created this activity said, we hope to have given a renewed impetus to our work for the School.

*Translated from Spanish to French by Jean-Jacques Gorog
Translated from French to English by Susan Schwartz*

PRESENTATIONS FROM THE TWO ANALYSTS OF THE SCHOOL NOMINATED IN FEBRUARY 2016

Colour of pass

Marie-Noëlle Jacob-Duvernet, Angers, France

At the bottom of a garden in the centre of France, grandfather takes her running, laughing, to taste the gooseberries. This little green fruit bursts between her teeth, and a sudden acidity floods her mouth, an unprecedented pleasure. She lets it happen, she does not know, she hardly knows how to speak. She is so young, the age when the water of heard language flows over one. Grandmother follows them, pretending to be cross for it is time for Mass and one doesn’t eat before communion. But grandfather laughs, a laugh for no reason, she is much too young to understand, a laugh arises in her life purely to be enjoyed.

And then that’s all, she has not revised it. He died without a word some months later. It stays like that ready to be forgotten, until analysis where, one day it has come back and then it was forgotten again.

This was not said in the pass, but today it is here.

At the moment when my pass is completed, in this final time when I transmit it to the School.

Today, and here in Colombia, the other country of grandfathers. It is what came to me about the country of “*papalelo*” de Gabriel Garcia Lopez.

It is not always possible to discern the marks but sometimes one experiences them. I cannot hide my joy from you, that of having finished my treatment, that of being here with you to pass on the laugh of my grandfather.

And in this great moment of newness where things are not completely sure, I keep Gabo’s words:

“The world was so new that many things were yet without name and to mention them it was necessary to point one’s finger.”¹

So if the words are lacking, let laughter burst,² if there is no longer anything to find it will testify to the road travelled.

Laughter is sonorous like One, mark of *lalangue*, bound to the body by an unheard of taste for acidity. Will that taste for acidity be the real condiment³ of my life?

Possibly, the fizzing acidity in my mouth, at the risk of impatience, of a little insolence, a touch of completely feminine rebellion.

Under cover of nothing

And yet during these years of analysis it will be necessary to traverse opposed symptomatic effects.

If there was impatience it was always in relation to leaving. Giving body or voice only if she is under cover. That will considerably delay the effective entry into analysis for she did not speak on the couch in order to be heard.

Elsewhere, there was the constant and rather successful search for cover that determined professional, family and love life. The symptom, even if it limits options, is not without efficacy.

Symptomatic certainty of not being under cover of anything, neither of others, nor, of what, in fact? But this question was not posed immediately; a certain time was needed that could not be cut short so easily. The time for the demonstration of the symptom and its necessity. The analyst, himself included in the symptom, is called to guarantee cover for the world.

This was a strong call to the analyst, for there was no leaving the shelter without anxiety, warranting in return the signifying and spatial decoupage of the world, between what produced fear and what didn’t.

This is the excessive construction of the phobia,⁴ since it is always about to start again in order to give an edge to a jouissance that remains unknown and untreated.

Paternal fragility and its terrifying outbursts was itself turned into a phobic signifier, a paradoxical means of giving consistency to the father by fearing him. Like Hans’s horse, always feared and always there, the father never ceased being it.

With the fear, she could not do without the father, which is not so much an amorous fixation, as a phobic fixation that was just as strong.

But for what enigma? That of “the suddenly actualized enigma to him of his sex and his existence”,⁵ in particular the condition of his coming into the world and maternal desire.

The end of a ravage

The fear of disappearing attributed to the maternal Other would constitute during all these years a certain knowledge about the trauma of her existence. It is because of *her*, the mother. She who had put her in danger of dying after a domestic accident, punctuated by “I have killed her”.

¹ Marquez, G. G. *A Hundred Years of Solitude*.

² Lacan, J., “De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la réalité”: le “rire éclate du chemin épargné” Scilicet p. 57.

³ In the seminar, *Le Sinthome*, Lacan refers to *lalangue* in terms of the “condiment” of “*ce qu’on dit ment*” [what one says lies], 1999, Editions du Seuil, p. 17. See *The Sinthome*, trans. A. R. Price, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2016, p. 9.

⁴ In « Le compte-rendu sur l’acte » Lacan speaks about phobia as “construction démesurément avancée” [an inordinately advanced construction], *Autres Écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 376.

⁵ Lacan, J., “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious”, *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 2006, p. 432.

Knowledge about the trauma as hard as iron, of those who rage, evoking the mother-daughter ravage, the sense of which will evolve in the course of the treatment. She believed for a long time that ravage concerned what was explicit, that is, the accident. In the end it will be in the place of the implicit of the structure, a structure holed by the unlimited and without reason.

It will be necessary for her to recognise that it is an absence in her mother's world that has caused the accident and not an intention, an absence similar to that which her mother cannot explain either in terms of her life or her choices. An echo of the absence of the phallus that limits feminine jouissance.

The explicable produced ravage for it concerned non-sense, the edge that wasn't there and the insoluble enigma. And I would say that there is mother-daughter ravage if, in the place of the enigma, they are stuck together. Each captive of the other by what can never be spoken by either of them. Stuck together, mother-daughter, the two are legion.

The great turning point of her analysis, even when 15 months more were necessary before she finished, is surely this passage from a certain knowledge about trauma, and the recognition of non-knowledge as traumatic. What I do not know about her and about me leaves me alone without her; end of a ravage.

The grapes of fantasy

This solitude became familiar in the waning of the analysis, the analysand's silent transformation punctuated by experiences that were events.

Missing a train will be a test for her, and writing that one can for an instant be lost without the panic of not having – the feminine side.⁶

But it is a dream that will give up knowledge about the trauma. A dream that introduces a counting and reveals a fantasy. "When sense cedes to number", says Lacan.⁷ It is precisely that, through a calculation that knowledge will yield and make an opening on the real.

The text of the "dream of 36":

"A woman is pregnant with 100 children. She loses 36 and brings 64 into the world. We take the babies from her like grapes from a bunch. But finally she doesn't keep any of them."

36 and 64 are two numbers that cipher loss. But it is not the same loss. The dream introduces the unexpected distinction between the fear of losing life, and the part of life that is lost, and which constitutes the object cause of desire.

The object *a* is a hole in the three registers and, at the level of the real it is this lost object, the part of life subtracted from the being who accedes to language.

But at the place of the hole in the structure, the object of surplus jouissance is situated, the one which replaces and fills the hole. Thus the object is both the object lacking and the one that is not lacking, the object of surplus jouissance.

Hence the subject is organised so that it does not lack, nor does the Other lack. The fantasy is the support of this montage, an imaginary fiction that places an object in the fault in the Other.

⁶ An experience described in "*Celles-là qui auront pris le train se perdent*" [Those who will have caught the train are lost]. *Revue de psychanalyse du Champ Lacanien*, No.17, p. 79.

⁷ Lacan, J., *Le Séminaire "RSI"*, lesson of 13 May, 1975. Unpublished

Here the grapes condense the two aspects of the object *a*, the grapes that, as part of life, are lost, 36 lost anyway. And then the 64, those that the Other does not keep because it does not want them.

These last ones are rubbish. Rejected grapes, another possible name for the object of surplus jouissance as waste.

It is because they are not kept that jouissance does not miss them in instituting the permanence of the rejecting Other.

The Other of the fantasy is consistent due to the very fact that it is rejecting.

One could have said that these grapes were green like those in La Fontaine's fable. When one doesn't want to submit to castration, when the fox couldn't reach the grapes that were good to eat, he had the option of saying that they were too green. Saying that they are green, only good for rascals but not for him, permits an escape from the castration of not being able to reach them. Fantasy as option, fantasy as the fiction that one does not really lack.

This dream traverses the fantasy in unveiling, through a calculation, the masked real. With an effect on desire and a major alleviation, since "*it is because of her*" ceases, that is, the intention ascribed to the Other.

The wandering [*erre*] of the end

Even the relation to the truth is transformed, as the truth of the fantasy is no longer motor or obstacle to the recognition of the real. If there is a change that one feels to be determining, why is that not the end of the treatment? And how to give an account of it?

What she experiences at this time is still not knowing what to do without her analyst, nor what to do with the symptom.

I have chosen to call this period of 15 months leading to the end, the wandering of the end.

Wandering, as Lacan wrote it with two "r"s, this "something like momentum, when what propels it stops and starts running again".⁸

In maritime vocabulary it is the resting speed of a ship when it stops being propelled.

Thus the momentum when the propulsion of the truth ceases. That ceases but something keeps on running for which it is necessary to allow time, to which one consents in order not to rupture the wandering through a premature ending of the treatment.

This momentum is not the journey of the itinerant, of the supposed liberty that is the error [*erreur*], says Lacan, made by the one who wants to remain non-duped. In the wandering of the end it is not so much a subject being in control, but rather that he is made a dupe of the unconscious.

It is a matter of leaving all one's luck to wandering in order to encounter a saying beyond statements of the truth. It is the wandering that goes towards the saying of the One all alone in separation. The wandering of the big R of the real.⁹

The green body and humanisation

Thus the period of wandering began without relation to the truth of the subject; it was a work of identification through jouissance. The real of wandering [*réel de l'erre*], "only starts with the number three",¹⁰ the three of the Borromean knot. It is indeed the time of the real subject, the one who has a body to enjoy.

⁸ Lacan, J., Le Séminaire, « Les non dupes errent », lesson of 13 November 1973. Unpublished.

⁹ Translator's note: The sound of the letter "R" in French is homophonous with the word "*erre*".

¹⁰ Lacan, J., Le Séminaire « RSI », lesson of 18 March 1975. Unpublished.

A first naming of *jouissance* was effected around the colour green, fluorescent as the glow-worm. Another dream will join a sexual *jouissance* with a childhood name that her father attributed to her and that signified, in dialect, the worm in the apple. The worm that comes out of the fruit, with spectacles on its nose as he drew it, is activated by her curiosity. Had she never liked this nickname? Here it has returned, knotted to the enjoying body. *Jouissances*, like names, are not so easy to bear, generating a singular horror of knowledge. Indeed, this name is not banal; it conceals the question of the destructiveness of desire. The worm is in the fruit and carries within it the germ of its destruction.

Three letters dreamed without any other discourse will allow this inhumanity¹¹ of desire to be squeezed and to be made “litter”. Three like the knot.

Only three letters in this dream: TNT or “*t’es haine t’es*” [“you are hate you are”]. Three letters instead of the two of the first name that are written MN *aime haine* [love hate].¹²

That is the loop of the binary of love and its inverse that is never ending.

What is new is the T of NT which in redoubling makes three and, not carrying any supplementary sense, is reduced to what it is, just a letter.

That names it in a flash, naming (*n’hommer*) that can be written with an “h” as Lacan did.¹³

In this saying, which is a saying of emptiness, there is an effect of act.

By being reduced to its letter, the explosive TNT loses the impact of sense. Becoming empty, it is a damp squib, a reduction that diminishes the promises of hate and in so doing, serves humanisation.

Jouissance that is spoken is devalued.

In the course of my pass, I found support in Lacan’s major illumination about what happens to *jouissance* in the treatment: “there is no awakening other than by *jouissance* ... opaque *jouissance* excluding sense ... that is, devalued”.¹⁴

This devaluing signifies in fact a tragi-comic moment in the treatment, for the name that is found is both major and a residue without value.

“Analysis is that”, says Lacan. “It is the answer to an enigma ... it must be said ... that is especially idiotic. It is for this purpose that we must pay attention to the thread”.¹⁵

Another paradox is that this moment of awakening, essential to the end of the treatment, is at the same time untransmissible. How to say in the moment, and to one’s analyst first, something of the importance of what is presented outside sense?

This is a new nomination, experienced as radical, but how to testify to it? She feels in the moment that this is impossible to transmit but she knows that it is that. Later she will articulate it with Lacan’s “*One knows*”.¹⁶ Just oneself, thus untransmissible, all the

¹¹ I am referring to Colette Soler’s course, “Humanisation?”, 2013-2014.

¹² Translator’s note: There is a homophony between the sound of the letters and the words.

¹³ Lacan, J., *Le Séminaire « RSI »*, *ibid.* Unpublished. Translator’s note : « n’hommer » plays on « nommer », « to name » and « homme », « man ».

¹⁴ Lacan, J., “*Joyce le symptôme II*” in *Joyce avec Lacan*, under the direction of Jacques Aubert, Paris, Navarin, 1987, p. 36.

¹⁵ Lacan, J., *Le Séminaire Le Sinthome*, Paris, Seuil, 1999. p. 72. See *The Sinthome*, trans. A. R. Price, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2016, p. 57.

¹⁶ Lacan, J., “Preface to the English Language Edition”, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1981, p. vii.

more so since it does not last. There is no friendship in these moments when the real unconscious emergences. There is no time to establish friendship. Here the emergence is fleeting and unsayable.

So this nomination doesn't allow her to finish her treatment in that session. What can seem paradoxical seems to me logical today, a decisive certainty not necessarily being a decision-making certainty. Distinguishing the decisive decision-making left her to the time of the *après-coup*, this time that will bring her to the decision of ending the treatment.

Use of the symptom and separation

She came back once with the final question about her psychoanalysis which is, in fact, that of separation. The analyst, called as complement of the symptom to constitute the necessary cover, presentifies right at the end the question of separation.

I would say now that this separation became effective through the transformation of "what one knows oneself" into "what one alone knows".

"Oneself" and "alone" are not absolutely the same thing. What one knows oneself is furtive, epiphanic, untransmissible.

What is this "alone"?

It is the "alone" of separation that is not effectuated on a single occasion.

The interpretation of the analyst aims at this point throughout the treatment. In particular, I think of a word the analyst spoke that she judged erroneous, making interpretation as disappointment. A disappointment in order that the relation stop and she gives herself voice. There is also separation in the act of saying *jouissance*.

And then, in a concluding session that will "bring on the result" of separation, there is a knotting with a use found for the symptom. Saying how to do with the symptom, how it being demystified¹⁷ makes separation evident.

That is what happened and here again is a surprise. It is saying a use, a use of the judged symptom, sufficient, satisfying, that is going to make the operation of separation. The use of the symptom is what she finds alone, radically, as if she spoke alone for the first time. Something that can be stated and this time, making a decision.

What one alone knows can be said. A saying without the Other and carrying repercussions.

Thus she is going to tell of the use found for the symptom; now she can go, if by chance that doesn't suit, and continue on her way in order to go further.

From wandering to the target

Despite its logical times, an analysis is long and then there was haste. It is in this way that she presented herself to the pass, in the immediacy of the end of the treatment.

Something continues to run more quickly than her. And during these weeks of testifying in order to describe the acceleration experienced, she used this image: "I feel like an arrow that has been shot," she says, towards a target, one remaining to be specified.

The target is what is going to be defined in the pass, a transformation that I will qualify as orientation. Thus the desire of and for psychoanalysis that will be studied today is an orientation for me.

¹⁷ Lacan, J., Le Séminaire "L'insu qui sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre", lesson of 16 November, 1976. Unpublished.

This orientation is the one that will emerge from the dream that she had the night that follows her demand for the pass. More precisely, this was a nightmare setting the scene for the murder of the parents and then in the end, an unprecedented confrontation with her father who says to her:

“Marie-Noël you are going to be a good girl, you will behave, and I am going to cut your nails”.

Waking in anxiety in the middle of the night, she believed she would cancel her demand for the pass and return to the treatment. In great disarray, she writes this nightmare down and – an exceptional thing – she falls asleep again like a baby.

In the morning, she knows that it is a dream *for* the pass, in that it allowed the resolution of anxiety.

And then with her effects of writing, it will make an orientation of the pass for the School with a new clarity, one step more.

I retain some elements:

Her father wrote a part of her first name, Noël, like the festival, [Christmas], despite her claims for a feminisation: she wanted “L.L.E”. [NOËLLE].

But in the dream, the letters of Noël are not secure, they moved into “*gentille*” [kind].

What is to be retained here is the letter and not the meaning that one could give to “*gentille*”. A letter that is presentified by its displacement, namely its mobility.¹⁸ Letters move about in a way different from words, which stay immobile, weighed down with their meaning. Letters take flight from Noël to *gentille*.

No sense and not to be read like true writing.¹⁹

This dream joins the letter, opaque jouissance of the exclusion of sense, a jouissance thereby devalued and its condition, which is recalled here, of being made the dupe of the father,²⁰ under the form in the dream of being let go, in the place of the One incarnated like a fingernail.

The letters are not to be read but are the letters of the destination on the ticket: Lemberg, Cracow or here, MedeLLin.

It is in this way that the dream will bounce back in the pass as a play on words, laughing:

Du véreux au vers eux, bien sûr! [From corrupt to towards them, of course!]

From corrupt (green of the gooseberry and the grape and the worm in the apple) to towards them, that is, towards you.

This is the third time of the wandering of the end that I am showing to you:

What one knows oneself (real unconscious)

What one alone knows (use of the symptom)

What one knows for (to transmit, to you)

In conclusion, analysis is a river crossed like a body that is enjoyed by a knowledge that horrifies it. But the dark waters are to be *de-mythified* to the point of

¹⁸ Lacan, J., “The instance of the letter in the unconscious”. *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 2006, p. 418.

¹⁹ Lacan, J., “Postface au Séminaire XI”, *Autres Écrits*, Paris, Seuil, p. 504.

²⁰ Lacan, J., “*Joyce le Symptôme II*,” in *Joyce avec Lacan*, under the direction of Jacques Aubert, Paris, Navarin, 1987, p. 36.

becoming an open shore, unknown, to be populated joyously from the address to a beyond-oneself [*outré-soi*] as an over-seas [*outré-mer*].

Thank you.

Translated from the French by Susan Schwartz

From the confines of an analysis **Vera Iaconelli, Sao Paulo, Brazil**

The first formulation of my suffering led me to start an “analysis” which proved to be disastrous. I went aged sixteen, three years after the tragic death of my elder brother – a key factor in my history. There passed several more years, sixteen, until I could pass from a sequence of psychotherapies (Jungian, Psychodrama, Reichian...) to an analysis, a journey provoked by the birth of my first daughter. From there, aged 33, would follow 7 years of analysis with an excellent *Winnicottian* professional. In these almost two and a half decades between psychotherapy and psychoanalysis I assumed that my analysis would be interminable and that I would continue talking and talking of that death, of my father and “some little things of my mother”, my namesake, Vera Iaconelli. Speaking in a way that was increasingly more elaborate, more precise, more intelligent and, of course, more painful.

The end of the analysis was not something assumed, although the matter of endings, as much that of the finality of death, as that of analysis, was always present.

I went through a very painful divorce when my second daughter was nearly nine months old. I consider this to be one of the effects of my neurosis: that I continued to talk in my analysis in a way that was increasingly more elaborate, more precise, more intelligent and more painful.

Many years would pass before I read in *Television* (1973):

*Good sense is the form suggestion takes, comedy, that of laughter. Setting aside their quasi-incompatibility, does this mean they are the whole story? That is the point at which psychotherapy, in any form, breaks down, not that it doesn't do some good, but it's a good that's a return to what's worse.*²¹

Meanwhile I must have improved, since hardly a quarter of a century later I begin to tire of recounting innumerable versions of the facts of my life. Twice a week for 50 minutes, year after year... One day I heard my analyst say, “Hysterics gave Winnicott quite a lot of work”. I find that he is also tired of our skating around. I can assure you, without irony, that he is an excellent analyst.

Having listened to what my analyst said, I make another analytic wager: passing from the English school to the Lacanian. Fear, unconfessed frisson in imagining the “cut” of the session, an unexpected ending. A good friend puts me in contact with a French analyst. Double frisson; the unknown. The Forum, the Lacanian movement, the institutional “who’s who” didn’t form a part of my life. Triple strangeness. Detail: my name in French would be *Verra*. I will come back to this “detail”. We shall see... [*on verra*].

Straight away the interviews in this Lacanian analysis give a demonstration that is anything but free of what this option is concerned with. Speaking without end, or rather without listening to oneself, begins to be unmasked straight away, head on. That *no* is said is left forgotten behind what is said in what is heard, at least not for the analyst.

²¹ Lacan, J., *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, p. 8.

And so we go to *a* version of *my* history:

My father was alcoholic and a little crazy, and my mother was dominated by him. They were passionate, humble but over time created considerable wealth. After being married for several years and already with three children, trying to recuperate an already beleaguered marriage, they had three more children, six in total. Of course these births didn't help with the alcoholism, the violence, and the Dostoyevskian family displayed its whole spectrum of horrors. I was the fifth child of this long-suffering and mismatched couple. But my eldest brother was there, docile and present. We adored each other. When I was 13, he had a heart attack and died, aged barely 24. My mother and father collapsed, lost their possessions and we went to live in the unoccupied apartment of an aunt in the centre of Sao Paulo. This insolvency allowed me to precociously liberate myself. At fifteen I began to work; at sixteen I was already able to pay for my "analysis". The family writhed within a grief impossible to work through. The contingent tragedy placed itself within a family drama which preceded it, and which turned the mourning into melancholy. The search for treatment came out of the hope of speaking forever of those siblings, this father and "some little things about my mother".

But there was the possibility of losing hope. A possibility, without which, I wouldn't be here today. There is a necessary deception, there is a necessary desperation, after which you don't have to hope anymore.

From this search that began within an impossible mourning, there emerge some central points that indicate a change of direction in this analysis that hadn't been possible up until then. I mention some, amongst others, to understand that they were crucial moments:

The first memory that counts for me refers to the recognition of my sister, 20 months younger than I, as absolute rival. It concerns a scene constructed in analysis in which I realize that she already knew how to write her own name before we were formally taught to read and write. This same moment is that of the recognition that, before this, I existed within a maternal cloud. An entity with which I shared something along the lines of not existing completely and even of not existing for anything. From this life and death fight, one of alienation and separation, symptoms formed: a profoundly acute difficulty in learning to read, the impossibility of writing and using words correctly, the conviction of my absolute lack of intelligence, moments of absence, isolation, constant fear, anxiety crises. Luckily those were not times of easy diagnoses of dyslexia or attention deficit disorder. However, neither were they those of listening to the symptom as a form of subjectivisation.

I believe that I realised the desire of my father and uncle, rivalrous brothers, sometimes erring, sometimes learning. Time was necessary for me to realize that above all, I assumed knowledge, the desire of the Other, and still more, that I assumed that the Other existed. Meanwhile I jumped around to attain the perspective of these men with my deeds and defects and I didn't admit that they looked elsewhere. A beautiful deception that I can now recognize. The Other is an enigma in so far as knowledge doesn't exist and it couldn't therefore know itself. Nor could my actions realize what emerged from the unconscious, tireless in its production of affect.

I don't believe in my hysteric is a phrase that I heard coming from my mouth in analysis, fruit of a tough recognition that I always defended, a better version in search of "the" version that would explain death, sex, mother, woman. The fundamental operation that functioned in these sessions was the *precise* cut, a word that in Portuguese connects the ideas of rightness and the necessary. There is no memory of perceptive or dramatic interpretations by the analyst, barely of the act that pointed toward what was said unconsciously, to the repetition. Which, in the face of such suffering, sustained the emptiness which the profusion of meanings of the different versions sought to repair, which is supported in the act, from the first moment in which the analytic dispositive is

put in motion (and indeed from before, given that the analyst's desire precedes it). It is crucial. Support without guarantees, which implies a considerable risk, but without which the unnecessary hope doesn't give way. I understand that in this ethical change of course the analysis exits from the infernal axis of demand. Demand for a patch, which means, "disguise the torn fabric", whose ideal is the invisible patch, that which leaves no trace of the hole. If the retroactive meaning in the Graph of Desire is already given from the start it only needs the analyst to propose a change of direction. To point beyond the meaning is to tackle the confines of the analysis. Place of limitation and boundary that will be left to the side by the direction that aims at the Real. By means of subversion of "The" version, I passed to The aversion, and at last to the recognition of the diverse versions. Versions not recognised as such in 25 years of psychotherapy.

Coming to the end, a sense of urgency prevented me going to the sessions at my usual times. Something imposed itself and I would appear in my analyst's consulting room at any moment. I no longer expected any listening, but I still needed to give testimony to what had occurred. One day I didn't need to return anymore. I left, telling him that I wouldn't return and saying *thank you very much* [phrase written in English in original text]. Afterwards I laughed at closing years of analysis with a phrase so much out of context. Wouldn't it be better to say thank you [*obrigada*] or *merci beaucoup*? But maybe *very* was of concern to me. I get home and realize that I haven't paid a part of the fee for the last session. Not bad for my obsessiveness. Shame and laughter. In the end, the final action was bungled as my actions had always been. I returned to pay the remainder and share that that is what is finally left. I didn't take up the work of interpreting this action, rather it involved simply assuming what there is, beyond interpretation, the analytic act. We don't cure ourselves of our unconscious; with luck, we enjoy it.

Afterwards:

After the fall of the transference and the end of analysis I passed through a period of great enthusiasm that, however, led to a tremendous emptiness. I discovered unexpectedly that I could neither validate myself through the enthusiasm of the end of analysis, nor from the fact of already acting as an analyst, and not from a place of inertia. In the end, couldn't I do something else with my life, in another place, with other relationships? Couldn't I send my children away to live with their father, live in another country, work at something else, or have another husband? Or maybe, perhaps, no place, no work, no relationships. I could. At no moment in this period did I have the desire to return to my analysis. I didn't have to return; I had a strange conviction about my desolation. I continued via the way of dreams. I recorded them at daybreak and I listened to them in the morning.

Within a short time I was choosing everything anew. Anew, or rather, for the first time. I was discovering a different enthusiasm, without guarantees. Even without those that were supposedly guaranteed by the end of analysis. A necessary deception, but without mourning.

In my clinical experience there was a change, of course. I still feared assuming the consequences of a change to listening, one that avoids understanding, and rather points towards the Real. But at a certain moment I realised that I could only listen to my patients if I could lose them, all of them, without exception; and if this was the price to pay, then so be it. Because concessions in the name of the "good" point toward the worst, I know. The result of taking up this place, of sustaining the analytic discourse, was that my patients changed and started coming more frequently, and many more patients came my way. My desire to listen beyond understanding subverted the aversive character of my clinical work, that is to say, full of interminable versions moving towards the worst. Nowadays it is much more fun, although not without suffering. It's the best we can offer. And this is the wager that animates me.

Amongst the dreams I had there is one which I have brought today. The day before I had it, I had spoken with a colleague during a class in the Forum and she asked me why I wasn't a member. I replied that I had begun to study Lacan a short while ago and that I had dedicated myself seriously to another institution, so was unable to contribute as a member. That night I had the following dream:

I come out of a class in the Forum conversing with my analyst and we are searching for a word to explain something. She says the word in German to me and I reply that we have a word in Portuguese: "ERRÁTICO". She repeats the word in German and I insist, impatient, that it is "RANDÔMICO."

Curious, I get down to writing these words.

ERRÁTICO / E R R A t I C O / ERRA IACO / VERA IACO

ERR (ERRAR), my symptom since infancy

VERA IACO my surname for my friends, which differentiates me from my mother who is also called Vera Iaconelli

VERRA my name, pronounced with the accent of my analyst.

VERRA ERRA: A cause for shame away from home, but it amused my father who used to laugh at my errors, even at the cost of denying my suffering at school and later on in academic life.

TIO: My father's brother who encouraged me to study, and with whom my father had Homeric fights.

Thinking about this dream I immediately remember, with strong emotion, that Lacan captured me with his emphasis, taken from Freud, on the relationship between error and truth – this last word being the meaning of the word VERA. From this comes the recognition of the desire of the analyst. Not to recoil in the face of the mistake, the error, but rather to listen to it, to elevate it to the dignity of the act. A desire that I renew following the period of inertia at the end of my analysis, and which the dream comes to name.

RANDÔMICO from which can be extracted: the name of my analyst DOMINIC, that of my first dead brother RICARDO, that of my second dead brother NIC (I began this last analysis referring to this second impossible mourning for a brother who died as a result of surgery, aged 45). In one word, RANDÔMICO, the "arc" which closes the mournings, including that of the end of analysis. *Randômico* also has the meaning of erratic in Portuguese. Death is unavoidable and random. There isn't a possible version of death. Death is truthful erring.

From this dream I recovered the name that marked my *sinthomatic* identification; the destiny given to the desire of the analyst as a permanent search to listen to the error/truth of the unconscious. The investment in new social ties is only possible after the realization of the mournings; I wagered that it would be worthwhile transmitting this experience. I didn't do it alone, for as Glauca Nagem says in her prelude to this meeting, it is "Chinese whispers", the children's game of whispering in the ear of the other and discovering what arrives in the end. To this end I noticed with surprise that the school transmits something to the AS through its nomination. Something which challenges and which *causes*. This dream also confronted me with the desire to testify to the pass, or rather, to the link that I am ready to establish in the space of the School, and which responds to the desire to contribute through transmission. As far as that goes, we shall see.

Translated from the Spanish text by Richard Barrett

THE FUNCTION OF THE PASS IN THE DESIRE OF AND FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS

*The pass, transmission and the desire of and for psychoanalysis*²² Pedro Pablo Arevalo, Venezuela, AS 2014-2017

After almost two years as an AS I would like to share some thoughts about the impact of the pass and the transmission on the desire of and for psychoanalysis. Regarding my own, it was supported during the analysis by the transference, by the desire of the analyst and in the *jouissance* of deciphering the unconscious; it was potentiated by the traversing of the fantasy, the writing of the *hystory* and the interviews of the pass. This coincided with the end of analysis, with subjective destitution and the emergence of the desire of the analyst, while the desire for psychoanalysis found its anchorage in the certainty provided by the efficacy of the symbolic treatment of the real, and in the tremendous effects of an analysis carried to its logical conclusion.

In my experience as AS, transmission has meant an intense exchange, both in *presentia* and virtually, with colleagues worldwide and has extended the elaboration process in transference to the School, with invaluable analytic effects. Simultaneously certain occurrences of *jouissance* have revealed how the drives and *jouissance* can manifest for the analyzed, and also have made evident and tested the tools that the latter has in facing the future, as well as the efficacy of the transference to the School in elaborating *jouissance*, no matter how intense and persistent it may be. In all, this has produced a new and substantial loss of *jouissance* and a general perception of particular *jouissance*. The desire of and for psychoanalysis of this analyst, which originally was sustained purely in the imaginary, and then in the analysis and in the elements of the *dispositif*, is now strongly linked to *jouissance*, the real and the certainty of the symbolic treatment of the real.

Regarding the impact of the pass on others' desire of and for psychoanalysis, one has to begin with the effect on the *passers*, which, from what can be seen and read is noticeable due, fundamentally, to the fact that this encounter usually touches the real.

Regarding the presentations of the testimony, a space is opened in which the real is at play in the articulation of accumulated psychoanalytic knowledge and the knowledge of the unconscious, both that of the AS and of every participant who is open to this interaction "from unconscious to unconscious". This somehow involves the real of the *sinthome*, in which the analyzed recognizes his absolute difference. In a way it is a support for the desire of and for psychoanalysis, of both the AS and the participants, anchored in the real. This marks a difference regarding the effects that other types of transmission of psychoanalysis can have, like the presentations of papers and cases or the theoretical elaborations that take a rather symbolic route.

I think that this form of transmission is not exclusive to the AS, but rather that it is in the reach of any analyst who has experienced the *dispositif* of the pass and who has assumed it analytically. Regarding this I wish to mention the event "The School *a viva voce*" which took place in Buenos Aires, in August 2015. I quote Gabriel Lombardi who, in a summary, says that there was the participation of seven...

colleagues [...] who went through the experience of the pass and benefitted from having done so – even if they were not nominated as AS. They extracted from that experience something other than a disappointment: they learned from the experience and it strengthened the desire of the analyst that is so costly to acquire, so difficult to transmit and impossible to explain, and which allowed each of them to promote the desire for

²² Some ideas in this paper have been presented in an Afternoon of the School organized by the CO of the SPFLF-France and the French members of the ICG, on April 9th, 2016 in Paris.

*psychoanalysis. This element, the connection intension-extension that is logically inherent to the Pass but barely taken into account until now, became evident this time.*²³

Another interesting example I know of was an intervention in the Vth Meeting of the ALN Zone of the SPFLF in May 2015 in Caracas,²⁴ where an analyst presented a testimony on the effects of having gone through the *dispositif* of the pass without having been nominated. This intervention stands out for being a personal initiative and not an institutional invitation. In any case, on both occasions the participation of the public made evident the strong impact of this kind of transmission on the desire of and for psychoanalysis in the community, something that has to do with this intension-extension articulation about which Gabriel Lombardi speaks.

Regarding the effects of another aspect of the transmission – publications – on the desire of and for psychoanalysis in the community, my experience is based on having published, as an AS, many articles in channels linked to the School, and having received numerous comments. I have also put my drafts in circulation by email, as well as many of my notes on theory, some quite polemical in fact, which have had quite a success as far as producing an exchange of opinions with colleagues from many forums. In passing, it is very positive to note that analysts with a great command of the accumulated knowledge of psychoanalysis would exchange ideas about the particular knowledge of the analyzed with an AS. Those who only value psychoanalytic theory and its application do not perceive the transcendence of this knowledge. Going back to the written exchange, it can have effects on the desire for psychoanalysis in the community through the effect of these colleagues at the local or international level.

One last aspect to mention is that even if the pass is very highly valued in all forums and universities where I have been invited, and that the remarkable effect of transmission of the desire for psychoanalysis occurs, I know that this is not always the case, despite the fact of being part of a School centered in the pass. Of course, this depends on the position of the analysts of great weight in each locale, which I think can be directly linked to the point at which each one finished their own analysis. Those who didn't have a truly conclusive end can hardly grasp the enormity of a logical conclusion of an analysis. This is another reason for which I think that we should become a School centered in the pass ... and on the end of analysis.

Thank you very much.

Translated from the Spanish by Gabriela Zorzutti

Jury or Cartel?

Sonia Alberti, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, ICG 2014-2016

1.No doubt there was a reason that Lacan proposed the paradoxical articulation between the function of the Jury and the promotion of the surprise of a nomination.

2. In contrast to therapy which, in terms of rigour, only distorts the aim of psychoanalysis, Lacan maintains in his “Proposition of 9 October 67” that psychoanalysis implies the *impossibility* of a return to an original state so that it must be conducted to the point that permits, *a posteriori*, verification of an ending *so radical that it renders impossible such a return*.

²³ Taken from *Wunsch* 15, available at <http://www.champlacanian.net/public/docu/3/wunsch15.pdf>

²⁴ The book with the papers presented at this event was for sale during the Meeting of the IF and the Meeting of the School in Medellín 2016.

3. The Cartel of the Pass studies the testimonies in order to verify if psychoanalysis has been taken to this radical point in order to contribute to the construction of what this point of no return to an original state would be: the point where the psychoanalyst arises as an effect of the treatment. Next year will be the demi-centenary of the Proposition! Since its publication, elaboration and utilisation, many cartels have offered their contributions based on numerous testimonies, debates and experiences in several Schools. We know that there was everything, including dysfunction, but certainly there was progress!

4. I am raising two orders of elaboration: the first would be to deepen the elaboration of what this procedure might be; the second, the construction of a list of characteristics presented by the passands over decades of experience.

5. In the first elaboration, the function of the Cartel as non-knowledge is most important – for it is non-knowledge that promotes desire – along with the function of the work of elaboration which is to produce a surprise “in the time of the act”,²⁵ a time, I assume, that is one of surprising the Cartel in its work of elaboration by the precipitation of *that's it!* Precipitation taken here in the equivocity of the signifier that leads to *lalangue*, that which is *pre-cipitated*. On the one hand, it subverts the time of understanding that could go on forever; on the other hand, it makes reference to the lines left by the rain when it falls in the same place,²⁶ the crossing out of any prior trace, and some isobar lines, other lines that are already not the same; some lines that are only traces in a solitary latitude, and the traces that end so to appear as a bouquet of traces ... hetero, from domains that have nothing in common with each other, such as the littoral – understood here as what marks the impossible return to the previous state – the one in which the passand initiated his analysis. In this sense, then, the initial position of the Cartel in the School is to put itself to work in order to elaborate how an end of analysis would be based on an experience that has been attested to. The initial position of the Cartel that wishes to know – because it does not-know – is the contingency of this precipitation that “explains why there are no criteria in the pass, but a possible authentication of a singular pass based on certain live points that come to light in the procedure and about which we must speak well for most often they have been left in the shade”.²⁷ A clarifying flash, but, above all, a light that is precipitated in the work of the Cartel and which does not in any way impose an *a priori* knowledge but a before and an after that make a littoral. Impossible to find it in another pass.

6. In the second type of elaboration by the Cartel of the pass, one could search for some characteristics presented by passands over the decades of experience – traits already collected in the precipitation of traits. Here the risk is that of starting from a knowledge, a point contrary to what was proposed in the first type of elaboration. To exercise its function as Jury, there must be references for the conditions for naming someone AS in each case that will inform discussion in the Cartel. The function of the Cartel as Jury is required, not only in order that the experience would have a meaning in the institutional context but also in order that the series of nominations in the School can be verified. This is the only way of identifying a) the nature of the wager with regard to the ex-sistence of the analyst; b) that there is not only one analyst – but anyone can be an analyst after having emerged from an analysis; c) that this institution is centred on the discourse of the

²⁵ Soler, C., *Wunsch* 11.

²⁶ Lacan, J., “Lituraterre”, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.

²⁷ “Première discussion de la passe dans l'ECF”(http://www.valas.fr/Patrick-Valas-Premiere-elaboration-sur-la-passe-a-l-Ecole-de-la-Cause-Freudienne-en-1985,169#outil_sommaire_0)

analyst. If one does not start from knowledge, is it then an act of the Cartel? In the experience of this ICG, the Cartel is constituted as ephemeral, for one or two passes, only functioning for the time of listening, elaborating and concluding. A wager verifiable in the *a posteriori*, based on what has been presented by those who submit themselves to the experience and, having been named and – here is the novelty that I see unfold in our community – also those who have not necessarily been named. *Wunsch 15* also testifies that among passands who were not named in previous years, there are those who have something to transmit of the experience.

7. When there are divergences in the Cartel, it is preferable not to vote because that would diminish the elaborative function of the Cartel at the same time as it would expose the impossibility of observing the precipitations mentioned above because there are differing opinions. For each for the subjects meeting, there can be different precipitates that conform to the relation that each of them has to *lalangue*, the crossing out of any prior trace – and to what extent do they not depend on a culture? The decision is made by the Cartel, not by each one of its members, so that it is not enough that one or other of them proposes to run the risk of making the wager. It is necessary that Cartel reach that point as the product of a work. For this reason, as a subject, one must be awake. This is why it is not possible to simply complete a checklist in the attempt to verify, in the sayings of the passand that have been transmitted by the passers, whether certain Rubicons have been crossed, for that would bureaucratize the procedure. In this case, the experience could not in any way serve the desire of and for psychoanalysis! Could that possibly be determined by culture also? I think so! Even because it is necessary that there be an offer if there is to be a demand ...

8. The wager is that the multilingual cartels of the pass in our School contribute to a greater exchange in our zones and, as a result, for the desire of and for psychoanalysis in our different cultures. On the other side, this exchange in our Cartels of the pass can also contribute to each subject member of a Cartel verifying his own possibility of making the wager in that the nomination attests, above all, that the Cartel itself is made up of subjects with *lalangues*, its relations modified in relation to unconscious knowledge.²⁸

Translated from French by Susan Schwartz

***Cartel-Pass-School*²⁹** **Ramón Miralpeix, ICG 2012-2014**

From the start we can see that the School of Lacan is primarily tied to the cartel. Both the School and the cartel are founded on the fact that “the teaching of psychoanalysis cannot be transmitted from one subject to another by any other means than those of a work transference”.³⁰ This is the reason why the cartel has always been a way of entry into the School. On the other hand, we have the instrument of the pass in order to give an account of the moment when the passage – I would actually call it the leap – from analysand to analyst based on the function of the desire of the analyst is produced, and to extract a knowledge from it. To put it briefly, in the beginning this instrument was shaped by

²⁸ Cf. Soler, idem.

²⁹ This work was elaborated within the cartel “The Cartel, the Pass, the School” composed of Cora Aguerre, Vicky Estevez, Lydie Grandet (Plus-one) and Beatriz Zuluaga, V International Meeting of the SPFLF. Medellin, July 14th, 2016.

³⁰ Lacan, J., “Acte de foundation”, *Autres Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, p. 236.

passers and the Jury of the pass in the hope that this passage-leap could be verified by someone, the passand. Upon installing the function of the pass, Lacan expected something more from his instrument than the sole power of testifying that this passage had been produced, since he stated clearly that, “beyond its function of selector, in its operation, the jury cannot abstain from work on the doctrine”.³¹ I think that it is easy to suppose that this was reason enough for the jury to be transformed into a cartel, a tool which had already been tried and tested, and from which we can expect the production of a work “proper to each one” through the elaboration of the collective knowledge within it.

Yet experience shows that we find ourselves confronted with an unlinking within the Cartel of the pass. I don’t know if it happens all the time, but in any case it is rather frequent – an unlinking between the Cartel and the pass, as if when there has been a pass, the function of the Cartel as such, in terms of what is produced as an elaboration within it, comes up against serious difficulties. During a debate in Barcelona, I asked, “What sort of difficulty would prevent the Cartel of the pass from functioning as a cartel?”

That the ICG has organized itself into cartels which are called “epistemic” and which work on the crucial problems of psychoanalysis seems excellent to me, but it still leaves the question of this difficulty open. It would appear that if the response to this difficulty is the division into two types of cartel, that of the pass, which is ephemeral, and that of the ICG, which is permanent, then the “beyond the function of selector” suggests a difficulty for the Cartels of the pass that is more structural than conjectural. It is a question that meets the one posed by Colette Soler in 2006, “Nowadays, what would prevent a Cartel of the pass, whose function as jury is ephemeral, from continuing in its function as a cartel of elaboration during the two years of each International College of the Guarantee? And doing so in order to follow through a work focused on psychoanalysis itself, or rather on what it is today in the light of experience, because it is certain that an elaboration cannot be reduced to commentaries on the texts left to us by Lacan. Without this effort of transmission, how would all the members, as well as the perspective of the final pass which is present in each analysis, be affected?”³²

Thus we have the first knotting between the Cartel and the School, and another between the Cartel and the pass – the second one, as we have seen, has its own specificity, which we will try to define. The third knotting between the pass and the School constitutes the very heart of the School since the second function entrusted to our School is to “accord the guarantee of this formation through the instrument of the pass and the authorization of analysts who have given ‘their evidence’”.³³

Let us come back to the Cartel of the pass. I think that we can deduce from its first function, that of being a plate sensitive to the moment of this passage from the analysand to the analyst, to this discontinuity that the passer transmits in what he says, without it being what he says, if there really were an encounter – that is to say, it is what passes in the saying, affecting the members of the Cartel and touching them in “their” real. It is precisely this affect/effect that can be converted into an index or into a proof of that which had indeed passed, and what of the crossing, the leap, has been transmitted. The mark of what affected the members of the Cartel is not that of a known knowledge, but on the contrary, it is the effect of an encounter with a real, with something singular which comes from the outside, and which nonetheless resonates... extimately, as we could say. The possibility of being this sensitive plate, the resonance chamber, is the preliminary condition on which each member of the cartel has to count “a posteriori”, once he senses that he has been touched. But there is another condition in order for this encounter to take

³¹ Lacan, J., Proposition sur le psychanalyste de l’Ecole, *Autres Ecrits*, p. 256. See, Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School”, trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995.

³² Soler, C., Cartel d’Ecole, soirée des cartels, 29 novembre 2006.

³³ Lacan, J., Principes directeurs pour une Ecole orientée par les enseignements de S. Freud et J. Lacan.

place – it is also necessary that the Cartel of the pass as such offers the hole within which the non-articulated knowledge can lodge itself, as a knowledge coming from the real.

A second function thus emerges, determined by the members of the cartel in their position as analysand, which ought to allow for the integration of this real knowledge into the knowledge constituted by the doxa, but on condition that the latter is permeable to modifications. It is not that simple, because there exists a constant tension between, on the one hand, knowledge that is known and knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and, on the other hand, between the doxa and the “product proper to each one”. Perhaps that is where the first difficulty resides, as I noted earlier, perhaps going beyond the function of the receptor-selector constitutes a structural difficulty which is determined by “the real at stake” and which would render obscure, like a fog, this passage that I qualified as a leap, the one wherein the analysand passes to analyst. The response of Lacan is precisely that it is this “dark shadow that covers this juncture [...] is what our School can work at dissipating”.³⁴ Yes, but how?

We also find this leap in the texts that orient us. In the first ones, “The Founding Act” of 1964 and the “Proposition on the Psychoanalyst of the School” of 1967, we can note the hope lodged in the symbolic, but in the “Preface to the English Edition of Seminar XI”, I don’t really know how we could find a response to this idea of dispelling the dense shadow. In any case, it is clear if we pay attention to it, that the position is no longer the same, when “There is no *friendship* [*amitié*] there, in that space that supports *this* [real] *unconscious*” [author’s emphasis].³⁵ There, it is the same “enmity” [*inimitié*] as that between the act and the interpretation that is on the side of meaning. Would it also be the same enmity that is responsible for the im-passe between the act of nominating an AS and the elaboration of the Cartel, that of a knowledge that could be transmitted?

Here, we find ourselves at the very heart of that which the symbolic covers over. How to convey that which is opposed not only to speaking but even to simple attention? Attention is meant to be understood as an instantaneous attempt at understanding something, in other words, as the power of being able to say something about it. One would not be able to improvise a slip of the tongue or a bungled action that would attest to it. But still, the duty of transmission is definitely present. All that remains for us to be “poem”; I don’t think there can be any other solution. We know that the poem, if it is a poem, will largely depend on the receiver, on the resonance chamber, on the “sensitive plate”. It transmits, beyond the intention of the poet, that which the poet is ignorant of transmitting. It is in this way that we can conceive of the AS as poem, read, and recognized. And in the Pass, this witness passes to the Cartel of the Pass and to its members, through the passers. Thus it is up to them, the members of the cartel, to function like the passers, like transmitters, like poems.

A poem, alright, but in order for this poem to be produced, one isn’t enough; it can only be one among others! Without looking further, finding ourselves gathered here opens the possibility of the poem. Sometimes, in the form of anxiety, malaise, enigma...

So, it only remains for to us to be... speaking [*être ... parlant*] – we don’t have any other solution!

Translated from French by Sara Rodowicz-Ślusarczyk

³⁴ Lacan, J., “Proposition du 9 de octobre 1967”: “*Cette ombre épaisse à recouvrir ce raccord[...]celui où le psychanalysant passe au psychanalyste, voilà ce que notre Ecole peut s’employer à dissiper*” *Autres écrits*, p. 252. See “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, p. 8 (trans. mod.).

³⁵ Lacan, J., “Preface to the English Language Edition”, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1981, p. vii.

That which disposes...

Maria Teresa Maiocchi, ICG 2014-2016

“... un franchissement... il est sûr que nous rencontrons l’acte à l’entrée d’une psychanalyse... » Jacques Lacan, 1967. [In French in the text]

The word “*Dispositive*”³⁶ raises a question for me, and it also puts us to work. The term “dispositive of the pass” is reinforced by the local dispositives of the School, which point in turn to facts, places, numbers, and a diversity of practices that are organised according to an *ethos*.

Since the 1970s “dispositive” has become a strong term and has various contexts. With Foucauldian deviations this word casts a rather wide net. The idea of a dispositive refers to an organisation capable of emptying out and controlling the dangerous nature of the saying (*dire*), “it is the net that is stabilised through its heterogeneous elements”, and at the same time it questions the nature of what links them together” in order to verify (*constatare*) and to counter (*contrastare*) the split between knowledge and power....³⁷

I have always been intrigued by the polysemy of this term and by the practical character that we give to it in the School: it is something that provides a place and makes a place. Both aspects point to a contingent dynamism as they contribute to giving the dispositive the attribute of an absolute difference. This is visible in the testimonies and the practices of the DEL. Even beyond what is involved in a “procedure”, a dispositive has to do with what, in practice: 1) combines diverse elements into a logic without however violating their heterogeneity, and 2) points to its living end.

Hence, beyond the current uses of the term, and its uses in information technology, our dispositive implies another wager: it responds to the other side and to the fear of the untameable and heteroclit character of the power of the particular, which is being organised and reduced, unbeknown to the subject, to the inevitable cancellation of the idea of any freedom of action.

The question that our “dispositive” puts into act is rather that of the passage from the particularity that is the symptom, the unrepeatable in the subject’s story, to the irreducible singularity which is “worth the trouble” to extract, reaching that point through the particularity of the symptom,³⁸ precisely the one that no social reduction and no dominant discourse has ever been able to limit: the contingency of an unprecedented encounter. From that point of view, the dispositive is knotted more to its old tradition than to its contemporary deviations, the latter consisting of an “operating system”, as in the juridical or the military fields, amenable to the complex efficiency of a mechanism. Beyond the automaton...tuche will surprise.

In order to support my thesis, I shall go back to the origin of this seductive term: behind the evidence of the positive [*positivo*], of the “putting” or “placing” [*porre*] from which it derives, there is in fact a “lifting”, [*levare*] in the sense of the kind of flash in which Freud found a similarity to the analytic process while he was look at a painting by Michelangelo (1901). *To put* – in spite of the positive, *ponitivo*, as the support, the solid, the putting in place – surprisingly seals a semantic area that is linked to separation. The Latin *sinère* signals in fact that there has been a fall, a drop, a throwing... . The term *dis-*

³⁶ While the word “dispositive” does not exist in this sense in English we are retaining it to cover the range of meanings it has in French, Italian and Spanish: procedure, instrument, device, organ depending on the context. This paper depends on the play between “dispositive” and “to be disposed to”.

³⁷ Vedi *Preludio* di M. Strauss a questo RV, *Lo strappo*.

³⁸ Lacan, J., “*Intervention à la suite de l’exposé d’André Albert*”, June 14, 1975.

positive implies that some elements are being organised, disposed of, or re-disposed of, because of the fact they have been dropped, let go. In a way, they have been lost and only at that point re-disposed of according to a new organisation of their differences: we would say *wiederfindung*, by analogy with Freud (1905), a finding which is in fact a re-finding. In other words, what is *put*, po-sitive and (well) disposed, implies in the first place an initial loss, the assumed risk of a fall. There is thus a visible regulation in the dispositive, a regulation but at the same time, an opening towards contingency. Chance. And this makes Lacan's choice of a *Pro-position* even more extraordinary.³⁹

In the aforementioned "Proposition", Lacan speaks of the "particularity" of the signifier of the transference as the sign of the entry into the analytic dispositive. But what orients the dispositive itself, and therefore the exit from it, the *ethos* for which it is worth "holding tight to the singular"? This does not mean gaining a surplus knowledge about particularity in order to lodge the latter in the discourse as a way of adorning it with trophies... . It happens on the contrary through the work of identifying the singular through the specific "pulling" that tightens the knot and implementing it – not without rules – by way of good luck [*chance* – French in the original], a good encounter. It is not a repetition of destiny but a real destination.⁴⁰

In these terms, would an end be thinkable if the "particular" of the beginning did not already include the tension of the "singular", of a concluding step, the exit from prison, the expectation of something new? An expectation, an analytic affect, a "form of desire" as Colette Soler says. Isn't it that this first decisive movement is already present in the fold of the structure and the knowledge from which the subject appears? The analytic dispositive in its entirety implies the pass: it aims at crossing a threshold, the one that Lacan called in his early teaching: "the point where the true journey begins".⁴¹ Later in his teaching, Lacan will say: "The question is not about the discovery of the unconscious which has a preformed matter in the symbolic, but of the *creation of the dispositive from which the real touches on the real, that is to say what I have articulated as the analytic discourse*".⁴² Lacan affirms that this creation is the "positing" of a writing. Creation, *ex nihilo*: a risk which exposes the subject to the throw of the dice and therefore to *chance*... linked to an unfathomable *fall*.

My thesis, therefore, aims at the dispositive (of the pass) insofar as it constitutes a condition of desire in every analysis. Would it take place effectively if it were not already captured in the holed structure out of which the dispositive makes act? It is not *at the end* that the subject "finds himself in it".⁴³ "Psychoanalysts are part and parcel of the concept of the unconscious, as they constitute that to which the unconscious is addressed", says Lacan in the *Position of the Unconscious* (1960).⁴⁴ In other words, the desire of and for psychoanalysis, if it comes from the unconscious, from the transference – which is "put in act" from the unconscious – can only be included in the dispositive as equivalent to

³⁹ Lacan, J., "Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School", trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995.

⁴⁰ Lacan, J., "If something is encountered that defines the singular, it is what I have called by its name, a destiny, it is that, the singular, it is worth the trouble to say it and that only happens by good luck, a luck that has rules even so. There is a way of squeezing the singular, it is only by way of this particular that I have made equivalent to my symptom.

Si quelque chose se rencontre qui définit le singulier, c'est ce que j'ai quand même appelé de son nom, une destinée, c'est ça, le singulier, ça vaut la peine d'être sorti, et ça ne se fait que par une bonne chance, une chance qui a tout de même ses règles. Il y a une façon de serrer le singulier, c'est par la voie justement de ce particulier, ce particulier que je fais équivaloir au mot symptôme." *Intervention à la suite de l'exposé d'André Albert*, June 14, 1975.

⁴¹ Lacan, J., "The mirror stage as formative of the *I* function", *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. B. Fink. New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, p. 81.

⁴² Lacan, J., ... *ou pire* (1975), author's italics, in *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 548.

⁴³ Lacan, J., *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company.

⁴⁴ Lacan, J., "The Position of the Unconscious", *Écrits*, op cit., p. 707.

“discourse”. A discourse conceived as “discourse without speech” capable of making from the link between the subject’s story, its factual, heteroclitic character, and its destination, an act. Hystorisation, singularity. In this sense, the dispositive ensures the places and modes of extension of the act that are effective in making people grasp that psychoanalysis is interesting in that it produces a decision which constitutes an act because “it does something”.⁴⁵ How does one want what one desires if it is not for the fact that the mobilisation of desire is already inscribed in the ethos of a structure which does not entirely come from one’s experience?⁴⁶

Seen through this lens, Lacan’s insistence on a retroactive time, the future anterior, the tense of the Freudian *Wo es war*, implies that “the desire of and for psychoanalysis” be included in an “it will have been”: if there is desire of and for psychoanalysis, if the “fundamental rule” is applied, the pass will have been and therefore, the “dispositive” of the School will have been too, even in this time of paradoxes. The responsibility of the “desire of and for psychoanalysis” lies with the psychoanalysts, with their so singular plurality: alone, not alone on their own. Scattered, ill-assorted, however joined in solidarity, “to subsist in a social link that had never before existed”,⁴⁷ like the cartel. As such, their being together is to be “disposed”, and this implies some otherness and some others... . For that reason, there *will have been* a “dispositive”, as support of the desire of and for psychoanalysis. The invention of a *School of “the Forums”* means that the School speaks of an intension which is knotted to an extension that *makes* desire, an extension which is, let’s not forget, an extension of the act.

Translated from Italian by Chantal Degril

The desire of and for psychoanalysis: a desire propelled in the dispositive of the pass

Silvia Migdalek, Buenos Aires, ICG 2012-2014

In my country a cult has developed around a song about the story of “*rock nacional*” [national rock], whose protagonist’s name is Tanguito. This song became an anthem of its time. It has the refrain: “because love is stronger, because love is stronger.” Thinking about what I wanted to say today, this musical phrase persisted in my mind: “because desire is stronger.” The desire of and for psychoanalysis, according to our music, to our community, was, one might say, atonal, to such an extent that nobody had heard of it or read about it, even though Colette Soler had proposed that it be the theme for a gathering of the School we were about to hold in Buenos Aires. We all had the same lapsus of reading, which followed the music familiar to us. We read “the analyst’s desire”, when in fact we were offered a question about the desire of and for psychoanalysis. It operated as a sort of collective lapsus, which, of course, only redoubled the interest in it. Lacan once said, “the anecdote always hides some structure in the background.”

For me, at the time, the moment of deciding to ask for admission to our School was a turning point and my desire for psychoanalysis was renewed. My participation in the procedure of the pass was undoubtedly another. Hearing something is not the same as experiencing it. Freud noted this when he spoke of the necessary dimension of *Erlebnis*, living experience, which is one’s own analysis. What is apprehended there is unforgettable and fruitful, with the contingent result of the emergence of the desire of the analyst. The

⁴⁵ Lacan, J., Le Séminaire, livre XV, *L’acte analytique* (1967-68), lesson of 15 November, 1967.

⁴⁶ Lacan, J., “*L’Etourdit*”, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 461.

⁴⁷ Lacan, J., *D’écolage* (11 marzo 1980) <http://www.acfrhonealpes.fr/doc/Lacan-Decolage.pdf>

experience of participating in the procedure of the pass, of desiring to be a part, is a step that cannot but be incited by a desire of and for psychoanalysis already established beforehand, but which is transformed by the encounter with others with whom this trait is shared. All those who participate in the Cartel of the pass are driven by some desire for psychoanalysis. In my case, that was the first time I was about to encounter it, and so the affect was one of enthusiasm. Expectations arose in me, together with a feeling of great responsibility in the face of what I can define as a double duty. First, to be there after having crossed a “bridge of clouds”, lending my ear in a very particular way; and also what the work of the Cartel of the pass entails, a work that must be transmitted; there is a wait for the announcement, and then the transmission of the results to an entire community. In my case, there was also a very long journey, and I did not take into account that I was about to arrive in a city totally covered in snow, one in which I was by no means used to getting around.

Despite knowing each other very little, as participants in the multi-lingual cartel we began working quite quickly and without too many introductions. In our first meeting we heard four testimonies and decided on two nominations of MS. The moment right after the passer ends his or her testimony and remains alone with the echoes, still present, of the testimony that was just heard, is a special time. In terms of logical times – seeing, understanding and concluding – the time to understand is very short and powerful. Every word that was spoken by the cartel members reverberates in this space in a singular fashion and pushes towards a working together. Sometimes the agreement regarding the conclusion is surprising, and it can also be surprising how different a reading of the same testimony can be.

I especially remember a certain conversation in our cartel. It happened when another passer went out of the room after finishing his testimony. To the surprise of the rest of us, perhaps because of a definitive conclusion for him that was not so definitive for the others, he shouted, "There was a Pass!" The incongruence among us at that occasion was encouraging and led to a fruitful debate that we couldn't postpone to another time. But let us try to pinpoint this argument. Obviously, it is not about idealizing a consensus, but the Cartel of the pass, as we just said, is unique in that it needs to reach a decision, and so there is insurgency in the process. The diversity that each contributes is crucial for the functioning of the procedure.

The hearing of the passers' testimonies is cordial and attentive and leaves different affective impressions. In some cases the second passer sheds light on the testimony of the first, complements it, contradicts it, opposes it or affirms it, but in these cracks passes what we can call the style of the passand. There is no standard, or at least we can aspire to there not being one. It is hard to imagine that the experience could be reduced to that, to a "model of the pass", to a ritualization or bureaucratization. Although we know it's a possible slope, luckily it's not that way in our cartel. I think that in passing to what is produced by the Cartels of the pass, the nominations as well as in non-nominations, and in the elaboration of the experience itself, the most lively and burning issues of psychoanalysis are made present. It is our responsibility, and in this way we can contribute to the continuity of the desire of and for psychoanalysis and its dissemination.

An anecdote to conclude. As I mentioned at the beginning, there is always a structure in the background. At the end of the work of the cartels, the International College of the Guarantee (ICG) met. When our cartel announced at the end of the first round that we had two new AS, all the colleagues applauded, excited by the good news. The effect of enthusiasm was mutual, and did not cease to be new and contagious. I think my participation in the Cartel of the pass was a kind of renewal of a testament and it left with me a profound teaching about the desire for psychoanalysis.

Translated from Spanish to Hebrew by Susy Roizin and Eduardo Minesas, translated from Hebrew to English by Yehuda Israely and Idan Oren.

THE DESIRE OF AND FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE TREATMENT

The Decantation of the Desire of and for Psychoanalysis in the Pass

José Antonio Pereira da Silva, Brazil

In order to speak about the decantation of the desire of and for psychoanalysis in the pass, I bring up this word's etymology. It comes from the Latin *decantare* - which signifies to pour [*passar*] a liquid gently from one container to another aiming to separate it from the sediment or the deposit; in addition, it means to celebrate, to exalt in chants or verses, to enhance. So we ask ourselves what comes to pass, what is celebrated, what is exalted in chants or verses regarding the desire of and for psychoanalysis in the pass? Reading Freud's text ([1912] 1980), we verify that he already said something about it, warning us that the analyst needs to pass through a psychoanalytic purification in order to be able to conduct an analysis, and the lack of personal analysis makes the analyst unqualified to perform her/his function.

The pass, as a device of the School invented by Lacan ([1967] 2003), aims to verify the passage from analysand to psychoanalyst, which took place in the personal experience of an analyst's analysis. It is in this way, according to the School's text elaborated by Lacan, that the psychoanalyst authorizes himself only by himself and he may, by his own initiative, give proof of this passage through his testimony. The testimony is collected by a passer, who is an analysand designated by the Analyst Members of the School for this analysand's list of passers, for this analysand is, in his own personal analysis, at the moment of passage from analysand to analyst, or because of the outcome of their personal experience. Through this dispositive, the School, as an institution, guarantees that there is an analyst, certifying that an analyst depends upon his training, which is primarily to become psychoanalyst from his own experience.

In the *Écrits*, Lacan proposed that we should put something of ourselves to the analytic community with regard to the analytic cause.⁴⁸ So I will relate some aspects of my analytical experience that point to the desire of and for psychoanalysis. Initially I chose a psychodramatist since I believed that Moreno's invention could sustain the desire to know about my unconscious and the questions produced by the symptoms. After working on the development of several roles I used to perform in my life, I realized something was missing regarding unconscious knowledge,⁴⁹ and I concluded that that method had met its limit. Then I decided, literally, to cross the street in order to seek the analyst whom I supposed had the conditions and characteristics to lead me to encounter this knowledge.

I went through the preliminary interview, in which I confronted an essential difference from the previous experience, namely, the act of my implication in my complaint, in my choices and, therefore, in the symptoms that represented me. So the analytic process began and lasted for fourteen years. It was possible to traverse several forms of alienation to the other and to traverse the phantasies, to overcome the fear of abandonment, the insecurity, and to restore self-confidence. I also could deal with the

⁴⁸ Lacan, J. "Overture to this Collection", in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English* trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 3-4.

⁴⁹ Translator's note: In the original text, the author uses the Portuguese word "*saber*" which has the sense of the French word "*savoir*" rather than "*connaissance*". It is to be kept in mind every time that the word "knowledge" appears in this text.

rejection and shame around my proper name, due to several “jokes”⁵⁰ around it in the culture. Finally, the analyst fell from the place of the work of the transference while the work transference to psychoanalysis in the School and in the clinic was maintained.

This passage was marked by two episodes: first, a dream in which my wallet and my identification card were stolen; it was an anxiety dream that scared me. This enigmatic dream was worked through in analysis and I realized it was necessary to build a new identity. At the same time, a nodule on my hand became visible; it appeared and disappeared as if it was a knot to be undone. So I verbalized my desire to terminate the analysis to the analyst. Also at that time, I got I call about having being drawn as passer. I listened to the passand’s testimony about the various passages in his analysis, transmitting this experience to the cartel of the pass. Now I ask: what in fact was transmitted? Was I accurate in the transmission of the testimony of the pass?

To my surprise, I was drawn to be passer once again. I accepted it, I listened to this new testimony, realizing the differences between the two experiences, and transmitted them to the cartel of the pass. Afterwards, I learned that one analysand was granted the title of Analyst of the School by one of the cartels [in a pass] I took part in. I realized, at that time and still today, that the experience of the pass was not without consequences for my personal analysis, analytic training, and clinical practice.

Regarding the decantation, it is possible to realize that along with the gradual construction of a style, there is the possibility of bearing my name, which can now be decanted⁵¹ with satisfaction: “And now, José, ... Where to, José?” - like Carlos Drummond de Andrade (1942) asks in the poem “José”:

And now, José?
The party done,
the light gone out,
the guests gone home,
the night grown cold,
and now, José?
and now you, over there?
you, the nameless,
mocking the rest,
composing verses,
loving, protesting?
and now, José?
[...] Where to, José?⁵²

However, unlike the José of Drummond’s poem, this José speaking to you knows his direction, acknowledges his limitations and his desire, knows how to deal with the not known, with the impossible, with the analysts’ lack of being, abdicating his being and choosing to bear the desire of the analyst and the desire of and for psychoanalysis. Willing to pay for the analytic cause, reducing himself along with his name to any signifier in order to be the support, on occasion, the semblance of object *a* for the analysand.

To conclude this short reflection on the decantation of the desire of and for psychoanalysis in the pass it is important to highlight that, in order to keep the desire of and for psychoanalysis existing, the psychoanalytic act, invented by Freud as an act that

⁵⁰ Translator’s note: The original Portuguese word “*gozações*” combines both meanings “jokes” and “*enjoyment/jouissance*”.

⁵¹ Translator’s note: The original Portuguese word “*decantar*” also carries the idea of “chanting”.

⁵² Translator’s note: Translated by Jean Longland.

inaugurates an analysis and taken up by Lacan in relation to the end of the analysis, precisely to the passage from the analysand to the analyst, becomes necessary. First of all, it is necessary that an analyst sustain the performance of an act, which constitutes a true inaugural act of analyzing a new analyst. It requires the engagement with one's unconscious desires, maybe the beginning of an analysis of someone who may become a psychoanalyst and, then, sustain new demands and desires of and for psychoanalysis.

Therefore, the device of the pass in Lacan's School aims to guarantee to the community, that there are analysts who can assume the responsibility that this position requires and, from an ethical position, give to the analysand the possibility to choose and the responsibility for her/his desire and what causes it.

Translated from Portuguese by Gabriela Costardi

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From one testimony to the other **Jorge Escobar, Colombia, AS, 2014-2017**

After wandering, slowly and for some years, in the at times infernal confusions of free association that constitutes the course of every analysis, I found, as the Castillian language poet said, the “sound of the unnameable.” It went round without stopping, paradoxically the order of the enunciable prevailed. This encounter will leave as a mark a silence that echoed episodically, instead of the near infinite sliding in the universe of words. Noting it, I was shaken by the most deafening of all silences, giving a musical sonority to the end of the treatment and defining at the same time the measure of a new life and a new relation to the School, and to psychoanalysis. An unparalleled moment where the treatment reached a resolution and where I announced, without even meaning to, that I had become an analyst. From that moment, instantly, and for months, I was assailed by the desire to put myself forward to the dispositive of the pass. I was armed as never before with the courage, confidence and ease to make this wager, that of submitting the result of the treatment to the judgment and scrutiny of the School, with the resolute conviction of having obtained a singular point of certainty. The very same point, many do not know it, where the foundation of the treasure of Freud's discovery is to be found: a treasure not to be looked at without falling under the power of astonishment. I wanted to testify to what had been enriching and unique, and to share it with the institutional Other: these “jewels” within its remit which we seek so much, to preserve the Freudian heritage. I helped to “reanimate in the field of psychoanalysis its just successions.”⁵³

⁵³ Lacan, J., “Discours à l'École freudienne de Paris”, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001.

Informed consequences of the symptom, the effects of assuming castration, the new relation to the drive, but above all signalling the good news that in a treatment, in and from this School, in someone and for one of its members, that seemed to be a training, from that point I had assumed a new destiny, that of the analyst. My relation to psychoanalysis had begun early, when, still a child, Freud had made his sudden appearance in my life as an inquisitiveness about knowledge. Browsing bookshops, I was captivated by the week's selection: *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, hand in hand with the most famous poems by the author of "*L'aimée immobile*," one of the most significant XIXth century poets of the Spanish language.⁵⁴ Two texts, I would come to realize this many years later, which deal with the same thing: of the real present in love, of loss, of the inevitable outcome of the sexual non-relation. The first two texts bought with my own funds already foreshadowed the answer subsequently sought to a neurosis that had been installed since the first years of childhood, of which I will have to make an inventory, as well as of its resounding cry, by means of the urgency that anxiety will establish.

The losses of love and the question of sex will precipitate this manifestation of the real, making an appointment with an analyst a matter of urgency. The security of the fantasy's consistency had failed and what was closest to madness appeared. It was truly curious that a doctor (the profession I am trained in) seeks in psychoanalysis, without considering anything else, the sole possibility of an answer with an ironclad guarantee, with this most urgent demand addressed to an analyst. This first seduction coming from my "forgotten" reading of Freud had taken me to research.

When I met the analyst for the first time (without knowing the theories, nor the foundational texts, nor the idea of the School), from this first appointment in very special circumstances, it was a meeting at home given the critical and delusional situation in which I found myself asking for a personal treatment. And even before going into the dispositive, I signalled why I was looking for an analyst: to testify to him, and through him to his institution, about the state of alienation I found myself in, which affected my reason and even my perception of the world and my body in a dramatic way, which was a demonstrative fact that confirmed what Freud and Lacan had said and discovered. A first testimony – today I would call it a "wild pass" – which pointed to a transference to psychoanalysis from the time of my early years when the saying of Freud must have generated an echo in the future analysis.

The treatment strictly speaking was inscribed in the framework of this prior transference to the knowledge of psychoanalysis. Quickly informed that my first analyst belonged to an institutional form that preceded our School was truly significant. The analyst was someone, he was not just anyone, and he inspired trust. The institution and the curiosity about the theory will come later, while attendance, though passive, at seminars, at reading groups and various forms of work quickly developed. Thereafter participation in cartels and interest in the collective of analysts would emerge. I noticed that the analysts had a place in the institution; the discourse falls upon them in a radical way. When the effects on the symptom tempered it and when a certain elaboration of knowledge was possible, I asked to be a member of the institution as an involved doctor.

Transference to the discourse as well as to unconscious knowledge, before and during the treatment, was always present, as four attempts of analysis demonstrate. The first three exits left me with a bitter taste of uncertainty and the need for a fourth was imperative. The desire for analysis truly lodged itself in me. The last attempt was with a member of the School, someone that was recognised for their experience as an AE and for his belonging to the College of the Guarantee. The two analysts are founding AMEs, with institutional commitments, involved in implementing the dispositive of the Pass as

⁵⁴ Amado Nervo.

passands, members of cartels, transmitting this contagious passion: the magical plague of desire. My proposed title, from one testimony to the other, marks the space and time of the treatment that goes from the initial attestation of a desire for psychoanalysis to the vicissitudes of the treatment itself, which did not cease to indicate this dimension as well as the incalculable emergence of the desire of the analyst. This space marks the expectation that can be awaited, a reducible space at the end, when the formations of the unconscious delivered all the possible fruits and when the impact of sense was close shaven, when the real of the unconscious made its appearance.

Translated from French by Esther Faye

The desire to continue after “the cure” [guérison] **Jean-Jacques Gorog, Paris, ICG 2014-2016**

Why wouldn't psychoanalytic treatment end with the disappearance or the alleviation of what had motivated it?

Should the question be summed up in the didactic dimension? Indeed we could think that I am continuing with my formation beyond what I have to complain about because I wish to become a psychoanalyst. This is a possibility that exists, that we encounter, and that is given as a reason when the problem appears, when the question comes up. This idea is doubtless shared by the psychoanalyst and his analysand, but shows itself to be misleading.

To show this one needs only to take the example of those analysands outside our “milieu” who inexplicably go beyond what could be considered a “sufficient” end. Very curiously, at this time, the wish to become an analyst arises very regularly, whatever the formation or the milieu, demonstrating by the way that every analysis is didactic. Our requirement regarding the end does not always correspond to that of our patients, and if, as a matter of course, it more often happens that the analysis in our view is interrupted too soon the opposite also exists.

To tackle the question we must return to the definition of the symptom. The one at the start, the presenting complaint, but also the symptom of the end, the one that we will not give up as it constitutes our being, our identity with which we are identified as a speaking being. Lacan proposes it in a concrete way in his seminar⁵⁵ - much commented on: to know how to do with one's symptom, what one is supposed to know how to do at the end of the treatment. No longer is it a question of it having to disappear. But in reality was there ever a time in the Lacanian trajectory when the symptom was supposed to disappear? The answer is no, and this answer is very clearly articulated with the critique of the genital norm of Freud's followers, the one which is unattainable and for a good reason since there is no sexual relation. From the beginning it is therefore necessary to suppose that such savoir-faire is acquired in the analysis, failing which, pitfalls await us, such as the transitory perversion, if we stay with Lacan's examples.

The encounter with the real of the sexual relation that does not exist coincides with the real of the symptom. The symptom is simply the modality that belongs to each individual and is where this real is inscribed consequent to contingent events. For a certain time in Lacan's teaching, this real that the analysand approaches through his analysis, took the name ‘anxiety,’ and we can restore to it its full and somewhat pompous Freudian name ‘castration anxiety’. Later there will be other names. This perspective of anxiety constitutes an advance in analysis. It is, by the way, perhaps the only one, the one which is

⁵⁵ Lacan, J., *L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile a mourre*, lesson of 16 November 1976. Unpublished.

decisive and that designates in my opinion the knowing how to do with the symptom. You will tell me that it apparently and above all concerns the obsessional, this is true, but it's about him that Lacan is clearest. I will leave aside hysteria, which in being a discourse presents the problem differently.

Phobia, which we studied this year, is most noteworthy in that the resolution of the phobic symptom seems inconsequential with respect to what is decisive, the anxiety that is to be restored and which the phobia protects. A difficulty in positioning himself as a man in relation to a woman is due, according to Lacan, to this lack of restoring anxiety and that will persist in Hans. Which will not prevent the said Hans, at the very time that Lacan delivers his seminar in the spring of 57, to stage Don Giovanni at Salzburg, giving a new power to the concept of operatic staging. But perhaps, on the contrary, it's this location that allows him to play in this genre with bodies with greater freedom than previously, and about which all the testimonies assert he had remained frozen up to this point.

But the symptoms that came up at the beginning of an analysis are often shown to be "renegotiable" when the first complaints have been overcome and when this other thing at stake makes an appearance. Such is especially the case if this possibility was taken into account at the start during the preliminary sessions. They are there for that, to get hold of that something that takes the form of the symptom beyond the complaints.

To this type of imperative correspond those prolongations of the analysis towards this mystery-symptom that it's not a question of ridding oneself. Incidentally, doesn't some flash of wit appear in this formula that makes the woman the symptom⁵⁶ – even if Lacan does not say it directly, it goes without saying – the symptom of the man? Can we imagine that it's about getting rid of it? This is surely not Lacan's idea. It thus remains to know how to do with one's symptom.

It's that, like for Hans, something beyond the bridling that masks the real, which founds our action in Lacan's mixing of ethics with sexual difference, remains to be deployed. Psychoanalysis sometimes has virtues that are not inscribed in the entry ticket.

It is certainly why Lacan recalls how, for Freud, life events make a return to analysis every five years useful. I also see there the reason for what Lacan calls in *L'étourdit*⁵⁷ the second turn of the treatment, the title justified in its equivocation – the turns of the said [*les tours du dit*].

Continuing the treatment often involves the materialisation of this second turn. It restarts the completed circuit and is complemented by the events that occur in the meantime. This time moreover also corresponds to the possibility of a pass. It's why our wish that the demand for the pass be earlier must I believe be revised on the grounds of this sometimes somewhat laborious second turn.

Translated from French by Esther Faye

The desire to be analysed, a forced desire. With regard to a case Ana Martinez, Barcelona, Spain, ICG 2014-2016

The reflection I present here is a product of the work of an ICG cartel entitled "The step/no step of entry into an analysis" [*Le pas d'entrée dans un analyse*], a statement in French which plays on the equivocation in meaning between "the step of entry into an analysis" and "no entry into analysis". As such it is a theme closely linked to the title that brings us together at this table, the emergence of the desire for psychoanalysis in the treatment.

⁵⁶ Lacan, J. *RSI*, lesson of 21 January 1975, *Ornicar* 3, p. 108.

⁵⁷ Lacan, J. "*L'étourdit*", *Autres Ecrits*, Seuil, Paris, 2001, pp. 449-95.

I personally opted for a clinical orientation to the work, and I started out with a prejudice. I thought that all that could be thought and formalised about the entry into analysis was already said, formalised and even mathematized by Lacan in “Proposition of 9 October 1967”. Ignorance on my part, from which I was happily rescued by my colleagues in the cartel. I don’t have time here to dwell on the multiple references to entry into analysis, preliminary interviews, the difference between psychotherapy and psychoanalysis etc. which can be found in Lacan’s work after 1967. Something left for another occasion.

And so I take up the structure of the entry into analysis as it is presented by Lacan in the “Proposition”. It is produced when transference towards the subject supposed to know is installed through the emergence of a formation of the unconscious that is directed towards the analyst, and so opens the way for the work of the analysand. It also refers to the process of hysterization of the subject’s discourse. But for this to happen two things are needed: firstly an analyst capable of enabling the entry into analysis, and secondly a resolute analysand.

For my part, I have maintained a clinical orientation in my work within the cartel as it is one thing to theorize the structure of the entry into analysis, whilst it is another to determine the entries case by case, and see what can be learned from this. Two cases allow me to show something with regard to our theme. One is from my own practice⁵⁸ and another was provided by another member of the cartel.⁵⁹

The first case concerns a woman who first came to see me when she was 29 because she was suffering from anxiety and confusion due to the discovery of the infidelity of her partner, and a second time four years later. The problem then was sexual. On both occasions work was established which was open to the unconscious and to remembering, and which satisfied the patient as much as the therapist. Thirty years later the patient returns. Her aspect and situation are striking: greatly aged, obese and limping. She has invalid status and doesn’t work. She has been depressed for a long time but didn’t want to return to me because she would have to pay, that is to say she would have to accept a loss in order to enter.

What has happened during this long interval? On the patient’s part she has exhausted the round of “cheap resources” where she hadn’t found a place to lodge her symptom, and on the part of the analyst, I had completed a personal trajectory to discern with clarity the difference between applied psychoanalysis and an entrance into analysis.

How to show proof of the passage into the analytic discourse in this case? I isolate three indicators that I consider attest to it. In first place, on this occasion the therapeutic miracle didn’t happen but she nevertheless continued to come. In second place she is able to confess memories and desires which are very difficult for her to say, for example her desire to murder her father, a dominant father to whom she is nevertheless identified in several hated traits. In third place there arises a manifestation of the unconscious under transference: she often asks to go to the bathroom just after the session. A symptomatic act with respect to which she asks herself what it could want to say, relating it to what develops in the sessions. I recognize there a step of hysterization in the patient.

The second case deals with a supposedly hysterical subject, apparently very committed to the analysis who during the preliminary interviews produced a symptomatic signifier which implied transference towards the subject supposed to know. And as such, it seemed to unite the conditions necessary for an entry into analysis. The analyst marked the entry by directing her to the couch, an act that was at first well accepted by the subject. However, to the surprise of the analyst the subject abandoned the process after a few

⁵⁸ Martinez, A., “Passing from the therapeutic to the psychoanalytic”. *Echoes*, Newsletter of the ICG 2014-2016, no. 6, 2016.

⁵⁹ Cordova, N. “At the door step ...” *Echoes*, Newsletter of the ICG 2014-2016, no. 6, 2016.

sessions. The analyst proposed a double hypothesis. On the one hand she thought that the process became unbearable for the patient once the dimension of the gaze was removed, and on the other she considered that there had possibly been a hastiness on her part and a moment of horror in the subject. We therefore have here the case of a subject who flees from analysis in the same moment that she enters into it.

What do these two cases teach us?

That every entry into analysis is different but that there is a common trait: it surprises the analyst. In the first case the surprise was the return of a former therapy patient asking for analysis, forced by a symptom that insisted. Could we say that this subject desired analysis? Absolutely not, but she knew that it was only through it that she could find a path for her unbearable malaise, and this is why I speak of a forced desire, forced in this case by the symptom.

In the other case the subject apparently desired the analysis. She had even gone as far as to establish a transference towards the subject supposed to know but at the moment of truth she left, fleeing from it. Here the subject seems to present “subjective destitution is written on the entry ticket...”⁶⁰ of which Lacan speaks in the “Proposition”.

Beyond the variety of clinical entries, we think that it is worth postulating as a general trait, the emergence of the desire for psychoanalysis in the treatment, as a manifestation of paradoxical desire, an undesirable desire, forced, against the current, to which the subject only consents with difficulty.

Translated from Spanish by Richard Barrett

The desire of and for psychoanalysis versus the analyst's desire **Camila Vidal, Spain, AS 2015-2018**

I would start with a question that was taking form as I was thinking about what I wanted to say at this Encounter. The question appears obvious, but the truth is that I had never before formulated it to myself. It is the following: Why do we want to make psychoanalysis exist? Or to say it with Lacan: Why do we want to prevent psychoanalysis from disappearing?

Though the question is simple, the answer is not. On the one hand the answer is clear: we don't want it to disappear because we think it is beneficial, it has helped us, or helps us to tolerate existence, the pain of existing; it's a good therapeutic. Besides, we dedicate ourselves to it, we want to have patients, we have to make a living from our work and therefore we are very interested in maintaining it. These are good and legitimate reasons, however I believe all of us would agree that it is not "only" for these.

The fact that psychoanalysis helps us to endure existence, doesn't indicate its specificity, as there are different ways that we humans find for managing to do this, amongst them, and very precisely, religion. Both Freud and Lacan insisted on trying to elucidate the power of religion and establish the need to rationally justify in what ways psychoanalysis is not a religion.

Then, why do we not want it to disappear but not want it to be a religion either?

Psychoanalysis could disappear for two reasons. Lacan mentions one and it has to do with the success of psychoanalysis: if psychoanalysis did succeed in "reducing" the real, in passing it all to the account of the signifier, then it would have no more meaning and would disappear because it would no longer be necessary. The other reason, given by Colette Soler, is that the true danger for psychoanalysis is not that patients will stop

⁶⁰ Lacan, J. Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School, trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* no. 6, 1995, p. 8.

coming because, as is evident, there is no danger we will die out due to success, as someone will always come to consult us. The actual problem could be rather that no one will be willing to sustain the position of the analyst, and that could happen.

Then, the question that we could ask ourselves is: what led each of us to psychoanalysis?

I don't know what led you, however I could formulate something about what it was that led me. What I found when I first read Freud wasn't exactly the perception of a knowledge (*savoir*), but rather I found that that obscure everyday part inhabited by the most radical rejection of what one is, was converted into something dignified. Something of that extimity that we don't get to know nor get to be able to think about in any way, but nevertheless is felt in the body, which means that it is being enjoyed, was converted into something dignified. That absolutely unacceptable part that I didn't know what to do with and that presented itself as an insurmountable obstacle appeared to me to be transformed into the dignity of the subject.

Surely I didn't know how to say it like this at that moment, it has only been the long trajectory of the analysis that enabled me to do so, but without any doubt, what I have encountered there – today I can say it – was "a more dignified love" as Lacan says. To find a certain dignity in what is being rejected substantially modifies one's position in the world.

However that that was discovered early on presents us with another question: What dignity do we encounter at the end of analysis?

If I continue this line of reasoning, what constitutes the *parlêtre's* major particularity, and which, in fact, doesn't establish a link with others because it is absolutely singular to each one, that in itself is what has established a link with psychoanalysis; therefore, we find ourselves here joining in a group around a School, we who do not form pairs and are dispersed, each one of us with a singular link to psychoanalysis.

Hence, those singularities are very difficult to reduce, and without doubt the work of the School frequently requires doing that in some way. I say that they are very difficult to reduce because what is involved in them is not only the price that each one must pay to get there, to reach the point of irreducible singularity, or the different modalities which are taken throughout the treatment, but also the certainty we have that it is only based on that, that one can do something in life. And besides, they carry the link each one has established with psychoanalysis so everyone has a good reason not to give up.

That more dignified love we spoke about at the beginning has an ethical counterpart: the *jouissance* where the *parlêtre* finds the residue of the mark of his advent as such, has to be taken on. Without that, no discourse will give it order. This is the strength of psychoanalysis, it is the truly subversive that it brings to humanity, and it is what, at the same time, awakens a radical rejection which can become evident amongst us as well. Then the dignity in question is the possibility of separation between the subject and his act.

The trajectory of the treatment and its termination has allowed me to verify how the point on which the neurosis is constructed is, at the same time, the point of separation. Where the contingency of my birth had shown my mother's difficulty with the name, constituting the knot of the neurosis itself, it is the same point that produces the early dis-encounter between us both and obliges me to search outside, producing a point of radical separation that will later enable the encounter with psychoanalysis. Thus, right at the point where the operation of separation enables the advent of the subject, there the neurosis is being constructed. Therefore the analysis enables the subject to separate from his own act, not to get confused with it, in the reverse of the Christian position summarised in the assertion, "You will know them by their acts". Thus psychoanalysis brings us, not the dignity of the act, but rather the separation from it.

So let's remember the question since, depending on the answer we give it will be articulated in different ways in the attempt to produce a desire of and for psychoanalysis.

Translated from Spanish by Ofelia Brozky

THE DESIRE OF AND FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS OUTSIDE THE TREATMENT

Between agalma and surplus knowledge: on the desire of and for psychoanalysis

Sidi Askofaré, Toulouse, France, ICG 2014-2016

The title I have proposed for my presentation – in a rush, it is true – is sufficient testimony to my difficulty, which comes from the fact that if I believe I know what is meant by “demand for psychoanalysis” or “the desire of the analyst”, the “desire of and for psychoanalysis” remains for me enigmatic, even opaque, to this day. And this is so even after attempting to elaborate on it in a presentation entitled “Extension of the domain of the act” here in Medellín, May last.

Hence I reformulate my question: how to understand “desire of and for psychoanalysis” if this desire is to be distinguished, not only from the “demand for analysis” but also from the “desire to be a psychoanalyst” – always suspect – or from “the desire of the analyst” that we attempt to elucidate based on testimonies of the pass? And how does this “desire of and for psychoanalysis” manifest itself outside the treatment?

I will limit myself here to offering a few elements for reflection, really some associations.

My experience as a lecturer-researcher in psychology confronted me early on with the exact opposite of what one could have imagined to be the “desire of and for psychoanalysis,” in a double sense. On the one hand, by the fate of psychoanalytic knowledge, which was not allowed except insofar as it was rendered “inoffensive,” subsumed under a general psychology; in one word: “Lagache-ized.” On the other hand, by the violent rejection of psychoanalysis, its knowledge and its clinic, in the name of the ideals of a certain scientism. It is this second determination that today is generalized under the push of the international cognitive-neuroscientific movement.

In this situation – which only keeps getting worse – the question is no longer the one Freud enunciated in 1919: “Should we teach psychoanalysis in the University?”, but rather how do we teach psychoanalysis in the university, particularly to psychologists in training?

In terms of our round table, the question was to know how to generate a “desire of and for psychoanalysis,” a transference to psychoanalysis, how to make it algamatic in a way that could bring the psychologist in training into a clinical thinking based on a knowledge and an ethics related to its discourse.

Thus we see there is no universal, definitive response to this question, not even that of Freud, who thought primarily in terms of teaching psychoanalysis in medical schools, for it is necessary to adjust the response to the situation and, in particular, to the state of relations between the discourses. Vincennes was not Budapest, or even Paris-Sorbonne at the time of J. Laplanche or P. Fédida. And the situation is so different today depending on whether one is in Bogota, Rio, Buenos Aires, Milan or Toulouse. One thing remains: the university continues to be one of the places to encounter psychoanalysis, one

of the places where the “Scilicet” – “you can know” – can operate, and what psychoanalysis thinks or says about this.

Now for my second reflection: I have often remarked that each time someone asks about Lacan’s contribution to psychoanalysis, there is a tendency to mention his epistemological and conceptual inventions – the subject supposed to know, object *a*, jouissance, the discourses, etc. – or the institutional ones: cartel, pass, School. This is not wrong of course. Moreover, it is incontestable that psychoanalysis has been enriched by these contributions. But the Lacan Event, if I may so call it, cannot be reduced to this. I have to say that if Lacan is different from all the analysts who followed Freud, this is also and especially because, like no one since Freud, he has cared about the welfare of psychoanalysis and the propagation of the analytic discourse. And this was not just some pious wish, some half-baked desire. Indeed, whether it was through his “Return to Freud,” the development of his teaching, his institutional inventions, Lacan not only restored the cutting edge of the Freudian discovery, promoted “the desire of the analyst” as the motor force on which the analytic experience and the production of new analysts depends, but he also sustained and exemplified the responsibility incumbent upon analysts for the presence of the unconscious in the scientific field and, I would add, in the cultural field, in the social link. How has this been possible? What is there in his teaching, his style, his practice, which could produce such an effect? Are we not justified here in identifying a “desire of and for psychoanalysis,” that goes beyond what we refer to as the “desire of the psychoanalyst”? In the historical moment we inhabit, it seems to me that we are confronted with the following fact: the work of theory and the institutions established on the basis of the desire of the analyst and the pass, as important as they have been, are now reaching their limits. And in reaching these limits, their motor function in the propagation of the analytic discourse is likewise affected. The reason is simple.

It is that the desire of the analyst, like the pass – the dispositive of the pass meant to extract this and put it to work at the heart of the community of the School – is centred on analysis in *intension*. From this perspective, as long as there is analysis, the question of the desire of the analyst and, therefore of the device of the pass to bring it to light, must remain active.

Nevertheless, this diagnosis brings up a new question, to which we are invited to respond: what desire needs to be mobilized for psychoanalysis in extension – homologous to the desire of the analyst for psychoanalysis in intension – so that we, as analysts, may meet what is also our responsibility, namely, securing the ex-sistence of the unconscious in the world?

There would be very little or nothing to this if “discourse of the analyst” were only a commonplace synonym for psychoanalysis. In fact, owing to Lacan, this term carries such considerable consequences and produces such conceptual and practical upheavals that it will open up a second pathway for those who consider themselves responsible for the ex-sistence of the unconscious.

Hence, can one not call this desire to generate, propagate, sustain, the “*desire of and for psychoanalysis*,” given that the “desire of the analyst” functioning in the treatments is not enough to assure the existence of psychoanalysis in the culture or in the social link? To be sure, with this *desire of and for psychoanalysis* it is not so much a question of making psychoanalysis lovable – mission impossible! – as making it desirable, *agalmatic*, as promise of a different knowledge, a surplus knowledge that, to parody Freud, could be of interest – “the interest of psychoanalysis” – to the other discourses. And this undoubtedly implies an operation other than the one consisting in playing with the *escabeau*. It seems to me to be a question of eliciting a transference to psychoanalysis as such, that is to say, as a discourse. And this transference, as Lacan knew how to make clear, goes by way of foregrounding a different knowledge that alone can disclose psychoanalysis and eventually a psychoanalysis. And this transference happens, as Lacan

knew how to point out, by the emphasis on the other knowledge that only psychoanalysis can bring to light and, possibly, a psychoanalysis.

Translated from French by Devra Simiu

The limit of the outside

Marie-José Latour, Tarbes, France, ICG 2014-2016

If the treatment is a place, this place ought not be restricted to that of the analyst's consulting room. One should also consider its other side, that is, the analysand's side: the waiting room, the movements, the bungled acts, the dreams and all the little incidents that are addressed to the psychoanalyst. On the analyst's side: supervision, cartels, clinical college, seminars, the international meetings, etc.

So the outside of the treatment is not simply the other side of the place where it happens. The outside of the treatment is the extension of psychoanalysis, which is always of the order of psychoanalysis but on this side or the other of a psychoanalysis.

Outside, the treatment calls forth precisely the presence of psychoanalysis in the world. It is the responsibility of psychoanalysts to think about the mode of presence of this praxis, which is the only one that treats symptoms as formations of the unconscious. It was to this end that Lacan created the School of psychoanalysis.

The fact that psychoanalysis keeps its place in civilisation does not only go [*passé*] via what goes [*passé*] between one psychoanalyst and another. Neither a psychoanalysis nor a psychoanalyst is enough to ensure that there is desire of and for psychoanalysis.

If speaking is often about entering, a psychoanalysis makes it possible to take the measure of what speaking owes to the resonance of the outside that welcomed us. The unconscious has for a long time been considered like a monster buried deep inside! Freud demonstrated that the unconscious is not so much a matter of depth but of surface. Id [*ça*] speaks, but outside the subject. This "outside the subject" is one of the names that Lacan gives the unconscious.

Some make the etymology of "outside" derive from the Latin *fores*, "the door". An opening and closing [*battement*] of the door is what it takes to apprehend the outside. We know to what extent the question of opening and closing is congruent with the unconscious, with what Lacan calls its "position". The simple opposition inside/outside proves to be inadequate in situating it and in orienting oneself in it. One should instead consider the cut in act between the two signifiers. The unconscious would thus be the *slash* [in English in the text], the oblique bar.

Very early in his teaching, Lacan did summon the topological figure of the torus in order to show the insufficient character of a binary distinction and, to detach us from that indecisive intuition that the distinction inside/outside implies. In considering *ex*-sistence as being posed (from the Latin *sistere*) as outside (in Latin *ex*) something, while at the same time remaining linked to it, Lacan posits the outside as what escapes us while positing itself. However this outside is not a non-inside.⁶¹ The unconscious *ex*-sists in relation to the analytic discourse, however it is in the treatment that one can verify it.

In his "Discourse to the EFP", Lacan delivers a little apologue which also calls into question the ordinary opposition between inside and outside: during the night, while walking around the gates that surround the Obelisque in Paris, someone is worried: "The jerks locked me in". The person who is so concerned about the limit of the outside forgets

⁶¹ Lacan, J., *Seminar, RSI*, lesson of 14 January, 1975. Unpublished.

that he is in fact in the middle of the Place de la Concorde and, in the process, he manages to be locked outside!

This apologue leads Lacan to give a valuable topological definition of the desire of the analyst: “this place outside, where we are without being aware of it, but where finding oneself implies having exited it for good, namely this exit being taken only as entry, yet it is not just about anyone since this is the path of the psychoanalyst”.⁶² It seems to me that Lacan is looking for an absolute exteriority, the one that is always outside, which holds itself outside the signifying opposition.

Lacan will make the function of transference topological, in the form of an interior eight which, at first sight, could lead us to believe that the two fields overlap, with desire being what would belong to both. Except that the point outside the line is that point which cannot be grasped since it is outside the lines without the points of the projective plane, that of the cross cap.⁶³



This point is both the experience of the outside and also, the experience of the outside of experience.⁶⁴ The treatment is also this outside. Thus, “outside the treatment” would be equivalent to being outside this outside, which is not however equivalent to being inside, the line of desire being this line without points, because every point on this side [*endroit*] annuls the point on its other side [*envers*].

A seven year old girl recounts a dream during a session. This dream evokes for her a book: “Schmélele and the Eugénie of Tear Drops”.⁶⁵ This book by Claude Ponti, a famous French writer who plays with words like others play the piano, presents to us Schmélele, who lives with his parents in a house that is so poor that the walls, the roof and the windows have left to go and live somewhere else. If it were not for Bâbe, the door, which stayed behind, one could think there would only be the outside left, radical exile. However, as the inscription in the book that Clara brings to the session indicates, “When one opens a door, one sees what is behind, not what is inside”. On one side of Bâbe there is the outside, but on the other side, what is there? asks Clara.

Schmélele’s parents, who are very fatigued by their exhausting work, shrink and end up disappearing. Bâbe is very unhappy and leaves too. This house without a door is not a house anymore and Schmélele follows it. The rest of these adventures unfold around the function of that door.

A door without a house – would that be one way of saying the place of analysis? Thinking of the threshold, that fertile place, isn’t it what we are aiming for when we interrogate the desire of and for psychoanalysis outside the treatment?

I do not find pertinent the term “*connexion*” which we tend to use to speak about our activities in conjunction with other disciplines. According to the dictionary, the term “*connexion*” points to the close relationship between certain things, ideas, fields, etc. It is

⁶² Lacan, J., “*Discours à l’EFP*”, *Autres Ecrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 266.

⁶³ Lacan, J. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1981, pp. 156 and 271.

⁶⁴ Bousseyroux, M., « La passe à l’autre nuit » dans *Penser la psychanalyse avec Lacan. Marcher droit sur un cheveu*, Ramonville Ste-Agne, Erès, 2016, p. 125.

⁶⁵ Ponti, C., *Schmélele et l’Eugénie des Larmes*, Paris, L’école des loisirs, 2002. Author’s note: the name “Eugénie” is a homophonic equivoque of “genie”.

thus a link made out of a chaining. Isn't it rather the point of discontinuity, the point where it [ça] does not close up, the point of cut that we should reflect upon?

By the very fact of being in language, the subject is ex-cluded from his origin. Outside from the start! This gives us perhaps an indication of the difficulty of exiting! Can't the desire of and for psychoanalysis be traced outside a psychoanalysis, on its external edge, the one that contributes endlessly to interrogation?

Translated from French by Chantal Degril

“Faire prime sur le marché?”⁶⁶

Diego Mautino

*“We start from the fact that the roots of the psychoanalytic experience positions, in its extension, the only possible basis for the motivation of the School, and is to be found in the psychoanalytic experience itself, that is to say in its intension”.*⁶⁷

I have chosen as title for this presentation, an expression of Lacan's from the “Italian Note”, adding to it a question mark: “to be at a premium on the market?” With regard to the future of psychoanalysis, we start from an affirmation that anyone who works on behalf of the family tree “will never have the time to contribute to knowledge (*sapere*), without which there is no chance for analysis to continue to be at a premium on the market, in other words that the Italian group is not to be doomed to extinction.”⁶⁸ Following Colette Soler's precise elaboration: “this is a thesis with great currency. And you will see what this implies even beyond the relationship between what Lacan termed psychoanalysis in intension and extension.”⁶⁹ Considering that Lacan's thesis in the opening quotation is that psychoanalysis in intension conditions the extension, namely the diffusion of psychoanalysis around the world, as well as its application to therapeutics, this brief interrogation concerning the “Note” proposes a condition for the survival of psychoanalysis: in “the contribution to knowledge” (*sapere*), what kind of knowledge are we talking about?

To be at a premium on the market

“To be at a premium on the market” is a thesis in the “Italian Note” with a currency that is as potent as it is great, which follows from a consideration of the family tree, thereby referring to what is transmitted in the line of the One, instead of in the line of knowledge. Furthermore, there is an implied thesis that therapeutic success alone at the end of analysis is incapable of securing the future of psychoanalysis. Now, to maintain the “chance to contribute to knowledge without which you will become extinct”, poses a question: what knowledge are we speaking about? There are many knowledges. To begin with, Lacan writes “contribution to knowledge” which, as Colette Soler comments, is a way of evoking the serial production of a knowledge that is not therefore understood as a knowledge that is discovered all in one go and is the work of a single person, but rather a progressive and

⁶⁶ Lacan, J., “If he does not authorise himself to be an analyst, he will never have the time to contribute to knowledge, without which there is no chance that analysis will continue to be at a premium on the market, that is, that the Italian group will not be doomed to extinction.” “Note italienne” *Autres écrits*, Seuil, Paris, 2001, p. 310.

⁶⁷ Lacan, J., “Proposta del 9 ottobre 1967 sullo psicoanalista della Scuola”, prima versione, in *Altri scritti*, Einaudi, Torino, 2013, p.571.

⁶⁸ Lacan, J., “Nota italiana”, in *Altri scritti*, cit., p.306.

⁶⁹ Soler, C., *Commentaire de la Note italienne de Jacques Lacan*, Edizioni Praxis del Campo lacaniano, Roma, 2014, p. 93.

pluralistic contribution. In the background of this expression is the idea of a plurality of contributors, if not from a community, then at least from a plurality in which each, one by one, can contribute to knowledge.⁷⁰

What does “to contribute to knowledge”, mean? Let’s start from the affirmation that, in the previous paragraph, Lacan writes as a supposition: “there is no sexual relation, and by relation I mean one that can be written.”⁷¹ From this affirmation he passes on to consider that the supposition is not enough to ensure the impossibility, that is of not proceeding to the possibility of trusting a “maybe, one day it would be written, if possible.” Rather, he responds precisely to the question of how to go beyond the supposition – that even under the best circumstance it would remain indemonstrable – when he writes in the next paragraph “without proving this relationship with writing, there is in fact no way of reaching what I have, at the same time as I was posing its inexistence (compare with “there is no sexual relation” in the previous paragraph), proposed as an aim that psychoanalysis would make itself equal to science: that is, to demonstrate that this relationship is impossible to write, and precisely for this reason it is neither affirmable nor refutable by way of truth”.⁷² Thus it cannot be affirmed nor refuted by way of truth, but it is possible to demonstrate through writing what is impossible to write.

“The knowledge at stake (...) is that there is no sexual relation, and by relation I mean one that can be written”.⁷³ In this way, the knowledge at stake – “there is no sexual relation” – is introduced as knowledge supposed to start from Lacan’s statement, that is, with the indication that it is necessary to move from supposition to demonstration. He does not say: there is no sexual relation that can be spoken, but rather “it’s not possible for it to be written”. This is because in analysis ... one says.

What does one say in analysis? Whatever one says, the analysand’s every utterance, has truth as its signified, therefore we do not produce any guaranteed knowledge about what is in question, namely that the sexual relation cannot be put into writing. And at this point Lacan returns to writing and to what is written, to counter the inadequacy of what psychoanalysis makes use of, namely the truth. This way psychoanalysis “would be equal to science”,⁷⁴ through the demonstration that it is impossible to write, making it an operation homologous to that of science. Therefore in what way could it equal science without being it? In “demonstrating” that this relation is impossible “it would be equal”, Lacan puts forward a proposal with an objective, using a subjunctive, a mode that effectively creates a *giving value in act* to the resonance of psychoanalysis over other discourses - “to be at a premium on the market?”

The “Italian Note” ends with “all must turn around the writings that will appear.”⁷⁵ In relation to our question about the condition for the survival of psychoanalysis – “contributing to knowledge” – what kind of knowledge are we talking about? We see that a knowledge sifted from truth is not enough; one more step is necessary in order to demonstrate the impossibility of the relation through writing in every case. After stating the objective – to demonstrate through writing the impossibility of the relation – Lacan accentuates the contrast with truth, because at the level of truth the relation is neither affirmable nor refutable. Among the questions that remain I will choose one for the discussion: how and where to situate this demonstration – in the treatment, outside the treatment, or in both?

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 98.

⁷¹ Lacan, J., “Nota italiana”, in *Altri scritti*, cit., p.306.

⁷² *Ivi.*

⁷³ *Ivi.*

⁷⁴ Lacan, J., “Nota italiana”, in *Altri scritti*, cit., p.306.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 307.

The desire of and for psychoanalysis outside the treatment
Martine Menès, Paris, France, ICG 2014-2016

The question of the link between the teaching of psychoanalysis on the one hand, and its transmission in the formation of the analyst on the other, is a question that has bothered me for a long time. In other words, it concerns the link between extension and intension. I will develop this point at the Rendezvous, although I include it in my current discussion. Today I am going to interrogate, essentially, the conditions whereby a teaching oriented by psychoanalysis supports the desire of and for psychoanalysis.

In effect, I do not teach without psychoanalysis, I write with this reference, and sometimes I listen with this orientation to whoever is ready for the wager. It is not always the case. In 1969 at Vincennes, Lacan asked the question: “How to teach what cannot be taught?” in a way that declares the link and the difference between teaching and transmission, such that he would then propose a programme of his own in the Department of Psychoanalysis.

Freud himself wondered if one should teach psychoanalysis in the university. In his article “On the Teaching of Psycho-analysis in Universities”⁷⁶ Freud made the difference between the teaching of psychoanalysis and the formation of the analyst explicit. He defined the conditions: personal analysis, supervision, sharing with other confirmed analysts, and even participation in clinical presentations;⁷⁷ in other words he described the role of a school of psychoanalysis.

However, it is the university itself that needs psychoanalysis, which Freud radically distinguished from psychology, in particular for the training of future psychiatrists. Lacan was also concerned about the training of interns, and it is to this group that he wanted to address his talks at Sainte Anne, entitled “The knowledge of the psychoanalyst” and he began with this wish on the 4th November, 1971.⁷⁸

Freud would conclude that, if the future medic “will never learn psychoanalysis proper ... it will be enough if he learns something *about* psycho-analysis and something *from* it”.⁷⁹ Lacan, a little bit more than fifty years later, declares that with teaching “one tries to bring about the know-how”.⁸⁰ How to pass from the desire for knowledge that is informative, to the desire for knowledge of the unconscious, and how to lead those who would be “at the threshold of psychoanalysis”⁸¹ towards the desire of and for psychoanalysis? It is a question.

That is to say, psychoanalysis is not learnt [*s'apprend*] but it takes [*ça prend*], although only under specific conditions. Lacan has essentially given one such condition that he has repeated on several occasions: one can only teach from the place of the analysand, from one's own saying, and thereby one teaches oneself. “Having taught for ages, everyone knows that I do so in order to teach myself,” he declares.⁸² One can

⁷⁶ Freud, S., “On the Teaching of Psycho-analysis in Universities”, SE XVII, p. 171. He obtained the title of Professor himself in 1902 at the University of Vienna.

⁷⁷ Freud, S., *ibid*, p. 171.

⁷⁸ Lacan, J., *Je parle aux murs*, Paris, Seuil, 2011 : “In returning to speak at Sainte Anne I had hoped that it was to the interns.”

⁷⁹ Freud, S., *op cit*. p. 173.

⁸⁰ Lacan, J., « Allocution sur l'enseignement », *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 303.

⁸¹ Lacan, J., Intervention à l'évolution psychiatrique, 23 janvier 1962.

⁸² Lacan, J., « Allocution sur l'enseignement », *Autres écrits*, *op.cit*, p. 300.

suppose that it was the same for Freud. Like Lacan, who states it explicitly, as for example in his “*Allocution sur l’enseignement*” in 1970,⁸³ Freud would not prepare his presentations; he would speak spontaneously, without notes, until the moments he was faced with a large audience when he would have to write his course notes in advance (included in the *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*).

Therefore the address comes from the place of the barred subject, the discourse of the hysteric offering the most synchronous position, that of every entry into analysis. But it can come from this place in any other discourse, the place from where the S2, unknown knowledge, is produced.⁸⁴ “Teaching is not the transmission of a knowledge, but at best the transmission of a desire (for knowledge).”⁸⁵ I add the parentheses that Lacan inserted later, in 1969, in the seminar *D’un Autre à l’autre* to signify that it is not an isolated epistemic desire.⁸⁶

Thereby, a new question is raised: desire cannot be taught, but can it be transmitted? Lacan, again much earlier, in 1957, gives an indication: “This pathway is the only training that I can claim to transmit to those who follow me. It is called: a style”.⁸⁷ In other words, by way of the one-by-one. Style, indeed, supports desire and not meaning; it is an expression to the side of what is said. The style, the salient feature of the knowing-how to do with one’s symptom, bears the mark of the division of the subject and of the gap between what can be taught and what is untransmissible. It gives one’s taste for psychoanalysis, and it is the taste for psychoanalysis that can circulate by the paths of the transference to the work.

But, to conclude, it must not be forgotten that Lacan advised to do the same as him and not to imitate him. That is, in talking, to be guided by one’s own knowledge, in teaching by speaking one’s own saying, and not by re-citing. In 1978 he declared “It is rather annoying that each psychoanalyst is forced to reinvent psychoanalysis,”⁸⁸ joining Freud who considered that each case obliges us to put in question what is presupposed in established theories. Not so annoying, however, if one considers that the desire of the analyst can only be singular, namely that the analyst is invited by his or her own analysis to reinvent him or herself, to start from where he or she is. Lacan himself reinvented psychoanalysis: “I have been driven to put myself in the very specific teaching position that consists in beginning anew ... as if nothing had been done”.⁸⁹

It is, therefore, a chance that each analyst would be obliged to reinvent, with his or her own desire of and for analysis, “a true teaching, that is, teaching that constantly subjects itself to what is known as renewal”.⁹⁰

Translated from French by Victoria Grace

⁸³ Lacan, J., *ibid*, p. 297 : « je n’ai rien préparé ... comme le pli s’en est pris... »

⁸⁴ Lacan, J., *ibid*, p. 303.

⁸⁵ Lacan, J., *ibid*, p. 297.

⁸⁶ Lacan, J., Le séminaire livre XVI, *D’un Autre à l’autre*, Paris, Seuil, 2006, lesson of 23 April 1969, p. 274: « ... parce qu’il s’agit du désir inconscient, tout court » [“because it concerns unconscious desire”].

⁸⁷ Lacan, J., “Psychoanalysis and Its Teaching” (1957), in *Ecrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 2006, p. 383.

⁸⁸ Lacan, J., 9^e Congrès de l’École Freudienne de Paris sur « La transmission ». Published in the *Lettres de l’École*, 1979, n° 25, vol. II, pp. 219-220.

⁸⁹ Lacan, J., « Donc vous aurez entendu Lacan », Presentation to the Faculty of Medicine at Strasbourg, 10 June 1967, *Mon enseignement*, Paris Seuil, 2005.

⁹⁰ Lacan, J., “The Freudian Thing” (1955), *Ecrits*, *op.cit.*, p. 362.

A most fundamental bond

Leonardo S. Rodríguez, Melbourne, Australia, CRIF 2014-2016

Nearly sixty years ago Lacan wrote about the impact of psychoanalysis in this world in terms highly relevant to our discussion:

[...] anyone capable of glimpsing the changes we have lived through in our own lives can see that Freudianism, however misunderstood it has been and however nebulous its consequences have been, constitutes an intangible but radical revolution. There is no need to go seeking witnesses to the fact: everything that concerns not just the human sciences, but the destiny of man, politics, metaphysics, literature, the arts, advertising, propaganda—and thus, no doubt, economics—has been affected by it. (Lacan 2006 [1957], p. 438 [527])

Today psychoanalysis continues to have its influence on a number of disciplines and discourses—despite the periodical announcement of its death by those who are annoyed by its existence and despite the ever increasing power of the psychopharmacological industry and its contempt for the social bond and the word.

In ways that are not always tangible but which are nevertheless verifiable, the psychoanalytic discourse has continued to have a presence in our part of the world as Lacan saw it in 1957. I say ‘our part of the world’ in reference to the Western hemisphere, including those countries that are geographically in the Middle East and the East but which have developed under Western influence, like Israel, Australia and New Zealand. By now there have also been significant developments of psychoanalysis in the East, in Japan, China and India, as well as recent significant developments in the Middle East which touch us more directly, as our friends from Turkey and Lebanon join the heterogeneous, transcultural and translinguistic community that we are—the Forums of the Lacanian Field.

Psychoanalysis has now been firmly established in a good proportion of the great cities of the world, as well as cities that are numerically smaller, and even in cultural contexts that are not favourable to it. What has made the survival and expansion of psychoanalysis possible is not self-evident but it may be identified.

A few things are required for the birth and growth of psychoanalysis in a given place: analysts and analysands, writers and readers of psychoanalytic texts, teachers and students of psychoanalytic topics, that is, the transmission of our discourse through the formative means adopted in the early part of the Twentieth century. For this to happen, a critical mass of people is required. By ‘critical mass’ I mean a number of people living *in a sensitive cultural milieu*, open to the singular offerings of the psychoanalytic discourse. This entails modalities of the other discourses (master, university and hysteric) that are able to establish a link with psychoanalysis and with psychoanalysts, or at least with people for whom the desire of and for psychoanalysis has some way or other transformed them.

For many people who have never seen a psychoanalyst, and who will probably never see one in their lives, it is not only that the words ‘psychoanalysis’, ‘psychoanalyst’, ‘Freud’ mean something, but also that they evoke a singular experience of discourse—and not to be found in any other modality of discourse—and the notion that the unconscious exists, that there is something in you that is more than you (Lacan 1977, p. 263). It is difficult to see that psychoanalysis may prosper in a given social milieu unless some knowledge about the existence of psychoanalysis and the unconscious is present, and it has not been obliterated by the prevailing religious or ideological powers. This means that at least a rudimentary knowledge must have been introduced by somebody who went through the analytic experience and who is also a reader. The history of our pioneers

shows that. Freud was aware that the psychoanalytic thing could be recognized by ordinary citizens; and if *The Interpretation of Dreams* took years to sell just a few copies, by contrast *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, published only a year after the book on dreams, was a bit of a best seller from its first edition. There was something familiar to every reader in it. There is something for everyone in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, but it requires more work on the part of the reader—work for which many readers of Freud were prepared, for in a few years it was re-published several times and translated into several languages. But by then there was talk about psychoanalysis, in Europe and in the Americas. Talk about psychoanalysis is not the same as psychoanalysis, but thanks to the erratic ways of human desire one thing led to another. It is not only the professors who, for better or worse, have uttered words concerning psychoanalysis. By now, the ‘word of mouth’, as the English expression goes, has become a substantial medium for us. This ‘word of mouth’ is not only efficacious when somebody is in desperate need to talk to somebody else, but also when it adopts the form of a commentary in passing, apparently insignificant in its content, yet transcendent in its ultimate effects.

The city of Melbourne, where I live and work, although not the worse, is not particularly fond of psychoanalysis. Unlike what happens in other parts of the world, a significant proportion of the patients I receive have no idea about psychoanalysis. Yet they have an idea of the unconscious and its workings through the ordinary word, dreams and its uncanny symptomatic effects. Some of those patients have progressed to become analysts themselves.

As I also work with children and adolescents, over the years I have had the opportunity of listening and speaking to teachers, groups of mothers and fathers, health professionals and other lay people who have not been my patients. Whatever the conversation is about—it starts as a rule on a child in trouble—people who have not even heard of psychoanalysis and who ask me “And how to you spell it?”, after a few sentences start to talk in a manner that is not the same as when they speak to others. I hear from them stories about encopresis and school refusal; about incest and other atrocities of family life. I don’t tell them stories about the object *a* or the Borromean knot; and yet I can speak to them as I do not speak to others. For the style of talking and listening that Sigmund Freud created generates transferences, and touches even those who are most intolerant to the manifestations of the unconscious.

That our discourse has a capacity to reproduce itself has to do with its reverberations throughout the unpredictable links that it generates in a rather serendipitous way. These links may well be ‘intangible’, as Lacan put it, but are nevertheless effective. For the resonances of Freud’s creation continue to move the core of our being, and so the analytic discourse still is, as Lacan once put it, “amongst the most fundamental of the bonds which remain viable for us”. (Lacan 1990, p. 14)

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EXPERIENCES OF THE CARTELS OF THE PASS

CONTRIBUTION FROM THE AS NOMINATED IN NOVEMBER

Sketch for a work to come

Elisabete Thamer

What is treated in an analysis? The unconscious, the subject, or both?

To pose this question implies that Lacan's initial idea of a "subject of the unconscious" has been left behind in favour of another that came later, one that disconnects *unconscious* and *subject*: "That there is an unconscious means that there is a knowledge without a subject".⁹¹

To ask whether the efficacy of an analysis concerns the subject, the unconscious or both at the same time is a legitimate question, it seems to me, particularly in order to apprehend what allows its end. It is a fact that if an analysis is to unfold, there must be an engagement between the subject and his unconscious: the analysand supposes it has knowledge that he urgently wants deciphered. This is the adherence to the unconscious causal hypothesis of symptoms that leads the analysand to read what the unconscious says in its different manifestations. These ends – deciphered unconscious knowledge and the displacement of some of the symptoms – sustain in the subject the hope that one day he will accede to an ultimate knowledge arising from the deciphering of his own unconscious and, above all, that this knowledge will definitively sweep away what he suffers from symptomatically. The therapeutic effects obtained with the analysis contribute to a certain extent to maintaining this mirage. Subject and unconscious are thus necessarily imbricated during a long period of the analytic process. But can they still be so at the end?

Freud himself, and Lacan after him, concluded that the unconscious was inexhaustible. Freud had expressed this through notions such as the "navel of the dream" [*Nabel des Traums*]⁹² or "primal repression" [*Urverdrängung*].⁹³ Lacan spoke of it as "an ideal worker",⁹⁴ "*der Arbeiter*",⁹⁵ "which does not think, or calculate, or judge",⁹⁶ until his elaborations on the real unconscious.⁹⁷ These are so many developments that say, in different ways and with distinct theoretical and clinical consequences, that the unconscious is inexhaustible, boundless, and thus fundamentally outside the grasp of the subject and analysis.

Where then to find what could put an end to the analysis, if that does not come from the unconscious? The answer lies on the side of the subject.

Freud was surprised how the subject developed a taste for the analytic process to the point of postponing its end indefinitely. Indeed, the subject's taste for it was not because he was holding his breath in the expectation of a cure [*guérison*], but because *speaking is a jouissance*. *The unconscious "is the fact that being, by speaking, enjoys"*,

⁹¹ Lacan, J., "L'Acte psychanalytique" (Compte rendu), *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, p. 976.

⁹² Freud, S. *The interpretation of Dreams*, SE IV, p. 111 and SE V, p. 525.

⁹³ Freud S., "Repression", SE XIV, p. 148.

⁹⁴ Lacan J., *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, p. 14.

⁹⁵ Lacan, J., « ...Ou pire » [Compte rendu], dans *Scilicet* 5, Paris, Seuil, 1975, p. 9.

⁹⁶ Lacan J., *Television*, op. cit, p. 14.

⁹⁷ See Lacan J., "The Preface to the English-Language Edition", in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*. London, W.W. Norton & Company, pp. vii-ix.

says Lacan in *Encore*.⁹⁸ How then to cut into this *jouissance* seized from speech? Certainly, only interpretation that does not nourish the analysand's chatter with meaning will have a chance of shaking it.

We acknowledge, in the end, that analysis does not deliver a subject an articulated knowledge that would remove the opacity of the symptom that resists, nor even would allow him to name what does not cease being written. But without doubt, analysis can touch the *jouissance* bound to language, that "makes a function of the subject", that is to say, phallic *jouissance* and its correlate, *joui-sens*, which will be able to finally cease being written.

If *jouissance* which binds the subject to deciphering his unconscious is modified by the saying of the analysis, from then on the formations of his unconscious will no longer have the force of sense for him. That is to say, the subject will no longer put energy into supporting the lure of the transferential hypothesis. From that point, the subject acquires the firm conviction of the *ex-sistence* of the unconscious, but that only happens if the analysis has delivered him sufficiently to know that even so this unconscious outside his grasp is, despite everything, well and truly his. The scraps of his *lalangue* that have been deposited there at the whim of contingency [*tuche*] are *Heimlich* to him, but without an Other to organise them. A lucubration will suffice then in order that a *fixion* finally stops the race to the truth and satisfies the subject.

Here we have some points that I would like to go on to develop further.

Translated from French by Susan Schwartz

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF THE ICG

What is it to nominate?

Marie-José Latour

"Life [*bios*] is short, and art [*technè*] long, opportunity [*kairos*] fleeting, experimentations [*peira*] perilous, and judgment [*krisis*] difficult."
Hippocrates

This epigraph, very well-known but recently re-read in the brief and pertinent work by Giorgio Agamben, *L'Avventura*,⁹⁹ has resonated in a new fashion with the definition of the Pass provided by Lacan in his Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI: "that putting of the hystorization of the analysis to the test".¹⁰⁰ It would not be very difficult to assert the five terms evoked by Hippocrates, as well as their conjugation with the mode of the not-all, with regard to the device of psychoanalysis invented by Freud, and also with that of the Pass invented by Lacan. Isn't it the coinciding of these terms – life, art or savoir-faire, opportunity, experience, and judgment – with that adventure that could make the flash of lightning? appear, and, following Lacan, the one we wait for from the Pass? Isn't it

⁹⁸ Lacan J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore 1972-1973*. Ed. J-A Miller. Trans. B. Fink. New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company p. 105.

⁹⁹ Agamben, G., *L'aventure*, Paris, Payot & Rivages, 2016.

¹⁰⁰ Lacan, J., "Preface to the English edition of Seminar XI", in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, The Seminar, Book XI*, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1981, p. x.

the contingency of this coincidence that springs forth in the nomination of the Analyst of the School?

A psychoanalysing life

If there can be no criteria that orients the decision of the cartel of the Pass, it is precisely due to the fact that we await something that is not of the order of a signifier, something other than what is said [*un dit*]. Meanwhile, we do not lack the knowledge that this something can only be discerned *via* the signifier. Didn't the seminar of the School which was held in Paris this year underscore that the term 'hystorisation', as Lacan spelled it, is his way of deterring the tendency towards narrative that is irremediably taken by every speakingbeing?

Let us make it clear once again, according to Lacan's assertion in the seminar on "The psychoanalytic act",¹⁰¹ that the hystorisation of an analysis is not the story of an analysand's private life [*vie privée*]. In this lesson of the seminar, Lacan makes ironic remarks about private life: of what would it be deprived [*privée*]? "From the moment one makes an analysis, there is no more private life", he said provocatively, reminding us in this way of the necessity of saying [*dire*] which orients the psychoanalyst. Those who believe in seeing in it a certain taste for the indiscreet do so on their own account – because the fact that there's no more private life for the one who makes an analysis doesn't mean that it hence becomes public. And Lacan makes it clear: it means that there is "a psychoanalysing life". Isn't it this very life that is in question in the Pass? Freud and Lacan gave us an idea of what such a life could be.

Let us also point out that the putting to the test is not so much about the narrative of this psychoanalysing life, as it is about the *hys-torisation*, that forgotten twist of the saying [*le dire*]. The narrative that reaches the cartel, *via* the passers, will perhaps bear the trace of this impossible that marks the saying [*le dire*]. The nomination would be the echo of that. That is, in any case, my experience in one of the cartels of the Pass in which we nominated an Analyst of the School.

Doesn't the putting to the test that Lacan wished for, indicate that the narrative addressed by the passand to the passers could be neither written nor established in advance? If everyone could, in their analysis, have the experience of how a dream unravels in the light of the narrative that one makes of it, isn't the point of the Pass to put this very experience to the test? Wouldn't it be a way of reducing its deceptive character, which is signalled in our epigraph, and of which Lacan underscored the irreducible paradox in his Geneva lecture on the symptom?¹⁰² Because, certainly, if everyone recognizes the authority of experience, it is exactly that same authority which can counter a possible surfacing of the new, which doesn't wait to be re-recognized [*re-connu*], since it is not known [*connu*].

***N'homination*¹⁰³**

It seemed paradoxical to us that in certain testimonies, and rather recurrently, proper names were silenced. Those of the analyst, of analysts, those of the essential persons in the

¹⁰¹ Lacan, J., *Le séminaire livre XV, L'acte analytique*, lesson of March 27th, 1968. Unpublished.

¹⁰² Lacan, J., « Conférence à Genève sur le symptôme », [1975] « C'est exactement ce que Freud nous dit – quand nous avons un cas, [...], il nous recommande de ne pas le mettre d'avance dans un casier. Il voudrait que nous écoutions en toute indépendance des connaissances acquises par nous [...]. C'est très difficile parce que le propre de l'expérience est évidemment de préparer un casier. » « It's exactly what Freud tells us – when we have a case, (...), he recommends that we do not put it in advance in a record file. He wanted for us to listen completely independently of all the knowledge we had acquired (...). It's very difficult because what is proper to our experience is to prepare a record file. » See "Geneva Lecture on the Symptom", trans. Russell Grigg, in *Analysis* 1, 1989.

¹⁰³ Editor's note: This is a neologism where Lacan associates naming [*nomination*] and man [*homme*].

history of the passand, especially if these happened to be names which were, if not famous, then at least known. It is nonetheless the minimum rule of psychoanalysis, “to call a cat a cat”, as Freud reminded Dora! How is it that an analysis which leads the analysand to make a request to bear testimony to it within a device that can produce a nomination, that such an analysis can leave in hiding this singular experience of language, so properly human, which leads the one who speaks to name?

“Every man is an animal except for the fact that he names himself” [« *Tout homme est un animal sauf à ce qu’il se n’homme* »], wrote Lacan on the board just before beginning the lesson of his seminar on March 20th, 1968. For sure, to give a name is different from naming. With a single though ingenious act of mis-spelling, Lacan pins down this distinction. Isn't it the two sides of the name that are at stake, as they are to be written on the Moebius strip – the signifying side of the name, and the point wherein the name is tied to the saying [*le dire*]? Nomination is proper to man; it is the essence of language itself. The name is a kind of language in *intension*. Yet, by definition, language excludes the possibility of a pure nomination. No name can be said to be 'proper' [*propre*, also: clean], no more can that of the Analyst of the School; is it not rather that this legend, being both a small sequence of explanatory text alongside a figure, and also a fabulous narrative that makes room for that which remains impossible to name [*innomable*]. It is thus that the onomatopoeia, 'crack', which, for this passand, had the value of a reminder of how, at the heart of the signifying chain, sound passes the meaning, traversing the testimony of each of the passers all the way to its acknowledgment by the cartel. An event, an onomatopoeia, a scribble, a word form – something that could not be modelled – occurs at the greatest point of intimacy of speech and, in one instant, speech accedes to its immediacy.

For the small human being, naming is often produced as the high point of jubilatory squandering – suddenly something, up to then mute, finds a way to be named. 'That' had a name, then! And this remains a mystery, because how can one explain recognizing something that was not known? In that flash, which those in love call the *coup de foudre*, it comes out of this same encounter, of a fulguration preceding memory. Suddenly, a name makes room within language for a word of another kind.

To find the name is an invention each time. To name is a modality of language which leaves one to believe “*l’esp d’un laps*”¹⁰⁴ that there's nothing to add. Within a name, there is the radical character of 'it's that'. Nomination re-knots with that extension that the name indicates yet does not contain, like a pointing index finger that attempts to inflect language a little towards that which couldn't be said.

The *raison* of a name

Is there a reason to a name? Our International College of the Guarantee stated rather that, if there is a cause, there is no reason, and this led us to invite the cartel of the pass to transmit its decision without commenting on it. “The cartel composed of ... has named you Analyst of the School” or “has not named you Analyst of the School”.

The nomination appears, within a certain haste and constriction, as dissident with regard to the designation and to the particulars. The nomination to which the pass gives place would be produced at first sight a bit *in contrario* to what a name usually is.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, if a name is this breath of air that has the power to make someone turn around, the cartel of the Pass which produces this nomination can only know in the aftermath, if the singular of what is called, can turn around and respond to this nomination.

¹⁰⁴ Lacan, J., “The Preface to the English-Language Edition. In *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*. London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. vii.

¹⁰⁵ Iaconelli, V., « Nomination et effets sur le lien » in *Mensuel de l'EPFCL*, n°108, October 2016

In a text of rare brilliance, Michel Surya has drawn our attention to the fact that one can want to be able not to turn around in response to any of the names by which one could be called. In *Le mort-né*,¹⁰⁶ the author of Georges Bataille's biography writes about the devastation [*ravage*] that can be produced upon having to respond to the 'call', when having to respond to one's name is the equivalent for him of responding to a shame. "It was enough for them to call you by the name that you owed to them for it to become all of the unhappiness that was attached to it, and coming with it all the way to school, and entering with you". But how not to respond to any name? "Not to respond to anyone in order not to respond to anything that your name would name" is the impossible task with which the child is confronted. And that is so until he decides to 'un-name' himself. A beautiful testimony to a savoir-faire with *lalangue*, which, within the same movement, suggests the erasing of the name and the power of nomination, the trace and the fiction, the attribution of a name which always comes from the Other, and the solitude with which responding to it confronts us.

Isn't consenting to bear a name consenting to the gap between the name and that which it designates? The de-nomination, which perhaps overlaps with the labelling effect of nomination, indexes this gap.

At the point of concluding this contribution, I was reminded of what Lacan himself named the "drastic remedy" [*remède de cheval* »] which he thought he found in 1968, at the time of creating the *Scilicet* review, based on the principle of unsigned texts,¹⁰⁷ with the exception of those by Lacan himself. Wasn't it a way of asserting de-nomination? That it didn't last surely required some examination. Couldn't every nomination produced in the pass be awaited as a way of "untying the contortion by way of which experience in psychoanalysis is condemned to not delivering a passage to anything that could change it"?¹⁰⁸ Lacan's severe judgment at the time with respect to the psychoanalysts' contributions ("pitifully confusing", "boring", "harmful" are some of the qualifiers he employed) could have the effect of producing a certain reservation, if not an inhibition. The point is to preserve the gap which the name indicates rather than cover it, a condition for "psychoanalysis to become again what it never ceased to be: an act yet to come".¹⁰⁹

Translated from French by Sara Rodowicz-Ślusarczyk

The passer, his AME, the passand, the cartels ... and the impasses **Sonia Alberti**

Having come to the end of two years' work in the ICG, which gave itself the task of taking up and rethinking some impasses in our School – to the extent, for example, of suspending the nomination of new AMS for the period – I would like, based on my experience, to bring to the fore the impasses around the point that the cartel must reach in order to conclude positively about a pass. I do so in relation to what I already presented at Medellin, also published in this *Wunsch*.

First question: two frequent faults in the passers' narrative

¹⁰⁶ Surya, M. *Le mort-né*, Al dante, 2016.

¹⁰⁷ Lacan, J., « Introduction de *Scilicet* au titre de la revue de l'École Freudienne de Paris », in *Scilicet n°1*, Paris, Seuil, 1968, p. 4.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 5.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 9

There was as an almost unanimous observation that passers are often excessively, let us say, timid with the passands. When questioned by the cartel, some even said that they did not want to intervene, hurt, or take away any freedom from the passand as he was speaking. Sometimes the passer did not even know the name of the analyst! Nor even simple things about the life of the passand; they certainly questioned themselves about them, but they were afraid to ask, afraid that would not show sufficient respect for the passand. For example, it wasn't unusual that certain faults in the narratives prevented the *hystorization* of the life of the analysand – that which is constructed in the analysis – in a way that made it possible to testify that there had been change, but not *the way in which the analysis was responsible for that change*. If that is not possible, how then to *hystorize* an analysis? According to the definition that Lacan gives in “The Preface to the English-Language Edition” of *Seminar XI*, the pass is “the putting of the hystorization of the analysis to the test”.

Now, taking up the function of the AS: to testify, in the School, to what psychoanalysis was able to achieve in that case. The cartel of the pass does not only verify if a passage to [the position of] analyst has or has not been transmitted through the testimony, but also if there were a way of making it one example among others of what psychoanalysis is capable when faced with crucial problems. Along with that, to give value to the impossibility of a complete answer and, at the same time, the function of the contingency of a response – given through example – that can allow psychoanalysis to advance in the contemporary world. If there is nothing given, or practically nothing given about the subject's analysis itself, only the stories about the changes he experienced during his analysis, how would it be possible to guarantee, in a minimal way, that the possible AS could teach about the way in which psychoanalysis functioned in the School? It even happened that we formed the hypothesis that there was an end of analysis according to the changes testified to, but the cartel of the pass saw itself at an impasse with regard to naming a passand AS who had not revealed the moments of his analysis that lead to these changes, nor even the interpretations of dreams or of symptoms during the analysis. What would this say to the School about the AS? He will tell his story? He will speak about changes of position in life that have been assumed on the basis of an analysis? But what analysis?

Each analytic act is unique as is each passand, and this emerges everyday in the clinic. There will always be an *impossible to say* about that, but how to make it operate if it does not pass through what is said?

Second question: the difficulty of having a unanimous decision for a nomination.

In the cartels in which I have participated, there have been situations where we have been unanimous in not naming a passand. This allowed us much working together, going over the questions that led each of us to his or her position.

The work has been much more difficult in situations in which some members of the same cartel judged that it would be possible to reach the point of nomination, while other members differed. And to the extent that a nomination implies a unanimous decision, thereby implying that all members of the cartel were convinced of the possibility of nomination, what lessons could be drawn from that experience?

Firstly, I would like to say what for me justifies the necessity that *all* the members of the cartel are convinced of the possibility of nomination: the work of the dispositive of the pass is a work for the School, it is not a work for the passand, nor for the passers, nor for the Secretariat of the pass, nor even for the members of the cartel, despite the fact that each of those who participate in the dispositive only gain through it, the core of Lacan's greatest gift to the School! Now, if this is a work for the School, we must take into account that the nomination of AS is also a gift that this pass produces for the members of the School, independently of the linguistic zones, a gift which makes it possible to work

on the crucial contemporary questions of psychoanalysis. If a pass does not succeed in convincing the members of a cartel, how could that pass assume the responsibility of carrying within it conditions sufficient for allowing the School to work on what psychoanalysis is capable of?

Based on this, we must pose the question of what leads each member of the cartel to position him or herself in favour, or not in favour, of a nomination. The factors are multiple and not always identifiable. But let's look at some:

Without doubt, the first is not the testimony of the *passand*, but rather that of the passers. This is an absolutely tangible reality when one works in a cartel of the pass! Besides, Lacan was very precise about that when he observed that the passer *is* the pass.

This observation has several consequences: the selecting of passers is the concern of the AMS and, thus, the construction of the lists of AMS – also a task of the ICG – could not be a greater responsibility. I speak of an analytic responsibility to oversee the evidence that such and such an analyst will have given to the School, about involvement in the clinic, theoretical and ethical orientation, and availability to present to the community by participating through presentations of work in cartels and committees, based on the verification of this engagement by *several* members of the School. Because, even when all of this is verified, there is no guarantee that a passer selected by that analyst can accomplish his task of helping the cartel of the pass. How many times has it happened in the last two years that the cartel has regretted the difficulty with such and such a passer? The passers do not have a script to follow, but they must realise faults at the moment of the testimonies since they appear at the moment when they give their narratives to the cartels.

Going beyond the passers and the AMS there is a third reason, which concerns the *passand*. Yes, he wants to speak of his experience, OK. But he wants to speak about it to what end? It is a question to which the response is not always clear but, in principle, it would not aim at verifying that there was an end to the analysis and a passage to the analyst. In my experience with my colleagues in the cartel, the response to this question should already be assumed; it would not need the opinion of the cartel! Also in principal, the testimony of pass is *for the School* in the sense that consequences can be drawn from it that refines the function of psychoanalysis today, about its efficacy in the current world. For this reason we must know how the analysis functioned, what the interventions of the *passand*'s analyst were and their effects etc. How to locate the entry into analysis, the succession of subjective passes, the crossing of the fantasy, and finally, subjective destitution, *possibly the sinthome* and, at least, the necessary passage to the analyst – which does not mean that that person is necessarily installed as such in an office.

The fourth reason possible to identify, but still difficult to elucidate, is not without relation to the greatest or smallest resistance which, in this case, is not that of the analyst but of the analysts who make up the cartel itself. In my experience, I would say that such resistance is not so much named, but rather concerns listening to the passers. From the discourse that is their own and which is, thus, particular, how to hear a New one? In my opinion, it is not the responsibility of the *passand* to identify a New one, but rather for the cartel to deduce it, for this is necessary for listening. Are we up to that? To what extent can we divest ourselves sufficiently before hand? How not to identify what we are in the process of hearing in a cartel from previous experiences? And to leave space for whatever new pathways a narrative can open? We speak a lot about a pass involving something New. But are we, as members of a cartel, really open to identifying it? This is a problem to be taken up at the level of the ICG, or each time that a new ICG is constituted.

If a nomination is not always made based upon an immediate consensus of all the members of the cartel, and if a cartel works, is it possible that one or more members of a cartel could construct what has convinced them that there was not only a passage to the analyst but that that it was demonstrated in the logic of the pass in question. And with this

construction, then, to convince the other members of the cartel who were not originally inclined to name the passand. This can happen and, in turn, it depends on several other factors that are not always immediately pinned down. If they are not always pinned down, perhaps they could become an object of more in depth work with the result that something can be pinned down. And, who knows, the School would gain from that?

Translated from French by Susan Schwartz

Via

Nadine Cordova, Paris, France, AS 2014-2017

I would like to remind you that our ICG made the choice of establishing two types of cartel: a permanent cartel of the ICG, which enables an elaboration the crucial points of psychoanalysis, and an ephemeral cartel, that of the pass. It is a way of emphasizing one more time the necessity of articulating the experience of the treatments and the continuing work of elaboration. Moreover, we proposed to write a few lines on the decisions taken regarding the passes that were heard and to enter them into the “Notebook of the Passes”¹¹⁰ in order to keep the traces of the work that had been carried out and its results. Thus, the testimonies of the passands put us to work. Therefore it is crucial that members of the ICG try to communicate to the School what these experiences have to teach and what they modestly contribute to psychoanalysis.

On this basis I would like to say a few words about what I have retained from the cartels of the pass. My intention is simple and it concerns a realization pertaining to the passers. On the basis of their transmission something unexpected has come up. It is doubtlessly a logical effect, but as always the fact of living an experience allows us to take things up a bit differently.

I have listened to a few passes and each time I was surprised by two things. The first regards the discrepancy between what is transmitted by each passer.¹¹¹ This discrepancy can even at times give the impression that the passers are speaking of two different passands. The other point, which is not unconnected to the previous one, relates to the subjective effect left by the passers during the process. In any case, it is the object of the first exchanges between the members of the cartel, to their own embarrassment at times.

Still, these discrepancies and the various styles are not without consequences. The manner in which the passer transmits the testimony of somebody absent gradually fades away, thereby making space for the emergence of the one whose pass it is. This means that after a while the members of the cartel leave behind the impressions produced by the passers.

One can talk thus of a logical time in the pass. It supposes, of course, the path of the testimony, which benefits from the different spaces and times of the device and includes the presence and the absence of the speaking bodies together with what there is of subjectivity. There is also a sort of movement, which is inscribed on the basis of an encounter of the passand with the passers and then an encounter of the passers with the cartel. What passes over from what is heard in what is said in the presence of the passand and the passers and then the passers and the members of the cartel will move about in the cartel, that is to say, the cartel will succeed in working on the unique content of what has been transmitted and the work will be narrowed down until clarity of decision is achieved. And it is thanks to this moving about of words and bodies that a logic of the testimony

¹¹⁰ The decision has been taken during the Symposium in Medellin.

¹¹¹ This was mentioned in Echoes n°7

will sketch itself out. Let us add to that the specific information that the cartel might ask of the passers on certain unclear points of the testimony.

It seems to me that a connection plays out in this movement between the passer who “is the pass”, the testimony of the one who has passed through it and the members of the cartel. That we do not see the passand or the passers after their transmission, allows a passing to the sayings of the passand where interest is focused only on what has been said via the passers.

Beyond the presence of the passers, the testimony acquires all its *dit-mension*.

It seems to me that at this moment one can talk of a true eclipse since at the outset we are dealing with a somewhat blurry moment, a transient moment where something is confused; the passand’s sayings [*dits*] are more or less marked by the folds of the passer. If the members of the cartel take these folds into account, they will not be captivated by them. They unburden themselves of them step by step, at a slower or faster pace, in order to focus on what has been transmitted. The cartel then tries to orientate itself, to grasp the passage to the [position of] the analyst; the cartel lets itself be surprised. Indeed, the versions of the testimony given by each of the passers come thus to intersect, respond to each other, oppose one another and raise questions; each member of the cartel will grasp some bits of the testimony, be confronted by others, identify what is missing, what insists and the key moments of the testimony raised by the passers.

One could say that the two ways of transmission reveal the division of the subject, what this has aroused but more importantly the rough patches and the affects.

Thus what might appear in the beginning to be a kind of embarrassment will turn out to be propitious for bringing the course of the passand’s analysis, and what it has produced, into the light. Even if there exist areas of obscurity, what has been lost in transmission, there is a kind of reverberation, which passes through the passer. There is something that keeps on moving which passes through all the stages of the dispositive.

I am thus tempted to say in the *après-coup* of the experience that each time the cartels of the pass are taken by eclipses. Thanks to this movement, the material, which is transmitted by the passers, initiates the work of the members of the cartel, whose availability and attention have struck me. The cartel in any case will not make a statement before the necessary time, the time proper to every pass.

All the passer – who is wondering how his own analysis will conclude – has done is “pass”, but not without conveying [*fait passer*], and the way he has conveyed, the passand’s testimony. The testimony bears the marks of an analysis and sometimes the mark of a turning. If the desire of the psychoanalyst can be caught, it is perhaps also because in the course of the cartel’s elaboration it has hollowed out a space to receive what has taken place.

Translated from French by Tolek Magdziarz

Doing the pass is still worth it

Maria Luisa de la Oliva

Often Lacan wondered what could bring someone to decide to devote himself to psychoanalysis, and each time he was frustrated not to find an answer that was satisfying. In spite of that, and perhaps even because of it, he was encouraged to pursue the question. He wondered if the pass, as it shines a light, could bring to the fore some of the shadowy parts of an analysis. However, hoping for something does not necessarily mean finding it. He also hoped that the AS would shed light on “crucial problems, at the vital point they

have come to for analysis”,¹¹² which does not signify that they have succeeded in doing so.

What could bring someone who has done an analysis to want to testify about the experience in the dispositive of the pass? This is also a fundamental question for members of the ICG, for we who participate in the experience of the pass in the position of the “jury”. This place involves an intimate judgment about what is listened to in the testimonies that the passers convey. The judgment implies a certain *a priori*: something is expected from the testimony in order to be able to conclude whether there is or isn’t a nomination. With regard to what is expected from the pass, Lacan left us several indications throughout his teaching to give us orientation.

At the same time there is also the unhopd-for, the surprise that allows there to be a nomination. Just like when someone tells you a joke, you expect it to make you laugh but you never know in advance where the laughter is going to come from. If the laugh is not produced this could be because the joke is bad, or because it has been told badly, or even because it does not resonate with what makes that person laugh; that is to say, something of the order of the affects of jouissance. In all cases, it is only *a posteriori* that we can situate this point. Thus, there is a conjunction of essential variables that give the pass its character of contingency.

In the pass we take support from the theory that has been produced in order to verify it or not. This is the virtue that always makes the pass something new. And for that reason there is no standard pass.

In *Echoes 7*, Marie-José Latour poses the paradox with which those in the “jury” are confronted when expressing an intimate judgment. It is a matter of taking into account what is known, the textual knowledge of the unconscious of the passand and the knowledge of the texts that orient us, as well as what is not known. The paradox is: how not to be guided by our experience which can make us classify things in some cases and enable us to detect something new or different, while at the same time, in order to orient ourselves, we need to know what these cases are? The jury should not allow itself to be blinded by a knowledge that plugs the opening necessary for catching something new, unhopd-for, something with a surprising spark. What does the passand know of his non-knowledge? How is that non-knowledge organised, since Lacan tells us that the not-known is organised as the framework of knowledge?¹¹³ How to situate and deduce the edges of non-knowledge? How to realise the limit of that of which one can give testimony?¹¹⁴

Camila Vidal, AS named by our ICG 2014-16, also poses this same paradox of the pass, since she tells us that what is expected is to clarify the logic of the end of the analysis, which determines if someone becomes an analyst. Her transmission “*is not directed towards an area of clear and didactic knowledge, but towards a limit behind which springs profound ignorance and where all sense is shaded in a profound fog*”. “Fog” is a signifier that names the existence of the impossible for her, that which in the real cannot be “touched”, but which nevertheless exists. She puts forward the necessity of conserving a certain “fog” in the pass in the sense that meaning is suspended, and not to erase a sector of shadows that remain illuminated.

The Spanish dramaturge Juan Mayorga, philosopher and mathematician, says: “*the language of mathematics is a language without fat, and the creative person in theatre aspires to this language without fat*”. Perhaps we could apply this to the pass: we expect a testimony to be as “unfatty” as possible. That is to say, at the greatest distance from sense

¹¹² Lacan, J., “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School”, trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* 6, 1995, pp. 1-2.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ In his book *Remnants of Auschwitz* (New York, Zone Books, 2008) Giorgio Agamben interrogates the intrinsic limits to the testimony of those who were imprisoned in the concentration camps.

and from theory. In the work of *hystorization* of the treatment that is involved in testimony, it is expected that there be a reference to the resolution of what it was that lead a subject to have a psychoanalysis – even though it may be the case that the analysis is not yet finished – and that is: how he has found a way to manage his symptoms. What must be produced for that to happen, and what subjective mutation does it suppose? We expect certain co-ordinates to orient us, but we can expect nothing *a priori* as to the particular way in which each passand succeeds in this, since it concerns something unique that is like an identity card – not transferable.

I will elaborate now what the experience of listening to the passes during my time on the ICG has taught me, even though they were concluded without any nominations. It was an enriching experience working with my colleagues in the cartels of the pass, and in the cartel of the ICG.

– In each pass it was possible to locate a particular desire for psychoanalysis, articulated with a transference to the School that was not always there initially. In this sense it is significant in certain cases the point at which the pass seems to have the function of ‘the key to the vault’, in the architectural sense of the term.¹¹⁵ That is to say, a function of support. From the clinical point of view, that has interesting effects. For example, for certain subjects, the testimony allows the installation of an edge where what is produced in the analysis can remain framed, contained, and thus does not drift. Sometimes that functions like an impetus to write a matheme with which one aims to give an account of the emergence of a real that has been tested, that allows a point of arrest.

– Also one can observe how, through the work of testimony and the encounter with the passers, the passand can glimpse that there is still an analytic turn for him to make, even though he had thought initially that his analysis had ended.

– In the experience of doing the pass, some look for an answer that would authorise them to become analysts. Others expect a final response that would confirm them or verify that their analysis is finished; an expectation that they think will be sealed by a nomination.

– The pass can be considered as that which, retroactively, gives sense to the analysis undertaken. That is to say, the pass as an S2 to which is articulated the whole chain of the S1s of the analysis. Or the place from which what happened in his analysis can be questioned.

– In other cases, the pass is thought of as a last step to be taken in the process of the analysis. As if it were something prescribed, marking the end of the analysis.

In Medellin we heard that the pass has perhaps arrived at a limit point. It is hard to think so since the pass is anchored precisely in the hole in the Other. Is there something that could enclose the experience then? *Mutatis mutandi*, that made me think of what the genetic biologist said to the theologian Francisco Ayala who had asked him what we lack in terms of scientific knowledge, and he replied that we lack more than we lacked 50 years ago. He uses this metaphor:

“Scientific knowledge is like an island, and everything that we know is there. The ocean is what we do not know, and we are not able to ask the ocean, we are only able to look on the shore, on the edges of the island. If the perimeter of the island increases, knowledge also increases, but so does what we do not know. We can ask more questions, and thus there are more things that we do not know.”

Provided that the pass continues to pose questions for us, provided that we continue to expect something from it?

Translated from French by Susan Schwartz

¹¹⁵ The “key” is the stone that is placed at the highest point of the vault, in the centre, and it is that which diffuses the stress that keeps one half of the structure against the other. Thanks to the key, the stress is offset and the two parts of the vault support each other. It is the last piece that is put into place in the construction of an arch

Poetry and the languages of the pass
Susan Schwartz, Melbourne, Australia, ICG 2014-2016

To listen to a language that is familiar but not one's mother tongue is to listen with particular concentration to the speaker's mode of speech, tone and ease of expression, all of which affect one's reception of both the meaning of the words and their resonance. For the members of a cartel of the pass, the things that are heard, misheard or even not heard during the transmission of a testimony do not depend solely on the question of each member's mother tongue. Language is from the Other and, when one listens to a testimony, the effect of a certain distance from the linguistic source is propitious for the equivoques and ambiguities analogous to the sonorous material that is the foundation of *lalangue*. The fact that this is productive is very evident in the series of discussions amongst the members of the cartel following each testimony, and it places their receptivity to the fore. Our role, as members of the cartel, is to hear what has escaped the discourse of the passand's testimony but has been caught in the transmission of the passer.

In this brief reflection I would like to consider the effect of the multi-lingual nature of the cartels of the pass on what is transmitted by the passer to the cartel. There must be a verification of the indices of the turning points in the analysis, but it is essential that there is also an echo of the desire of the analyst resonating in the testimony of the passand. There is a double dimension of the movement from analysand to analyst – the fall of the Other, and the unprecedented desire to be the support of the *a*, the cause of unconscious desire for the analysand. To be an analyst, this position of “reject” must be taken up with enthusiasm, as Lacan tells us in the “Italian Note”¹¹⁶. It is up to the passer, if indeed he hears it, to make this enthusiasm evident to the cartel.

Lacan says in *Encore*, “it has become clear, thanks to analytic discourse, that language is not simply communication”.¹¹⁷ He is speaking of the enigmatic effects of *lalangue* that go beyond what the speaking being has the possibility of stating, the poetic resonance that indicates his singular name. In 1844, the American poet Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote of the poet as “Namer” and “Language-maker”, in the sense of being the one who, in a stroke of genius, invents each word that obtains currency “because for the moment it symbolized the world to the first speaker and to the hearer”.¹¹⁸ He comments that etymology shows “the deadest word to have been once a brilliant picture” and for this reason he calls language “fossil poetry”. For me, these words suggest the trace of the poetic, resonant quality that locates the foundations of language in the real. In the testimony of the passand, what can we detect of the subject as a poem being written?¹¹⁹

Among members of a cartel of the pass there may be three or four different mother tongues. These languages are Latinate, and in the case of English, derived from the Latinate, predominantly the French. But we each hear in a unique way, according to our own *lalangues*, and what is essential is that something is heard in common, like the moment of brilliance that is the striking of a new word, one that is taken up.

Beyond the languages of the pass there are the contingencies of the various forms of encounter, of the singular styles of passer and passand, of effect and affect. To put one's analysis to the test is a courageous act taken without any guarantee. And without doubt it is a risk, and part of that risk is the drawing of lots for the passer. The passer's style will have an effect on what is conveyed of the passand's discourse and the manner in

¹¹⁶ Lacan, J. “Note italienne”, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 309.

¹¹⁷ Lacan, J. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, *Encore* 1972-1973, trans. B. Fink, New York, WW Norton & Company, 1998, p. 139.

¹¹⁸ Emerson, Ralph Waldo. “The Poet”, 1844, <http://www.emersoncentral.com/poet.htm>

¹¹⁹ Lacan, J. “Preface to the English-Language Edition”, in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. A. Sheridan, New York, WW Norton & Company, 1998, p. viii.

which it is transmitted. This will affect, in turn, the cartel's reception of the testimony. But again, as with the plurality of languages in the cartel, these differences are productive and show that something is alive there. These contingencies lead us beyond the signifiers to question, to discuss and to locate what falls from this intersection of discourses. To reiterate: something of the real must pass to the cartel from the passand, something that is caught by all members.

What manifests in each testimony is the power of the passand's narrative, the history of their lived experience. What is not always so powerfully conveyed is the hystorisation of the analysis. Some passands do not sufficiently address the logical moments in their analyses, especially the turning points and the fall of the Other. Clearly the pass is not the place to test whether one has finished one's analysis. Taking my reference again from the "Italian note", the cartel awaits the transmission of the resonance of the desire of the analyst in the sayings of the passand. As Lacan emphasises, the analyst pertains to the "*pas-tout*". In other words the real must be taken into account as our mainspring of unknowable knowledge.¹²⁰

Our School is international and embraces the plurality of languages, cultures and experiences of psychoanalysis that are reflected in its membership. But for the cartel of the pass, it is not essentially a question of languages but of the *lalangue* of each member. This is the School's strength and it makes of the cartel a particularly sensitive receptor for both the discourse of the passand and what passes beyond that discourse. A poem translated into another language can capture the feeling and the meaning of the original but will both subtract and add something to it in the process. This is inevitable. But where written translation is the result of considered interpretation, translation that occurs in the moment of encountering the other's speech is interpretation whose source is the real of *lalangue*. Again Lacan's words in *Encore* are apposite: "Language is what we try to know concerning the function of *lalangue*."¹²¹ The multi-linguistic dimension of the cartel of the pass gives a depth to the process of verification of the passage from analysand to analyst, to the act of nomination and to what can be known about the singular effects of a psychoanalysis.

With regard to the cartels of the pass **Colette Soler, Paris, ICG 2014-2016**

For someone who, like me, has taken part in the cartels of the pass twice, first in 2006-2008 (and even before that, in the School of the Freudian Cause), then again, in 2014-2016, it is impossible to ignore [*méconnaître*] that the passands' discourse evolves with time. This is because the effect of the doxa of the group upon what is said in the pass is obvious, both on the side of the passands and the passers, and on the side of cartels. To simplify: in 2006 and even before then, at the SFC, the pass was only concerned with recognising the fantasy and the traversal of mourning. The identification with the symptom was not even in question then. In 2014 ... the real, *lalangue*, equivocalities, sound without sense, the letter outside sense, the impossible, the proper name, etc. started to appear in the testimonies.

The *dispositif* and the language of the Other

This theme comes up sometimes in the discussions of the cartels about the passes, and it does so in a rather negative way because sometimes one sees in this a sign of inauthenticity. On the side of the passands, it becomes even clearer when one reads their

¹²⁰ Lacan, J. "Note italienne", op. cit., p. 308.

¹²¹ Lacan, J. *Encore*, op. cit., p. 138.

texts after the pass. One cannot but notice that, at least at the moment, they evaluate the fact that they have been nominated or not in terms of the current themes. The texts of those who are nominated unfold in a way that explains their nomination. The others do the same, but in order to query their non-nomination. They ask, for example, what is missing? Is it the letter, the equivocalities of *lalangue*, etc?

This fact leads us to a theoretical question. Following Lacan, we consider as given, the fact that an analysis produces what we once called the “liquidation of transference” and, nowadays, the “fall of the subject supposed to know”. However, whether or not the passands speak in the *lalangue* of that Other that the community, as a group constitutes, they adjust themselves to the theses discussed by the latter. This indicates without a doubt that the community as a group has the function of the subject supposed to know.

I finally came to the conclusion that there is no reason for surprise or reproach because this phenomenon is inevitable in the structure of the *dispositif* invented by Lacan. This does not mean that there are no disadvantages to it, namely, the disadvantage that consists in encouraging the make believe [*semblant*] of knowledge.

Raising this question constitutes an opportunity to go back to the status of speech in the School, both in the *dispositif* and outside it. Lacan gave some valuable and unique indications at the start of *Television*, which go beyond what he had said previously in “Function and Field of Speech and Language”. He posited, essentially, that on television as well as in his teaching he spoke in the name of the “object” that the audience constitutes when it is listening. There is no distinction therefore between *Television*’s auditor and the audience at his seminar, “a gaze in both cases, which I don’t address in any case” he added. There is therefore a disjunction between the object that makes someone speak [*fait parler*], and the address. However, he refers to “speaking to” [*parler à*] those who know something about it (*qui s’y connaissent*), that is, the analysts. This distinction does not only apply to Lacan. The structure of speech itself implies a distinction between the one who listens, the auditor-object who makes someone speak and, on the other side, the one, or the ones, to whom he speaks. Besides, how could an analyst whose profession is based on listening to his analysands and who has, moreover, the “duty to interpret”, not be aware of a distinction that Socrates, the precursor, had already implemented in his time?

I come back to the *dispositif*. The passand is invited to speak about his analysis in a *dispositif* of speech where he knows, because he received the promise, which he may obtain (perhaps, because nothing is certain) from his interlocutor, the title Analyst of the School. It is therefore a structure that supposes, without any possible doubt ... the transference. Let’s not forget that speech, i.e. transference, is demand, demand addressed to a partner who can, and, in this case, who must, respond. Furthermore, the transference, I quote, “ha[s] no end but that of obtaining”....¹²² You recognise the phrase from the “Proposition on the Psychoanalyst of the School”. In a psychoanalysis the analyst-partner remains silent so that the analysand is forced to reveal his cards. However, in the *dispositif*, the jury-partner must give a response, either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. We are perfectly sure that a psychoanalysis can produce the fall of a subject supposed to the “knowledge without subject”, that is the unconscious, and also, sometimes, of the identification with the unspeakable object or, with the absence of reason with regard to the symptom. However, when the interlocutor is supposed to respond, this is not necessarily the end of the address to the subject supposed to know in speech. Certainly, a lot of passands assure us that they have goals other than “obtaining” the title, for example, the goal of verifying for themselves the accomplishment of their trajectory, and even of pursuing the analytic experience through other ways, etc., and we do believe them. However the end of the transference that aims at “obtaining” the response of the cartel supposed to know how to

¹²² Lacan, J., “Proposition of 9 October on the Psychoanalyst of the School”, trans. R. Grigg, *Analysis* no. 6, 1995, p. 7.

evaluate it, is always present, hence the disappointments. The latter show that the demand was there and that the testimony was in part – I am exaggerating here – plea.

There is certainly a big difference between the passand and Lacan in relation to his audience: Lacan did not expect remuneration from it, therefore he was not obliged to borrow his language from it and we know too well to what extent he pushed that liberty, which can only be attained by the one who does not ask for anything. This constitutes a very big difference from the passand. There is another important difference here with the presence of the passers. In the *dispositif*, the roles are distributed in the following way: there is the passand who comes and speaks about himself [*se dire*] to the passer, and the passer who listens. However, the one to whom the passand speaks in his demand is other, it is not there: it is the jury-cartel, supposed to know... how to listen or to recognise and then beyond that, there is the community.

An enlarged Other?

In 1967, Lacan justified the presence of the passers based on the idea that the passer was close to the passand due to the particular moment in which he found himself in his own analytic experience. I will add that the passer, in not being the one who decides, was susceptible to gathering testimonies whose authenticity had no chance of being heard by any jury. The reason is that a jury, for the very fact that it is asked to give a verdict, be it only in the form of expecting one, leads one to the temptation of saying what one supposes that it wants to hear. Well, with time, we now know that the invention of the passer, which while undoubtedly having other merits, is insufficient to counter this effect. The evolution of the passands' discourse according to the doxa, even through the injection of fragments of knowledge in the most authentic testimonies, fragments that circulate among the productions of the school, are a sure sign of this phenomenon.

In the cartels of the pass some lament this, but they are wrong, because it is an effect of structure and is, therefore, inevitable. At times, some even come to the conclusion that the less the passand knows about what is being worked on in the community and the more he testifies to being at the periphery of what is being elaborated there, the better. As if the passand's ignorance about the School and its doctrine constituted a guarantee of authenticity. I think they are wrong in this case because they forget to ask themselves: "to whom is he speaking", this passand who is virgin in relation to the doxa of the School? Beyond those who listen to him and all other passands, he knows enough to be waiting for the response of the cartel.

Beyond the passers and the jury, one can wonder what kind of interlocutor the community constitutes, the community that listens to those who were nominated, to those who were not nominated and, also, to the designated passers. We notice that in our School we are fond of these diverse testimonies. The latter are totally unprecedented, given what used to constitute the pass in Lacan's lifetime and in his School. Then, the question of the AS's presentation to the School of the testimony of their pass following the pass itself was never raised as such. Lacan expected the AS to speak only about psychoanalysis. The WAP inaugurated this practice, which puts the community in a place that still needs to be better defined, between that of the passer who listens, and that of the jury supposed to know and whoever makes the decision. Obviously, the one who listens, whether this be the passer or the audience of the School, well, he makes a judgment too. He judges without being in the position of deciding. And this opens up a space for possible disputes between the different judgments and not only on an imaginary level. This occurs in different ways: the passer who does not approve of the decision of the cartel, the public who strongly applauds the one who has not been nominated, as strongly as it contests the decision of the cartel or, on the contrary, the public who remains silent although it disapproves of the nomination. And the juries of the cartels go on protesting, emphasising the fact that the cartels are sovereign and that their decisions, aiming at something beyond

the bathroom scales (*pèse-personne*), cannot be discussed from any other place, that is, a place where one knows only ‘persons’ [*personnes*]. Yes, however it is necessary that the community of the School believe them, that it believe in their capacity to judge beyond the bathroom scales. However, “psychoanalysis today” as we like to call it, is developing in an epoch where, as is well known, the processes of destitution are on the agenda. Can we ignore this? In any case, I have come to the conclusion that since Lacan’s School, the pass has changed and it has done so *de facto*, by joining to it the public of the School which wants to listen to the cartels, to the passers, the passands, and to those who were nominated or not. I take note of (*je prends acte de*) this change which, by the way, seems to me to be going well with the spirit of the times, the latter being neither in favour of delegating the power to judge, nor to decide. The question is obviously one of knowing if, by conforming to the spirit of the times, we are not opposing the spirit of psychoanalysis? After reflection, I don’t think so. In effect, all members of the community of the School, whether as analysands, analysts, supervisees, supervisors, share a part of the analytic experience. This also applies to the members of the cartels of the pass, because they have nothing else to justify their being given the power to decide other than having been elected after, it is true, having been nominated either AMS or AS. The process is a democratic one and we do not have any other, however it does not constitute in any way an analytic guarantee. So, to where does one address an appeal [*en quel lieu faire appel*]? Lacan had already noticed that, for psychoanalysis, there is no other place to appeal but the community of experience itself. However, this term community that I am using here must designate, not simply a group of psychoanalyst members, but a School where one is analysed, not only to cope with the misadventures of everyday life because these are never ending, and for long enough not to be happy with therapeutic benefits only, and where one works in cartels, in supervision and elsewhere to question psychoanalysis itself. Once again, I reach the same conclusion: the priority is a School, a School that must function as a School.

The said nomination

The expression circulates: one is nominated AS, or not. However, AS is not a name, it is a title, in the same way one is nominated minister, museum director, etc. In all rigour, it does not touch on the being itself, but it participates in the promotion of a competence upon which one will be distinguished after having given some evidence, or at least a few bits of it. We look for these bits of evidence in the testimony of the pass before we try and say which ones have been retained. Lacan said of his pass that it was “as thin as a hair” [*mince comme un cheveu*]. With this title, he intended to “select” [*trier*], that is the term he used, a possible aptitude for a function, that of making oneself “Analyst of the School” or, in 1975, being able “to think about what they do”¹²³ or, again, in 1976, to “hystorise oneself of and from oneself” as an analyst. However, it is as if, with the judgment whereby the signifier AS is attributed, one touched on the core, on the very being of the analyst, who finds himself either confirmed or annulled. This is in spite of the fact that it always remained of the order of the “improbable” for each one, according to the term Lacan used to apply to analysis until he introduced the logic of the inconsistency of the “not-all”. It is different when it comes to a name. A name, a true one, does not concern the being, but rather what ex-sists by way of a real [*au titre d’un réel*]. A name does not have a signifier and it is precisely because of that that it can however have a name. Lacan said he was very surprised¹²⁴ by this irreducible over-reaction (*sur-réaction*) in the same way Freud is said to have been surprised by the emergence of the transference. Would this over-reaction

¹²³ Translator’s note: Lacan, J., 1985 *Geneva Lecture on the Symptom*, Analysis no.1, 1989, pp. 7-26: “we notice that this title, whether it is attributed or not, resonates for the subjects in question well beyond its limited scope. One cannot ignore it and to take it into consideration is very instructive.”

¹²⁴ Ibid.

come from the fact that every judgment of attribution of a signifier, here AS, “decrees, aphorises, makes an oracle”?¹²⁵ One could wish to believe that the perceived annoyance results from the fact that the judgment of the members of the cartel of the jury – a judgment that one likes to qualify as “intimate” (are there any judgments that are not intimate?) – does not specify the reasons. And the cartels of the pass are being asked to give reasons. No, they won’t give any and this is by definition: if there were any “reasons” for it, there would not be any judgment that ... recognises.

That recognises what, if not a singularity? This is because the structure is to be constructed, it is to be detected; it does not have to be “recognised” as such by one’s fellows. In saying that, it would be a mistake however to idealise singularity – even if it must be defended against all the standards that tend to cover it in common discourse – because singularity is a destiny. The fact that the cartels are waiting for it is the minimum one can demand of them. They don’t have to feel praise for it because the structure is only realised by singularities that have absolutely no need to be recognised in order to be. Their authentication in the pass, however, implies a change of great importance: it links one unary singularity to others. It has the effect, therefore, of creating a social link. When an AS is nominated, the whole community pays its tithes¹²⁶ and it pays the passands for their demand and their willingness to make use of the *dispositif* that Lacan made available to them.

The duty to authenticate

Therefore, we are talking about a judgment that recognises. But what is to be recognised? This question is asked by every member of the cartel, and is always based on the indications given by Lacan and relayed by the doxa of the School. There are many indications but all of them imply that in the pass, it is not the passand who is being scrutinised, neither his clinical structure, nor his being of desire nor of the symptom, all of which constitute the object of an analysis but not the object of the pass. In the *dispositif*, only the testimony that the analysand is able to give of his analysis, its trajectory and its results, is at stake and, more specifically, the change produced for the one who came to call himself an analyst. Therefore, will it be about authenticating a finished analysis and the process of its particular advances up to its “points of finitude” or, rather, the performance of the testimony even in cases where the process remains unfinished? In other words, is it about authenticating the subject’s capacity to think his own experience since, according to Lacan, the analyst is double? He is the one who operates in the treatment and also, the one who thinks his operation. The question is to be posed as such and the indications given by Lacan focus on both aspects.

First of all, we possess all the indications concerning the passand’s analysis. The first emphasis is on the moment of the turning point for the possible analyst with the conditions that are well laid out in the “Proposition on the Psychoanalyst of the School”: the traversal of the fantasy, which ensures the passage from the family romance of the trauma (if I may allow myself this condensation) to the silence of the “*traumatisme*”, to the words that are lacking (but not the images) for the being “object” [*l’être “objet”*], – whether the linguistic equivocalities are present or not – and which make being [*qui fait être*] “singularly and strong”.¹²⁷ Is that constituted by the end of an analysis or by a turning point that allows for the final phase? The debate has been open in the past and a lot of contributions have been made on that theme in our School. Lacan himself already

¹²⁵ Lacan, J., “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious” in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English* trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006, WW Norton & Co, New York and London, 2006, p. 809.

¹²⁶ Lacan, J., “Joyce le Symptôme” II p. 33, in *Joyce avec Lacan*, Navarin, Paris, 1987, and my article “L’Un tout seul et ses liens” in *Stylus* no. 33 and *Revue Champ Lacanien* n. 19 to be published in 2017.

¹²⁷ Lacan, J., *Discours à l’EFL*, Scilicet 2/3, Paris, 1970, p. 21.

decided at the time that it was necessary to make a distinction between the turning point of the pass and the end of analysis. However this debate is, in fact, now closed and everyone is speaking about nomination as the sign of the end of an analysis. And those who were not nominated are surprised: “But I thought I had finished ... Besides, in 1976, in his Preface to the English Edition of Seminar XI, Lacan himself added some considerations, which were less focused on the possibility of a hypothetical moment of turning point, than on the end of the analytic process. This time, the emphasis is not on the lack of words to say the truth of the object, but on the words that do not lack, the ones of the unconscious without a subject, a knowledge that is at the level of *jouissance* i.e., a real knowledge, because it is outside sense. The analysand will be satisfied with this real knowledge after having grasped little bits of it, and no more. He will never have the assurance of being able to transmit something of it – “one knows it” (*on le sait soi*) – nor of the result, because the latter remains in suspension in any case. At the same time, however, by entrusting the passand to hystorise his analysis in the process, Lacan puts the accent less on the analysis itself and on its end, than on the passand’s capacity to transmit something of it.

Among this profusion of indications, how is it possible not to interrogate what orients anyone’s judgment in the reception of a pass, as far as it is possible to circumscribe it? Obviously, everyone can only decide for oneself and not on their colleagues’ behalf. I am therefore taking the risk of doing so.

That which decides

I must say that in the discussions with the colleagues of our CIG - a truly excellent one which made some very good decisions – I have often felt a gap between my points of view and that of a few others concerning what orients the decisions of a cartel. I can only say it in my own name [*titre*] because, without any doubt, in the pass as well as elsewhere, what the auditor (passer or cartel) grasps has a double structure: first of all, his own pre-judices [*pré-jugés*], and secondly, his aim. These are the basics of the structure of speech as presented by Lacan in “Variations on the Standard Treatment”. They led Lacan to formulate that the one who listens is the “master of truth”, before saying later that the one who listens is in the position of a subject supposed to know. And effectively he is, because whatever constitutes the basis of his listening and the point of focus of his attention depends only on him. In analysis, for example, one knows very well that there is a difference between aiming at the words to say it, i.e. the signifiers, if not the phonemes of *lalangue* and/or at sense, and aiming at the One-saying *sinthome*, to use the latest formulations.

We agree that we expect testimonies of the analyst’s desire. I’d like to make two remarks on this point. The first one is based on experience: since the beginning of Lacan’s School, everybody agrees that there are no testimonies on the analyst’s desire. Lacan himself said it: obviously, I haven’t received any. This is for a good reason: the *dispositif* uses speech and, at the same time, it constitutes an impossible that relies on speech. In “The Direction of the Treatment”,¹²⁸ Lacan speaks of the incompatibility of desire with speech. This thesis dates from the “Direction of the Treatment”. Desire is unpronounceable however, it is pronounced. In analysis, one tries to “circumscribe” it through deciphering and through interpretation. But how is it in the pass? We know Lacan’s famous sentence, which is precisely about the analyst’s desire: to believe one has entered it and to have found oneself in it, is to be out of it for good. However, this exit is not just any exit, it constitutes a return to the analysing way [*la voie analysante*], to the

¹²⁸ Lacan, J., *Ecrits*, The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power, W.W. Norton & Co, New York and London, 2006, p. 530: ‘But desire is nothing but the impossibility of such speech...’

one which, precisely, attempts to formulate desire, until it stumbles upon the impossible. Moreover, isn't it because this desire is unpronounceable that one cannot authenticate it? And if this is the case, how does it happen?

Lacan offered an answer: the index of this desire is the analytic act. The unpronounceable analyst's desire is the desire supposed to the act. This desire is not itself without phenomenological indices. However, there is an "*aporia*" as well in the account given by the analysand, for the very fact that the act is not a subject. Rather, the act subverts the subject. However, the act is attested to through "its effects", says Lacan. In analysis, only those who have finished testify to the act of the one who has directed the treatment. This is why Lacan did consider nominating as AS the analysts of the analysands who were already nominated AS. However, when it comes to the passands, the effects of the act that instituted them as analysts cannot be recognised in the analyses they conduct or will conduct. Thus, one can only resort to the antecedents of the act, i.e. their own analysis, which, alone, can create the conditions, and no more than the conditions, before the effects can verify the act. So, what do we expect of what Lacan called "hystorisation" of an analysis in the testimony of the pass, in order to pronounce a nomination? In the end, isn't it necessary to confront this question without any detours?

You have already probably heard, since it has been a recurrent theme for some time, that in the pass, one does not wait for anything but a surprise. That one does not wait for anything is a pure lie, if not misrecognition (*méconnaissance*). As I have already said, one cannot listen without judging and without any presuppositions. This is a principal thesis about speech. Concerning surprise, one certainly waits for it in an analysis. In the same way, one looks at surprising the unconscious in it. However, in the *dispositif* of the pass, one does not have to wait for the surprise as it is already there, always, in every pass. However, the surprise is not always a good one. All passands come up with a surprise, those who are nominated as well as those who are not nominated. This cannot be any different, because the *dispositif* organises an encounter with what is most intimate in every singularity, and we cannot fail to find it in the pass. To be surprised by it is not a virtue and we have even seen – and this is not fiction – the case of a cartel that expected something so radically different that it ended up protesting against what surprised it in a first place.

So, what I look for is the assurance that the passand's testimony indicates, or rather, that it allows the perception that his analysis was pushed far enough to reach a certain point that will be the condition for the possibility of an act. In listening to my colleagues, I believe that most of them share this view. I have already said that analysis is what is at stake in the pass, and not the symptom-being of the passands. In other words, it is not about their clinical structure, although the *dispositif* provides a remarkable vantage point in that respect. It is not only neurotics who go through the pass. All the classical structures are represented in it and I will go back to this later. Of course, when the testimony does not give the assurance that there has been an analytic trajectory, this does not mean that the trajectory did not take place. Experience and testimony about experience are two different things. However, in this case, an insufficient "hystorisation" will blur the reading of an analytic trajectory, which in turn will constitute an obstacle to a nomination.

Hystorisation. This term has had much success for quite some time now! Applied to analysis, it has precise and multiple connotations. However it indicates in the first place that what is at stake here is to give a narrative of what happened under transference, if possible from the point of entry to that of exit. To hys-torise oneself, even when it is written with a hyphen that divides the word in order to evoke the torus of neurosis, is about fabricating the romance of one's own torus. Hysteria tells stories, always; it is part of its structure and that is its virtue. This is the reason why I use the Freudian term 'romance'. However, I write the word without the hyphen. One cannot deny that the testimony of the pass is a narrative made for a double audience, one comprised of two

passers. Therefore, it has a structure both of speech and of language. This is the reason why, as in the *Witz*, it can pass through the filter of the passers, except when the latter constitute a screen, and this happens sometimes when they allow something heard that is not part of the narrative, but that will remain unheard without the narrative. The pass cannot be out of the structure of speech. What is said of the narrative can, on the one hand, bring out the Ones of the unconscious, of the sound without sense, of the letter which cuts through the sounds and, on the other hand, the impossibility of filling the *troumatisme* of the lack in knowledge and the impossible to say (*dire*) and, finally, of all the guises that the real takes, to use our common language of the moment. But what we are looking for is precisely what is un-common, what is specific to that singular passand. The real unconscious is certainly specific to each one, however it cannot reach us without a narrative where, as in any historical narrative, sense can only be present. Therefore, no isolated, or local, or erratic element of the unconscious, or again any concluding saying (*dire*) will be sufficient for making an analytic trajectory readable. Too much importance has been given to the “beyond sense” from the time we started putting the emphasis on the function of *lalangue*. There is certainly some “outside sense”, we name it “the real “, and an analysis can and must aim at it, as I emphasised. However, nothing can stop the “leaking of sense” in speech. One rightly emphasises the recognition of the outside sense [*hors sens*], one insists on the necessity of the emergence of linguistic equivocalities, of the enigmatic real letters. I don’t deny it: the fabric of the unconscious made of *lalangue* is made of the outside sense and of the erratic elements that condense jouissance. However, there is a ‘but’: on the one hand, what is being grasped is always a “lucubration”, that is an attempt at grasping some knowledge in *lalangue*. This is valuable because in an analysand it constitutes an index of his access to the real unconscious. However, one cannot make of it the key for identifying the analytic effects, especially since some subjects have access to it from the origin, that is, structurally.

Here is an example to clarify what I have said. Lacan’s sentence, “I am a poem and not a poet, this is what I would have brought to the pass if I had been through it”, has been widely commented on. Well, for sure, he would not have been nominated if he had not said anything more. This is because we have here a very condensed and precise proposition, which arrives, as we know, as a conclusion to a vast work of elaboration. It is, to speak properly, a “saying” (*dire*), which does not only imply that he has become aware that the unconscious speaks without him, but also, that his conception of the unconscious and its relations to the subject is inferred and clarified by all the previous sayings of his teaching, and this convinces us. However, let’s imagine a passand who might present a similar condensed conclusion without saying anything about the trajectory that led to it? One would expect that he make his assertion credible by basing it upon what was modified in his trajectory, upon the transformations and the retroactive light that the analytic work brought to his *sympt-trauma* at the point of entry. Moreover, we would even expect him to indicate the remainder of the opaque symptom that would certainly remain present. If not, how could we recognise a saying in it, the saying that his analyst made “ex-sist”? How to even recognise the One-saying sinthome of his analysis, if it does not lead to the perception that the major sayings that unfolded during the work of his analysis have found their unity in it, if not their quilting point (*point de capiton*)? The nature of the signifier outside sense is constitutive, but analysis proceeds through the saying in act and in particular, for the analysand, the act of demand. Besides, analysis aims at making “a saying ex-sist” via the succession of the subject’s sayings of truth. The latter never fail to convey the subject’s castration and their half sayings (*mi-dire*) do not fail either in cutting through the postulate of the subject supposed to know. However, the One-saying has yet another function, a more inclusive one, if I may say: it supports the nodal One of the metabolism of desire and jouissance, specific to each one. These formulations, which were produced at the end of Lacan’s teaching, and not by chance, have the advantage of having

a trans-structural impact. As I already said, all the classical clinical structures are present in the pass and they are easily recognisable, based on my own experience. But in any case, analysis is in question. Unless one considers that there is a standard treatment for each structure, one will ask of the testimony of a psychotic and of a neurotic that it transmit how his analysis was, how it operated upon the symptoms he identified at the point of entry, whatever they might have been, how his analysis eventually re-oriented the desire conveyed by his interpretation in fantasy and, finally, what the balance is.

I conclude by using an analogy, again to make myself better understood. Lacan said about biographies that, sometimes, when a biography is well written, one can perceive in it the unique phrase that organised a whole life. There is something of it in the hystorisation that one makes, not of one's life, the one that has already been hystorised in analysis, but of one's analysis: one ought to perceive in it the unity of all of one's options, all of one's sayings, no matter in what *lalangue* this unity occurred. Also, one ought to perceive in it the link between the singular symptoms at the point of entry and the changes at the end, changes that the subject will be able to testify to, as well as to their retroactive effects. Aiming at the One, whether it is said simply by evoking "the phrase" that orients a life, or via the sinthome-saying whose access is more difficult, applies in all cases to all structures. According to Lacan's expression, the One is made to ex-sist in an analysis in order to be read in a pass, and this is the only way to suspend not only the social norms of discourse, starting from the sexual ones, but also all the norms that come from psychoanalysis itself in the judgments of the pass. These are sometimes masked by some concern about the clinical structures – which certainly ought to be identified, but not evaluated in the pass. In effect, one understands – at least I hope – that for the one who allows his One-saying to be read in his testimony, this does not imply that he enunciate it because his One-saying is to be inferred from his sayings. This is homologous in fact to the saying "I am a poem and not a poet" that I evoked earlier. For that particular passand, there is no need anymore to ask if his castration is sufficiently assumed, his transferential credulity sufficiently reduced, if his relationship to knowledge is the right one, if he has sufficiently taken the measure of his "non-knowledge" (*non-savoir*), if he has traversed his fantasy, if he has elucidated his symptom-relation to his partner or, if his structure is compatible with analysis, etc. It is the proof by the One-saying, a proof that also requires verification through its effects.

Paris, 9 January 2017

Translated from French by Chantal Degril

*Tracing of jouissance, interpretation and the end*¹²⁹

Ricardo Rojas

I return to a dream, considered in the literality of the testimony of one of our Analysts of the School, School of Psychoanalysis of the Forums of the Lacanian Field, presented at Vigo on October 1st, 2015. She called this testimony *Fog...*:¹³⁰ *I am sitting on a bed surrounded by cockroaches. I want to step down, but I cannot, because if I step down I would step on the cockroaches, and if I step on them they would go 'CRACK' (...)... 'What is crack?', the analyst asks. 'A noise'. End of the session.*

In the same testimony she provides the analytic community with a few important elements in relation to the signifier *cockroach* [*cucaracha*].¹³¹ The phantasmatic plot that

¹²⁹ This is the individual product of the work of the Cartel No. 3 of the International College of the Guarantee 2014-2016 on the theme: 'The knowledge that passes...'

¹³⁰ Vidal, C. *Niebla...* Testimony of the pass. Vigo, October 1st, 2015. Unpublished.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

she constructs involves the mother, who on the occasion of choosing the name of the passand found it difficult to do it; so that she took her own name, added the name of the godmother to it, as well as the name of the saint of her birthday, which was the same name of an uncle. This resulted in a name composed of three names, which the passand regarded as extravagant, which the mother ended up not using, calling her daughter *cucaracha* instead, a name that was simplified by her brothers to *cuca*. In her testimony she spoke of the sense that she could extract from the maternal acting-out, which she explained as the *oxymoron* resulting from the mother's difficulty in assuming her name and surname as a married woman, which is the same as the passand's own name. Furthermore, for the mother it was not necessary to be supported by any signifier, which was expressed through her desire that no name be inscribed on her gravestone. With this insignia taken from the Other – she concluded – she makes or constructs a name for herself, as a defence 'in the face of the real of the nameless, of the Other that does not exist, making "Cucaracha" exist'.¹³² Her life was centered around that signifier, which according to her expressed a fainting desire that was not enough for life, through a call to the other in search for support, 'whose consequence was unfailingly the feeling of being crushed [in her existence] by the weight of that other, under a signifier, a "...poor Cuca", that closed the infernal circle.'¹³³ This enabled her, 'away from the complaints and reproaches sustained by the different significations that the nickname "Cucaracha" maintained throughout the whole analysis, to catch a glimpse of the object that she had been for the maternal Other.'¹³⁴

Agreeing with this fragment as if it were a whole thing could have been the final destiny of this analysis, had it remained with a form of certainty obtained through grasping that signification of the symptom. But there was another turn, another stretch, and a doubt emerged as to the ultimate signification, making it possible to see that there is a beyond a signification with which a reinterpretation of life is produced. This required a work of re-elaboration of her unconscious-interpreter, on the basis of a number of dreams during the final phase, as well as the work of interpretation of her analyst.

In the Cartel No. 3 of the International College of the Guarantee we had, over a few months, the experiences of the Cartels of the Pass that studied the testimonies, while in our Cartel we examined the texts, mainly those by Lacan, as it is evident that without a reference to texts the experience would be simply a mystical experience. In this Cartel of the ICG I was able to verify that the experience of the analyses transmitted through the testimonies illustrate clearly the theoretical elaborations that orientate our work. This was a feeling I had already experienced with the Cartels of the Pass. I then expressed that one of the two testimonies that we heard contained elements that were practically an illustration of some remarks made by Lacan in relation to the end of analysis in the last session of *Seminar XI*, on the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis.¹³⁵

Our readings in the Cartel took us to the seminar held by Lacan at Sainte-Anne, *Le savoir du psychanalyste* [*The knowledge of the psychoanalyst*],¹³⁶ and more precisely in relation to what we are discussing, the session of 4th May 1972.¹³⁷ On that occasion Lacan made a few important remarks for the analyst as much as for those who listened to the testimony of a passand through the account of the two passers. He insisted that one should

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Lacan, J. *The Seminar Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*. London, Tavistock, 1977.

¹³⁶ Lacan, J. *Séminaire XIX, Le savoir du psychanalyste* [*The knowledge of the psychoanalyst*], the first three and a half lessons of which have been published as a separate text under the heading of *Je parle aux murs* (Paris, Seuil, 2011). The remaining sessions were included by the editor of the Seminar in *Le Séminaire, Livre XIX, ...ou pire, 1971-1972* (Paris, Seuil, 2011). [Unpublished English translations available at lacaninireland.com]

¹³⁷ Lacan, J. *Le Séminaire, Livre XIX, ...ou pire, 1971-1972* (Paris, Seuil, 2011), pp. 149-165.

not understand too quickly nor pass onto subjectivation, including oneself among the effects of discourse and consequently reducing everything to a mere signifying formalism that ordains the effects of knowledge. Lacan said that ‘one should not skip a signifier’ – one should not skip that essential element; one should not skip the signifier ‘that makes the change of level possible’ and which produces for a moment ‘a feeling of contradiction’.¹³⁸ He emphasized that what one should do is to remain with that signifier and not to skip it, since moving along and bypassing it would imply to understand too quickly.

Let us consider the dream of our analysand, taken to the pass as a passand, and the analyst’s interpretation. If the analyst had understood too quickly, filling the signifier *cucaracha* with sense, the understanding would have only been ‘naïve knowledge’ and would have covered up the tracing of the real imposed upon jouissance. The analyst would have proceeded like a ‘nominalist’ who only takes into account ‘the representations of the subject’ [his imaginary montage].¹³⁹ It would have been the case of an analyst who, for instance, had interpreted that the signifier *crack* meant the representation of the crushing of the analysand’s existence by the preeminence of the phantasmatic phrase ‘poor Cuca’. But this passand’s analyst did not intervene in order to provide more sense, but in agreement with Lacan’s indication of the quoted session of his Seminar: in relation to what is called interpretation, the analyst intervened ‘in her discourse providing her with the supplement of a signifier’.¹⁴⁰

It is interesting to note in this case the interpretation of someone who tells the analysand: ‘*What is crack?*’ The analyst stops at a signifier, *crack*. The analyst does not skip the signifier *crack*, which makes the change of level possible. This is an onomatopoeic contradictory signifier of something that breaks apart and which clearly conceals the tracing of jouissance. This is also an interpretation that, to use the expression of *Seminar XI*, maintains the distance between *I*, the ego ideal, and the *a*, the object small *a*, and this leads the analysand to abandon her identifying idealization. This is an interpretation that keeps the distance between the nicknamed *Cuca* – an insignia taken from the Other, that sees that she is being seen by the cockroach, horrified by the lethal circulation of the tracing of jouissance. Lacan answers the question *What is psychoanalysis?* by saying: *It is the mapping out of what is understood as obscure, of what is obscured in understanding, because of a signifier which marked a point of the body.*¹⁴¹ The obscure is represented by the *fog*, and the signifier *cucaracha* marked the body.

At the end of the session of the Seminar on *The knowledge of the psychoanalyst*,¹⁴² Lacan wonders whether, on the basis of the schema of the psychoanalytic discourse, one is able to answer the question: What is the product of placing the subject at the level of the jouissance of speaking? He remarks that the product is a signifying production, that of the S_1 , a new signifier – *crack* in the case that we have examined – a signifier outside any signification, One of absolute difference, One of a simplified repetition that puts an end to a vain repetition, a repetition that is always the same, the vain repetition of the symptom, a symptom that becomes cornered, without any other possible choice but that... or worse as there is no other knowledge but the One.

To conclude, it only remains a reflection, already advanced by Lacan in *Seminar XI: After placing the subject in relation to the a, the experience of the fundamental fantasy becomes the drive*¹⁴³ [a looking at being looked at by the look becomes a voice, a ‘crack’,

¹³⁸ Ibid., pp. 150-151.

¹³⁹ Ibid. p. 155.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 155.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. p. 151.

¹⁴² Ibid. p. 165.

¹⁴³ Lacan, J. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, op. cit., p. 273.

S₁, a new signifier without sense]. Lacan speaks of the pass as a way of approaching the opaque relation with the drive and of getting to know how, after the crossing-over of the fantasy, in a beyond of the analysis, the subject experiences the drive. This theme is studied in *Seminar XXIII, The sinthome*,¹⁴⁴ around the question of the *knowing-how-to-do-with*, and in *Seminar XXIV* around the *identification with the sinthome* and the place of the letter at the end of the analysis. As for the beyond, the passand also showed us a whole piece of work on the signifier *fog* in her analysis and in her experience of the pass. There was a swarm of signifiers at the end, with several signifiers, as in the swarm there is more than one signifier, as in the end of the analysis there is more than one interpretation, another turn to arrive at *the fall of the subject supposed to know with the 'there is something of the real that has not been touched'* [interpretation of the analyst], *which produces almost simultaneously the crossing-over of the fantasy and the fall of the Other, as it transforms the signifier Cucaracha in sinthome*,¹⁴⁵ or resolution of the equation of the desire of the analyst.

Translated from Spanish by Leonardo S. Rodríguez

The experience of the ICG

Maria Teresa Maiocchi

“... Quindi, alla fin fine, l'unica cosa che si può fare per la Scuola –perché un desiderio di Scuola lo vorremo ben diffondere!– l'unica cosa che si può fare è farla funzionare; ed è la stessa cosa che si può dire per la psicoanalisi.” C. Soler, Milano, 17 maggio 2015

“Plus on est de saints, plus on rit, c'est mon principe, voire la sortie du discours capitaliste, — ce qui ne constituera pas un progrès, si c'est seulement pour certains.” J. Lacan, 1975¹⁴⁶

At the end of two years in the ICG (2014-2016) I would like to give an account – for myself, for the work we have done together, and for the Italian colleagues who elected me – and to share how being in the ICG has been an experience of the School, and has had a particular impact on me. On the side of the international, this was in the objectivity of the advances made and the work realised, and personally, it was the great teaching. There have been truly “singular” contributions, with the notable nuances that, as Lacan showed, we must recognise with this term, and also the affect of the School that was engendered, but was not expected. The decisive support and indefatigable revitalisation of which Colette Soler is capable can be added to this is.

What is the task of the School in its intensive epistemic dimension and also in the “social” reality that is played out in the analysand’s regulated and liveable links? In the cartel of the ICG, as in the ephemeral cartels of the pass, there was an experimenting, a testing of a reality made psychic, a way of living and of thinking [*forma mentis*], the

¹⁴⁴ Lacan, J. *The Sinthome, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016.

¹⁴⁵ Vidal, C. *Niebla*, op. cit.

¹⁴⁶ Lacan, J. *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1990, p. 16. “The more saints, the more laughter; that’s my principle, to wit, the way out of capitalist discourse – which will not constitute progress, if it happens only for some”.

testing of a knotting and a re-knotting of various dimensions, in a group that was not small: 16 people, of very different cultures and with their own experiences, covering a very broad geography.

Work, demanding work, but above all meeting the new, even the traumatic sometimes, in an elaboration of knowledge that made its “gay” nature emerge. “A/effective” experience of the link.

It is mad for someone to refuse to identify with the group ... Lacan tells us, but “by that, I am not saying to what extent they have identified themselves with the group ...”¹⁴⁷

Everyone will have had an original response in assuming, up until the end, the Lacanian question: “... the aporia particular to the analytic group” as Colette Soler says, between the dimension of “being associated”, and that of radical singularity. It’s a question – and a teaching – that the work of the ICG has constantly aimed to put in play: “The starting point of every social knot is constituted, I say, from the lack of the sexual relation as hole,” says Lacan.

A School lies exactly there: a group of the scattered and ill assorted that can nevertheless make a link, not *in spite of* but *because of*. Neither association nor mass, nor even an anti-group, but the place “in which the original dispositives privileging the transference to psychoanalysis, could compensate the obscenity [of the group].”¹⁴⁸ The School is thus its dispositives, whether in the sense of the Local Dispositives, or in the sense of the dispositives that are put into action, which are in themselves acts constituting, for the School, the most specific dimension, the pass, the cartel: *Kern unseres Wesen* [core of our being] of our being-doing School.

Over the course of these two years of frequent and regular meetings – two whole days every three months and a monthly meeting of the international cartels thanks to Skype – an assiduousness that has been affirmed and that is put at play in a personal capacity and gives a verification. A series that makes for seriousness. To face in detail – in relation to the instant of the look, the time for understanding and the moment to conclude, decided by the touching of the real at stake – themes and progress of the *happening* [*advenir*] (of the) School, the advent [*avènement*] of School, this is politics, the only type that interests us, the politics of psychoanalysis, and in particular the passes studied, each one involving listening for the *dit-mension* [saying-dimension] of the *particular* – the symptomatic history of the passand – and the singular hystorisation of its course as *sinthome*, the writing succeeding in a new knotting, a new writing of a hole, consenting to the accumulation of a knowledge specific to the original dimension of *our experience of School*.

Given the discretion that is asked of them at the level of institutional organs, what are the relations of the members of the ICG with the Dispositive that elected them? This seems to me to be a crucial theme, one that the work in the cartels of the ICG evoked in me in highlighting the cartel as an unprecedented link that forces the temporal and spatial incompatibilities, the novelty and knot of the outgoing ICG. The cartel has constituted the reference point of the *modus operandi* of the all the work, both in the cartels of the pass, and of the ICG. Without making too strong a point, the cartel has become, *de facto*, the point of radicalisation of the experience of a knowledge that shows, in act, its vital point

¹⁴⁷ Je cite le pas: “L’identification dans Freud, c’est tout simplement génial. Ce que je souhaite, c’est quoi : l’identification au groupe. Parce que c’est sûr que les êtres humains s’identifient à un groupe. Quand ils ne s’identifient pas à un groupe, ben ils sont foutus, ils sont à enfermer. Mais je ne dis pas par là à quel point du groupe ils ont à s’identifier. Le départ de tout nœud social se constitue, dis-je, du non-rapport sexuel comme trou. Pas de deux : au moins trois, et ce que je veux dire, c’est que même si vous n’êtes que trois, ça fera quatre. La « plus-une » sera là ...” (J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire XXII, R.S.I. (1974-75)*, leçon du 15 avril 1975). Inédit. Voir: <http://www.valas.fr/Jacques-Lacan-RSI-1974-1975>, p. 288. Trans. Note: for an English translation see Cormac Gallagher, www.lacanireland.com

¹⁴⁸ C. Soler, *Les affects lacaniens*, Paris, Seuil, 2011, p. 158.

of emptying out, knowledge that passes, that happens, advents of the real The partial summaries of the work that have been made, even in their points of suspension, the putting into act of a cartel on a panel in Barcelona, *qua* cartel, the links to the texts that have been cited, referring from one to the other, showed the “making it work” [*la faire fonctionner*] that the ex-sistence of a School requires. The work of a School is the School at work.

It is from there that I note that it is from the work of the cartel that I have drawn energy to advance along the path of doing [*faire*] in my Dispositive, from the side of the initiatives to put into action, and their style, marked exactly by the experience of the cartel, preparatory works, a Seminar of the School, putting in act local Spaces of the School: a work of construction of a place, a base of operations to confront – with regard to a specificity of the experience and the contribution of others – a School. Lacan gave this place the name “School” precisely in order to put into tension the associative dimension with that of an encounter and of an elaboration, a former style, one that demands a localised experience in which a desire for knowledge is animated, incarnated and located in the structure, that which even signifies “all alone”.¹⁴⁹ The solitude of the act is not the solitude of its effects, lone is not “the only” The extraordinary currency of “*Discours du 6 décembre à l’EFP*”.

In other words, we could easily be misled by this proverbial, “the more saints, the more laughter ...” that Lacan shows us with his logic in *Television*. A gay plurality comes with the experience of the School: Lacan does not spare himself there, his terms are explicit, even saying “gay, even *gamin*”¹⁵⁰ thus: gaiety, good humour, enthusiasm, joy in our work, satisfaction at the end, the pass as *Witz*, etc. With these key terms – especially in 1970, thus when the pass was launched and ... it was not so successful – we must measure ourselves, for a School of the pass is a School with respect to enthusiasm for discourse: for textual knowledge, for new signifiers and emerging practices that eclipse fatigue by privileging this “chance to at least be located in the structure”,¹⁵¹ that makes the unconscious a place to live.¹⁵²

To be in the work of the unconscious: work [*travail*], a word that evokes *oeuvre*, as “*travaglio*”, “*travail*” – which, in Italian is always used for the period of labour before giving birth; always separation, *se-parer* from the Other, even from the absolute Other that fixes us until the end within its empty orbit, as we heard recently in Paris. Work which bears fruit, in order not to stay imprisoned by an endless mourning, by the “beautiful soul’s” pointless complaint, and especially, in current conditions, by psychoanalysis *under attack* [in English in the original] particularly in the university discourse – and often in several ways – and even from analysts themselves: a work of transference [*travail de transfert*] without “work transference” [*transfert de travail*] to psychoanalysis itself in risking staying suspended, stuck to the imaginary (therapeutic) of an Other that guarantees, where it is in fact a matter of arriving at a singular writing, a singularity of writing, that touches the real with the poem that is each one of us.

Translated from French by Susan Schwartz

¹⁴⁹ “On n’est pas si seuls. Somme toute.” dit la fameuse dédicace de Lacan à Philippe Sollers, à son volume des *Ecrits*.

¹⁵⁰ Lacan, J., “*Allocution sur les psychoses de l’enfant*”, *Autres écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 2001, p. 363.

¹⁵¹ Lacan, J., *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, p. 5

¹⁵² See, in this Wunsch, M N Jacob-Duvernet’s presentation given in Medellin, “Colour of pass”.

The pass and the clinic, the question of “*hystorization*”

Gabriel Lombardi

It is fifty years since Lacan wrote the “Proposition”, a little less since its implementation. Our work in the ICG has been arduous and interesting; I have been surprised by its consequences and have been left with the impression that some of those consequences are yet to be elaborated. The Freudian dispositive – less complex in its composition – required many practitioners and a longer duration so that their results could be clear; the changes that this involved at the level of the clinic, of the conception of the positions of being and of the *parlêtre's* real ex-sistence, as well as its "sole conceivable object", the cause of desire, had to wait more than 60 years to be partially clarified.

I would like to testify here about some personal impressions and some questions that were left open for me after this, my second period, on the ICG.

A renewed perspective on analysis. The elaboration, the questions and the decision of the cartel of the pass have turned around *transmission*. The question about what is at stake in the termination of analyses and in the access to the desire of the analyst were no longer answered according to the criteria followed by the doctrine of the time. Rather, the responses leaned towards what the cartel/jury considered to have passed, or not, through the passers, with regard to the passand's experience of analysis, and finally, of his pass from analysand to analyst.

The *absence of valid criteria for all the cases* suggests returning to the radical insufficiency of all preaching in relation to the position of the analyst. Nothing, no one, no subject can be predicated “analyst”, Lacan said, and the nomination of ASs reminds us of the forcing through which some questions are solved in collective logic (assertion of anticipated certainty) as in mathematical logic (axiom of choice or hypothesis of the continuum). The time for reflection in the cartel of the pass is brief, some hours, two or three days maximum, their decision – implying a finite temporal limit – is performed in the temporal mode of grasping, constrained by its international composition and the peremptoriness of return flights.

The strength of this dispositive is remarkable and is different from the treatment, in that it *puts to the side questions of the classic clinic of psychoanalysis*. The essential questions turn around the position of the passer as "sensitive plate", of his aptitude to transmit the passand's new desire, even an effect of enthusiasm, or rather, the obstacles interposed by the passer in the transmission, such as the aversion and/or the identification of the passer with the passand. This recalls Lacan's saying: “the passer is the essence of the pass”. It is enthralling for offering us an outline of what is discussed in analysis, in its resolutive phase, for those who choose the analyst's desire, as its clarification, even be it partial, should also succeed through an indirect testimony.

There is a surprising disconnection between the pass and what I would call the "old clinic" of Freud and Lacan. The particularities, those that still weigh heavily in the clinic (neurosis, psychosis, perversion, male, female, hetero or homosexual) were barely a part of the debates in the cartels of the pass I participated in, even though there were four nominations of AS. This *purity of the moment of the pass, freed from the clinical particularities*, has been meticulously nurtured in the cartels and also in the ICG, the body that establishes the cartels, and which receives and registers the most salient of the results they gathered.

Another surprise, perhaps connected to the previous one, was the precariousness of the reflections on hystorization (a neologism introduced by Lacan in the Preface of 1976), in the internal debates of the ICG.¹⁵³ The Lacanian idea, as I understand it, invites you to return to the steps of experience, in order to situate the support taken by the analysis in the hystorization of the symptom, that is the push to go via the hysteric position that constitutes the only type of symptom (divided subject) that poses its question from a position of semblance or agent in the social link. That passage is not only restricted to women, it is also for men, for hysterics and obsessionals; and subjects from other clinical types also have to go that way in order to have an experience of analysis.¹⁵⁴ The results gathered so far echo the expression “*épars desassortis*» (scattered ill-assorted) from the “Preface”, everyone singular, which is not bad, but is insufficient with respect to so called *hystorization*, which would require returning to the symptom; and *the symptom can only be circumscribed in its particularity*. The results of the pass are connected with the fact that “not all” the ASs come from the same clinical type, the same sex, the same position in reference to the mythical and fundamental real of the father, nor from the same type of object relation, heterosexual or homo. In the testimonies, all these structural data usually remain in the closet.

That “*hystorization*” indicated by Lacan evidently refers to his idea of *hystorization in the analysis*, with that “y” (epsilon) of Greek origin, which French usually employs for hysteria, but not for history (“iota” in Greek). Whatever the clinical type the symptom of origin might be, whatever the fundamental symptom is, the analysand must have passed, in his analytic experience as such, not only through the analyst’s discourse, which puts him to work from his division as subject *a\$*, but also through his analysing reaction in another discourse, and particularly in the hysteric’s discourse (*\$S_I*, “the discourse effectively sustained by the analysand”).

The *relationship of the hysteric’s discourse with that of science* converges with the impression that “every analysand” should pass through that mode of social link. Anyway, the question arises for me whether the hystorization of the analysis itself could not include the support encountered by the passand in his fundamental symptom, that which precedes and underlies its specifically social form, that is, hysteric.

During the two ICGs in which I participated, I only heard talk of psychosis in the case of some requests for the pass that had not been accepted. This happened as if the candidates admitted were considered explicitly and tacitly to be cases of neurosis, as if the

¹⁵³ Lacan, J., The Preface to the English-Language Edition. In *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*. London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. ix. See “I have therefore designated as “pass” ... verisimilitude.”

D’où j’ai désigné de la passe cette mise à l’épreuve de l’hystorisation de l’analyse, en me gardant, cette passe, de l’imposer à tous parce qu’il n’y a pas de tous en l’occasion, mais des épars désassortis. Je l’ai laissée à la disposition de ceux qui se risquent à témoigner au mieux de la vérité menteuse.

Je l’ai fait d’avoir produit la seule idée concevable de l’objet, celle de la cause du désir, soit de ce qui manque. Le manque du manque fait le réel, qui ne sort que là, bouchon. Ce bouchon que supporte le terme de l’impossible, dont le peu que nous savons en matière de réel, montre l’antinomie à toute vraisemblance.

¹⁵⁴ See The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, trans. R. Grigg. New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2007, p. 33, beginning with the paragraph « I hear a lot said about the discourse of psychoanalysis ... » J’entends beaucoup parler de discours de la psychanalyse, comme si cela voulait dire quelque chose. Si nous caractérisons un discours de nous centrer sur ce qui est sa dominante, il y a le discours de l’analyste, et cela ne se confond pas avec le discours psychanalysant, avec le discours tenu effectivement dans l’expérience analytique. Ce que l’analyste institue comme expérience analytique peut se dire simplement — c’est l’hystérisation du discours. Autrement dit, c’est l’introduction structurelle, par [P 36.] des conditions d’artifice, du discours de l’hystérique, celui qui est ici indiqué d’un grand H. J’ai essayé de le pointer l’année dernière en disant que ce discours existait, et qu’il existerait de toute façon, que la psychanalyse soit là ou non. Je l’ai dit d’une façon imagée en lui donnant son support le plus commun, celui d’où est sortie pour nous l’expérience majeure, c’est à savoir le détour, le tracé en chicanes, sur lequel repose ce malentendu que, dans l’espèce humaine, constituent les rapports sexuels. J. Lacan. Séminaire L’envers de la psychanalyse. *J. Lacan, Leçon du 17 décembre 1969.*

passage through the analysand's discourse excluded other options, at least for being admitted to the effective working of the pass. Even the question about subjective position with respect to the father as a real reference, which could be posed systematically, is not currently a preoccupation for the members of the ICG. And perversion in the male is no longer spoken about. *The diagnosis as to clinical type* is a knowledge of classification, which, if it is not neurosis, implies a value judgment that is apparently offensive and disqualifying. This is contrary to the way we work in our Zone, where we study not only the deficits, but also the benefits that perversions and psychosis contribute with regard to the social bond. For Lacan, these three great clinical types of symptom not only form the set of analysable symptoms, but also the three normal forms of desire.

A *critique of psychoanalytic judgment* is required in the future to avoid the current perspective according to which we owe everything to neurosis, and that it is the best filiation for the analyst, if not the only one. Certainly there are schools less open to this type of question than ours. A member of the *Escuela Freudiana de la Argentina* (Freudian School of Argentina) denounces as inappropriate the fact that ASs talk about their passes in public. They do not agree that what the ASs have published about their own passes should be considered material to be worked on. The risk of obscenity is thus combated with obscurantism, forgetting the Lacanian suggestion that between public and private life, there is the analysing life, which is not something to be frightened of, especially if, instead of being content with fantasies, we take account of the essential clinical reference: the symptom in the neuroses, the perversions and the psychoses, the symptom in so far as it is analysable and can be unstuck from its fantasmatic adhesions. This symptom, is equivalent to the division of the subject as in the treatment it becomes intolerable, impossible to bear, and thus has a chance of being resolved.

It would be interesting if we could go back to Freud and Lacan's penchant for weaving the heuristics that guided them in the hystorization specific to each one, and not only from the basis of neurosis. Fliess and Aimée had an influence here, as did their own non-neurotic possibilities: "if I were more psychotic, I would probably be a better analyst", Lacan said, and maybe it was not a joke. But that is not yet a topic of debate in our School. This New Critique of Judgment would not only require, as in the treatment, paying with one's intimate judgment, but also with what one can say about it in the internal debates of the ICG. The current references would not only be those taken into account by Freud and Lacan: Kant and Brentano among others. There are current reflections that can be considered in this debate, even if only in order to depart from them. Let us take as sample the position which amuses Pascal Quignard: "What I lose in the faculty of judging (comparing) I gain in the capacity to think (meditate). There is no longer a point of view in my vision. The idea of killing, or of hierarchizing, or of electing, has been withdrawn".

It could be argued that *subjective destitution ends in act with the division of the subject*. For what purpose then does Lacan indicate hystorization for the experience of the pass? Why go back over the connection with the coordinates from the beginning of the treatment and the family referents in which the dimension of the symptom is constituted? A possible explanation: what is at stake in the pass is not so much of the order of the *hystorization of pathos*, as of subjective destitution, the condition of the act to which analysis gives access. Another possible explanation would be the inadequacy of the passers. The effect of the status of the question in our ICG was evident, and will be for those who come after us.

Subjective destitution is not a permanent state, but rather a structural condition of the act, after which, the division – existential condition of the subject – returns. Any analyst knows that, and knows what to do with it. Lacan himself said he felt guilty, *reus*, about the symptom, and that is why he had to spend [*passer*] his life passing the pass. The articulation between the two positions, destitution and symptom, would thus not only be

interesting, but also relevant to our conception of the pass, which has the structure of a judgment, not of attribution, but of the existence of the desire of the analyst.

Punta de Este, February 2017.

Translated from Spanish by Ofelia Brozky

PRODUCTIONS FROM THE CARTELS OF THE ICG

Cartel “The no/step of entry

Hysterisation at the entry into analysis

Colette Soler

Currently we speak of the hysterisation of the subject as the condition of entry into analysis, and my question bears in fact on the hysterisation of the hysteric.

The notion of hysterisation at the entry point could lead us to think that the step of entry into analysis is the passage to the discourse of the hysteric. But is that the case? Lacan calls the hysteric subject “the unconscious at work”, and indeed, the barred subject of hysteria is supposed by the formations of the unconscious: dreams, the lapsus, and beyond that, symptoms. Thus we conceive hysteria as predisposed to the transference in which the speaker addresses himself to the other based on the signifier of the symptom, S —>S^a. We also consider that the structure of the transference itself is very close to that of the discourse of the hysteric, to the point that from 1970 onwards, Lacan wrote \$—>S1. This is a different structure from that of the analytic discourse, in which the subject is not in the position to question his other, but is himself submitted to “the question of surplus jouissance”, and thus called upon to produce a response and not to wait for one from the other. It is a significant change of position.

Now, the hysteric, masculine or feminine, wishes to put the other to work – “what do you say to that, Professor?” – the other that she certainly showers with her love, but in order to call upon and question his desire, and especially his desire to know what she, that lover, is. We cannot say that Freud was not unmoved to this.

On this point, Lacan’s thesis at Yale University in November 1975 is radical: it is because some hysterics affected Freud that he invented the rules of the dispositive, he said, as a healthy protection against this soliciting by which he could not but be affected.¹⁵⁵ We know these rules. The first among them, the fundamental one, is free association, which invites the uttering of “stupidities”,¹⁵⁶ namely signifiers, since the signifier is stupid. Thus it encourages the suspension of the aim of interlocution in order that one says just what is in one’s mind, what is formulated in the mind. Not to speak to, or to speak for, but to speak without thinking, to speak for no reason at all, which requires a sort of withdrawal of the ego in its relations to the other. It is this that Lacan calls the analysand’s work and on this point hysteria is rather resistant, above all when the first impulses of transference love start to weaken.

As for Freud, in spite of the rules of the dispositive produced in response to hysterics, one could say that he put interpretation to work, and it is this that Lacan, in the letter to the Italians in 1973, called “his love affairs with truth”. Putting interpretation to work consists in it not only being made the cause of the work of articulation of truth by the analysand a—>\$, but interpretation itself working towards this articulation, which

¹⁵⁵ Lacan, J., *Conférences et entretiens dans des universités nord-américaines*, Yale University, 24 de novembre 1975. *Scilicet* 6/7, Paris, Seuil, 1976.

¹⁵⁶ Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore 1972-1973*. Ed. J-A Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1998, p. 22.

positions the analyst in the place of the S1 in the discourse of the hysteric, $\$ \longrightarrow S1/S2$. This is why Lacan could formulate, without disrespect, that the analytic discourse supposes the fall of the Freudian model. Freud's love affairs with truth place him on the side of the articulable part of truth. But it is through the impossibility of articulating everything, that truth touches the real. When Freud took the measure of this other part, namely that which moved to the side of this 'impossible to say', what he produced is the death drive. This is a way of approaching what goes against the pleasure principle, what we call *jouissance* and of which there are multiple and very varied forms that do not allow us to suppose this single, moreover aporetic term, death drive.

However, it should be noted that hysteresis at the entry is necessary even for the hysteric, and it is not produced without the analytic act, for this entry does a violence to the structure of the hysteric, which is at base almost the same as that of the transference. And contrary to what we think in general, in a certain way it is easier for the obsessional to withdraw from interlocution, for he is so pleased with his intimate thoughts that he has the habit of speaking to himself. However for him too there is a difficulty, for speaking to oneself is generally done in a low voice, and here, he must speak out loud, and when speaking aloud his habit is to let his ego speak and to inflate his narcissism. But even so, to speak for nothing, if I may say that of free association, raises the vector of intentionality which suits him very well, while the hysteric never wants her chatter to be for nothing, in spite of appearances, but rather, always to touch the other.

She got to that point with Freud; let us hope that after Lacan it will happen more often through the analytic act.

Translated from French by Susan Schwartz

Cartel "The knowledge that passes"

*A difficult relation to knowledge*¹⁵⁷

Sol Aparicio

*"Todo pasa y todo queda
pero lo nuestro es pasar
pasar haciendo camino"
Antonio Machado*

"The knowledge that passes" ("*Le savoir qui passe*") is the theme we have given ourselves to work on in the cartel. The initial idea for the title was the simplest possible – to examine what of unconscious knowledge is in play in the course of analysis, what thereof can be elaborated and modified, what *passes*. Thus to examine, let me repeat, what in the testimony of the passand – which the passers are responsible for hearing and transmitting – succeeds in making itself heard by the cartel playing the role of the jury. I am using the expression "making itself heard" as it is the *parlêtre* that is in play along with the saying that speech conveys. But one might very well formulate this in terms of reading by saying that the knowledge that passes is the one that lets itself be read, the one which is made legible.

"It is in what is legible that knowledge consists".¹⁵⁸ After Lacan said it we take it up as something obvious. Experience shows us, however, that this is not self-evident, it reveals how the discourse of the analysand is first and foremost confused, how much time and work is required to make legible the knowledge specific to the subject.

¹⁵⁷ I am taking up here the title given to a short contribution published in the newsletter, *Échos*, n°6

¹⁵⁸ J. Lacan, The Seminar, "*Le moment de conclure*" 1977-1978, Lesson of 10 January 1978

“The knowledge that passes”.

Of course, it was quickly noted that such a statement (*énoncé*) contains equivocation. “The knowledge that passes” is also the one that does not remain, which can be forgotten (*s’oublie*). Besides, this forgetting is exactly what the pass is called upon to counter. In one sense or another this knowledge that passes concerns the pass.

However, that some knowledge can be forgotten, does not remain, passes..., does this mean that it is erased? Not at all. Where could this knowledge have ceased to dwell, if not in consciousness? The unknown knowledge that is the unconscious does not get erased.¹⁵⁹ It remains, it dwells and does not get erased at all since it does not cease to be written, which is why Lacan calls it Real. (Lacan did in fact end by considering that the Real is written, that it does not cease to be written, and that it is thanks to this that it appears.)¹⁶⁰

Having said that in 1972 when talking of “the knowledge of the psychoanalyst” during the “*Entretiens à Sainte-Anne*”, Lacan noted that, “the knowledge in question (in psychoanalysis) does not pass easily”.¹⁶¹ (Our cartel is, naturally, interested in this series of talks that Lacan entitled “the knowledge of the psychoanalyst” and that he conducted that year in parallel with his seminar ...*ou pire*.) He referred then to the fact that the analytic discourse puts psychoanalysis in a difficult position and made clear that he meant to say: “*what is difficult, is the relation of the psychoanalyst with knowledge*”.¹⁶²

What is characteristic of knowledge, he explains, is that it has a consistency of the sort that when one knows something, then one knows that one knows it. But Lacan was talking about the ego in order to emphasize that the novelty of psychoanalysis, the challenge with which it always confronts us, is that of a knowledge irremediably unknown to the ego.

It is this subversion in the function of a knowledge that does not pass, that does not pass into ordinary consciousness. And it is why the new status of knowledge inaugurated by the Freudian discovery entails, necessitates, a new modality of discourse. As for this novelty, which he initially qualified as event, “the Freudian event”, the event of the saying of Freud, it might be that psychoanalysts are still having difficulty integrating it. There is still a long way to go.

In this discourse, the Freudian *Verneinung* occupies a place of utmost importance. Lacan had translated it much earlier when talking about “negation” [*dénégation*]. Subsequently he assimilated it with lying in as much as what the *Verneinung* shows us is that “a false thing has to be said in order to succeed in making a truth pass.”¹⁶³ Yet what is characteristic of consciousness is exactly “supporting this falseness with its consistency”. Consciousness lends itself to falsehood. One needs thus to conclude that it is opposed to the true and situates the true on the side of knowledge which does not know. But which can be said.

We notice here in what sense for us it is no longer about making the unconscious pass into consciousness, as Freud wanted it at first, even if this always constitutes a good part of what is *done* in analysis – and in regard to which Lacan distinguished the analytical task from the analytical act. When all is said and done [*en fin de compte*] it is a matter of “knowing how to do” [*savoir y faire*], knowing how to do with what remains unknown, with the unknown that remains, the real of the unconscious. When all is said and done

¹⁵⁹ Let us not forget what Lacan was keen on recalling at the end of his life: “the unconscious always remains Other”.

¹⁶⁰ J. Lacan, The Seminar, “Le moment de conclure”, 10/01/1978: “*What is the link (lien), if not the site (lieu), of the representation of writing? We have the suggestion that the Real does not cease to be written. It is precisely by writing that forcing is produced. The Real gets written all the same. Because it needs to be said: how would the Real appear, if it didn't get written?*”

¹⁶¹ J. Lacan, “Le savoir du psychanalyste”, Lesson of 4 November 1972.

¹⁶² Ibid., 1 June, 1972.

¹⁶³ Lacan, J., The Seminar “L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile l'amour”, lesson of 15 February, 1977. Unpublished.

analytically [*en fin des comptes*], if I may say, it is this knowing how to do [*savoir y faire*] that certain passands convey in their testimonies.

There exists, we could say, a certain know-how [*savoir-faire*] in this “knowing how to do”. Know-how is that of the analysand, the analysand-subject – even if it should be added that it owes something to the analyst’s know-how. Since, as Lacan has put it, analysis is practiced in a couple, it is done in twos, there is something of the order of the “interloan”¹⁶⁴ [*entreprêt*], a loan of signifiers. This is without a doubt why Lacan was talking of “an analytical know-how” which, as I understand it, is a know-how that we owe to the analytic discourse.¹⁶⁵

Regarding the know-how, Lacan recalled that both the slave and the artist are subjected to serving the One.¹⁶⁶ Picasso formulated this in his own way when he declared: “painting is stronger than I am, it does with me as it pleases.” An artist and a slave at the same time. But it is chiefly the art of Joyce as writer that kept Lacan’s attention; he hailed Joyce’s know-how regarding writing and remarked that poets do not know what they say...

What did Joyce know of his know-how? The question has no other meaning than of noting that there exists a certain knowledge in the know-how. The know-how attests to a knowledge that can be extracted. And this, once again, with the aim of telling of our difficulty in this business of knowledge. If we start with the unconscious, the distinction between knowledge and know-how turns out to be less obvious than it seems. Let us recall here what Lacan put forward at the end of his seminar, *Encore* – a well-known excerpt in our School: “the unconscious is knowledge, a knowing how (*savoir-faire*) to do things with *lalangue*. And what we know how to do with *lalangue* goes well beyond what we can account for under the heading of language.”¹⁶⁷ We are always overtaken by this know-how of the unconscious, overtaken, and reduced to the task, to the attempt to turn it into an “enunciated knowledge”!

And yet...

There does exist a knowledge that grounds the know-how, a knowledge from which the know-how derives. That is, it seems to me, the case regarding the psychoanalyst. (This assumes that we accept the idea of a know-how of *the* psychoanalyst, which should be distinguished from the know-how of a psychoanalyst, that is, a particular manner that each analyst can have of handling the transference with each of their analysands.)

One could firstly say that “the knowledge of the psychoanalyst” comes to them from Freud, from the Freud whom Lacan gave us to read. Let us quote him: “To say it bluntly, the truth that is inscribed in Freud’s statements (*énoncés*) on sexuality, is that there is no sexual relation.”¹⁶⁸ Lacan qualifies the knowledge of the psychoanalyst as knowledge of impotence. It is also a knowledge of the impossible. This knowledge of the lack-of-relation specific to psychoanalytic discourse is incarnated in our own experience of the real that we have to deal with – the symptom. But what does experience teach us in

¹⁶⁴ Cf. J. Lacan, the end of *Television* – “The interpretation must be prompt to in order to meet the terms of the interloan (*l’entreprêt*)”. *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1990, p. 46.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. J. Lacan, *Seminar XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, translated by Russell Grigg, W. W. Norton & Company, 2007, session of 17 December 1969, p. 35: “It’s on (on the side of the psychoanalyst) that there is S2, that there is knowledge – whether he acquires this knowledge through listening to his analysand, or whether it is already acquired, locatable knowledge, which at a certain level can be limited to analytic know-how.”

¹⁶⁶ What is suggested by Lacan’s remark concerning the slaves of Michelangelo, is that the work turns you into a slave and makes you forget just *who* is in charge. See the last session of ...*ou pire*

¹⁶⁷ Lacan J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore 1972-1973*, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1998, p. 139 (translation modified).

¹⁶⁸ J. Lacan, *Compte-rendu du séminaire ...ou pire, Autres écrits*, p. 549.

this respect if it is not that in the face of the jouissance of which the symptom is made, there is nothing but the desire for knowledge that operates? It is there that we find the know-how of the psychoanalyst.

We are always overtaken ... But if the analyst is there, there is desire..., desire period [*tout court*], as it is by definition intransitive, where “everything runs around” (“*tout court*”) and runs its course and its discourse, if I am allowed this easy joke [in English in the original]. Desire runs [*court*] its course and discourses [*discourt*], revived as it is through the unknown....

To conclude.

We know that Lacan proposed the pass because there is the unknown, and because knowledge is also lacking with regard to the passage to the analyst. The pass was a call for offers [*appel d’offres*] in the literal sense. It is crucial to bear this in mind. In the pass, the passand offers the testimony of his experience to the School. He does not make, as it is all too often said, a demand.¹⁶⁹

Translated by Tolek Magdziarz

A knowledge acquired/ for whom? (Le savoir acquis/a qui?) **Jean-Jacques Gorog, Paris, ICG 2014-2016**

Main argument: How can this unknown knowledge [*savoir insu*], said to be unconscious, be modified through being teased out in analysis? Or rather, what changes in an analysis? The subject? And what can we know about this unknown knowledge after the passer has conveyed it? Will we find a trace of the know-how of the analyst there?

I would especially like to submit this latter point for your attention. First of all, how to find a trace of that know-how? The answer lies, as the *dispositif* establishes, in the echo of a treatment, the one that the passers transmit; that is, it lies in what the testimony says about the analyst’s know-how. Here, I would like to use the references that the clinic gives us and that could give us an idea about the clinician’s know-how. A few situations come to mind.

The first of these is the patient’s presentation. One of the things one can learn from that situation – an encounter with patients who have often met a lot of people during their turbulent journey, and among them, some analysts – is this: how have the clinicians who listened to them known what to do with them? The difference between cases is perceptible, in that they either testify or not to a clinician’s know-how with the clinic when confronted with patients. Of course, we cannot speak here of psychoanalysis proper ... although, from Lacan’s point of view, the question of psychoanalysis should be posed here and so it often was, for example when the patient had already been in analysis before his hospitalisation. Secondly, and in the same vein, we find the question of entering a psychoanalysis for the second time with a different analyst. Lacan was sensitive to it, I know because he shared with me, almost apologetically, that a botched analysis could not be recuperated, meaning that he had been unable himself to recuperate it when a patient was not at his best, that is, visibly very unwell. He evoked his failure in this comment, but this does not take away the question of the know-how of the analyst who had preceded him.

¹⁶⁹ It is here we find ourselves with people who feel, as Lacan put it, “rejected” (retoquées). (Cf. J. Lacan, “Geneva Lecture on the Symptom” (1975), in *Analysis* 1, 1989.)

Then there is the situation of supervision for all those young – and not so young – analysts who learn there how to have the courage to adapt their own know-how and to do so in each case. In other words, they learn how to allow themselves to invent their “own” know-how. Without a doubt, this is why Lacan defended the supervisees’ point of view and he always agreed with them.

Lastly, there is the pass. To refer to the passand’s psychoanalysts is in fact essential, whether there were only one or more, and going beyond the child or the adolescent’s narrative of their “childhood neurosis”, because the analytic experience itself is part of this history, whether “history” is written with a ‘y’ or not. We have discussed at length whether or not the analyst’s interventions/interpretations are present in the testimonies. In fact, it happens that they play an important role in the testimony of the treatment, however it can also happen that there is no trace of them. In any case, this cannot be a decisive element: the know-how may, and perhaps must, remain discreet. This is how I understand Lacan’s formula in *Television*: The interpretation must be prompt in order to meet the terms of the interloan [*entreprêt*].¹⁷⁰

A bit of logic now: If the formula “I don’t make you say it” [*Je ne vous le fais pas dire*] is the one Lacan proposes in relation to interpretation, then it becomes legitimate to think that the analysand, who had grasped something of what he had enunciated without knowing it and in the moment he discovered it, did not attribute it to the analyst but to himself, as his own production.

This formula is explicitly composed of an equivocity between two parts that are eminently dissymmetrical: 1. The one that concerns the unknown knowledge of the unconscious – the “you have said it” [*tu l’as dit*] – that refers directly to the formations of the unconscious. 2. However, there is something else, the other side, that of the equivocity, which is specific to the definition of interpretation that Lacan underlines:

“I even take responsibility for it as, likewise, I have not made anyone make you say it.”¹⁷¹

This second part concerns the psychoanalyst, the one who intervenes, and one knows about this difficulty, which we always find present in the clinic, whatever the psychoanalyst has effectively said (“my psychoanalyst said ...”). It returns in the form of a saying that we know must be subject to caution because one recognises in it the analysand’s refusal of his own speech. To sum up: the assertion, “I don’t make you say it” marks the dimension where the interpretation is interpretation of transference in the sense that it is a matter of reducing it, of reducing its imaginary lure. Yet, the psychoanalyst’s know-how is precisely required at that point, as Lacan shows when he evokes the “handling” of transference.

If we take into consideration the double entry required in any analyst’s speech, in attempting to situate it in relation to the four discourses that regulate the social links, we will have to re-examine the function of knowledge in each one, though this is not without some difficulty. The first one concerns the status of knowledge in the discourse of the unconscious. One knows that this discourse replicates identically the Master’s Discourse. However, in the latter, it is clear that the slave’s knowledge is not an unknown knowledge, it is a know-how.

S1	--->	S2
-----		-----
§		a

¹⁷⁰ Lacan, J., *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, A. Michelson, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1990, p. 46.

¹⁷¹ Cf. Lacan, J. ”. *L’Etourdit, Autres Ecrits*, p. 492: “*Je le prends d’autant moins à ma charge que, chose pareille, je ne te l’ai par quiconque fait dire*”.

See translation by Jack Stone et al., www.lutecium.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/letourdit_uk.pdf

Master Slave

This knowledge is certainly unknown, however only on the master's side, for the master does not want to know anything about the slave's knowledge. The slave works for his master and he knows what he has to do. Then, what becomes of the status of knowledge in the discourse of the unconscious? One could think that this is the same unknown knowledge as that of the formations of the unconscious, but it seems to me that knowledge cannot be both an element of discourse and, at the same time, discourse itself. Is the discourse of the unconscious any different to the unconscious knowledge itself? It came to my mind too, following Lacan's insistence on describing the unconscious as the worker,³ that what is written S2 in this discourse could also pertain, paradoxically, to the know-how.

This question appears to be simpler in the other discourses. In the University Discourse, knowledge, S2, is a knowledge that is already deposited; it fills the library shelves and it is available. It is neither know-how nor unknown.

S2	<i>a</i>	
-----	-----	University Discourse
S1	§	
§	S1	
-----	-----	Hysteric's Discourse
<i>a</i>	S2	

As for knowledge in the Hysteric's Discourse, it is a knowledge *in progress* [in English in the text], a knowledge to be produced. It has to do with the quest for the master's knowledge, certainly unknown to the master, a knowledge he must fabricate in order to satisfy the hysteric's demand. This is why, for Lacan, it is close to the scientific discourse, except that the scientist does not have anybody to question him and force him to fabricate a new knowledge (this comes, as a rule, because the question always comes from the Other).

Finally, we have the analytic discourse:

<i>a</i>	§	
-----	-----	Analytic Discourse
S2	S1	
Analyst	Analysand	

In it, the S2 takes the value of unconscious knowledge, of unknown knowledge. It is what comes into the place of truth without the analysand knowing it in advance, as his speech addressed to the analyst gradually unfolds, with the condition that the analyst cuts through it with his interpretation in the sense given above. This should only surprise us a little because, for Lacan, the deciphering of the unconscious is only possible in the treatment, in both its dimensions: formations of the unconscious and transference. Here Lacan distances himself from Freud, for whom it was sufficient to recognize the existence of the unconscious. It wasn't until Ferenczi that the idea of the analyst being in treatment himself became essential. The test of transference, conceived for its whole duration, is thus necessary.

This trajectory remains to be developed because, obviously, one should be able to see what happens to each term according to its position. However, it shows that the equivocity in question in interpretation comprises in effect the order S1//S2 of the analytic discourse through which the unknown knowledge of the unconscious emerges. Something

else that is both central and distinct also emerges: the supposed knowledge attributed to the analyst in the register of what is called the transference – the other side of equivocity – pertains to another mode of knowledge. All of the analyst's know-how will be required here in order to reduce it.

One can dispute that what I am putting forward here concerns a moment that does not imply the end, or the passage to the analyst. However this kind of moment is of particular interest to us because it can be the sign of a shift [*bascule*].

What do we gain from these specificities about the forms of knowledge *a propos* of the pass? To make a distinction between the two modalities of knowledge described here and enunciated in the equivocity of interpretation requires – at least it seems to me – an evaluation of their presence in the testimonies of the pass, even when they appear in a more or less masked way.

Therefore, for example, changing analysts implies indeed some de-supposition of knowledge. However, as the continuation of analysis with another analyst shows, it does not necessarily constitute the de-supposition that occurs at the end. However, it can do so in the form of criticism of a comment made by the previous analyst that the analysand did not recognize as his own speech, or that the psychoanalyst speaks about himself. By the way, it is surprising that sometimes, the passers do not think of questioning further the change [*passage*] from one analyst to another.

Translated from the French by Chantal Degril

The know-how of the analyst and the question of touch

Maria Luisa de la Oliva

Just as Menon asked Socrates whether virtue could be taught, we can ask ourselves if being a psychoanalyst is something that can be taught, and hence, if it can be learned. We can respond that to be a psychoanalyst does not pertain to the order of mastery. There are neither masters nor pupils, and what is transmitted is not knowledge, but the desire to know. What is taught does not depend on accumulated knowledge, but on the manner in which this knowledge has been grasped, knotted, incorporated by those who transmit a teaching; that is, what is knotted to their own experience of analysis

The question that Lacan posed very early on concerns the place the analyst must occupy, and what its conditions are. Throughout his teaching he will bring limits to that thing that is difficult to grasp, the desire of the analyst. In the seminar, *The Transference*, this place is in relation to a certain operation that implies the order of the void.

In the lectures that Lacan gave at Saint Anne in 1971 on the knowledge of the psychoanalyst, ten years after the seminar on transference, he posits that “the question of the knowledge of the psychoanalyst is not in any way about knowledge, whether that is articulated or not, but about knowing what place he must occupy in order to sustain it”.¹⁷² It is one thing to know the place he must occupy, but this knowledge [*savoir*] relative to the place he must occupy is quite another thing, since the discourse of the analyst is not of the order of knowledge [*connaissance*], since knowledge [*connaissance*] has no relation to the object *a*. What is important once again for Lacan is that it is necessary to occupy a determined place in order that this knowledge can be sustained.

In the “Italian Note” (1974), he affirms that if analysis is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient. He deduces from this that not everyone will know how to be an analyst. “*The analyst arises from the not-all*” [*pas-tout*], and for that to be the case, it is necessary to take the real into account as that which results from our experience of knowledge.

¹⁷² Lacan, J, The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst, lesson of November 4, 1971.

The real that interests psychoanalysis is sexual. If the analyst can circumscribe the cause of his horror of knowledge, horror when faced with the existence of this real, then “*he will know how to be refuse [déchet]*”. That is to say, he will be able to occupy the position of what is presented for the subject as the cause of desire.

We call that which cannot be caught “*a*”; it is what occupies the place of semblance in the discourse of the analyst and is the result of the operation produced in his own analysis. It is what is written in the lower part of the matheme of the analyst’s discourse. There, knowledge occupies the place of truth; knowledge of the analyst, one could say, and which is made from the effects of the observation – through the turns in the analysis – that there is an abyss between S1 and S2. This abyss will be the One that insists, and which ensures, as a consequence, that the truth can only be half said. Thus one could say that there is a knot essential to the desire of the analyst. It is specifically a real that can sustain the discourse.

It is worthwhile emphasising the difference between know-how [*savoir-faire*] and ‘knowing how to do’ [*savoir y faire*]. Know-how is practical knowledge about any activity. It is an essential element of an art or craft, but one that does not appear in a book of instructions. It aims at the experience but not only that, for it includes a certain touch, a knowledge of how to go about it which adds something to the experience. On the other hand, the ‘knowing how to do’ makes reference to the capacity to handle something, of knowing how to manage something, knowing how to sort things out.

One could say that the analyst’s know-how is articulated, in part, with the analyst’s knowledge. It has been considered previously that the analyst is a product contingent on the analytic operation, and this does not always happen. The knowledge that is extracted from the analytic experience is that of the unconscious taken to the limit of non-sense, of the unknown that enjoys. This is a knowledge that is no longer supposed, a knowledge without a subject, and which also involves knowing how that is mixed up in the symptoms, and a certain knowing how to do with this. Is the product of an act that is not of the order of either knowledge [*connaissance*] or information – the ideals of our time – teachable? The pass proves to us that there is something of that which is passed, but which also teaches us.

On what does the “touch”, which is not something that can be attributed to knowledge [*connaissance*] but which is implicit in the analyst’s know-how depend? We could say that in that know-how there is a trait extracted from his experience as analysand. The treatment can lead to a knowing how to do: a know-how with the symptom which goes together with the turnings that must be made in an analysis in order to locate the dark areas, impossible to know, that are the territory of the real. I would dare to say that the psychoanalyst’s knowledge is an effect of the knowledge of his own analysis about the not-known [*non su*], which might allow analytic know-how, and to operate within this quality, since his own analysis has led him to something of the order of waste [*déchet*], an emptying out of essential jouissance in order to offer this vacant place to another analysand, as Lacan presents it in his seminar on transference. But although the necessary conditions for an ability to operate are given, I think that something else needs to be added to the know-how. It concerns “*touch*”. Could one call it a style? It is here that I put forward the hypothesis that one’s style unfolds from one’s knowing how to do, from identification with one’s symptom. It is that which can give one something extra, a certain “*savoir*”, a word made from “*savoir*” [flavour] and “*savoir*” [knowledge], a certain flavour and knowledge, a certain taste, which enables the direction of treatments with a personal touch, a nuance. It is there in the making of the dish, but it is not in the recipe. Thus I propose a plaiting between the analyst’s knowledge, the analyst’s know-how and the knowing how to do with his symptom. The latter is what would give the particular touch to his know-how as analyst, the consequence being that there is no mould for analysts. One is not the same as another.

The knowing how to do that artists teach about is what for them is “instrumental”. *Instrumental* is the title of a book by James Rhodes in which he gives testimony to how, through music, he was able to construct a knot that allowed him to live instead of committing suicide.

This knowing how to do is on the side of the analysand as it is on the side of the analyst, in that they are both speaking beings and thus submitted to the same impossible: the lack of sexual knowledge. Both are faced with the advents [*avènements*] of the real. The difference is the result of the fact that the analyst is supposed to be aware of the existence of such a real, and to have reached a point of knowing how he became muddled up with his symptoms, and how he disentangled himself, having found that he suffered less if he came to an arrangement with this impossible, for which he had to let go his horror of knowledge in his analysis and include it as a part of the constitution of his symptomatic knot, not allowing himself to be lured by what veils it. This allows him to follow the path of the analysand in his manner of being knotted in the course of the treatment. In the seminar “*L’insu*”, Lacan specifies that the pass consists in recognising the passand’s Borromean knot.¹⁷³

It is not a matter of knowing the real since that is inaccessible, but of taking it into account in so far as it exists. The real exists and jouissance exists. It is of the order of the One that insists, of what does not cease existing until death. The real is irremovable and analysis does not modify it because it is of the order of existence. But analysis can produce mutations in one’s position in the face of the real. That is the wager.

The real is “without remedy”, as Camila Vidal says. I like the expression “without remedy” since it implies that there is neither cure, nor correction, nor help. There is only a warning. One is alert to being faced with the real and that, if one borrows Gilles Lipovetsky’s thesis in his last essay, produces an effect of “lightness” [*légèreté*].¹⁷⁴

In the “Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst”, Lacan defines psychoanalysis as “the locating of something composed of darkness, of something obscured in understanding, from the fact that a signifier has marked a point in the body”.¹⁷⁵ Psychoanalysis is thus an area between light and shade. Thus, if in the pass testimony is given to what happened in an analysis this will also be under subdued light, like the words of the tango (*média luz*).

If the real is “the mystery of the speaking body”, of the body “parasitised by the signifier”, if we can only deal with it in obscurity,¹⁷⁶ Lacan’s question is how to recognise what the Borromean knot is in the darkness, since he affirms that the pass is precisely a matter of that. How to deduce, to extract the saying, for it is not the same thing as what is said? In his book *The Remnants of Auschwitz*, Agamben speaks of the “lacuna” that is included in the testimonies of those who were in the camps. They testify to something that cannot be testified to. For Agamben, commenting on these testimonies includes trying to listen for this lacuna, that is to say, “trying to listen for the not-said”. For Semprún, that would imply that this testimony was given well.

Translated from French by Susan Schwartz

¹⁷³ Lacan, J., Le Séminaire “L’insu”, lesson of February 15, 1977. Unpublished.

¹⁷⁴ Lipovetsky, Gilles. *De la ligereza*. Ed. Anagrama

¹⁷⁵ Lacan, J., “*Le savoir du psychanalyste*”, lesson of May 4, 1972.

¹⁷⁶ Lacan, J., Le Séminaire “L’insu”, February 15, 1977.

Reading a map is not the same as knowing how to find one's way, Marie-José Latour

If know-how is this knack that cannot be written in the recipe, isn't it, at the same time, the index of the limit of readable knowledge and the promise of a discovery?

After having worked for two years on the ICG, both in the cartels of the pass and in the permanent cartel which has brought us together for the last time today (less one, since Ricardo Rojas, our Columbian colleague from Medellin, has not been able to join us this time), I made the wager of finding a way to circumscribe this aporia based on what a child knew how to pass on to me, and that I believed I could infer from his saying, as is suggested in the title of my presentation.

1.

Thésée suffers from a significant aphasia that, nevertheless, has not prevented him from learning to read. His teacher in the first year of primary school knew enough to suggest to his mother that she come with him into my consulting room, for this knowing how to read did not allow him to envisage separation from his mother without being seized by a terrible anxiety. Standing behind the armchair where he could have been sitting, keeping an eye on the door behind which he agreed to leave his mother waiting for us, and in the inarticulate breath with which he addresses me, I make out that he is saying that he is afraid to be there.

Roman Jakobson – the linguist and poetologue, who was in the audience at Lacan's seminar, and whom the latter recognised as someone who did not speak stupidly about language – established the importance of the distinctive function of sounds and of the consequences of its loss. In his work *Child Language, Aphasia and Phonological Universals*, he repeats that it is not isolated sounds that are important, but the distinctions between them, and above all the relation of each sound to all the others in the system. The nominative is the grammatical form that best survives in sufferers of aphasia. Indeed, the fact that I refer to both the surname and first name of his teacher and that I am interested in the names of those who make up his entourage produces a first effect that makes it possible for him to approach the table where he can draw.

Really, he paints more than he draws, the thickening line becoming the image of his increasing difficulty with elocution. It is difficult for me to grasp what he says, but I can hear that he addresses his speech to me. Where to find the tool that would allow the distinction, the separation? I note his dedication to representing, and his effort in attempting to find a way of effectively rendering the distinction. In conformity with the writing of the Saussurian sign, at the back of each drawing, he writes its title: "sea", "camping", "merry-go-round", "street sign" [*panneau*]. Needless to say, this exercise in denomination is not propitious for narration. Thésée does not tell stories but one could say that he makes me a witness to his difficulties with the use of speech.

A few sessions later, he writes on the back of a drawing: "For Jason", his brother. Believing that this could be a warning that that could indicate an attempt to annul the function of the cut between the sessions and the world, I tell him that the drawings that he does here are not drawings that he can take with him, without that raising a question. He does not give me the time to say more, and with a wide smile, and an unexpected confidence he says to me "I agree, I will leave it here, but I can write 'For Jason'". Terrific! Thésée grasped, with a rare economy, the anxiolytic effect of the representation of the universality of knowledge. Leaving his mother is no longer a problem and from that point he pursues his schooling without major mishap in what is conventionally called his learning.

2.

However, reading a map is not the same as knowing how to find one's way. If it is the signifier that distinguishes and separates, the signifier is also the cause of jouissance. Thésée certainly does not contradict Lacan when he writes in the "Direction of the Treatment" that, "it is not necessary to know the floor plan of a house to bang one's head against its walls; indeed, one can do so very well without it".¹⁷⁷ Can't we read here one of the first occurrences of know-how [*savoir-faire*]? Everyone has certainly had the experience; it is not enough just to know something to be able to do it. As Georg Perec wrote, "living is to pass from one space to another, trying one's best not to bang into something".¹⁷⁸ Thésée is going to draw for us his version of the species of space. Now aged eight and a half, he draws quickly and without a pause, so not without jouissance, the route he takes to get to my office.



Drawing 1

The road signs blend with the area that is signed. Not much room to go forward, little to rest. A little stupidly perhaps – since where would they put their feet? – I am surprised by the absence of people. Thésée replies: "They haven't arrived yet". A lesson for my impatience! Thésée reminds me of the necessarily unprecedented experience of speech and articulation of knowledge with its equally necessary suspension.

Once more, it is not so much the scenario that counts as the inventory of these signs, each with its own signification, types of Ones, as readable as each letter of the alphabet. There is a gap between the Ones of language [*langage*] and knowledge. Contrary to what the discourse of the master would have us believe, and what the discourse of the hysteric dreams of, something is not enchained between S1 and S2. Indeed we can see the path that remains to be travelled, the orientation required for reading.

Going back to my task, I am pleased to observe at what point the route is seen to be impracticable and what is involved in finding a way. We know how Lacan insists that one thinks with one's feet. (Colette Soler has given weight to this apparently minor remark in her commentary on the "Italian Note".) Thésée reminds me in a way that opening the path in this uncomfortable world is not so much a matter of lucubration. Does he not give all his energy to what could be a thought that works?

From session to session, and drawing to drawing, he circumscribes the area at work, the sign [*panneau*] then acquiring the function of an edge.

¹⁷⁷ Lacan, J., "The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power" (1958) in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006, p. 508.

¹⁷⁸ Perec, G., *Species of Spaces and other Pieces*. Penguin Classics, 2008.



Drawing 2

From his first seminar, Lacan repositioned the function of the analyst in relation to knowledge when he said that it was not a matter of guiding the subject with regard to knowledge, but rather about the ways of accessing this knowledge.¹⁷⁹ Would the analyst become something like the depopulator in order to allow a subtraction that would have the function of circumscribing the hole in language? In the labyrinth with which Thésée is confronted, a path is drawn around the hole. And, in doing so, the playground becomes a place that Thésée can frequent.



Drawing 3

3.
A loyal reader of *art press*, I was surprised, when a few days after a session with Thésée, I discovered inside one issue the photograph of an installation by Annette Messager, *The prohibitions*:¹⁸⁰



Drawing 4

¹⁷⁹ Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I, Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-1954*, trans. J. Forrester, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

¹⁸⁰ Annette Messager, *Exposition Dessus dessous*, Musée des Beaux-arts, Cité de la dentelle et de la Mode, Calais, du 17 octobre 2015 au 15 mai 2016.

It is not a matter of deducing from this contingency anything about Thésée, but of taking a lesson from it in order to situate the know-how with regard to the analytic experience, the first function of which is to make a question out of knowledge: “is it of them-two that it speaks?” [*est-ce d’eux que ça parle?*].¹⁸¹ The Scientific Committee’s preparatory work for these Study Days, along with each of the presentations, has allowed the making of an inventory of the different occurrences of this statement. In one of the last, in 1977, Lacan turns to the child’s speech to clarify the subtlety of what is at stake in these distinctions between knowledge, knowing how to do [*savoir y faire*] and know-how [*savoir faire*].

He invites us to “hollow out the evidence” [*évider l’évidence*]¹⁸² of these “I know” that mean nothing, but which punctuate so many of our propositions, then returns, “evidently” [*évidement*], to a child’s speech. What left him taken aback some seventy years earlier was what he heard from his little sister, Madeleine, who affirmed unblinkingly, not “I know” but “Manène knows”. If know-how is the principal that allows us to knot the real that does not speak, with the symbolic that in speaking always lies, and with the imaginary that is always wrong, this know-how could not be a matter the “ego” [*moi*]. What is most important here is not what it is that Manène knows but that “she” knows.

The French language is one that allows homophonic questions: “*qui sait qui c’est*” [who knows who it is?] and “*qui c’est qui sait*” [who is it that knows?]. That “One knows”,¹⁸³ is what makes the transmission of know-how difficult because it is not a signifier, even if to make it known is what the pass proposes to do. How redoubtable is that aporia that drives the cartel to seek what it does not know [*ce qu’il ignore*].

Following the same lesson of the seminar, *L’insu*, Lacan envisages the pass as “something that means nothing other than ‘*se reconnaître entre soir*’” [‘to be recognized between evening’].¹⁸⁴ And no, this is not a typo or a lapsus! It is difficult to read in this recognition “*entre soir*” any capacity for authorization! An enigmatic formulation, but one that attracts our attention to a possible error in perspective, that of a false “*s(av)oir*” forming an impasse on the paradox of recognizing what one does not know [*connaît*]. The “*se*” of “*se reconnaître entre soir*” does not owe much to the ego or to imaginary visibility. Lacan’s talent, a know-how in using language in an unusual way, should not, even so, lead us to model what cannot be. With such a formula, we are safe, it seems to me.

If in seminar *Encore*, Lacan clarifies what there is of a know-how with *lalangue* in the unconscious, it is in the seminar *The sinthome*, which he returns several times to the know-how of the artist. We know the importance of this seminar for what Colette Soler has called “a reinvented psychoanalysis”.

Up until the first lesson of *The Sinthome*,¹⁸⁵ what we used to read as knowledge in the writing of the discourses, S index 2, becomes the index of the division introduced into the subject. S2 writes the divided character of the symbol, the cipher of the piece broken in two that served as sign of recognition to the bearers of each of the halves.

¹⁸¹ Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore 1972-1973*, trans. B. Fink, New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1998, p.138.

¹⁸² Lacan, J., *Le séminaire livre XXIV, L’insu-que-sait-de-l’une-bévue-s’aile-à-mourre*, leçon du 15 février 1977, inédit.

¹⁸³ Lacan, J., “The Preface to the English-Language Edition” in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981, p. vii.

¹⁸⁴ Translator’s note: “*entre soir*” sounds similar to “*entre soi*”; “*se reconnaître entre soi*” would mean “we recognize one another”.

¹⁸⁵ Lacan, J., *The Seminar Book XXIII, The Sinthome*, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016, p. 10. *Le séminaire livre XXIII, Le sinthome*, Paris, Seuil, 2005, pp. 18-19

That language is this “unique system composed of elements that are signifiers and devoid of signification at the same time”,¹⁸⁶ isn't it this that makes possible the dividing of the symbolic register into symbol and symptom? For Lacan, this dividing characterizes Joyce's know-how, joining together the “doing” [*faire*] of the symptom with the knowing [*savoir*] of the symbol.

Doesn't “know-how”, even the phrase itself, hyphen included, make this division perceptible in some way? Will we not remember that the “doing” [*faire*] is, first of all, a poem?

Translated from French by Susan Schwartz

¹⁸⁶ Roman Jakobson, *Six leçons sur le son et le sens*, Paris, Minuit, 1976, p 78.

FUTURE EVENTS

Interamerican Symposium of the IF

“Sexuation and Identities”

Rio de Janeiro, September 7-10, 2017

Theme

In the Symposium "Sexuation and Identities," psychoanalysts will be able to demonstrate how psychoanalysis, far from being normative - according to some unjustified accusations - gives all relevance to the uniqueness of sexualities. Psychoanalysis brings the questioning of sexual identities. Sexuality is the complex conjunction of "sexual dispositions" (Freud), of random encounters, of identifications, and of the construction of the fundamental fantasy as a response to the enigma of the Other's desire. The result is the *sinthome* that, by tying the three registers (Real, Symbolic and Imaginary) of each being-to-the-sex, condenses the way each one enjoys sexually from his unconscious. Each subject has its unique form of being a man or woman, of using the semblants of gender, of being situated in relation to the division of the sexes and circulating in the diverse positions of *jouissance*. This is what we learn on the couch from the practice of the unconscious. The politics of psychoanalysis is the politics of the symptom – sustained by the ethics of well-saying it. Starting from Lacanian sexuation and the rereading of sexuality inaugurated by Freud at the beginning of last century, we invite analysts to bring their contributions, with their clinic and this new logic, to the current questions of the new sexualities and questions about gender and sexual orientation.

Event

September 7	9h-17h – Study Day of the School 17h - Assembly of the SPFLF-Brazil (1 st call at 17h et 2 nd at 17h30)
September 8	9h-18h Interamerican Symposium and Encounter of the SPFLF-Brazil
September 9	9h-18h Interamerican Symposium and Encounter of the SPFLF-Brazil
September 10	9h-18h Interamerican Symposium and Encounter of the SPFLF-Brazil

Information

Date : from September 7-10, 2017

Place : BRAZILIAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS DES CHIRURGIENS

Visconde da Silva 52 Street – Botafogo / Rio de Janeiro

Contact : <http://www.simposiosexuacao.com.br>

E-mail : sexuacaoeidentidadesrio2017@gmail.com, Telephone: +55 (21) 2286 9225

Registrations

Payment :

	Professionals	Students
<i>Before April 15, 2017</i>	R\$ 380	R\$190
From April 16 to June 30 2017	R\$ 420	R\$ 210
From July 1 to August 31 2017	R\$ 460	R\$ 230
At the Symposium	R\$ 500	R\$ 250

Forms of payment :

Bank transfer in the name of Formações Clínicas do Campo Lacaniano-RJ
Banco Itaú Ag.: 5622C/C:18237-5 CNPJ. 03.137.219.0001-25
Send proof of transfer by email to: sexuacaoeidentidadesrio2017@gmail.com

Important: Early registrations at \$100 dollars will close on January 30.

COMMITTEES

General Coordination: Antonio Quinet

Organising Committee : Maria Anita Carneiro Ribeiro (coordinator), Andrea Bruneto, Bárbara Zenicola, Beatriz Maya, Florencia Farias, Gloria Patricia Jaramillo, Julie Travassos, Katarina Ponciano, Katia Botelho, Luciana Piza, Maria Helena Martinho, Mariano Daquino, Rosane Melo, Robson Melo et Sandra Mara.

Scientific Committee: Sonia Alberti (coordinator), Ana Laura Prates Pacheco, Dominique Fingermann, Gabriel Lombardi, Gabriela Zorzuth, Ida Freitas, Kátia Botelho, Maria Vitória Bittencourt, Ricardo Rojas et Vera Pollo.

Committee for the Study Day of the School: Clara Mesa, Marcelo Mazzuca, Sandra Berta avec les membres de la CLGAL.

Committee for distribution: Local: Leonardo Pimentel (coordinator), Elvina Maciel, Felipe Grillo, Marcela Laboissière et Taoana Padilha. For Brazil: Coordinators of local forums. For the Americas: Coordinators of the forums of North and South America.

Committee for posters and videos: Sonia Borges (coordinator), Geisa Freitas, Felipe Grillo et Sandra Chiabi.

Social Committee: Adriana Dias Bastos (coordinatrice), Gilda Mesquita, Silvia Lira et Tati Torres.

Treasurers : Gloria Justo et Luciana Piza.

International Rendezvous of the IF-SPFLF “The Advents [*Avènements*] of the Real and the Psychoanalyst” Barcelona, September 2018

Twenty years have passed since the creation of the International Forums of the Lacanian Field following the initiative taken by some of us in July 1998. This creation constituted a new path, a path in accordance with the one Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan opened up, a path that emerged as a movement of counter-experience, with the aim of creating a School of Psychoanalysis. That School was effectively born in 2001.

Twenty years later, we – the founders and many others – will meet again in Barcelona on the occasion of the Xth International Rendezvous of the IF-SPFLF and the VIth International Encounter of the School. We have some essential elements at our disposal: the impetus of the desire of the International Community, the compromise between the Forum of Barcelona and the other Spanish forums in order that the organisation could proceed smoothly and, the title of the Rendezvous which will serve as an axis for structuring the work of that Community in the meantime.

“The Advents of the Real and the Psychoanalyst”: this is an enigmatic title because of the semantics of the term “advent”, the use of the plural to express the plurality of the elements that can be real, and also the plurality of the meanings of the term, from “what comes back to the same place” and constitutes an obstacle to well-being, to the real of what can overflow. It is enigmatic also because of the complex relationship between the two terms and the dependence of the second one upon the first. But there is not only that...

If, as Lacan affirmed in “La Troisième”, the future of the analyst depends upon what of the real happens [*advient*] (and not the other way around), what consequences do these advents have on the social links and in particular on the analytic discourse, the one that binds the analysand to the couple analyst-analysand?

Therefore, it is a title that makes us question, that keeps us awake and that will put us to work.

There does not exist any advent of the real that will not cut the illusory and wished for experience of continuity in the speaking-being, whether that be the trauma of the Other as constitutive, or the real of the jouissance of the body, or the accident or, again, the progress of science.

This is to say that every advent of the real implies an effect, an immediate effect that is affect – anxiety – and also other effects, albeit more silent, that remain incalculable. They spread through the social sphere and, as we can see, they do not cease to produce new forms of segregation. It is not up to the psychoanalyst to reduce the advents of the real, but the psychoanalyst can respond. He can, as Lacan says, counter the real.

Rosa Escapa and Ramon Miralpeix,
Presidents of the Organising Committee.

Translated from the French by Chantal Degril

GENERAL INFORMATION

PLACE: The Rendezvous will take place at the CCIB¹⁸⁷ (Centre de Convencions Internacional Barcelona)

¹⁸⁷ Vous pouvez visiter le lieu dans <http://www.ccib.es>

DATES: du 13 au 16 September 2018

REGISTRATION:

Payment	2 days	3 days
<i>Before April 30, 2017</i>	200 €	240 €
<i>Before April 30, 2018</i>	240 €	290 €
<i>Until September 13, 2018</i>	290 €	330 €

Organising Committee

Presidents: Rosa Escapa and Ramon Miralpeix

Jacqueline Ariztia

Jorge Chapuís

Carmen Dueñas

Ana Martínez

José Sánchez

Teresa Trías

Contact

miralpeix@copc.cat et rosaescapa@gmail.com